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ABSTRACT 
 
Across six Chapters, this thesis examines the legal effects of mergers and acquisitions 
(M&As) on the employees, Board of Directors and shareholders of companies with the 
objective of gaining in-depth understanding of this area. The thesis then develops legal 
and practical solutions for the problems and negative effects associated with M&As, 
specifically regarding employees, Boards of Directors and shareholder companies 
involved in such operations. This research determines to answer the following question: 
How do mergers and acquisitions (M&As) affect employees, management and 
shareholders rights and obligations? And what the legal basis for transferring their 
rights and liabilities between companies involved in M&As? 
 
Despite the importance of M&As as a means of economic concentration and 
emergence in terms of major commercial or industrial projects, the laws of both the 
UAE and Qatar do not sufficiently address the issue of mergers or their goals and 
conditions. They also fail to regulate acquisitions or to otherwise specify when 
acquisitions become necessary for companies. Furthermore, the laws do not specify the 
rights of workers regarding their knowledge of or participation in M&As or developed 
adequate solutions for the negative impacts on companies workers in such processes. 
These laws do not provide the right for the Board of Directors of the transferor company 
to merge with the Board of Directors of the transferee company. Additionally, they also 
unsuccessfully address the minority shareholders right (those not interested in the 
merger) to exit the merged company and recover the value of their shares. Moreover, 
the UAE and Qatar have not developed appropriate solutions for the exchange of shares 
between companies involved in mergers in the case of dissimilarity between the actual 
values of the shares of both companies. This has notably led to jurisprudence and 
judiciary confusion between the concept of M&As, their legal nature and the legal basis 
or theory for the transfer of the rights and liabilities of employees, management and 
shareholders between companies involved in M&A operations. 
 
In accordance with legal texts, the above discussion, M&A legal theory and the 
theory of the agency contract between a company and its Board of Directors, the thesis 
argues that M&As should not lead to cutting labour contracts or negatively affect 
employee rights as long as corporate ventures remain in place and M&A operations do 
not lead to the liquidation of merged or acquired companies. Also, the thesis shows that 
a company is linked with its Board of Directors through a special form of agency 
contract, which justifies the transfer of the rights of the Board of Directors of the 
merged company with regards to the merging or new company management. The thesis 
also develops solutions and processes for the exchange of shares between merged 
companies when there are differences between the actual values of their shares, through 
the shareholders of the merged company buying shares from the merging company or 
by selling their shares to the merging company and recovering the value of their shares 
in cash. The study also recommends taking a set of procedural measures during M&As, 
modifying some of the relevant legal texts of the UAE and Qatar, which would mitigate 
the negative effects of mergers and acquisitions. Furthermore, this research suggests 
ways to improve such laws to reach the level of those of developed countries, in order to 
encourage mergers and acquisitions in the region. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The modern economy is distinguished by the phenomena of centralisation of the 
economic forces and the transformation of economic units from small to large units, as 
large business projects in this era have become the effective drive for achieving economic 
progress and advancement. Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) are used as the most 
significant means for achieving economic centralisation and the emergence and 
acquisition of large projects.
1
  
 
For this reason, during the last two decades, in Qatar
2
 and the UAE,
3
 mergers and 
acquisitions (M&As) between companies have witnessed significant growth and have 
reached unprecedented record levels. The key factors for this are attributed to a prevailing 
orientation towards globalisation and the low cost of funding and avoiding bankruptcy, 
which happens from time to time in some companies. 
 
M&As are, nowadays, frequent events in the lifecycles of companies. The reason 
for this is the current financial crisis, which has led to weakening global demand and 
depressing commodity prices. Perhaps the primary reason for the increase in M&As in 
the past ten years is due to the increase in the profitability of the resultant entity through 
taking advantage of the ‘synergy effect’ by becoming more competitive, economic 
                                                 
1
 There are several other means to achieve economic centralisation, such as: holding companies, joint 
ventures, trusts and cartels. However, the merger could be the most significant and most prevailing of such 
means because of its advantages. The merger, with its two types (amalgamation or combination), is 
considered to be the way to achieve the highest grade of centralisation. This is because the merged 
companies not only lose their economic independence but they also lose their legal entities and their 
incorporated capacities are terminated forever. Consequently, all such companies are dissolved and melted 
into one company, which is a merging or new company, and the merged companies will not have any 
existence after the merger.  
2
 The State of Qatar is an Arab country situated in the Arab Gulf Cooperation Council State, which has 
transformed itself from a poor British protectorate, noted mainly for pearling, into an independent state 
with significant oil and natural gas revenues. Oil and natural gas revenues enable Qatar to have a per capita 
income not far below the leading industrial countries of the world. 
3
 The UAE is located in the heart of the Arabian Gulf bordered by the Gulf to the north and north-west, the 
state of Qatar and Saudi Arabia to the west, the Sultanate of Oman and Saudi Arabia to the south and the 
Sultanate of Oman and the Gulf to the east. The sovereign state of the United Arab Emirates came into 
existence on 2nd December, 1971. It has a federal structure and comprises seven Emirates namely Abu 
Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ras Al Khaimah, Fujairah, Ajman and Umm Al Quwain. Abu Dhabi, which is the 
capital of the UAE, is the largest and richest of the federal units. It is also the biggest producer of oil and 
the major contributor to the federal budget. 
2 
 
conditions and the difficulties facing small and medium-sized businesses, thus limiting 
their ability to work and grow. Furthermore, technological development has actively 
contributed to the evolution of this phenomenon and the spread of M&As among 
commercial companies across the UK, the UAE and the State of Qatar. 
 
Take the current example in the UK: company’s activities have reached a record 
high over the last few years in terms of the values of mergers and acquisitions. An 
analysis of international M&A activity by KPMG showed that UK companies made 232 
acquisitions of international companies in 2010. This marked a big shift in the M&A 
market that year.
4
 
 
In the UAE and Qatar region, the case is not much different; due to the global 
financial crisis that has been witnessed in recent years and the decline in oil prices to 
levels not seen since early 2007, some companies in the UAE and Qatar have been 
affected, like most companies worldwide. Despite this influence, due to the huge oil 
discoveries and respective geographic locations of the State of Qatar and the UAE, the 
effects of the global financial crisis have not reached most of the companies in both 
countries; the two countries remain witness to fast and continuous development in all 
sectors, the most important of which is the business and economic sector. This 
development has been accompanied by numerous companies investing in the sectors of 
oil and gas, construction and other businesses. It has also encouraged the governments of 
the two countries, which own most of the assets of the giant corporates, to encourage 
national companies to merge with or acquire other national or international companies. 
So, this situation will drive a slew of companies to enter in M&A activities across the 
UAE and Qatar on the basis that such activities are one of the solutions that governments 
and institutional investors have in the current climate to face the financial crisis and to 
enable companies to avoid bankruptcy or to increase their profits. 
                                                 
4
 For more see: Williamson, M “UK firms ‘resuming merger and acquisition activity” [2010], Available 
at:<http://www.heraldscotland.com/business/corporate-sme/uk-firms-resuming-merger-and-
acquisition-activity-1.1074017> [Accessed 01 June 2011]; see also British Sky Broadcasting Group Plc v 
Competition Commission, Court of Appeal (Civil Division), [2010] EWCA Civ 2; (2010) 107(5) L.S.G. 16, 
Basbos, F. A. M ‘The Legal Effect of the Merger of the Public Companies Limited by shares under the 
Jordanian Law’ PhD thesis in Law, Amman Arab University, (2006, Jordan) 11-17, Vickers, J. (2004), 
Merger Policy in Europe: retrospect and prospect. UK: Office of Fair Trading, pp.1-15. 
3 
 
 
 
The UAE has emerged as the most active centre for M&A activity in the Arab 
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC
5
), with 50 such transactions being reported from that 
country alone between 1996 and 2001; during this period, the total number of 
transactions in the banking sector was 49, followed by business services with 21, oil and 
gas with 20, insurance with 17, food-related businesses with 14 and wholesale trade with 
11. Significantly, the majority (38 of the 91 deals) were small deals of between $10 
million and $50 million. There were 12 deals of between $100 million and less than $500 
million and five transactions exceeded $500 million.
6
  
 
In recent years, GCC M&As have constituted up to 10% of global M&A activity. 
In the year (2011) it has reached 4%, compared to Europe’s 15% share. Geographically, 
the majority of M&As are expected to take place within the GCC area: the UAE with a 
share of 58.4%, followed by Qatar (11.4%).
7
 In October 2012, companies based in the 
UAE were collectively “the most important and most frequently targeted” in the Middle 
East for mergers and acquisitions (M&As), with a value of $1.473 billion across eight 
deals compared with seven transactions worth a combined $22 million in the preceding 
month.
8
 One deal topped the $1 billion mark in October, which was the National 
Shipping Company of Saudi Arabia’s agreement to buy the fleet and business of Dubai-
based crude oil tanker company Vela International Marine for $1.3 billion.
9
 
 
                                                 
5
 The GCC is an Arab regional organisation of six Arab countries; United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait and Oman. It was founded in 1981 and its headquarters are in Riyadh, the capital 
of Saudi Arabia. These countries are the richest oil countries in the Middle East and the articles that make 
up the laws of each of the GCC countries are identical. In addition, the United Arab Emirates and the State 
of Qatar are the most developed countries in the GCC. For this reason, the study focuses on the provisions 
for mergers in the State of Qatar and the UAE Commercial Companies Laws rather than considering all six 
countries. 
6
 Lewis A and McGlinchy, The International Comparative Legal Guide to Mergers & Acquisitions 2010, A 
practical cross-border insight into mergers & acquisitions (Global Legal Group Ltd). 
7
 For more see Saleh Suhaibani and Abdel Azim Mussa ‘Merger and Acquisition, Global financial turmoil 
and new opportunities’ [2011] l Rajhi Financial Services. 
8
 John Isaac "UAE firms ‘most targeted’ for M&A deals in October" [2012], available 
athttp://www.khaleejtimes.com/biz/inside.asp?xfile=/data/uaebusiness/2012/October/uaebusiness_October3
17.xml&section=uaebusiness, accessed (13/12/2012) 
9
 Ibid  
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However, despite the high cases of M&As in the UAE and Qatar and the attention 
of both countries to such operations, M&As of UAE and Qatar companies compared with 
the UK are still in their infancy. One of the most important reasons for this is due to the 
laws in the UAE and Qatar not having clear provisions regulating such transactions and 
their legal effects such as the UK legislation. Accordingly, the objective of thesis is to 
gain in-depth understanding of the legal basis for transferring the rights and obligations 
of employees, directors and shareholders between companies involved. The thesis then 
develops legal and practical solutions for the problems and negative effects associated 
with M&As, specifically regarding employees, Boards of Directors and shareholders. 
Following this, the provisions of the legislations of the UAE and Qatar relating to M&As 
are developed and remedied by taking advantage of UK legislation. 
 
Looking at the relationship between a venture and a company, a venture is the 
economic or technical means that a company uses in order to achieve its ventures, whilst 
the company itself is the legal embodiment of the venture. Moreover, the venture is 
considered to be a socio-economic cell comprising three elements: work, management 
and capital, which are the key elements that drive the ventures that companies depend on. 
This thesis focuses on discovering how M&As effects the rights and obligations of 
employees, directors and shareholders; why and how such impacts could occur in the 
corporation systems of the UK, the UAE and Qatar. It determined the legal basis for 
retaining and transferring employees, directors and shareholders rights and obligations in 
companies involved in M&As operations, with finding solutions and practical 
perceptions to mitigate for the negative effects of M&As on employees, directors and 
shareholders in companies and the processes taking place in the UK, the UAE and Qatar. 
The thesis also aims to determine the legal nature of M&A, and analyse the reasons that 
prompted the UK, UAE and Qatar lawmakers to allow companies to engage in mergers 
even if one of the companies concerned was under liquidation. Moreover, the thesis aims 
to find practical and legal solutions for the problems in exchange of shares between 
companies involved in the merger in case of different situations. This includes cases such 
as the nominalism value with the actual value of the transferor and transferee company 
shares, or in cases of decimal fractions in one of the companies involved in the merger 
5 
 
while there exist an absence of such decimal fractions in the shares of the other company. 
In addition, in cases where one of the shareholders of the transferor company is not able 
to obtain new shares in the transferee company, practical solutions are found. The total 
legal quorum for shareholder approval on M&A decision is suggested, as are practical 
and legal solutions for shareholders who object to M&As and wish to exit from the 
operations.  
 
According to UK, UAE and Qatar laws, as well as the theory of the legal 
personality of a company, mergers lead to all the transferor company’s business 
obligations being transferred to the transferee or new company, which would receive all 
the transferor company’s assets and liabilities. Consequently, this means that all the rights 
of the transferor company, including the rights of the employees and the Board of 
Directors in their work and positions and all the subsequent rights and benefits that they 
enjoyed before the merger (in addition to the rights of the shareholders in the transferor 
company’s shares and its profits), are transmitted to the transferee or new company by 
force of law. However, the truth and reality has often proved to be contrary to such laws, 
as a number of recent studies
10
 have shown that some M&As lead to a loss of some 
workers, with some members of the Board of Directors losing their rights, work and/or 
positions and all the consequences of them (including rights and benefits) in the 
transferee or new company.
11
  
 
These problems are not limited to company employees or Boards of Directors: 
they also extend to shareholders, who are hampered by many procedural and legal 
obstacles and problems when exchanging shares between transferor and transferee 
companies when there are differences between the actual value of the shares of the 
transferor company and the actual value of the transferee company’s shares.12 For 
                                                 
10
 For more see Rhoades S A. (1993), Efficiency effects of horizontal (in-market) bank mergers, Journal of 
Banking and Finance 17, North-Holland, 411-422, Mylonakis J. (2006), The Impact of Banks’ Mergers & 
Acquisitions on their Staff , Employment & Effectiveness, International Research Journal of Finance and 
Economics ISSN 1450-2887, Issue 3, pp122-135.  
11
 Bhat P, ‘Impact of Mergers & Acquisition on Employees & Working Conditions’ (Law article; Indian 
Legal article 2010) <http://www.123oye.com/job-articles/cyber-law/mergers-acquisitions.htm> 
accessed 11 November 2011. 
12
 For classes of shares see paragraph 5.4.2 of the Chapter Five of this thesis. 
6 
 
example, unlike the UK Companies Act, UAE and Qatar Companies Laws only allow 
companies to issue one type of shares (ordinary shares). Accordingly, if the shares of the 
transferor company consist of ordinary and preferences shares
13
 while the shares of the 
transferee company consist only of ordinary shares, how can the transferee company 
distribute its shares to the shareholders of the transferor company? In addition, according 
to UK, UAE and Qatar Companies Laws, the shares of a company are divided into shares 
in cash (fully paid shares) and shares in kind (not fully paid-up shares).
14
 For shares not 
fully paid up, the laws require shareholders to meet 25% of the cash value of the shares 
upon subscription. “On the contrary, the shares in kind shall meet their value in full upon 
underwriting”.15 Accordingly, if the shares of the transferor company are divided into 
shares paid their full nominal values and shares not paid their full nominal values while 
the shares of the transferee company only consist of shares paid their full nominal values, 
the question arises as to how the shares of the transferee company are distributed amongst 
the shareholders of the transferor company. 
 
In addition, according to UAE and Qatar Companies Laws, the shares of 
companies are divided into enjoyment shares (shares subject to recovery or consumption 
during the life of the company) and capital shares. In this regard, a question arises 
concerning how the transferee company’s shares are distributed among the transferor 
company’s shareholders if the transferor company’s shares are divided into capital shares 
and enjoyment
16
 shares while the transferee company’s shares are only capital shares. In 
addition, unlike the UK Companies Act, the laws of the UAE and Qatar do not allow the 
transferee company to obtain shares in the transferor company in return for payment in 
cash, which leads to issues relating to how the transferee company’s shares are 
distributed amongst the transferor company’s shareholders if the shares of the transferor 
company include shares with decimal fractions while the transferee company’s shares are 
free from decimal fractions.  
 
                                                 
13
 For more details see paragraphs 5.4.5.2 and 5.5.5.3 of the Chapter Five of this thesis.  
14
 For more see paragraphs 5.4.5.1 and 5.5.5.1 of the Chapter Five of this thesis. 
15
 Article 155 of the State of Qatar Companies Law. 
16
 For meaning and more details see paragraphs 5.4.2 and 5.5.5.2 of the Chapter Five of this thesis.  
7 
 
The practical and legal problems of M&As do not stop at this point but extend to 
the majority vote of the shareholders required for approval of the merger decision. Unlike 
section 907 of the UK CA and regulation 13 of the UK Cross-Border Act, UAE and 
Qatar Companies Laws require the merger decision to be approved by a double majority: 
a majority in the number of shareholders who attend the vote and also who own the 
majority of shares. Furthermore, UAE and Qatar Companies Laws do not provide for the 
rights of partners or shareholders who do not support the suggestion of the merger or 
acquisition to exit from such operations and recover the value of their shares, which leads 
to the failure of the M&A process or a delay in its procedures due to the lack of the 
quorum required by the texts of law or the objection of the shareholders to attend the 
meeting of the Extraordinary General Assembly on the operation, which is necessary to 
approve M&A decisions. 
 
Accordingly, when companies are involved in M&As, especially where this 
involves changes in corporate identity or ownership, significant questions arise for the 
employees, Boards of Directors and shareholders of the companies: does this change 
mean that employment, Board of Directors and shareholder contracts and other rights 
have ceased, and what is the legal basis for transferring all of these rights and obligations 
between companies involved in M&A operations? 
 
Is the reason for the negative effects of M&As due to shortcomings in the 
legislation that allow employers to evade obligations imposed by laws and dictated by 
reason and logic? Or it is the desire of the companies involved to avoid further losses 
likely obtained by one of the company involved before M&A? Alternatively, is it due to 
the restructuring of companies involved in M&A operations? Furthermore, if modern 
laws protect the rights of employees, Boards of Directors and shareholders in M&A 
cases, what is the legal basis of the laws? Is it because the legal relationship between 
employees and directors with the enterprise is stronger than the relationship between 
them and their employer, or is it rather because M&As do not lead to the liquidation of 
the transferor companies but rather the transference of their ventures with all rights and 
obligations to the transferee or new company? 
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To discuss the problems and answer the questions above, the study follows the 
methodology of a qualitative and comparative study. There were difficulties in obtaining 
the necessary data due to the confidentiality of the judicial systems of the UAE and 
Qatar, which do not publish the judicial decisions that are issued by their courts, and 
blackout of companies to incidents and problems that occur on employees; Board of 
Directors and distribution of the transfer shares on shareholders of the companies 
involved in the process of M&As, in addition to sharing of the Governments or 
influential people in capital firms, or in its ventures Board of Directors directly or by 
other names, as well as the difficulty interview workers laid off from their jobs due to 
differences in nationalities and their place of residence, led to the difficulty to 
interviewing employees or Board of directors members or shareholders who had their 
rights affected by M&As. This is in addition to the importance of focusing on the legal 
side of the effects of M&As in order to reach the legal theory for the transfer of rights and 
obligations between the companies, and to know the legal basis for retain employees, 
directors and shareholders companies involved of their rights in M&As cases - which 
most of the research and published scientific messages lack - the research in this study 
follows a qualitative and a comparative methodology.  
 
The thesis undertakes a critical analysis and employs a comparative law method,
17
 
which uses a comparison as a tool in order to determine objectively what approach is 
taken to a particular problem, as a merger and acquisition effects on employees, directors 
and shareholders in the UK, UAE and Qatar countries. The comparative study and 
comparative law can be used as an aid to legislation and law reform, as a tool of 
construction, as a means to understand legal rules or as a contribution to the systematic 
unification and harmonisation of law. Thus, the comparative method and comparison 
itself has been an essential tool for generating knowledge in this thesis. It leads also to 
                                                 
17
 According to Malinauskaite Jurgita (2006) there is no decisive definition of what comparative law and 
comparative method is yet. But there is a rather vague definition of comparative law refers to suggest an 
intellectual activity with law as its object and comparison as its process' the extra dimension is given to 
internationalism. In general terms, comparative law is the comparison of the different legal systems of the 
world. For more see Malinauskaite J "A dive Into 'Unknown' Waters: A critical Analysis of the EC Merger 
Control Mechanism and Policy and its Application in th Baltic Countries" PhD thesis, Westminster 
University, [2006], 70, 76  
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understanding of texts of laws and grasps their legal styles’ at the national, regional and 
international level.
18
 In accordance with Warrington M (1998)
19
 a comparative study and 
law in the fields of historical, socio-economic, psychological and ideological can assist 
with finding the elements, which are influencing the law at all levels from a conceptual to 
ideological framework.  In general, comparative law can be used to evaluate the efficacy 
of an approach to a legal problem (in the legal effects of M&A) in terms of a 
jurisdiction's cultural, economic, political and legal background.
20
 For these reasons and 
due to the small size of the United Arab Emirates and Qatar and newness and modest 
their experience in the legislative arena compared with the United Kingdom and its 
legislation, this thesis could not be employed without comparison method between the 
UAE, Qatar and UK legislation. That exclusively, the study on a single legal system or on 
similar legal systems away from the comparison method leads to the repetition and 
dimension to take advantage of legislation from each other that were achieved by the 
comparative study method between the dissimilar legal systems.
21
  
 
Following a comparative and analysis method in this thesis (focusing on the legal 
aspect of the effects of M&As on employees, Boards of Directors and shareholders) and 
studying the legal basis for the transmission of their rights and obligations in such 
operations gives solutions to many of the problems faced by workers and shareholders in 
companies involved in the UAE and Qatar. It also helps in understanding the theory and 
the legal basis for retaining the rights and obligations of employees, directors and 
shareholders in M&As, which supports other researchers in continuing research in 
practical fields in order to access to create an environment and a strong legal system for 
both countries regarding M&As. This will then encourage companies to engage in M&As 
operations and investors to increase their investments in the companies involved, which 
will reflect positively the national economy in both countries. following this methodology 
                                                 
18
 German comparatists Zweigert and Koezt "Comparative Law: Method, Science or Educational 
Discipline" Bashkir State University [1998] 68, 69 
19
 Warrington M and Hoecke M “Legal Cultures, Legal Paradigms and Legal Doctrine: Towards a New 
Model for Comparative Law” the International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 47, No. 3, Jul [1998] 
496, 497 
20
 Malinauskaite Jurgita (2006), Ibid, 70,75 
21
 De Cruz, P "Comparative law in a changing world" second Ed, Cavendish Publishing Limited, London 
[1999] 
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and focusing on the legal aspect of the effects of M&As on employees, directors and 
shareholders and studying the legal theories for transferring their rights and obligations in 
M&As assists in establishing the rules applicable to M&A operations and also helps to 
determine the legal implications of them, particularly concerning the effects on the moral 
personalities of the transferor and transferee companies and their financial assets. It also 
helps in understanding a company’s relationship with its employees and shareholders 
before or after the merger, as well as providing knowledge of the proper interpretation of 
the legal texts regarding M&As. 
 
In order to achieve this, the study relied on some Arabic sources which were 
collected from some Arabic universities or bought from the libraries in the Arab region. 
The study also relied on some previous studies on the effects of M&As on employees and 
directors conducted on some M&As in the UK.  In this regard and due to the secrecy 
policy followed by most countries of the GCC in general and the UAE and Qatar in 
particular with regard to publishing judicial decisions, as well as the similarity of the 
texts of Egyptian Companies and Labour Laws and Jordanian Companies and Labour 
Laws with the texts of the State of Qatar and UAE Companies and Labour Laws, this 
thesis uses and depends on judicial judgements of the Egyptian and Jordanian courts.  
 
Due to the rapid growth in all economic and commercial fields that the UAE and 
Qatar have been witnessing due to oil and gas discoveries, they are two of the fastest 
growing economies and most competitive countries in the Middle East and North Africa. 
Furthermore, there is a strong and special relationship between the UK, UAE and Qatar, 
which goes back decades and is anchored in business ties going back 70 years, when 
Shell and the British Multinational Oil and Gas Company (BP) first came to support Abu 
Dhabi’s discovery of oil. This is currently embodied in the form of many joint ventures 
between the countries, which reached a value of £9.6 billion in 2011 compared to £8.9 
billion in 2010; the countries will try to further increase this figure in the future.
22
 At the 
                                                 
22
 There is now a mass of connections between individuals, civil society, and businesses in the countries. 
These connections are robust due to longstanding shared values and have made an ideal foundation for a 
thriving commercial and trade relationship. The UAE is the UK's largest export market in the Middle East. 
British contractors and consultants have been involved in some of the most iconic infrastructure projects in 
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same time, the UK Government is strongly committed to fostering greater commercial 
engagement, partnerships and opportunities on infrastructure development with Qatar and 
to pushing the relationship between the two countries into new areas. Qatar is the UK’s 
third largest export destination in the Gulf region. Over the past five years, bilateral trade 
has increased by over 160% to £2.2 billion. Imports of Qatari goods increased by more 
than 200% in the last year alone, driven by our growing demand for liquefied natural gas 
(LNG).
23
   
 
 Furthermore, given the importance of M&As between companies in the both the 
UK, UAE and Qatar, the similarities in their impact on employees and directors in both 
countries, in addition to the difference between the UK legislative systems with UAE and 
Qatar legislative systems are evaluated. In addition, due to the evolution of the legislation 
in the UK, and addressing the issues of M&As in the British legislation from different 
approaches, this allows and helps the researcher to conduct a comparison, and take 
advantage of British legislation in order to address the gap and remedy the shortages and 
imbalances legislative that suffered by the UAE and Qatar legislations relating to M&As. 
As well as in the scope of the personal nature theory and the theory of the legal 
personalities of companies (supported by the researcher and the thesis), the UK 
Companies Act 2006, the TUPE Regulations 2006, the Cross-Border Act 2007, and UAE 
and Qatar Companies and Labour Laws, this thesis deals with the rights of employees, 
Boards of Directors and shareholders in M&As, as a comparative study. 
 
In this regard, the thesis employs a comparative approach between the UK, UAE 
and Qatar legislations. Islamic Shari’a law regulates the laws of the UAE and Qatar and 
gives both workers and shareholders rights and obligations, thereby establishing social 
                                                                                                                                                 
the UAE, including the Burj Al Arab, the Dubai Metro, the YAS Marina Circuit, Ferrari World, the Zayed 
National Museum, and Masdar City. On the other hand,   the UAE’s has significant investments and 
projects in the United Kingdom such as London Array, Emirates Sky Line and the largest port in UK being 
developed by Dubai Ports. For more see For more see Ghali George Daniel "Methods and Problems of 
Accounting for Mergers" Alexandria, University House, [2002] 30, 31 
23
 For more, see Howell D “UK's ‘Strong and Growing’ Economic Relationship with Qatar: Qatar 
Infrastructure Projects” [2011], available at: http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/news/latest-
news/?view=Speech&id=627772082. Accessed 13/12/2012; Barakat S “Kuwait Programme on 
Development, Governance and Globalisation in the Gulf States, the Qatari Spring: Qatar’s emerging role in 
peace making”, the London School of Economics [2012] 
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justice and providing a decent life for families. As well as this, Islam preserves the rights 
of the owners of capital and prohibited any form of procrastination in the payment of 
rights so debts return to their owners, also prohibiting fraud among dealers, and 
regulating shareholders' profits. However, M&As has been result of globalization, 
monopoly and competition between companies to enter new markets, Islamic Shari’a law 
in its main sources (Qur’an and Sunnah) as well as the Islamic scholars did not address 
the issues of M&As,
24
 and its legal effects from the legitimacy side, therefore the study 
avoided delving into the impact of M&As in terms of legitimacy. Even the researcher 
does not enter in clamour, polemics and doctrinal interventions that may take out of the 
study important goals it seeks to achieve. 
 
 Despite the fact that the core principles of the laws in the UAE
25
 and Qatar
26
  are 
drawn from Shari’a, the application of Shari’a law is restricted and 
commercial/contractual transactions are regulated by written commercial codes and laws 
that are consistent with Western business needs.
27
 Most of the UAE and Qatar 
legislations are comprised of a mix of Islamic and European concepts of civil law, which 
have a common root in the Egyptian legal code established in the late 19th to 20
th
 
centuries.
28
 The UAE and Qatar laws are the applicable laws in the two countries and it is 
a set of rules that govern the behaviour of individuals within the UAE and Qatar society. 
                                                 
24
 For more see Mahmassani Sobhi "Workers' rights and duties in Islam" [2010], available at: http:// 
www.onefd.edu.dz, accessed 21/11/2012 (Arabic source) translated by Al-hemyari, Ameen Baggash, 
School of Law, Brunel University, London, the UK 
25
 The United Arab Emirates (the UAE) is a federation of seven emirates comprising Dubai, Abu Dhabi, 
Ajman, Fujairah, Ras Al Khaimah, Sharjah and Umm Al Quwain and was formed in 1971. The UAE 
federal constitution provides for an allocation of powers between the federal government and the 
government of each emirate. Dubai is subject to the federal law of the UAE but retains the right to 
administer its own internal affairs and enjoys certain other exclusive rights. 
26
 Qatar is a peninsula located halfway down the west coast of the Arabian Gulf. Its territory comprises of a 
number of islands.  It has maritime and land borders with Saudi Arabia and maritime boundaries with 
Bahrain, United Arab Emirates and Iran. The total land area of Qatar is approximately about 11,500 square 
kilometers. Islam is the official religion of the country and Arabic is the official language in Qatar, and 
English is widely spoken. 
27
 The basis of the legal system in the UAE is Sharia or Quranic Law. In the constitutions, Islam is 
identified as the state religion as well as the principal source of law. However, although the principles of 
Sharia influence criminal and civil laws, the direct influence of   Sharia in the UAE is primarily confined to 
social laws, such as family law, divorce or succession. Most commercial matters are now dealt with by 
either civil courts or permanently established arbitration tribunals. 
28
 Ahmed Aly Khedr & Bassam Alnuaimi "A Guide to United Arab Emirates Legal System" Hauser Global 
Law School Program, New York University School of Law [2010]  
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The Articles of laws  are characterized-like any laws in any countries- that their rules are 
general abstract; where, they do not address the specific individual, but addresses all 
people, the UAE and Qatar laws are features also by its binding rules, that force 
individuals to respect it by applying sanction on who opposes their operations. However, 
the UAE and Qatar legislations do not depend on a legal system similar to the Common 
Law system which is generally based on judicial precedents; legislation plays an 
extremely important role. 
 
Like other legal systems in the GCC, the legal systems of the UAE and Qatar are 
quite complicated and those unfamiliar with their workings can find this very 
problematic. However, although these systems are different from legal systems in the 
West, the basic legal principles and structure are logical and understandable. They have 
evolved over many centuries, in a similar way to the West and, especially in the UAE and 
Qatar, are adapting to the changing needs of society with new developments in thinking 
for a modern age. More changes in commercial law have liberalized legal regimes, 
creating a more open and understandable environment for foreign businesses and 
investors. 
 
Prior to the establishment of the UAE, each of the seven Emirates regulated its 
own affairs by passing local laws and regulations, including legislation establishing and 
regulating a judicial system.
29
 The Federal Government is entrusted with the task of 
promulgating legislation concerning and regulating the principal and central aspects of 
the Federation. In the comparatively short period since its establishment, the UAE has 
made important strides in regulating some of the vital legal aspects of its rapidly 
expanding economy such as Labour Law,
30
 Commercial Companies Law
31
 and several 
other very important laws were also promulgated. However, the UAE legislation are not 
                                                 
29
 For example the Emirate of Abu Dhabi promulgated a Law in 1968 establishing and regulating the Abu 
Dhabi Courts. It also promulgated the Law of Procedure at the Civil Courts No. (3) of 1970, and the Law of 
Procedure at the Criminal Courts of 1970. Dubai promulgated a Law establishing its Courts in 1970 and 
Fujairah followed suit in 1969. Ajman, Sharjah, Ras Al Khaimah and Umm Al Quwain established their 
Courts by Laws passed in 1971. Some of the local laws that were promulgated prior to the Federation still 
prevail today and will continue to be applicable unless and until they are repealed by Federal Legislation.  
3030
 Labour Law No. (8) of 1980, the Law under study 
31
 Commercial Companies Law No. (8) of 1984 Law under study 
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issued by parliament, rather, according to the UAE Constitution the state laws are issued 
under the provisions of the Constitution, where, Council of Ministers prepare a draft law 
and submit it to the Federal National Council (FNC), the Council of Ministers presents 
the draft of law to the President of the Union for approval, then submitted to the Supreme 
Council for ratification. Then, the federation president signs the law after ratification by 
the Supreme Council, and it is issued. 
 
Qatar
32
 legislation does not differ from UAE legislation; according to the first 
article of the permanent constitution of the State of Qatar, Shari’a law is the main source 
of its legislation. Articles 105 & 106 of permanent constitution also clearly state that the 
laws issued through the Al-Shoura Council shall have the right to propose bills. Every 
proposal shall be referred to the relevant committee in the Council for study, with 
recommendations submitted to the Council. If the Council accepts the proposal, the same 
shall be referred in draft form to the Government for study and opinion. Such a draft shall 
be returned to the Council during the same or the following term of session. Also, any bill 
rejected by the Council may not be re-introduced during the same term of session. Any 
draft law passed by the Council shall be referred to the Amir for ratification. 
 
In the judicial field, historically, Shari’a (religious) Courts formed the judicial 
cornerstone of the UAE and Qatar. The modernisation of the majority of the legal 
systems in these countries at the beginning of the twentieth century, led to the 
establishment of Civil Courts which were generally granted the competence to review 
civil transactions as well as commercial and other types of disputes. Separate Criminal 
Courts were also established. Matters of personal status such as marriage, divorce, 
custody and inheritance remained with the Shari’a Courts whose judges were trained in 
Islamic Law and Jurisprudence. In the UAE, the establishment of the Civil and Criminal 
Courts resulted in diminishing the role of the Shari’a Courts. Nevertheless, the 
competence of the Shari’a Courts in some Emirates, particularly Abu Dhabi, was 
                                                 
32
 Qatar is a peninsula located halfway down the west coast of the Arabian Gulf. Its territory comprises of a 
number of islands.  It has maritime and land borders with Saudi Arabia and maritime boundaries with 
Bahrain, United Arab Emirates and Iran. The total land area of Qatar is approximately about 11,500 square 
kilometers. Islam is the official religion of the country and Arabic is the official language in Qatar, and 
English is widely spoken. 
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substantially expanded later on to include, in addition to matters of personal status, all 
types of civil and commercial disputes as well as serious criminal offences. Therefore, in 
addition to the Civil Courts, each of the seven Emirates maintains a parallel system of 
Shari’a Courts, which are organised and supervised locally.  
 
The Federal UAE Civil Courts and the Civil Courts of Qatar, similar to the courts 
in most of the countries in the Arabic area, are organised to form two main divisions; 
civil and criminal, and are also generally divided to three stages of litigation, namely the 
Courts of First Instance, Appeal and the Supreme Court (colloquially referred to as Court 
of Cassation).
33
  
 
Although there are judicial systems in the UAE
34
 and Qatar,
35
 like the UK which 
makes judicial action a public one regulated and practiced by the state, however, 
composition of judicial system in the UAE and Qatar and the way the functioning of the 
courts does not rise to the level of the UK judicial system. Take as an example the State 
of Qatar, which has no specialized court to hear cases of workers, in the UAE in spite of 
the presence of a specialized court in labour issues, however, the Emirati legislator does 
not give this court the right to control of M&As, the reason for this is due to the small 
size of the UAE and Qatar, recent inception of the two countries and the modest 
experience between its judges.  
 
The thesis is split into six chapters: to understand the legal basis for transferring 
rights and liabilities between companies involved in M&As, Chapter One classifies the 
                                                 
33
 In the UAE The jurisdiction of the third division, namely the Shariah courts, which initially was to 
review matters of personal status, was expanded in certain Emirates such as Abu Dhabi to include serious 
criminal cases, labour and other commercial matters. Important cases with a security aspect are referred to 
special courts. 
34
 Judicial system in the UAE comprises three degrees litigation which are: Court of First Instance, the 
Court of Appeal, the Court of Cassation, each of these courts separate jurisdictions, are: Civil Court, 
Commercial Court, Criminal Court, Labour Court, Court of Real Estate and Personal Status court  (Family 
Court). 
35
 The judicial system in the State of Qatar, like the judiciary in the UAE. According to the new legislation 
the judicial structure in Qatar's judicial system consists of the Court of Cassation on top of the judicial 
hierarchy, followed by the Court of Appeal, the Court of First Instance and the Supreme Judicial Council, 
however Qatar does not have a court to consider in employees problems in general or the problems 
resulting from M&As which affect on employees directors of companies involved.   
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concepts of M&As, demonstrating the main differences between them and classifying 
M&A types and objectives. In order to understand the legal basis for transferring the 
financial disclosure of the transferor company to the new or the transferee company, in 
addition to retaining the rights and liabilities of employees, directors and shareholders in 
M&As, Chapter Two discusses the legal basis for this transfer according to the personal 
nature theory and the theory of the legal personalities of companies. Chapter Three 
provides a thorough understanding of the consequences of M&As on employees and their 
rights in M&A operations. It deals with the rights of employees by individual and 
collective contracts, the types of rights that should be transferred between the companies 
involved and the necessary conditions. Chapter Three also gives some practical and legal 
solutions and suggestions that would mitigate the negative effects of M&As. 
 
Chapter Four discusses the aforementioned consequences of M&As on Boards of 
Directors and, accordingly, classifies the relationship between the company and its 
directors or Board of Directors according to the theory of the institution or organisation 
and agency theory, as well as the legal theory of the personality of companies (the main 
theory). Additionally, the chapter discusses the effects of M&As on the rights and 
contracts of Boards of Directors. Finally, the chapter presents various courses of action 
that can be taken in order to mitigate and overcome the negative impacts associated with 
M&As on the management of a company. 
 
Chapter Five classifies the rights of shareholders in M&As, such as regarding the 
management, profits, getting new shares and approving M&A decisions. Shareholders 
have the right to object to an M&A and exit from the company with the option of 
recovering the value of their shares. Also, the chapter focuses on solving the problem of 
exchanging shares between transferor and transferee companies when there are 
differences in the actual values of shares. The end of this chapter presents possible 
solutions and suggestions that can be implemented to alleviate and overcome the negative 
impacts associated with M&As on the shareholders of a company. 
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Chapter Six presents a holistic look at Chapters One, Two, Three, Four and Five 
and provides an in-depth summary of the differences between the texts of the laws under 
consideration in terms of how these texts address the legal effects of M&As on 
employees, management and company shareholders. Moreover, some suggestions and 
recommendations are made concerning the reformation and amendment of these texts, in 
addition to proposing some practical solutions that can help to mitigate the negative 
effects of M&A. Further recommendations are made regarding solving the problem of 
exchanging shares between transferor and transferee companies. The study concludes 
with suggestions for possible future research directions. Finally, the last section provides 
a summary of the thesis and makes its closing remarks. 
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CHAPTER ONE: THE CONCEPTS, TYPES AND 
OBJECTIVES OF M&As 
1.1 Overview 
Mergers and acquisitions are nowadays frequent events in the lifecycles of companies, on 
the basis that this option has been recognised as one of the most prominent solutions for 
facing the repercussions of the financial crisis that has swept the world since 2007. The 
crisis has threatened many different economic entities in regard to bankruptcy or 
liquidation.
36
 Thus, M&As are one of the most successful means of enabling companies 
and economic entities to avoid this problem and to achieve profits, whether through entry 
to new markets, taking advantage of economies of scale or reducing the costs associated 
with producing a greater number of products or services.
37
 
 
Nevertheless, despite the importance of M&As and the multiplicity of their goals, 
it should be noted that the laws under consideration do not provide specific definitions of 
M&As,
38
 which, in fact, is not a drawback but is an advantage enjoyed by modern 
legislation, thus leaving a wide scope for jurists and judiciaries to attempt to elicit the 
meanings of the texts of the laws. However, despite such powers, the judiciary and jurists 
have not achieved consensus on one coherent definition of M&A concepts; this has 
resulted in increased confusion surrounding the overall understanding of the meanings of 
mergers and acquisitions, their nature, the knowledge of their effects and the legal theory 
for the transmission of the rights and obligations of employees, directors and 
shareholders between companies involved in M&As. 
                                                 
36
 For more see Abdel Azim Mussa and Saleh Suhaibani, ‘Merger & Acquisition: Global financial turmoil 
and the new opportunities’ [2008] Investment Research, Al Rajhi Companies for Financial Services 1, 13. 
37
 For more see ibid 10; Abdul Majeed bin Saleh Al-Mansour, ‘Acquisition Companies and the Position of 
Jurisprudence from it’ Islamic jurisprudence [2011]; Ashkenas, Ronald N., DeMonaco, Lawrence J. & 
Francis, Suzanne C, ‘Making the Deal Real: How GE Capital Integrates Acquisitions’ (1998) 76 
(1)Harvard Business Review 6, 15; Ravenscraft David J. & Scherer F.M,Mergers, Sell-offs and Economic 
Efficiency (The Brookings Institution 1987); Hughes Alan, The Impact of Merger: a survey of empirical 
evidence for the UK in Mergers and Merger Policy, Oxford University Press (1989); Balmer, John M.T and 
Dinnie Keith, ‘Corporate identity and corporate communications: The antidote to merger madness’(1999) 4 
(4) Corporate Communications: An International Journal. 
38
 The laws give a general concept for merger without indicating the type of agreement or contract which in 
accordance with a merger may be a harmonious union of two companies with result that a new company is 
formed which comprises both of their previous shareholders, directors and employees.  
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Markedly, opinions surrounding jurisprudence and judicial judgements in 
defining the concepts of mergers and acquisitions are divided into two concepts: the 
concept of sale,
39
 which considers M&As to have the same meaning and refers to a 
contract of sale or legal process wherein the merging or acquiring company buys the 
merged or acquired company; and secondly, the contractual concept,
40
 which 
differentiates between M&As and considers a merger as a contract between two or more 
companies, subsequently leading to the transfer of the rights and liabilities of the 
transferor company to the transferee or new company, while an acquisition relates to a 
contract of sale by one company to buy the shares of a second company, in whole or in 
part, in the form of payment in cash or bonds. 
 
In addition, unlike UK legislation, UAE and Qatar legislation does not regulate 
acquisitions in the hearts of their texts
41
 or situations where a merger or acquisition is 
necessary for a company.
42
 Furthermore, the laws of both the countries allow for all types 
of companies to enter a merger without distinction between companies enjoying a moral 
personality and companies that do not enjoy a legal personality, which include companies 
that are established between two or more persons in order to achieve a particular purpose 
and are not recorded or declared in the Commercial Register, ending with the end of the 
work that they were established to achieve, such as a particular partnership company. 
Moreover, UAE and Qatar legislation is unsuccessful in regulating cross-border M&As 
                                                 
39
 One proponent of this concept for mergers is the Egyptian Court of Cassation, as seen in its judgement 
dated 15February 1977.For more, see Section 1.2.1:Merger Definition According to the Theory of Sale of 
this chapter. 
40
 For the meaning of the contractual concept of merger and its proponents, see Section 1.2.2:The 
Contractual Theory in Merger Definition of this chapter. 
41
 Because the laws and the draft of laws in the two countries do not prepare or issue through Parliament, 
and do not depend on the case law as is the case in the UK, due to the lack of Parliament in the two 
countries (Qatar and UAE). For example in the UAE the bill is prepared by the Council of Ministers and 
submit it to the Union National Assembly then to the president of the Union for his approval and 
presentation to the Supreme Council for ratification. Following this, the President of the Union shall sign 
the bill after ratification by the Supreme Council and shall promulgate it. This is also the case in Qatar, 
where the advisory Council shall handle the legislative authority. For more see Constitutions of Qatar and 
UAE. 
42
 Section 23 of the Enterprise Act classifies when merger becomes an importance for the company, when 
provided for that by saying ‘a relevant merger situation has been created if—two or more enterprises have 
ceased to be distinct enterprises at a time or in circumstances falling within section 24; and the value of the 
turnover in the United Kingdom of the enterprise being taken over exceeds £70 million’. For more see also 
article 24 of the act. 
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and also fails to indicate the goals and objectives of M&As.
43
 Accordingly, the question 
raised is: what are the legal concepts, types and objectives of M&As and what are the 
differences between them? This will be discussed in this chapter, which is arranged as 
follows. 
 
Parts two and three of this chapter respectively discuss merger and acquisition 
concepts and thereby demonstrate the main differences between them. Studying and 
defining the concepts of M&As and stating the differences between them helps to provide 
an understanding of the legal natures and the effects of each of them on the moral 
personalities of companies involved in M&As, in order to acknowledge and classify the 
legal basis for transferring the rights and obligations of employees, directors and 
shareholders from the transferor to transferee company. Following this, the cause for the 
transmission of the rights and obligations of the transferor company’s shareholders to the 
transferee or new company is determined. The right of the transferee company to 
exchange shares with them exists only in merger cases and not in acquisitions, as chapter 
five of this thesis explains. 
 
In addition, this chapter gives a clear indication of the types of M&As, as well as 
their targets, owing to the differences in the aims of each type of merger or acquisition 
compared to others. It also considers the differences in the procedures and legal texts 
applicable to each merger or acquisition, as well as the impacts of mergers and 
acquisitions on the legal personalities of companies involved in M&A operations and 
their management, depending on the different types of merger or acquisition. Thus, the 
objectives of sections four and five are concerned with classifying M&A types and 
motives. Finally, section six provides a summary and conclusion of the chapter. 
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1.2 The Legal Concepts of M&As 
 
Mergers and acquisitions describe a host of financial activities in which firms are bought 
and sold. In an acquisition, one party purchases another by acquiring all of its assets.
44
 
The acquired entity ceases to exist as a company body but the buyer sometimes retains 
the name of the acquired firm or indeed may use it as its own name.
45
 In a merger, a new 
entity is created from the assets of two firms and new stock is issued. Mergers are more 
common when the parties are of a similar size and influence. Sometimes, acquisitions are 
labelled "mergers" because "being acquired" carries a negative connotation (like "being 
eaten"); a merger suggests mutuality.
46
 M&A activities involve both privately held and 
publicly traded companies and acquisitions may be friendly (both entities are willing) or 
hostile (the buyer is opposed by the management of the acquisition target). 
 
In spite of the importance of M&As as methods for external growth (both from 
the standpoint of project strategy and in terms of their effects on industry structure or 
companies and their stakeholders),
47
 M&As still lack a general theory governing and 
providing a precise definition; many legal and economic studies still confuse the 
interpretations of M&As. The reason for this is that both mergers and acquisitions are 
defined as tools intended to reap benefits from the expansion of the main activity of a 
company, increasing the competitiveness of the company. Alternatively, they can be 
conducted to reduce the costs of operation of the company in an attempt to increase the 
overall operational efficiency of the merging or acquiring company. It is considered that 
this increases the company’s profitability through attempting to control another company 
operating in the same industry or in a complementary industry, whether through the 
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purchase of a majority or all of the company shares that formed the capital of the 
acquired company (acquisition), or through annexation or fully merging another company 
into the merging company (merger).  
 
In order to remove ambiguity and confusion regarding M&As, this part must first 
provide a clear and accurate definition for M&As in accordance with the concept of sale, 
the contractual concept and the provisions of the laws under consideration, as highlighted 
in the next section. The subsequent chapters of this study discuss the legal nature of 
M&As and subsequently identify the impacts on employees, Boards of Directors and 
shareholders. 
 
1.2.1 Definition of Mergers According to the Concept of Sale 
 
The proponents
48
 of this concept for mergers combine the concepts of mergers and 
acquisitions on the basis that both are sales contracts between the transferor and 
transferee companies. Therefore, on this basis, they believe that a merger has many 
diverse implementations. Essentially, the term ‘merger’ is used to describe a wide range 
of dealings between enterprises, including mixtures, purchases or takeovers, unions and 
fusions, to name a select few. Moreover, in some cases, the term ‘merger’ is frequently 
and mistakenly used in combination with the term ‘acquisition’. 
 
According to this concept, Marof (2008)
49
 and Chiplin and Wright (1987)
50
 
believe that a company merger is a combination of the assets and liabilities of two firms 
to form a single business entity,or to buy part of company activity or part of tools 
production. For example, an entity may purchase another facility or some of its unit 
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production, which can enable the integration process to be implemented through the 
issuance of tools, property rights, payment in cash or other equivalent assets. Also, 
according to Sherman and Hart (2006),
51
 a merger is a combination of two or more 
companies in which the assets and liabilities of the selling firms are absorbed by the 
buying firms. 
 
This concept of mergers was adopted by the Egyptian Court of Cassation in a 
judgement dated 15 February 1977,
52
 which ruled that a merger contract is a contract of 
sale. The main case or claim can be summarised as follows: the Eastern Company for 
Cinema (the original debtor) merged with the General Company of the Role of Cinema, 
and the General Company of the Role of Cinema merged with the Cairo Company for the 
Distribution of Films, which then merged with the General Enterprise of Egyptian 
Cinema. Following this, the General Enterprise of Egyptian Cinema merged with the 
Egyptian Public Authority for Cinema. The Court of First Instance, in its primary 
judgement regarding the debt, ruled in favour of the claimant and against the Egyptian 
General of the Cinema. However, the Egyptian General of the Cinema defended the 
claim before the appeal court by not accepting the lawsuit on the basis that the lawsuit 
was irrelevant because the General Company of the Role of Cinema, which had merged 
with the General Enterprise of Egyptian Cinema, did not replace the Eastern Company 
for Cinema (the original debtor), which had been merged with and fully replaced in its 
legal personality and all of its rights and obligations. In particular, in regard to the debt, 
the legal personality of the Eastern Company for Cinema (the original debtor) did not 
expire through the sale of the General Company of the Role of Cinema, whereby the sale 
was confined to the assets and liabilities detailed in the partition resolution issued from 
the general sentinel and not including the debt mentioned. Therefore, it should have 
directed the claim to the public guard on this company, i.e. its legal representative, and 
not the General Enterprise of Egyptian Cinema.
53
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The Egyptian Court of Appeal rejected the aforementioned argument on the basis 
that the sale included the assets and liabilities of the Eastern Company for Cinema and 
the buyer company (General Company of the Role of Cinema) replaced it in terms of its 
rights and obligations. It therefore could not refuse the claim raised by the creditor 
against the transferee company (which merged with the General Company for the Role of 
Cinema).
54
 
 
The Egyptian Court of Cassation confirmed this judgement,
55
 stating that: ‘the 
assets and liabilities of the Eastern Company for Cinema are transferred to the General 
Company for the Role of Cinema, based on the sale contract concluded between the 
General Company for the Role of Cinema and the guard, and it has received what it 
bought. Also, the judgement was ratiocinate from this document that the General 
Company for the Role of Cinema purchased a financial disclosure of the Eastern 
Company for Cinema in all its elements of the assets and liabilities without limit or 
restriction to what is stated in the evaluation of a resolution or general guard decision 
issued in ratification of it. Thus, the buyer company replaced the Eastern Company for 
Cinema in all its rights and obligations, and then the General Company for the Role of 
Cinema merged with the Cairo Company for the Distribution of Films, which merged 
with the General Enterprise of Egyptian Cinema. For this reason, the latter enterprise is 
the defendant and owner of adjective in the claim, and this illation agrees with the true of 
law’.56 
 
Accordingly, it is clear that the Egyptian Court of Appeal and the Court of 
Cassation described the concept of a merger as ‘a contract of sale’. However, this 
description is not accurate as the matter in this claim does not relate to a contract of sale 
for many reasons. 
 
                                                 
54
 The Judgement Court of the Egyptian Court of Cassation, 15 February, year 1977, Ibid.  
55
 Ibid. 
56
 Ibid: In this case this judgement has been used due to similarity of the texts of Egyptian Law with the 
texts of the State of Qatar and UAE Companies Laws. 
25 
 
Firstly, in the case of a merger, the transferee company does not make a payment 
in cash in exchange for the transferor company’s assets that were transferred to the new 
or transferee company as a result of the merger.
57
Therefore, the description of a merger 
as a contract of sale goes against the fact that the essence of selling is the transfer of 
ownership (or other financial rights) in return for cash, which is not achieved in merger 
cases. The disadvantage of this interpretation can be seen clearly in the case of mergers 
by the formation of a new company,
58
 which results in the demise of the legal personality 
of both the transferor and transferee companies and the emergence of a new legal 
personality for the new company resulting from the merge.  
 
Secondly, the merger does not lead to the liquidation of the transferor company 
but rather the transmission of its rights and liabilities with the survival of its economic 
ventures as a set of assets in the scope of the transferee company, which justifies the 
transferee company’s shareholders getting new shares in the transferee company, with the 
transfer of the rights of the employees and management of the transferor company to the 
transferee company, the description a merger acting as a contract of sale standing in 
contrast to this finding. 
 
Thirdly, the description of a merger as a contract of sale on the basis of the 
comprehensive transition of the financial disclosure of the transferor company to the 
transferee company is unsuccessful and cannot be relied upon as an interpretation of the 
legal basis for the transfer of the transferor company’s management and shareholders’ 
rights and obligation to the transferee company, on the basis that a sale contract leads to 
sever the legal relationship between the company and its shareholders due to them 
obtaining cash in return for their shares. Also, the sale can occur without the consent of 
the transferor company's management, which later leads to its Board of Directors being 
laid off.The description of a merger as a contract of sale also violates the provisions of 
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UK, UAE and Qatar laws, the effects of M&As and the theory of the legal personality of 
a company,
59
 which all confirm that “a merger is a contract between two or more existing 
companies”;60 “accordingly every transferor company is dissolved without going into 
liquidation, and on its dissolution transfers all its assets and liabilities to a transferee 
company”.61 Furthermore, the description of a merger as a contract of sale stands in 
contrast to this concept. It can instead be discerned that a merger is a partnership contract 
or merger contract between two or more companies, whereby the transferor company’s 
property and shares move to a transferee company, which subsequently replaces it in all 
its rights and obligations. 
 
1.2.2 Definition of Mergers According to the Contractual Concept 
 
This concept for mergers deals with mergers from the contractual side and the demise of 
the moral personality of the transferor company without reference to the destruction of 
such companies. According to this concept, the merger definition differs depending on 
the nature of the work of the companies involved in the merger. Markedly, the most 
common definitions for a merger according to this concept are the definitions of the 
merging of companies and economic entities.
62
 According to this concept, a merger is a 
contract whereby two or more companies agree to combine shares and assets together 
into a single company, with the demise of the moral personality of each company or 
companies merged, and to accordingly establish one personality for the new company 
resulting from the merger.
63
 In other words, a merger is the legal process of combining a 
single company or several existing companies, or is otherwise a contract between the 
transferor company and the transferee company. According to this definition of a merger, 
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the legal personality of the transferor firm demises and all its rights and obligations are 
transferred to the transferee company, which replaces it in all its rights and obligations.
64
 
 
Through comparing this definition of a merger with the definition according to the 
concept of sale, the researcher finds that the former definition (according to the 
opinions
65
 of the proponents of the contractual concept) is closest in terms of accuracy 
and is worthwhile for the following reasons. Firstly, this definition shows that a merger is 
a contract occurring through consensus or mutual agreement between the transferor and 
transferee companies, which is consistent with what is outlined in the texts of the laws 
under consideration, which provide that: ‘The merger will not be valid until it is issued 
under a decision from every company that becomes a partner thereof as per the terms and 
conditions prescribed for the amendment for the articles of association and the statute of 
the company’.66 Markedly, this confirms that a merger is a contract necessitating the 
availability of general pillars of the contract, such as mutual consent between companies 
involved in mergers, a place and a reason.
67
 
 
Secondly, this definition highlights the legal nature of the merger contract and 
also its effects, which are the most important aspects. Markedly, ‘all the rights and 
liabilities of the transferor company will be transferred to the transferee company, 
whereby the transferee company that resulted from the merger will be considered the 
legal successor to the transferor company, which is replaced in all its rights and 
liabilities’.68 
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Thirdly, the definition of a merger according to this concept highlights what is not 
considered a merger between companies, such as economic concentration processes that 
occur by other non-merger means, such as joint ventures, holding companies
69
 the 
transfer of part of a company to another company or merger groups that do not take the 
form of a company in the legal concept of a merger (such as merge associations and 
public institutions), which are not mergers in the legal sense. Essentially, this is what is 
confirmed by the Egyptian Court of Cassation, who emphasised this requirement when 
ruling that ‘a merger should be between companies that have or enjoy a moral 
personality, whereby the operation that includes the capital of the new company consists 
of the assets of another company not considered as merged. Also, joining a branch or 
individual venture to another company or with this company to establish a new company 
is not a merger in the legal sense because branches or individual ventures do not have 
independent legal personalities’.70 Moreover, in another judgement regarding mergers 
between shareholding companies, the Egyptian Court of Cassation also ruled that
71
 ‘a 
merger that leads to the transferee company’s succession of the transferor company in all 
its rights and obligations is a merger between companies that have moral personalities 
and independent financial disclosure. In accordance with that, the moral personality of 
the transferor company expires and all its rights and obligations - including its financial 
assets - devolve to the transferee or new company, which replaces it in its rights and 
obligations. Thus, there is no merger when any company transfers part of its activities to 
another company as shares in-kind in its capital, as long as the first company still retains 
its moral personality and financial assets, including its obligations’.72 
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From the above definitions of a merger, as well as from the link between these 
definitions and the texts of the laws under study, we can define a merger as a contract 
between two or more existing companies whereby one or more companies joins another 
company (merger by absorption). The moral personality of the transferor company 
expires and all its rights and obligations move to the transferee company, which remains 
in existence. It can also be the mixing of two or more companies (merger by the 
formation of a new company). In this case, the moral personalities of the two companies 
entering the merger expire and they transfer all their rights and obligations to the new 
company resulting from the merger, which will receive all the rights and obligations of 
the two companies. The two companies’ economic ventures continue in the scope of the 
legal personality of the new company which becomes the legal representative and the 
party that claims all the rights and obligations of the companies involved in the merger. 
 
This definition is described by the researcher for the following reasons. Firstly, 
the definition of a merger as a contract requires the presence of two or more companies 
enjoying full legal personalities. Thus, mergers do not happen amongst companies that do 
not have moral personalities, such as particular partnership companies, companies that 
are in the process of construction or foundation, or companies that have been liquidated 
and their assets divided. 
 
Secondly, the definition refers to the types of merger from a legal point of view, 
whereby a merger arises through the annexation of one or more companies to another 
existing company, which is referred to as merger by absorption.
73
 Alternatively, the 
dissolution of the companies involved in the merger and their blending, with the 
subsequent establishment of a new company through their financial assets, is described as 
merger through the formation of a new company.
74
 
 
Thirdly, the definition focuses on the expiry of the legal personalities of the 
company or companies merged as a result of the merger, the definition of which focuses 
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on the most important element of the merger: moving the comprehensive financial 
disclosure of the company or companies merged to a new company, including the rights 
and profits or losses and negative obligations. 
 
Finally, the definition refers to the continuation of the economic venture of the 
company or companies merged, which justifies moving all the rights of the employees, 
the Board of Directors and the shareholders of the transferor company to the transferee 
company. This is consistent with merger objectives and the theory of the legal personality 
of a company and thereby enhances the researcher’s opinion in regard to the transfer of 
these rights from the transferor to the transferee company, as can be seen in the following 
chapters. 
 
1.2.3 Definition of Acquisition 
The expression ‘acquisition’ is normally used when one company buys or takes control of 
another, whether by buying the majority of the company’s shares or all of its property.75 
Unlike in the case of a merger, in an acquisition the buying company does not necessarily 
assume the liabilities of the target company. According to Spaeth and Garriga (2002)
76
, 
an ‘acquisition’ normally involves the purchase of another firm’s assets and liabilities, 
with the acquired firm continuing to exist as a legally owned subsidiary of the acquirer.
77
 
The acquired entity ceases to exist as a corporate body but the buyer sometimes retains 
the name of the acquired company, or indeed may use it as its own name.
78
 
 
Accordingly, the legal concept of acquisition is a contract of sale between two 
companies: the first big and strong (the acquiring company) and the second weak and less 
powerful (the acquired company). The first company gains control of the second through 
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the purchase of all or some of its outstanding shares, or otherwise through the purchase of 
its assets. The result of this process is the disappearance of the sold company and 
significant activity for the acquiring or purchasing company.
79
 In this regard, the 
company is then able to control the financial and administrative activities, with invested 
capital of the acquired company. Accordingly, the acquiring company becomes a holding 
company, whilst the acquired company becomes a subsidiary without the demise of the 
legal personality of one of the two companies.
80
 
 
Through the concept of acquisition mentioned above, it is clear that, in the case of 
an acquisition, four elements and important pillars must be present. Firstly, there must be 
a contract between two companies whereby there is a purchase (not a transfer) of the 
assets and the obligations of the acquired company to the acquiring company. Secondly, 
the acquiring company should be a large and strong company and the acquired company 
should be a smaller and weaker company in terms of financial position. Thirdly, in order 
for the acquisition to occur, the acquiring company must buy a large proportion of the 
acquired company’s assets through the purchase of all or at least 51% of its shares, in 
order to gain power and dominate the voting in terms of the Board of Directors. 
Moreover, following the acquisition, the acquired company should disappear or otherwise 
become a subsidiary of the acquiring company. Also, the acquiring company becomes a 
holding company that has control over all the activities and dealings of the acquired 
company, without the demise of its moral and legal personality. 
 
1.2.4 Mergers According to UK Legislation 
 
According to UK Legislation, a merger is a legal process whereby one or more public 
companies, including the company in respect of which the compromise or arrangement is 
proposed, transfer their undertakings, property and liabilities to another existing public 
company (a “merger by absorption”).81 Alternatively, it is a legal process whereby two or 
more public companies, including the company in respect of which the compromise or 
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arrangement is proposed, transfer their undertakings, property and liabilities to a new 
company, whether or not it is a public company (a “merger by the formation of a new 
company”).82 In other words, a merger is a legal process where one company proposes to 
acquire all the assets and liabilities of another in exchange for the issuance of shares or 
other securities of one to the shareholders of the other, with or without any cash payment 
to shareholders.
83
 
 
From the merger concepts mentioned, it can be said that UK legislators are keen 
and give attention to regulate mergers by providing provisions showing the general 
concepts of merger, as well as solving the problem of a minority shareholders or partners 
who are not willing to merge by providing that they can exit the transferor company and 
recover the value of their shares through payment in cash by the transferee company. UK 
legislation emphasises that the shareholders of the transferor company get new shares in 
the transferee company instead of their shares in the transferor company, which merge 
with the transferee company’s shares.84 
 
Importantly, UK legislators stipulate the transfer of all rights and obligations from 
the transferor company to the transferee company. In this regard and according to the UK 
Companies Act,
85
 mergers can have impacts in different ways. If two entities genuinely 
desire to combine their business activities for their mutual advantage, then a merger may 
be a harmonious union of two firms, with the result that a new firm is formed that 
comprises both of their previous shareholders, employees and management (merger by 
the formation of a new firm).
86
 The practice of mergers tends to be that they are anything 
but harmonious because the new firm (the resulting entity) usually finds itself with two 
people doing the same work that had been performed when the businesses were separate 
firms.
87
 Consequently, there will be a period of adjustment in which one group in the 
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management tends to acquire the upper hand. For example, the resulting firm’s logo, 
name and business culture may resemble one of the previous firms more than other.
88
 
Another means by which a merger can take place is where one firm is absorbed into 
another firm so that there is a merger but the resultant entity is effectively an enlarged 
form of one of the firms (merger by absorption).
89
 In any event, the resulting firm will 
have to recognise the shareholdings of the shareholders in the previous firm.
90
 
 
The UK legislators also give attention to companies taking benefit from the 
advantages of a merger, as determined by law. This is represented in the exemption of 
companies involved in mergers or resulting from mergers from all taxes and fees 
deserved due to the merger, giving priority to mergers of public shareholding companies 
and distinguishing between mergers by absorption and mergers by the formation of a new 
company. In cases of merger by absorption, the texts of the laws only allow public 
shareholding companies with others of the same type to form a new public shareholding 
company through the merger. In cases of merger by the formation of a new company, the 
law allows mergers for all public shareholding companies, regardless of the type of 
company resulting from the merger. 
 
According to the UK Insolvency Act 1986,
91
 there is a specific mechanism for the 
merger of companies. According to section 110 of the act, a company that is in voluntary 
winding up may transfer or sell the whole or part of its business or property to another 
company. The company may, in the case of voluntary winding up, pass a special 
resolution authorising the liquidator to receive a variety of property types, including cash, 
share policies or other interests, in the transferee company for distribution among the 
members of the transferor company according to their interests in that company.
92
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Indeed, a company is not just a legal personality; at the same time, it is a cell or 
economic entity that needs to preserve and continue its work. The UK legislators take this 
into consideration when they provide the right of companies in the merger even the 
companies under liquidation. With reference to this fact, article 110 of the UK Insolvency 
Act 1986 provides that it is allowed for any company under liquidation to empower the 
liquidator - by special decisions issued by the General Assembly - to provide the 
company’s activity or its assets to another company, in return for shares or other interests 
in the company for distribution to the shareholders of the company under liquidation.
93
 
The meaning of liquidation here is liquidation that happens in accordance with the 
requests of shareholders.
94
 However, in the case of voluntary liquidation in accordance 
with the requests of creditors, the liquidator derives its powers from the court or from the 
liquidation committee.
95
In this case, if the merger project cannot be implemented due to 
the non-issuance of a special resolution from the General Assembly authorising the 
liquidator to provide the company’s assets to another company, or if the shares of the 
companies involved consist of different categories, then the court can ratify the merger 
decision according to the rules and provisions of the Companies Act 2006. 
 
From the abovementioned, we can conclude that, according to the UK Companies 
Act, there are two circumstances in which a merger can take place: either by one 
company merging with another company or by two companies forming a new company 
by means of their merger. Shares or payment in cash for the transferor company’s 
shareholders are exchanged by the transferee company, replacing the transferor company 
in all its rights and obligations. This statute applies only to mergers between shareholding 
public companies; it does not apply to mergers involving private companies.  
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1.2.5 Acquisition According to UK Laws 
The most important acquisition (takeover) activities in the UK are governed by the 
Takeover Code
96
 addition to part 28
97
 of the UK Companies Act 2006. With this in mind, 
section 979
98
 of the UK Companies Act 2006 provides that a takeover bidder is someone 
who has already acquired 90% of a company’s shares and accordingly has the right to 
compulsorily buy-out the remaining shareholders. Conversely, section 983
99
 allows 
minority shareholders to insist their stakes are bought out. Furthermore, according to the 
Takeover Code, as a basic principle, all shareholders are to be treated equally within the 
same class of shares. In order to help ensure such equality, bidders involved in a takeover 
and mandatory offer are prohibited from paying lesser amounts to other parties for target 
shares within a certain period.
100
 
 
According to Stephen (2007),
101
 acquisitions (takeovers) may take effect by 
means of the simple method of one firm acquiring the majority or the whole of the shares 
in another firm from its shareholders. While, mergers ostensibly appear to involve the 
consensual union of two or more different firms, acquisitions may not necessarily be 
harmonious. Acquisitions involve one firm acquiring all or the majority of the shares in 
another firm and so taking over that other firm’s business assets. The firm conducting the 
acquisition will make an offer to the target firm’s shareholders to buy their shares at a 
given price. In relation to acquisitions or takeovers of public firms, whose shares are 
traded on regulated markets, the buyer will typically build up its shareholding in the 
target firm slowly until it holds a majority of its shares sufficient to take control of the 
business.
102
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In acquisition cases, it is normal for the acquiring firm to make an offer to the 
other firm’s shareholders to buy their shares at a stated price and with a fixed time within 
which the offer is to be accepted, with the condition that if a named percentage of the 
shareholders does not accept the offer, the offer is void. The offer is usually at a higher 
price than the present market value of the shares as quoted on the stock exchange and it 
may be in cash or in kind.
103
 
 
Economic reasons and rival bidders are the most important reasons for 
acquisitions. From a legal perspective, takeovers adopt one of three different types: 
friendly takeovers, bail-out takeovers and hostile takeovers.  
 
A friendly takeover means the takeover of one company by changes occurring in 
its management and control through negotiations between the existing promoters and 
prospective investors; this is done in a friendly manner. Thus, this type is also referred to 
as a negotiated takeover. This kind of takeover is carried out in further consideration of 
the common objectives of both parties.
104
 
 
A hostile takeover is a takeover where one company unilaterally pursues the 
acquisition of the shares of another company without the knowledge of the second 
company. The main reason that causes companies to resort to this kind of takeover is to 
increase their market share.
105
 Finally, the bail-out takeover option refers to the takeover 
of a financially tired company by a financially wealthy company.
106
 
 
It can be noticed that, unlike UK legislation, UAE and Qatar legislation does not 
regulate or define acquisition operations. Perhaps the reason for this is owing to the fact 
that the laws addressing M&A subjects in both countries are old, in addition to the lack of 
experience of national companies in acquisition cases due to the difference in economic 
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size and capital between them and foreign companies. This needs to be reviewed by the 
lawmakers in both countries and domestic and cross-border acquisition needs to be 
regulated, commensurate with the economic development of the two countries. 
 
1.2.6 Mergers According to UAE and Qatar Laws 
 
According to UAE and Qatar Companies Laws, a company may "even if in the process of 
dissolution…merge with another company of the same type or another type".107 
Furthermore, "the merger will take place by adding one or more companies to another 
existing company or by merging two or more companies in a new company under 
establishment".
108
 "The merger contract will define its terms and conditions, especially 
the evaluation of the liability on the merging company and the number of shares or 
equities that are allotted in the capital of the company or that is resulted from the 
merger".
109
 "The merger will not be valid until it is issued under a decision from every 
company that becomes a partner thereof as per the terms and condition prescribed for the 
amendment for the articles of the association and statute of the company".
110
 "All the 
rights and liabilities of the transferor company will be transferred to the transferee 
company or the company resulted from the merger which to be effective after the 
completion of the merger procedures and registration of the company as per the 
provisions of this Law".
111
 “The transferee company or new company that resulted from 
the merger will be considered as legal successor to the transferor company and is 
replaced in all rights and liabilities".
112
 
 
Through the legal texts outlined above, it can be observed that, as a result of the 
perceived importance of companies and their role in serving society and the economy, 
UAE and Qatar Companies Laws permit the merger of companies even in the case of 
companies in liquidation. This is on the basis that the reality confirms that a company is 
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not just a legal personality but is also an economical cell or entity requiring maintenance 
and encouragement in terms of continuation. However, the capacity for companies in 
liquidation cases to merge (which is intended in the text by the legislators)requires that 
the company remains in liquidation. It also requires that the company accordingly does 
not issue a decision to confirm the completion of the liquidation following the payment of 
debt
113
 and that the distribution of the company’s assets amongst its partners and 
shareholders has not been initiated.
114
 Essentially, at the end of the liquidation phase, the 
company has virtually ended and its economic project has also expired; thus, the merger 
in this case is a formality, especially if the company’s assets or money have not 
remained, where, the aims of company from the merger in this case to take benefits from 
tax exemptions provided by law. This is because a real merger includes the transfer of the 
assets and liabilities of the transferor company to the transferee company. Also, a merger 
requires the liquidator to have obtained a decision from the partners or shareholders to 
confirm the merger of the company with another company to form a new company.
115
 
 
The texts also point out the epithet of a merger as a contract between two or more 
companies, which is commensurate with the contractual nature of mergers, as a merger is 
a process that happens by mutual consent and with the approval of the shareholders of the 
transferor and transferee companies. Moreover, the texts point out the types and effects of 
merger decisions, as well as the procedures to be followed to make a merger decision. 
 
To encourage and provide support for small businesses to enter into competition 
with large companies, the texts mention that all companies seeking to merge have the 
right to choose and merge with any type of company. However, one disadvantage of 
these texts can be seen when companies are given this right without any restrictions or 
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discrimination between companies with a legal personality and those that do not enjoy a 
legal personality, such as particular partnership companies. Al-sgir (1987)
116
 and Al-msri 
(1986)
117
 believe there is no harm in allowing all types of company to enter into merger 
operations without discrimination between companies. However, this view is contrary to 
the provisions of the laws, which require that mergers only occur between existing 
companies and those enjoying moral personalities.  
 
According to UAE and Qatar laws, companies are divided into three types: capital 
 companies, people companies and mixed companies.
118
 Capital companies are 
based on financial accounts and do not depend on the personalities of partners, often 
including a number of shareholders. Importantly, the aim of such companies is to raise 
the funds required for a project; the optimum model for capital companies is the 
shareholding company.
119
 On the other hand, mixed companies combine the 
characteristics of persons companies and capital companies.
120
In this regard, there are no 
problems in merging these types of companies with other companies of the same type or 
a different type; rather, the problem is in regard to particular partnership companies, 
which are a type of persons company.
121
 
 
A persons company is an organisation based on the personalities of shareholders 
and confidence amongst partners, which is often established between a small number of 
people associated by close relationships, friendship or knowledge. Such companies 
include joint companies, limited partnership companies and particular partnership 
companies. In this instance, the question that arises is: to what extent is the merger of 
particular partnership companies (especially those companies established to do or 
perform a specific job and to end with the completion of work) feasible? 
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Particular partnership companies comprise two or more persons and the company 
does not have a moral personality, so the company is therefore not subject to the 
procedures of registration in the Commercial Register. This type of company is 
characterised by confidentiality between partners, without the presence of others, and 
does not need to be recorded in the Commercial Register or publicly, or its existence 
disclosed in the face of others. As a result of this, it does not have a name (title), 
independent finances, eligibility foracquire rights and take responsibility, nationality or 
homeland, or a legal representative.
122
 
 
Furthermore, particular partnership companies are often established in order to 
accomplish commercial business or otherwise, so their composition only takes a specific 
amount of time. In this regard, a particular partnership company is not subject to a 
liquidation system as it does not enjoy a moral personality. It also has no independent 
financial receivables from the partners’ receivables; rather, its liquidation is limited to the 
settlement of the accounts between the partners and determining the share of each of 
these in regard to profit and loss.
123
 
 
Accordingly, if a merger only occurs between two or more companies with 
independent legal personalities, it is therefore necessary to exclude particular partnership 
companies from the circle of companies that may integrate or be involved in merger 
operations, as they do not enjoy a legal moral personality that would qualify them to 
appear before the judiciary. With this in mind, the texts of articles 272 of Qatar and 276 
of the UAE companies laws, which allow merger operations for all companies (including 
particular partnership companies), are unfortunate, because particular partnership 
companies are different from the other companies that enjoy independent legal 
personalities in the face of others. Furthermore, entry of this type of company into M&As 
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leads to deprive companies of the tax breaks that are provided by the laws in cases of 
mergers between shareholding companies. For this reason, the aforementioned articles 
need to be reviewed and modified by legislators. 
 
From the texts, it can also be observed that there is an indication of the types of 
mergers and their procedures. The text also confirms how UAE and Qatar Companies 
Laws have adopted the contractual concept for the merger definition. This can be seen 
through the explicit statement that a merger is a contract, thus implying that a merger 
requires the presence of two or more companies adopting similar or different activities. 
Therefore, mergers can only take place in the presence of two or more existing 
companies; if the companies do not exist, strictly speaking, then this cannot be 
considered a merger in the eyes of the law. Similarly, it is not a merger when one 
company purchases most of the shares of another company with the aim of transforming 
it into a subsidiary of the buyer company. 
 
1.3 Distinctions between Mergers and Acquisitions 
1.3.1 Differences between M&As from the Legal Aspect 
 
Although they are often uttered in the same breath and used as though they were 
synonymous, the terms ‘merger’ and ‘acquisition’ mean slightly different things. From 
the legal perspective, the differences between M&As can be seen by considering the 
extent of the continuation or the end of the legal entity of the transferor or acquired 
company. Essentially, acquisition means buying,
124
 ruling and controlling a percentage 
between 51% and 100% of the acquired company’s shares, with the survival of the 
personal, moral and legal entity of the acquired company without change and with its 
operations continuing as usual. Thus, the acquiring company can re-sell the shares it 
possesses in the acquired company to other investors if they desire to do so.
125
 In other 
words, when one company takes over another and clearly establishes itself as the new 
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owner, the purchase is called an acquisition. From a legal point of view, the target 
company ceases to exist: the buyer "swallows" the business and the buyer's stock 
continues to be traded.
126
 
 
According to the theory of the legal personality of a company,
127
 a ‘merger’ refers 
to the expiration of the legal personality (the legal entity) of the transferor company and 
the abolition of its record as a separate commercial name in the Commercial Register of 
companies. This is ascertained upon completion of merger procedures and the registration 
of the new company resulting from the merger, meaning the dissolving of the legal entity 
of the transferor firm into the legal entity of the transferee company (merger by 
absorption), or the dissolving of both the transferee company and the transferor company 
and the subsequent emergence of a new legal entity (with a new commercial name) by 
the formation of a new company, comprising the same assets and liabilities of each of the 
transferee and transferor companies.
128
 In the purest sense of the term, a merger happens 
when two firms, often of about the same size, agree to go forward as a single new 
company rather than remain separately owned and operated. This kind of action is more 
precisely referred to as a "merger of equals." Both companies' stocks are surrendered and 
new company stock is issued in its place. 
 
1.3.2 Practical Differences between M&As 
 
From the practical side, acquisitions can be seen as hostile acts as they often happen 
without the consent of the members of the Board of Directors of the acquired company. 
This may subsequently result in changes in the acquired company’s management 
according to the desires of the acquiring company that controls the voting shares in the 
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acquired company.
129
 Commonly, there is often the transfer of the ownership of shares to 
the acquiring company’s shareholders, either by the payment of cash or by bonds: the 
acquiring company is thus able to control the assets of the acquired company and its 
requirements. However, markedly, mergers usually happen by agreement between the 
administrations of each of the merging and merged companies and also with the approval 
of the General Assemblies of each, owing to the importance of mergers in terms of 
representing the common interests of both parties and ensuring the shareholders of both 
companies retain their shares in the new entity or in the merging company. The shares are 
therefore accrued to shareholders in the new company.
130
 Whether a purchase is 
considered a merger or an acquisition really depends on whether the purchase is friendly 
or hostile and how it is announced. In other words, the real difference lies in how the 
purchase is communicated to and received by the target company's Board of Directors, 
employees and shareholders. 
 
In practice, there is also commonly differentiation between M&As in terms of the 
ways in which they are funded and in terms of the relative sizes of the companies. Unlike 
a merger, an acquisition is financed either through monetary financing or through debt 
bonds. Furthermore, capital may also be funded by borrowing from any bank or by 
obtaining finance by issuing bonds, instead, can give share of acquiring company as 
substitute or compensation.
131
 
 
1.4 Classifications of M&As 
 
The importance of studying the types of mergers and acquisitions is relevant owing to the 
different objectives of each type of merger and acquisition, as well as differences in the 
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legal provisions applicable in regard to mergers by absorption or mergers by the 
formation of a new company. Furthermore, there are differences in terms of their effects 
on the corporate structures involved in the M&A operations. Unlike mergers by 
absorption, mergers by the formation of a new company are known to be more complex 
and also have significant effects on the structure of the merging and merged companies, 
owing to the dissolution of the two companies and the formation of a new company, 
which requires greater effort and more money. With this in mind, it is recognised that 
there may also be some significant effects on the employees and Boards of Directors of 
the transferor and transferee companies owing to restructuring and the desire of the 
owners of the two companies to apply unified rules and regulations for the company 
resulting from the merger. In practice, mergers are traditionally classified in three ways: 
by degree of legal dependency, by degree of business connection and by the nationality 
of the companies.
132
 Moreover, acquisitions are classified according to the nationality of 
the companies, the type of work and production of the companies, the type of buyer and 
the quantity of shares. In the following paragraphs, different M&A types, according to 
their categorisation approaches, will be described in reference to the laws under study, 
showing the economic rationales behind the types. 
 
1.4.1 M&As by Degree of Business Relationship 
1.4.1.1 Horizontal M&As 
A horizontal merger is a business merger in which two firms are involved in the 
production of the same kinds of goods and services (for example, merging one steel 
manufacturer with another steel manufacturer).
133
A horizontal acquisition also takes 
place between two companies in the same line of business, such as one tool and dye 
company purchasing another.
134
 In other words, horizontal acquisition simply means a 
strategy to increase market share by taking over a similar company. This takeover or 
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buyout can be done in the same geographical location or in other countries to increase the 
company’s reach.135 
 
Mergers and acquisitions of this kind often take place as part of a strategy to 
achieve a larger share of the available consumer market by merging the strengths of each 
firm into one central entity.
136
 At times, a merger of this kind will also take place as a 
way of minimising the number of competitive companies within a given industry, which 
subsequently decreases the number of companies operating in a particular area. 
Markedly, this can be achieved owing to the merger facilitating collusion amongst the 
companies to reach a monopoly in the area or field in which the companies work, and 
thus to raise prices.
137
 This is often the case, especially in saturated markets. The reason 
for this is that horizontal mergers reduce the number of firms within an industry and thus 
enable the merged company to realise monopolistic profits.
138
 
 
Importantly, the motives for this type of merger mainly surround economies of 
scale or the development of the market position. Furthermore, a horizontal merger could 
lead to the production of higher quality goods and services, thus allowing consumers to 
receive a greater amount of satisfaction from their purchases. At the same time, a 
horizontal merger could create a situation where consumers have fewer options when it 
comes to selecting goods and services, thus forcing consumers to settle for less than what 
they really wanted.
139
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A horizontal merger is organised by Qatar and UAE Companies Laws where they 
allow for a company to merge with other companies of the same or different types,
140
 in 
order to provide an opportunity for companies to increase their activities by attempting to 
create more efficient economies of scale, with a desire to preserve and protect small 
business. 
 
1.4.1.2 Vertical M&As 
 
A vertical merger or acquisition occurs when two companies work at different stages of 
production of the same item. In most cases, the vertical merger is a union that takes place 
voluntarily. Both parties determine that joining forces will strengthen the current 
positions of the two businesses and also lays the foundation for expanding into other 
areas as well. For example, a company that produces bearings for factory machinery may 
choose to merge with a company that manufactures gears for the same type of machinery. 
Together, they may subsequently decide to continue to provide products to their existing 
clientele.
141
 Post-merger, the result is vertical integration and a single firm now 
performing both stages of production. It is useful to adopt a three-way classification for 
conglomerate mergers based on the relationship between the products involved. These are 
mergers between complementary products, neighbouring products and unrelated 
products.
142
 
 
According to Barthélemy (2011),
143
 a vertical merger or acquisition is a process in 
which several steps in the production and/or distribution of a product or service are 
controlled by a single company or entity, in order to increase that company or entity’s 
power in the marketplace. A current example is the oil industry, in which a single firm 
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commonly owns the oil wells, refines the oil and sells gasoline at roadside stations. In 
horizontal integration, by contrast, a company attempts to control a single stage of 
production or a single industry completely, which lets it take advantage of economies of 
scale but results in reduced competition. 
 
These types of M&As can reduce the reliance of one company upon another. 
Furthermore, it also reduces the costs of the two firms by eliminating redundant 
processes. This can also mean a merger between two companies involved in an identical 
business but at different levels. As an example, an upstream oil company may merge with 
a downstream oil company to streamline operations, or an automobile company may 
purchase a tyre manufacturer or a glass company.
144
 Similarly, a meat processing 
company could merge with a food distributor.
145
 Mergers in such situations permit firms 
to gain greater control of the manufacturing or selling process within one single 
industry.
146
 
 
A vertical merger typically requires more than a simple agreement for the joining 
of forces. Mergers of this kind will involve careful planning on the behalf of both firms. 
Investors for both entities will be involved in the process, as well as both management 
teams. Normally, all firms will also want to prepare their respective client bases for the 
vertical merger by providing them with information about what is anticipated to change 
and what will remain the same. The idea is to assure existing customers that the products 
and services upon which they rely will still be available, the level of service will remain 
high and that there will be benefits of the merger that will make life easier for each 
customer. However, some parties consider that mergers could lead to a substantial 
lessening of competition owing to the merger parties having knowledge of existing 
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systems and a broader portfolio of products. In particular, they are concerned about the 
effect of the ‘bundling’ of products.147 
 
According to Pilsbury and Meaney (2009),
148
 a company should undergo a 
vertical merger or acquisition when there is a threat of being unfairly exploited by a 
supplier. When there are a small number of suppliers, there is a possibility that these 
suppliers may take advantage of their clients’ dependence to behave opportunistically. By 
using vertical integration instead of outsourcing, a firm can totally avoid this threat.
149
 
 
There are also various different types of acquisition that allow one company to 
acquire another, such as through buying the voting stock. This can be done by a tender 
offer or otherwise by agreement of the administration. In the case of a tender offer, the 
buying company makes an offer to buy the stock directly to the shareholders, thereby 
bypassing the administration.
150
 
 
Another type of acquisition is consolidation. In the case of a consolidation, 
entirely new companies are produced, with the two previous entities ceasing to exist. 
Consolidated economic statements are organised under the assumption that two or more 
company entities are, in reality, only one entity. The consolidated statements are then 
prepared by merging the account balances of the individual companies after certain 
adjustments and accordingly eliminating certain entries.
151
 
 
1.4.1.3 Conglomerate Mergers 
 
Conglomerate mergers occur between two or more companies involved in totally 
unconnected business activities or in totally different industries. For example, a 
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conglomerate merger could witness the unison of an athletic shoe company merging with 
a soft drinks company. This category of merger is further subdivided into two main types: 
mixed and pure. Mixed conglomerate mergers involve companies that are looking for 
product extensions or market extensions, whilst pure conglomerate mergers, on the other 
hand, involve firms with nothing in common. Moreover, there are various other 
subdivisions of conglomerate mergers, such as financial conglomerates, concentric 
companies and managerial conglomerates.
152
 
 
Importantly, there are numerous reasons for this type of merger. Amongst the 
more general reasons are adding to the share of the market owned by the company and 
indulging in selling. Companies also look to add to their overall synergies and 
productivity by undergoing conglomerate mergers.
153
 Furthermore, there are many 
different benefits associated with conglomerate mergers.
154
One of the major benefits is 
that conglomerate mergers assist companies in diversification. As a result of 
conglomerate mergers, the merging companies can also reduce the level of exposure to 
risks through the sharing of assets and the reducing of business risk. However, such a 
merger can also become a risk to the company if the new company becomes too large or 
if it is not otherwise able to successfully blend the two companies.  
 
In conclusion, conglomerate mergers have many implications. For example, it has 
often been seen that the two companies merging do not have the same customer base as 
they are in totally different businesses, yet companies still continue to strive to ascertain 
conglomerate mergers in order to boost their sizes.
155
 This, at times, has adverse effects 
on the functioning of the new company. It has usually been experiential that such 
companies are not able to operate like they used to prior to the merger taking place. In 
addition, conglomerate mergers do not affect the structures of the host industries. 
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Moreover, it has normally been observed that companies that go for these types of merger 
are able to add to their production, as well as strengthen their marketing area; thus 
ensuring improved profitability. Furthermore, they are also able to manage a wide variety 
of activities in a particular market. For example, such companies can carry out research 
activities and applied engineering processes.
156
 
 
1.4.2 Merger Types in Terms of the Merger’s Effects on the Company’s 
Legal Personality 
1.4.2.1 Mergers by Absorption 
 
Mergers by absorption take place when an existing company acquires all the assets and 
liabilities of one or more transferor companies in exchange for the issuance of shares to 
the shareholders of the transferor company (with or without a cash payment).
157
 
 
According to section 278 of UAE Companies Law and section 274 of Qatar 
Companies Law, this kind of merger will be executed by a decision of dissolution issued 
by the transferor company.
158
 The net assets of the transferor company will then be 
evaluated in pursuance to the provisions of evaluating the material share stipulated in the 
law.
159
 Subsequently, the transferee company will issue a decision increasing its capital, 
as per the result of the estimation to the transferor company capital. Subsequently, the 
increase of capital will be distributed amongst the partners in the transferor company in 
accordance with their shares therein.
160
 
 
The objectives of a merger by absorption are the greatest operational 
consolidations in all business areas. Accordingly, this particular model implies or 
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accommodates all other types of merger, whether between firms operating in the same 
business (horizontal mergers),
161
 between companies operating or doing business in a 
way considered complementary (vertical mergers)
162
 or between companies operating in 
different businesses (conglomerate mergers).
163
 A merger by absorption may lead to 
decrease overlapping property and staff, achieve lower operating costs and add further 
economies of scale, such as in purchasing or distribution. However, a merger by 
absorption makes the merger contract subject to certain conditions, where the drawing up 
of a merger report is required, as well as the verification of the merger by experts and 
notification of the merger prior to its registration in the Commercial Register of the place 
of establishment of the absorbing entity. A practical example of a merger by absorption 
was the absorption of GBL by Electrafina.
164
 
 
Moreover, according to the theory of the legal personality of a company,
165
 the 
consequence of a merger by absorption from the legal side is the expiry of the transferor 
company and the demise of its legal personality, with the survival of its physical entity 
and economic project in the scope of the transferee company, which receives all the 
transferor company’s rights and replaces it in terms of all its rights and obligations. 
 
1.4.2.2 Mergers by the Formation of a New Company 
 
Mergers by the formation of a new company take place when two companies issue 
decisions of dissolution and then they form a new company, with its capital consisting of 
all the assets and rights of the two companies involved in the merger, in exchange for 
new shares issued by the new company for both the transferor companies’ shareholders 
(with or without a cash payment).
166In other words, the term ‘merger’ in regard to the 
formation of a new company means to unite two companies into one larger company, 
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subsequently resulting in the creation of a new company with a new name (with the name 
commonly consisting of the names of the original two companies) as well as a new 
trademark. On the other hand, such a merger can take place by the merger of two or more 
companies into a new company.
167
 Markedly, such types of merger are made by issuing 
each company involved in the merger (the transferor and transferee companies) a 
decision to dissolve itself, at which point a new company is formed, as per the terms 
stipulated in the law. Each merging company is then allotted with a number of shares or 
equity equivalent to its shares in the capital of the new company. These shares will be 
distributed amongst the partners in every merging company in accordance with their 
shares therein.
168
 
 
Mergers by the formation of a new company can accommodate vertical, 
horizontal and conglomerate mergers, and further comprise national and cross-border 
mergers. Unlike mergers by absorption, mergers by the formation of a new company are 
distinguished in regard to their complex measures and their negative effects on the 
structures and entities of the transferor and transferee companies, their employees, and 
directors, owing to the time it takes to restructure the two transferor companies and 
establish the formation of the new company resulting from the merger. Markedly, in this 
type of merger, there is the melting of the legal entity for each of the merging and the 
merged companies, and the subsequent emergence of a new legal entity under a new 
trade name with the same assets and liabilities of each of the transferor and transferee 
companies. 
 
This type of merger may be used in order to avoid bankruptcy. Essentially, it 
represents the desires of two companies to enter a new market, take advantage of 
economies of scale or reduce the costs associated with the production of a greater number 
of products or services, for example by reducing the number of employees resulting from 
the merging of similar sections. Moreover, via the merge, the companies may aim to 
control a greater share of the output sectors belonging to each of the two parties of the 
                                                 
167
Articles 273 and 276 of Qatar and UAE Companies Laws. 
168
 Articles 275 of Qatar and 278 of the UAE Companies Laws. For the concept of merger by the formation 
of a new company according to the UK Companies Act, see article 904/2 of the Act.  
53 
 
merger, thereby increasing the capacity of each to influence production and price trends 
within their respective sectors.  
 
Given the importance of this type of merger and its implications, section 904
169
 of 
the UK Companies Act and sections 278
170
 of UAE and 275
171
 of Qatar Companies Laws 
were organised in terms of its concept and procedures through explicit texts. According 
to the theory of the legal personality of a company (and unlike in cases of merger by 
absorption) the consequence of a merger by the formation of a new company from the 
legal side is the expiration of the transferor and transferee companies, the demise of their 
legal personalities and the subsequent emergence of a new legal personality, which is a 
company personality resulting from the merger. Therefore, this type of merger requires 
extensive consultations between the two companies involved prior to the merger in order 
to reach the best solutions and results and to avoid the two companies from experiencing 
negative effects should the merger fail, such as owing to the time that this type of merger 
necessitates. A practical example of this type of merger was the merge of Emirates Bank 
with the National Bank of Dubai by 95% of the capital. The deal was valued at $ 3.8 
billion and resulted in the birth of one of the largest banking institutions in the GCC 
region.
172
 
 
1.4.3 Domestic and Cross-Border M&As 
1.4.3.1 Domestic M&As 
 
A domestic merger occurs when one or more national companies merge with one or more 
other national companies. In other words, a national merger is a merger by absorption or 
by the formation of a new company in the same country between companies that have a 
                                                 
169
 See also regulation 2 of the UK Cross-Border Merger Act 2007. 
170
 See article 278 of UAE Companies Law. 
171
 Which provides for “The merger will be made by issuing each merging companies a decision of 
dissolution and then they form a new company as per the terms stipulated in this Law? Each merging 
company will be allotted a number of shares or equities equivalents to its shares in the capital of the new 
company. These shares will be distributed among the partners in every merging company in accordance 
with their shares therein”. 
172
 Saleh Suhaibani and Abdel Azim Mussa (n 50) 8. 
54 
 
similar nationality and operate under national laws. A prime example of this was the 
merger between Halifax and Lloyds banks. The objectives of this type of merger may be 
to achieve vertical and horizontal integration or to otherwise motivate competition and/or 
survival, as well as to increase the companies’ respective abilities to compete with 
dominant foreign companies.
173
 Also, such a merger may be used as a solution for 
troubled companies,
174
 to achieve public interest and protect the national economy, 
maintain a company’s reputation, ensure protection from exposure to economic vibration 
or may be used as a result of the desire to control.
175
 
 
A domestic acquisition is a process occurring between companies of one 
nationality and is subject to the law or laws of one state, regardless of whether the two 
companies practice the same or different activities and regardless of whether the 
acquisition is in whole or in part. In other words, unlike cross-border acquisitions, 
domestic acquisitions refer to where the selling and buying companies are incorporated 
within the same country or where acquiring and selling occurs between companies 
sharing the same geographical borders of operation.
176
 This type of acquisition can be 
friendly and occur through negotiations of the Boards of Directors of the two companies 
involved in the acquisition operation. Alternatively, they can be unfriendly, which occurs 
in cases where the target company of the acquisition is unwilling to be purchased or 
where the Board of Directors of the target company does not have adequate knowledge in 
regard to acquisition offers. 
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Domestic M&As may be witnessed either in the form of absorption or through the 
formation of a new company. In addition, they may also occur between two companies 
producing goods or presenting different services for final specific products,
177
 or between 
two companies operating within the same activity and which together produce similar 
products and services in order to form a larger entity and gain access to the largest market 
shares, hence reducing the costs associated with the production of a new entity.
178
 
 
Notably, a domestic merger leads to the expiry of the transferor company’s legal 
personality and the transfer of all its rights and obligations to the transferee company, 
which subsequently becomes the legal representative for both companies in the face of 
others. Unlike cross-border mergers, Martin (2004)
179
finds that in the UK, domestic 
M&As lead to increase both profitability and the wages of employees. Furthermore, 
Terry (1996)
180
 adds that domestic mergers offer employees the opportunity to improve 
their social identities.  
 
The aim of this type of merger or acquisition is to strengthen national companies 
and thereby increase their activities and services in competition with foreign companies. 
Furthermore, through such acquisitions, companies try to expand their markets through 
the annexation of customers of other companies in order to get new technologies, to try to 
reduce production costs by creating larger companies, as a result of a desire to control. 
 
Practical examples of these mergers between local companies that occurred in 
2008
181
in the UAE and Qatar include: the integration of Barwa Real Estate Company 
with Qatar for real estate investments, the integration of Qatar Trading for meat and 
livestock with the Al Meera Company for Consumer Goods, and the integration of the 
Qatar Company for Navigation with Qatar for Shipping.
182
 Examples of domestic 
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acquisitions in the UAE and Qatar include: between Ezdan Real Estate and the 
International Company for Housing in Qatar,
183
the acquisition between the Qatar 
Company for Cinema and Film Distribution (a public company) with Qatriah for 
advertising (a limited liability company), Abu Dhabi Investment Authority acquiring 
Citigroup, Emirates Bank International’s acquisition of the National Bank in Dubai, and 
Advanced Technology for Investment’s acquisition of IMD-MNFG for facilities.184 
 
1.4.3.2 Cross-Border M&As 
 
According to the UK Cross-Border Merger Act 2007,
185
 ‘cross–border merger’ means 
merger by absorption, merger by absorption of a wholly owned subsidiary or merger by 
the formation of a new company.
186
 These activities occur between at least one UK 
company and at least on EEA company.
187
 Accordingly, every transferor company is 
dissolved without going into liquidation
188
 and on its dissolution transfers all its assets 
and liabilities to the transferee company in return for shares or other securities 
representing the capital of the transferee company or by a cash payment, receivable by 
the members of the transferor company.
189
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In accordance with the merger concept above, the Cross-Border Act provides for 
a two-stage process to implement a merger between at least one company formed and 
registered in the UK
190
 and at least one company formed and registered in an EEA state 
other than the UK.
191
 Under the regulations, a “cross border merger” may take one of 
three forms: “merger by absorption”,192 where an existing transferee company acquires 
all the assets and liabilities of one or more transferor companies; merger by absorption 
between an existing transferee company and one or more of its wholly owned 
subsidiaries; and merger by the formation of a new company,
193
 which acquires the assets 
and liabilities of two or more existing transferor companies.
194
 In each case, the transferor 
companies are dissolved without having to go through a formal liquidation process. On 
dissolution, all their assets and liabilities are automatically transferred to the transferee 
company by operation of law.
195
 
 
The merger process has to be certified and approved by a competent authority (in 
England, this is the High Court).
196
 It is also necessary to carry out a parallel process in 
each of the other relevant jurisdictions involved to obtain a pre-merger certificate from 
the appropriate authority.
197
 The law also sets out the conditions to be met in cross-border 
mergers, representing what must be prepared or produced by the directors of a UK 
transferee company, which must include: a directors’ report explaining the effects of the 
merger for members, creditors and employees, and an independent expert report as to 
whether all the shareholders of the transferee companies in agreement that preparation of 
the report by management is not necessary.
198
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The UK cross-border regulations also require that such cross-border mergers take 
account of statutory employee participation rights where these exist in one or more of the 
merging companies. Employee participation is the practice of mandatory representation 
of employees on the boards of companies that are of a certain size.
199
 Moreover, approval 
of the proposal is required from the shareholders of each of the companies involved.
200
 
 
On the other hand, cross-border acquisition refers to a situation wherein the 
buying and selling companies are incorporated in two different countries and are thereby 
subject to two or more different legal regulations. A cross-border acquisition may notably 
be friendly or aggressive and may be entirely procured or acquired through the purchase 
of part or all of the shares and assets of the acquired company.
201
 
 
The cross-border merger regime constitutes a more efficient way of merging the 
businesses of two firms rather than the traditional transfer of the individual assets and 
liabilities of other firms, as the assets and responsibilities of the transferor firms will 
move mechanically through the operation of law. As the transferor company is 
automatically dissolved upon the merger taking effect, there is no need to undergo a 
separate liquidation process following a merger and, consequently, costs and timescales 
are reduced. Additionally, the act of merging with an existing firm in a foreign country 
allows the acquirer’s existing goods to be introduced relatively speedily into the new 
market territory.
202
 Furthermore, in a reciprocal sense, it allows any goods of the target 
company to be introduced into the acquiring firm’s long-established markets.203 Cross-
border M&As can also provide access to new sources of supply and services.
204
 Cross-
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border mergers can be used to reduce the number of legal entities and streamline 
corporate governance obligations and compliance costs within a corporate group. They 
also may have the advantage of increasing the possibility of claiming tax relief for losses 
that might otherwise be unavailable where the losses are those of an overseas 
subsidiary.
205
 
 
However, unlike domestic merger companies, this type of merger has little effect 
on employees and their rights due to the difference in the skills of foreign companies’ 
employees in relation to the skills of national companies’ employees, as well as the 
prevailing work culture in both companies prior to the merger. The impacts of cross-
border M&As are not limited to the impact on employees and the level of competition 
between companies: there are many matters that may face cross-border M&As. Take the 
example of a merger between a UK company and a company from another European 
country: some legislation (such as some legislation of the European Union), in order to 
determine the applicable law in merger cases, applies a different test to determine a 
company’s domicile.206Each jurisdiction in its Company Laws will have a means of 
legislating for mergers and dealing with the complications of two firms becoming one or 
one firm being integrated into another.
207
 There are also taxes and administrative 
problems and difficulties arising from non-harmonised areas of company law, especially 
in the area of work participation.
208
 
 
UK Companies Law regards a company’s domicile as being the country in which 
the company has its registered office, irrespective of where its head office or major 
activities are located. Thus, the registered office may be in one convenient location for 
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regulatory or other purposes while the company’s real business is conducted 
elsewhere.
209
 However, nothing in UK law prevents a company from moving its 
operations and control to another country: it will still be a UK company so far as UK law 
is concerned. By contrast, companies of most member states of the European Union are 
deemed to be domiciled wherever their central management is located because that is 
considered to be de facto the place where the company’s directing mind and will is 
located.
210
 Thus, a firm incorporated in London but whose head office is in Stockholm 
would be regarded as a UK company in the United Kingdom and as a Swedish company 
in Sweden. However, since it would not be registered in Sweden (in this instance), there 
is currently a problem as to where it has a legal personality under Swedish law.
211
 
 
The European Court of Justice has tried to solve such problems on multiple 
occasions. In Centros Ltd v Erhvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen,
212
 the court upheld the right 
of an English registered company to operate as a branch in Denmark. The Danish 
authorities had refused to allow it to do so on the basis that this was, in reality, a Danish 
company that was simply registered in London to avoid the minimum capital rules 
applied to Danish private firms. 
 
In another judgement of the European Court of Justice, relating to Uberseering 
BV v Nordic Construction Company Baumanagement GmbH,
213
 a Dutch firm moved its 
head office to Germany. According to Dutch law, which uses the place of registration or 
incorporation theory, as in the UK, it still remained a Dutch firm. According to German 
law (which uses the real-seat theory), it was held to be subject to German law and 
accordingly it was rejected as a lawful personality there. The European Court of Justice 
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held that although there should be some controls on migration, the denial of a lawful 
personality was a clear breach of the freedom of establishment.
214
 
Practical examples of cross-border mergers in the UK, UAE and Qatar include the 
merge of Shell, Texaco and Amoco and the merge of BP and Mobil. Examples of cross-
border acquisitions between companies include the acquisition between Barclays Bank 
and Qatar Holding, Citigroup and the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, and the 
acquisition between Turkish Telecommunications and Oger Telecommunications in the 
United Arab Emirates.
215
 
 
In the end of this part, we should point out that, unlike UK merger legislation, 
Qatar and UAE laws do not address this type of merger in the heart of their texts, owing 
to the small sizes of domestic companies and their inability to engage in competition with 
international companies that are characterised by large and multiple objectives and 
activities. This case needs to be reconsidered by the Emirati and Qatari legislators 
through the formulation of legal texts governing mergers between national companies 
with each other and between national companies and foreign companies, taking into 
account the business and company’s volume and the culture of the area. This should also 
take into account the extent of the effects of a cross-border merger on the level of 
competition between national companies or at the level of its performance or on its 
employees. 
 
1.4.4 Acquisitions According to the Type of Buyer and Quantity 
1.4.4.1 Acquisitions According to the Type of Buyer 
  
This type of acquisition is divided into two parts: acquisitions through the purchase of 
shares, which means that the acquiring company buys the acquired company’s shares 
through bidding and then submits them to the shareholders of the acquired company, with 
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the payment of the value of these shares made in cash;
216
 and secondly, acquisition by the 
purchase of assets, which means the purchase of the company’s entire assets in cash by 
the acquiring company, where the company that acquired its assets distributes for or 
versus acquired assets to its shareholders in cash in preparation for the liquidation of the 
acquired company, or otherwise with a company that acquired its assets using versus 
assets in changing its main activity. This kind of acquisition involves a costly legal title 
transfer and must be approved by the shareholders of the selling company.
217
 
 
1.4.4.2 Acquisition Types According to Quantity 
 
This type of acquisition is divided into total acquisitions by the purchase of all the assets 
of the acquired company and partial acquisitions by the possession of part of the shares of 
the company. In regard to partial purchases, some acquiring companies prefer to buy 51% 
or more of the acquired company’s shares, thus meaning that the acquiring company has 
a dominant voting power in the Board of Directors. This enables it to control the Board of 
Directors’ company decisions or at least secure effective participation in the issuance of 
such decisions.
218
 
 
What interests us in all the kinds of acquisitions that have been explained is the 
legal and practical effects on the legal entities of the companies involved in acquisitions, 
which are representative in regard to the extent of continuing or ending the legal entity of 
the acquired company and thus the extent of the impacts on the rights of workers, the 
Board of Directors and the shareholders of the acquired and acquiring companies. 
 
Acquisitions (in the most part) mean that the acquiring may purchase up to 100% 
of the acquired company’s shares with the survival of its legal entity in the scope of the 
legal personality of the acquiring company, where it will continue in its operations as 
usual. The acquiring company is then able to re-sell what it received in shares in the 
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acquired company. Importantly, this means the survival and transfer of the projects of the 
acquired company to the acquiring company, which justifies the transfer of the acquired 
company’s employees’ rights (both in relation to work and other rights) to the acquiring 
company. With this in mind, according to the theory of the legal personality of a 
company and the texts of the laws under consideration, in this type of acquisition the 
transfer of the facility from one owner to another does not justify the cancelation of 
employment contracts.
219
 
 
However, from a practical perspective, an acquisition can often be a hostile act by 
the acquiring company without the consent or approval of the management in the 
acquired company, which may result in a change of management in the acquired 
company. Furthermore, by the acquisition, the acquiring company may be able to control 
the fixed assets of the acquired company and its property and liabilities, subsequently 
leading to cuts in the relationships of the acquired company with its shareholders who 
take their shares in cash instead.
220
 
 
Moreover, an acquisition is a process of buying and selling between two or more 
companies, whereby one company (the acquiring company) acquires some or all of the 
shares in another company (the acquired company). The shareholders of the acquired 
company obtain cash in return for their shares that are sold to the acquiring company. 
Subsequently, the legal relationship between the acquired company and its shareholders 
is cut off once the acquisition is process completed. Therefore, in acquisitions (unlike 
shareholders in merger cases), the shareholders of the acquired company do not obtain 
new shares in return for their shares that expired by the acquisition operation. The result 
is that the acquisition does not raise legal problems in cases of trading shares between the 
acquiring company and acquired company’s shareholders.221 
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1.5 Motives of Mergers and Acquisitions 
 
Mergers and acquisitions often result in a number of social benefits. Mergers can bring 
about better management or technical skills to bear on underused assets. Moreover, 
mergers can also produce economies of scale and a scope that reduces costs, improves 
quality, and increases output. The possibility of a takeover can notably discourage 
company managers from behaving in ways that fail to maximise profits. A merger can 
also enable a business owner to sell the firm to someone who is already familiar with the 
industry, and who would be in a better position to pay the highest price. The prospect of a 
lucrative sale induces entrepreneurs to form new firms.  
 
In order to prove these rules and effects, and to learn more about M&A, many 
studies and literatures
222
 discuss such aspects, with the motive of merger recognised as 
merging and sharing corporations’ resources to achieve common purposes, which can be 
improved together than alone. Other research
223
 has been carried out on the dissimilarities 
between types of people, with respondents questioned on the business objectives behind 
mergers. The majority of respondents believe that the most significant purpose behind 
M&A is increase the market share (35%), followed by the maximisation of shareholder 
worth (20%) and access to new geographical markets (19%).
224
 
 
This study, as well as most other studies,
225
 has also found that the most important 
objectives of mergers and acquisitions include the realisation of economies of scale, 
customer demand, gaining access into new markets or to new sales channels, 
globalisation, obtaining new products and brands, diversification, and changing business 
models, which are discuses like as the following statement. 
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1.5.1 Realisation of Economies of Scale 
 
The most significant purpose for merger is business leaders’ desire to leverage increased 
size to reduce the per-customer costs incurred by the enterprise. Typically, mergers which 
are driven by this purpose are executed within the same or similar markets, thereby 
decreasing the time and cost of incorporation, and thus leveraging increased size, 
geography or creation. This approach is sometimes called as ‘buying market share.’226 
The typical promise to shareholders is that consolidation will net savings that will raise 
earnings—often during the merging of procedures, IT infrastructures, consolidation of 
production, and the reduction of operations and administrative costs.
227
 
 
1.5.2 Customer Demand 
 
As consumers become more knowledgeable and demand lower costs and better service, 
competition for customer ‘hearts and minds’ is on the increase. At the same time, 
customers are more in control of the terms of this competition. Increasingly, mergers are 
driven by the objective of ‘capturing’ more customers so as to ensure a constant revenue 
stream, or to otherwise expand the market within which new products and services can be 
delivered. This facilitates cross-selling and common branding.
228
 
 
1.5.3 Gaining Access into New Markets or to New Sales Channels 
 
Many mergers occur in defined product markets wherein the acquirer or merger partner is 
currently serving. For example, merging with a company that enables to target a broader 
or more responsive audience cannot only give access to a greater number ofpotential 
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buyers, but can also help to bring about enhanced production or distribution capabilities 
in new territories.
229
 
The move into other geographical regions may be spurred by poor prospects for 
growth in the areas in which the company is established. This type of diversification 
would be considered horizontal or related diversification. Furthermore, the size gives 
confidence to the client in the capability of the company. There are other possible 
motives for growth, such as profit, cost, revenue and prestige. Essentially, the means of 
achieving corporate growth can occur through internal or external growth. Moreover, 
three means of achieving corporate growth and development are identified:
230
 
 Internally, where the Finn invests its own capital to set up and operate a new 
venture. This option is often the primary vehicle of growth. 
 Externally through an acquisition or merger. This option is often used where 
speed is of the essence. 
 A combination strategy that combines elements of internal and external 
development through contractual agreements.
231
 
 
1.5.4 Globalisation 
 
During recent years, the emergence of a truly global economy has improved opportunities 
to tap the global workforce to supplement internal staff or to extend the enterprise. As a 
consequence, additional activity in acquiring offshore subsidiaries and service 
organisations to extend the enterprise’s business or to add needed abilities can be seen. 
‘Going global’ naturally brings about the need to merge or to acquire, as the time 
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required to establish and grow new foreign businesses—particularly in unknown 
markets—far exceeds the need to execute an M&A strategy.232 
 
It has been observed in recent years that there are several different sectors of the 
economy which are heating up with a number of cross-border mergers and global 
alliances; this is only to improve the economic state of the countries. Globalisation and 
mergers have helped to improve the economic state, with many more sectors having only 
experienced successful mergers with overseas’ companies in the UK. These global 
associations have brought an array of success, which has subsequently created a brand 
value in the market. The trends and growth of mergers and acquisition dealings have led 
to a noticeable increase in the globalisation and mergers within the UK.
233
 
 
Globalisation and mergers within the UK have been massively advantageous for 
all sectors across the country, which has increased the global market efficiency. The 
relation between globalisation and mergers in the UK are quite noteworthy. The 
important elements of British mergers for globalisation can be cited as: a good growth 
policy in the context of globalisation firms in the UK, which have been experiencing a 
surge in the revenue expansion owing to cross-border mergers, with figures set to 
increase more. Generally, UK firms have a clear M&A strategy, with the market policy 
obvious for most firms. That is why, when finalising a deal, no confusion arises. 
234
 
 
1.5.5 Obtaining New Products and Brands 
 
In the realm of new product progress, firms intending on achieving growth agonise over 
the ‘acquire or create’ judgement. Those with available cash, a good depth of resources, 
access to technology, and a keen strategic vision are in the greatest position to purchase 
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companies’ firms or to otherwise merge with firms to achieve new products. The 
alternative is a complex, expensive, and time-consuming period of product or service 
progress. Frequently, by the time a new product has cleared its beta stage, competitors 
and developers of knock-offs or cheaper versions are already releasing rival offerings. 
Technological gains have shortened the time it takes to design, manufacture, promote, 
and ultimately deliver a product or service to the marketplace; therefore, many companies 
prefer to buy rather than make in order to avoid expensive and time-consuming R&D, 
which notably may not yield the desired results.
235
 
 
The example for the extension of the product portfolio is the BMW–Rover 
Merger. Rover covered the lower end of the market with Land Rover; Rover had the 
strongest 4x4 brand worldwide. BMW was not present in those segments at that time. 
BMW stated that the alternative to buying Rover would have been to develop its own 
small car and sport-utility; however, each would have cost BMW more than acquiring 
Rover. Altogether, with the purchase of Rover, BMW acquired 17 marquees, including 
legendary names, such as MG, Austin-Healey and Triumph, and added a Mini—a small 
car and a sport utility—to its product range, all of which BMW needed, and for far less 
than it would have cost to develop them.
236
 
 
Domestic and cross-border M&A provide many prospects for achieving 
economies of scope from global marketing strategies 
237
(Child et al., 2001). Branding 
provides a useful illustration of such potential. An increasing number of Institution 
Multinationals (MNEs) are standardising their brands in order to send a consistent 
worldwide message and to take greater advantage of media opportunities by promoting 
one brand, one packaging, and one uniformed positioning across the market. Rather than 
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a patchwork quilt of local brands in local markets, the owners of international brands 
increasingly favour simplified international brand portfolios.
238
 
 
1.5.6 Diversification 
 
Mergers and acquisitions are frequently pursued to fulfil a need externally, rather than 
domestic. Such deals are frequently driven by the need to get exterior competencies 
which cannot—or, for causes of economy, should not—be developed internally. Such 
competencies include knowledge exemplar intellectual capital, skills or innovative 
techniques, products, such as to build a wider range of products addressing convenience-
based competition (and keep the customer from looking elsewhere) and technology, such 
as infrastructure, processes and capital.
239
 
 
1.5.7 Changing Business Models 
 
Numerous M&As occur in defined product markets wherein the acquirer or merger 
partner is presently helping. For example, merging with a firm that enables to target a 
broader or more responsive audience cannot only give access to a greater number of 
potential purchasers; it can also assist in bringing about enhanced production or 
distribution capabilities in new territories. As businesses have expanded throughout the 
last decade of this century, the fiercest of battles have been fought over existing products 
in new markets. Entering a market for the first time, however, is an act fraught with 
multiple risks.
240
 There are buyer-specific and competitive issues needing to be 
understood before access can be successfully gained to a new market. Moreover, 
purchasing a firm or merging with a firm that already has a foothold in that segment and 
which knows the ropes can ease the process and thereby minimise the risks. In the merger 
exercise, BMW acquired Rover to gain access to new geographical markets and to 
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thereby use the existing sales channels. Unlike Rover, BMW has a strong international 
sales organisation, which can open up significant potential for Rover in the USA and 
Asia within a short time period of time. On the other hand, however, Rover’s sales 
organisation in the UK, Italy, Spain and France provide an interesting basis for expansion 
in the lower market segment.
241
 
 
1.6 Summary and Conclusion 
 
Companies are economic entities that need attention and encouragement in order to 
continue carrying out their work. Therefore, UK, UAE and Qatar laws are keen to 
regulate mergers between companies and to give companies this opportunity and option, 
even companies undergoing liquidation. The laws of the UK, the UAE and Qatar also 
provide for the transfer of all the rights and obligations of the transferor company to the 
transferee company. They also categorise the different types of merger (merger by 
absorption and merger by the formation of a new company) and identify the procedures 
and conditions to be followed in each type of merger. 
 
With the aforementioned in mind, in this chapter we have found that the 
description of a merger as a contract of sale goes against the fact that the essence of 
selling is the transfer of ownership (or other financial rights) for a cash price, which is not 
achieved in merger cases. The disadvantage of this interpretation can be seen clearly in 
the cases of merger by the formation of a new company, which leads to the demise of the 
legal personality of the transferor and transferee companies and the emergence of a new 
legal personality for the new company resulting from the merger. Furthermore, a merger 
does not lead to the liquidation of the transferor company but rather the transmission of 
its rights and liabilities, with the survival of its economic projects as a set of assetsin the 
scope of the transferee company. This justifies the transferor company’s shareholders 
getting new shares in the transferee company instead of their shares in the transferor 
company. The concept of a merger as a contract of sale stands in contrast to this finding. 
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On the other hand, an acquisition is a contract of sale between two or more 
companies, whereby the acquiring company buys the shares or assets of the acquired 
companies in whole or in part in cash, without affecting the moral personality of the 
acquired company or the company that remains in existence after the acquisition. 
Accordingly, an acquisition does not lead to the expiry of the acquired company. In an 
acquisition, the acquiring company may buy a dominant and governing percentage of up 
to 90% of the shares of the acquired company, but may nevertheless witness the survival 
of its legal entity as it is, in effect, continuing its operations as usual.  
 
Unlike a merger, an acquisition is often a hostile act by the acquiring company 
without the consent or approval of the management or Board of Directors of the acquired 
company, which may therefore result in a change in the management of the acquired 
company according to the desires of the acquiring company, which dominates the voting 
shares in the new company. Also, through the course of acquisition, the acquiring 
company is able to control the fixed assets of the acquired company and its assets and 
liabilities in return for payment in cash. By contrast, a merger commonly occurs through 
agreement between the administrations of each of the transferor and transferee companies 
and also with approval from the General Assemblies of the shareholders of the two 
companies, who retain their shares in the transferee company. Accordingly, it is 
recognised that they turn into shareholders in the transferee company. These clear 
definitions of M&As and the distinctions between them from the legal and practical sides 
help us to understand the impact of them on the shareholders of the companies involved, 
and why the shareholders of the transferor company obtain new shares in the transferee 
company in return for their shares in the transferor company in merger cases only. 
 
Moreover, this chapter shows that M&As are beneficial to the performance of the 
parties involved in these processes through increased revenues and the improved 
utilisation of human resources, as well as an increased customer base. Furthermore, 
companies involved in such operations aim to enter a new market, achieve a 
diversification of their services or products through benefiting from economies of scale, 
or otherwise reduce the costs associated with producing a greater number of products or 
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services. In addition, they also seek to control a larger share of the output of the sector to 
which the two parties of companies (merged and merging, or acquired and acquiring) 
belong. 
 
With the aforementioned in mind and in order to determine the legal basis for the 
transition of the rights and obligations of employees, directors and shareholders from the 
transferor to the transferee company, this chapter has provided an evaluation of the 
concepts, types and objectives of M&As; the researcher concluded that, despite some 
similarities between the legal texts of the UK, UAE and Qatar laws that regulate mergers, 
UAE and Qatar laws have not addressed acquisitions and cross-border mergers. 
Additionally, unlike UK M&A legislation, UAE and Qatar laws allow all companies to 
enter into merger operations, without distinction between companies that enjoy moral 
personalities and companies that do not have moral personalities. This is incompatible 
with the theory of the legal personality of a company, whereby a merger leads to the 
expiry of the transferor company, the demise of its moral personality and the transfer of 
all its rights and obligations to the transferee company. 
 
In order to remove this ambiguity, it would be preferable for Qatari and Emirati 
legislators to review the laws governing M&As so as to fit with the development that the 
two countries are witnessing. This could be achieved through rewriting the laws of both 
countries and regulating national and cross-border M&As with explicit texts in one law 
for each country separately. Each law should include the concepts, types, objectives and 
procedures of M&As. The new laws should also address the legal effects of M&As and 
regulate the rights of employees, directors and shareholders in such operations. 
Remedying the texts of the UAE and Qatar and providing for the rights of employees, 
directors and shareholders in M&As would lead to mitigate the adverse effects of such 
operations, as well as create an appropriate legal environment to aid the success of 
M&As and encourage companies to engage in such operations. 
 
The legislators in Qatar and the UAE should amend article 272 of Qatar 
Companies Law and article 276 of UAE Companies Law, focusing on M&As between 
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shareholding companies and other existing companies that have legal personalities. This 
could be achieved through taking benefit from section 904 of the UK CA 2006 and 
providing similar texts. These amendments could provide solutions for the types of 
companies that can enter into M&As, enable companies in such operations to take 
advantage of the tax exemptions that are provided by the laws and help to determine the 
legal natures of M&As. 
 
Section 904 of the UK Companies Act and regulation 2 of the UK Cross-Border 
Merger Act indicate the concepts of mergers and the legal effects of such operations 
when they provide that a merger takes place when all the transferor’s rights, undertakings 
and liabilities are transferred to the transferee company. However, the laws do not show 
the type and nature of the legal agreement whereby the transferee company receives all 
the transferor company’s rights and replaces it in all its rights and liabilities. Therefore, it 
would be useful for the UK legislators to indicate the type of agreement between 
transferor and transferee companies in M&A cases, e.g. a sale agreement or a partnership 
agreement. From the researcher’s perspective, this would help to define the legal nature 
of M&As, distinguish between them and provide an understanding of the legal basis for 
the transfer of rights and obligations between companies involved in M&As. 
 
Section 902
242
 of the UK Companies Act and section 2
243
 of the Cross-Border 
Merger Act provide that "the members of the transferor company (or transferor 
companies), receive shares in the transferee company (or one or more of the transferee 
companies), with or without any cash payment to members". However, the sections do 
not indicate the percentage of the amount that must be paid in cash by the transferee 
company to the shareholders of the transferor company in return for their shares that 
transferred to the transferee company by the merger, which may lead to confusion 
between M&As. So, it would be better if the UK legislators added text to sections 902 
and 905 of the CA and regulation 2 of the Cross-Border Merger Act determining the 
amount in cash that the transferee company can pay to the shareholders of the transferor 
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company in return for their shares that expired or transferred to the transferee company 
due to the merger. Adding text to determine the amount to be paid by the transferee 
companies to the shareholders of the transferor companies would prevent confusion 
between M&As and make it easier to identify their legal natures and the legal 
implications of each of them; thus making it easier to identify the legal basis for 
transferring the rights and obligation of employees, directors and shareholders in merger 
cases. 
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CHAPTER TWO: THE LEGAL BASIS FOR 
TRANSFERRING RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS 
BETWEEN COMPANIES INVOLVED IN M&As 
 
2.1 Overview 
According to the UK legislation
244
 and the UAE and Qatar laws
245
M&As do not lead to 
the severing of employees’ and directors’ contracts or the cancellation of shareholders’ 
rights in the companies involved: these contracts and all the rights that are consequent 
upon them are transferred from the transferor company to the transferee company by 
force of law.
246
 This means that employees and directors therefore have the legal right to 
transfer their rights and obligations to the transferee company on their existing terms and 
conditions of employment and with all their existing rights and liabilities intact. Also, the 
transferor company’s shareholders obtain new shares from the transferee company shares 
in return for their shares that expired due to the merger.  
 
Although the texts of the UK, UAE and Qatar laws relate to the transmission of 
rights and obligations of employees and shareholders in merger cases, controversy still 
continues between some the Jurists
247
 and the judiciary
248
 about the legal basis that the 
legislation is based upon for the transfer of such rights and obligations between 
companies involved in M&As and their views are divided into two theories. First, the 
personal nature theory,
249
 which focuses on the relationship between employee and 
employer; second, the theory of the legal personality of a company
250
 and the legal nature 
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of M&As, which focuses on the legal personality of a company and the extent of its 
expiry as a result of a merger or acquisition, as well as the relationship between the 
company and its employees, directors and shareholders.  
 
Due to the importance of identifying the legal basis for transferring the rights and 
obligations of employees, Boards of Directors and shareholders between companies 
involved in M&A operations, this chapter explores the legal basis or the legal theory for 
transferring all rights and obligations between companies involved in M&A operations. 
Studying such theories helps in establishing the rules applicable to M&A operations and 
also helps to determine the legal implications of them, particularly concerning the effects 
on the moral personalities of the transferor and transferee companies and their financial 
assets. It also helps in understanding a company’s relationship with its employees and 
shareholders before or after the merger, as well as providing knowledge of the proper 
interpretation of the legal texts regarding M&As. 
 
This chapter is divided into four parts. Part one gives a general overview. Part two 
classifies the personal nature theory. Part three defines the theory of the legal personality 
of a company, which is divided into three sections: Section 2.3.1 takes a closer look at the 
survival of the legal personalities of transferor companies. Section 2.3.2 analyses and 
explains the expiration of the legal personality of the transferor company. Section 2.3.3 
examines and classifies the expiration of the legal personality of the transferor company 
with the survival of its economic projects. Finally, part four provides a summary and 
conclusion. 
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2.2 Personal Nature Theory 
 
This theory is deployed under the English common law
251
that was in force at the 
beginning of the twentieth century. It is based on the personal nature of the employment 
contract, and explains that the employee’s rights under a contract of employment cannot 
be assigned to another employer without the employer consent. Accordingly, the 
employment contract ceases to exist where there is a change in ownership of the 
employing company as a result of a merger, acquisition or other restructuring.
252
 
 
Also, according to this theory UK common law gave the individual worker the 
negative freedom not to consent to a change of employer.
253
 For this reason, practical 
employment issues resulting from M&As globally were particularly heightened in the 
UK and other countries at the beginning of the twentieth century even issued of the 
modern Labour and Commercial Companies Laws, which gave attention to organising 
the relationship between companies and their employees, Board of Directors and 
shareholders.
254
 
 
English courts were in the habit of excluding the recognition of employee rights 
and interests by the management of a company based on the ultra vires principle, and 
decided that a change in employer could not result in a burden being placed on an 
employee without his consent. In the Nokes v Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries 
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case[1940] AC 1014,
255
 a coal miner was transferred into the employment of the 
acquiring corporation, on a transfer of assets and liabilities by court order under section 
154(1) and (4) of the Companies Act 1929, without his knowledge or consent. The 
Chancery Court ruled that Mr Nokes would be liable to pay damages to the new 
business under the Employers and Workmen Act 1875 section 4 if he had a service 
contract with the company. He denied this but the Divisional Court and the Court of 
Appeal ordered him to pay damages and costs. However, Mr Nokes refused the 
judgement and appealed to the House of Lords. The House of Lords held by a majority 
that Mr Nokes did not have to pay the fee because his employment could not be 
transferred without his consent. The House of Lords also ruled that the new employer 
could not sue the employee under the Employers and Workmen Act 1875 for breach of 
contract because there was no contract in force between them.
256
 Lord Atkin, in that 
case, “declared that any rule of automatic transfer of employment was „tainted with 
oppression and confiscation‟ and upheld the principle that „a man is not to be compelled 
to serve a master”.257 
 
 
However, it is important to note that this common law rule was the offspring of an 
era that generally had very minimal protection for employee rights outside of the general 
protection of employment law. The rights and interests of employees were seen as not a 
legitimate concern of company law.
258
 The principle that the shareholders were rightfully 
the “owners” of the company and thus the only group deserving of protection or 
recognition under company law was the prevalent argument amongst legal theorists. 
Accordingly, the employees’ interest was thus firmly subordinated to the interests of the 
owners or shareholders of the company.
259
 The ruling of Plowman J in the famous case of 
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Park v Daily News
260
 expounded this traditional view by holding that ex gratia payments 
of company funds by sympathetic managers to redundant employees, without taking 
account of the interests of shareholders, are an exercise in philanthropy that is illegal, 
being ultra vires and a breach of the managers’ fiduciary duties.261 So, this theory did not 
hold any longer in front of the development of new legislation, which recognises that 
the relationship between the enterprise or institution and its workers is stronger than 
their relationship with the employer. Therefore, the personal nature theory has been 
criticised in many ways.
262
 
 
Firstly, the fact that the employee’s consent may be required for the transfer of  
his employment as a result of a take-over or merger transaction creates its own 
problems. The consent provision is based on the assumption that the employer and their 
employee have equal bargaining powers. It is obvious that this assumption is idealistic 
and does not reflect the true position of employees today, especially in many 
developing countries with high unemployment rates. Giving the employee the right to 
choose whom they work for is of no benefit to them in such cases, as the employee 
would be more interested in preserving their employment than in choosing their 
employer.
263
 
 
Secondly, reliance on the principles of the personal nature theory as the basis for 
transferring employees’ and directors’ rights and obligations in M&A cases is not 
consistent with logic and reality in full acquisitions, where the transferee company, 
instead of acquiring the undertaking, might have bought the whole of the shares of the 
transferor company, changed the Board of Directors, adopted new articles, amended the 
objections and other clauses in the memorandum, changed the nature of the business, 
increased the capital and, with the consent of the Board of Trade, even have adopted a 
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new name, which all lead to significant restructuring taking place, affecting employees’ 
rights but without changing the identity of the employer.
264
 With this in mind, “the 
consent of the worker could be effortlessly bypassed in such a situation”.265 
 
Thirdly, the rights that were given to workers under English common law were 
extremely limited. In real terms, the employee may have the right to decide whether or 
not to accept employment with the transferee or new employer, but this does not give 
employees the right to object to M&As. Also, it does not suggest that the decision 
regarding whether or not the company should merge should be given to employees; it 
does not therefore protect the employee against the adverse consequences of a 
transaction that has proceeded despite the lack of employee consent. It only gives the 
employee the liberty to refuse the transferee’s offer.266Employee’s situation vis-à-vis the 
shareholders in the decision to M&As is for the purpose of highlighting the feeble 
bargaining and disadvantaged position the employee may be in where M&A is rumoured 
or occurs unexpectedly.
267
 
 
More importantly, this theory focuses more on the personal relationship between 
the employees and the employer and neglects the most important aspect: the legal 
personalities of the companies involved in the transfer of undertakings. This aspect is 
considered by most modern laws, including the legislations of the UK, the UAE and 
Qatar, which assess the relationship between companies and stakeholders on the basis 
of the legal personality of a company. Accordingly, the transferor company expires as a 
result of the merger, with the transfer of all its rights and obligations.
268
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For these reasons, use of this theory was stopped after the enactment of the 
Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 1981.
269
 The 
fundamental purpose of the TUPE regulations was to bring about a reversal of the 
common law rule, i.e. to ensure that employees are not prejudiced in any way by the 
transfer of the business in which they are employed. Instead, the employment contract 
between the employees and the transferee company remains valid by the same rights 
and obligations of the contract of employment between the employees and the 
transferor company that was valid before the merger. It should be noted, however, that 
the TUPE regulations apply much more broadly. They are not confined to inter business 
transfers; applying for instance to outsourcing arrangements by local authorities and 
even to the granting of financial support to charities.
270
 
 
The TUPE regulations were introduced in order to give effect to the Acquired 
Rights Directive of 1977/ 77/ 187 (the ARD).
271
 This has a number of important 
consequences. The first is that the UK courts are required to interpret the TUPE 
regulations purposively, i.e. ensure that the purpose of the regulations is achieved, even 
if this means giving the regulations a meaning other than that suggested by a literal 
reading of the text. The most famous example of this is the case of Litster v. Forth Dry 
Dock Engineering Ltd,
272
 in which the House of Lords effectively rewrote regulation 5 
of the 1981 regulations so as to prevent employers evading the TUPE regulations by 
dismissing employees a few hours before a transfer.
273
 
 
                                                 
269
 The law replaced by The Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 2006 which 
came into force on 6 April 2006 and is intended to implement the amended Acquired Rights Directive 
(No.2001/23 EC). 
270
 For more see Sophie Redmond v. Bartol [1992] IRLR 366. For more seeHazel McLean, 'Protection for 
Transferred Employees' (1993) 52(2) The Cambridge Law Journal214, 217; Michael Salter Aidan Briggs, 
‘An Introduction to TUPE’ [2011] Ely Place Chambers4, 27. 
271
 In February 1977, the Council of the European Communities adopted Directive 77/187. 1 The purpose 
of the directive is to safeguard the rights of employees of businesses that are sold or transferred. The 
directive seeks to protect employees in three ways. First, it provides for the automatic transfer of the former 
employer's obligations to the new employer. Secondly, it prohibits the dismissal of employees solely on 
account of the transfer. Finally, it requires employers to inform and consult with employee representatives 
regarding the effects of the transfer. 77/187/EEC was subsequently repealed and replaced by Council 
Directive 2001/23/EC. 
272
Litster v Forth Dry Dock and Engineering Co Ltd [1988] UKHL 10 (16 March 1989) United Kingdom 
House of Lords Decisions. 
273
 Ibid. 
82 
 
Another important consequence is that the UK courts are obliged to follow the 
interpretations of the Acquired Rights Directive handed down by the ECJ.
274
 
Furthermore, the public sector has had an important influence in relation to the TUPE 
regulations. To begin with, TUPE can apply to transfers by a public body, even though 
they are not, in some senses of the term, a business.
275
 Moreover, as a matter of 
historical fact, the tendency beginning in the 1980s for local authorities to contract out 
services has been a regular context for the operation of the TUPE regulations. Finally, 
whilst the private sector has tended to regard the TUPE regulations as something to be 
avoided if possible, public authorities have tended to be enthusiastic supporters, 
especially after the Labour government came into power in 1997.
276
 
 
2.3 Theory of the Legal Personality of a Company 
 
Company legal personality refers to the fact that, as far as the law is concerned, a firm 
really exists. This means that a firm can sue and be sued in its own name, hold its own 
property and – crucially – be liable for its own debts. It is this concept that allows limited 
liability for shareholders as the debts belong to the legal entity of the firm and not to the 
shareholders in that firm. This theory focuses on the legal personalities of companies277 
involved in M&As and the extent of the expiry of the legal personality of the transferor 
company and the transfer of all its rights and responsibilities – including the rights of 
employees, the Board of Directors and shareholders – to the transferee company as a 
result of the merger or acquisition. There is almost unanimous agreement among Jurists 
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and the judiciary
278
that the legal basis for the transfer of rights and obligations between 
transferor and transferee companies is due to the legal personalities of companies and the 
nature of M&As. However, proponents of this view disagree about the expiry of the legal 
personality of the transferor company as a result of a merger or acquisition. Some of the 
Jurists
279
 believe that M&As do not lead to the expiry of the legal personality of the 
transferor company; rather, it remains in existence and continues in the context of the 
legal personality of the transferee company. On the other hand, others of the Jurists and 
the judiciary
280
 believe that a merger leads to the expiry of the transferor company and 
the demise of its moral personality, as well as an increase in the capital of the transferee 
company in the share of all kinds of assets of the transferor company. Furthermore, 
M&As affect the Memorandum of Association and the company system in order to 
secure the entry of new partners or shareholders. Notably, the effects of the merger are 
not limited to an increase in the capital of the transferee company; the transferee 
company not only receives the assets of the transferor company but also receives the 
venture that the company sought to achieve. Also, it receives all of the rights of the 
transferor company in the form of a sum of assets covered – including the positive281 and 
negative elements
282
 – and takes the transferor company’s place in terms of rights and 
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obligations. Accordingly, the transferee company becomes the claimant and respondent 
for the two companies in all rights and obligations. Due to the importance of the opinions 
on this subject, they will be reviewed in the following two sections. 
 
2.3.1 Continuation of the Transferor Company’s Legal Personality 
 
The concept of the survival of the legal personality of a transferor company means that 
the merger does not lead to the expiry of the transferor company; rather it remains in 
existence and continues in the context of the legal personality of the transferee company. 
The proponents
283
 of this concept explain that if the transferor company loses its moral 
personality through a merger, the company does not dissolve or expire. Rather, its 
presence continues and remains in terms of conducting its activities within the framework 
of the moral personality of the transferee company. Importantly, its lack of moral 
personality does not detract from its presence because in the moment that it loses its 
moral personality, it adopts the position of the moral personality of the transferee 
company. Proponents of this view justify this opinion in the arguments posed below: 
 
Firstly, a company’s expiration assumes liquidation because dissolving needs to 
be followed by liquidation. In accordance with this, the company should collect its rights, 
pay off its debts and distribute surplus finances between the partners. If the merger does 
not include the liquidation of the transferor company, the transmission of its financial 
assets to the transferee company means that the transferor company cannot be described 
as expiring.
284
 
 
Secondly, the transferor company retains all the main pillars of the existence of 
the company following the merger, which consequent excluding the idea of the expiration 
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of the company. Furthermore, proponents of this opinion
285
 state that the transferor 
company will not lose any pillar of those elements required by law for the existence of 
the company, and if the merger leads to various modifications in the system of the 
transferor company – which may lead to changes in the name or form or purpose of the 
transferor company –however, these amendments are permitted by law under certain 
conditions, and therefore do not result from the expiration of the transferor company. 
 
Thirdly, the proponents
286
 of this theory support their view by stating that if we 
assume expiration of the moral personality of the transferor company by merger, then the 
moral personality is not one of the pillars of the company, so loss of the transferor 
company its moral personality – as tracers of the merger – does not detract from its 
existence as a company.
287
 Markedly, the proponents of this opinion consider that the 
importance of the moral personality of the company is limited to two basic effects: it is 
the embodiment of the company’s activities in relation to another; and the separation the 
company’s financial disclosure from the disclosure of each partner from partners within 
it. Notably, however, it is neither of these two effects, or both, that arises from the moral 
personality to the extent considered to be a pillar forming the company.
288
 The advocates 
of this opinion confirm their beliefs by stating that there are companies that do not have 
moral personality, such as the company under incorporation, and particular partnership 
company; however, the law recognises their existence regardless.
289
 
 
Most importantly, the proponents
290
 of this concept explain the reason for the 
survival of the merged company without expiration: they state that although a merged 
company loses its moral personality as a result of a merger from the date that the merger 
contract is recorded in the Commercial Register (as is the case in a company’s 
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liquidation), the effect of the loss of the company its moral personality does not appear - 
only in the face of others. As for the relationship between the transferor company and the 
transferee company, this loss does not have an impact because this relationship is 
governed by the merger contract, which represents the law of the parties. The transferor 
company retains its moral personality in relation to the transferee company within the 
limits of the rights regulating the merger contract. 
 
In addition, the advocates of this theory
291
 state that the reason for the lack of 
expiration of the transferor company’s legal personality is that the merger is a change in 
the legal form of the transferor company. According to this idea, despite the difference 
between the merger and the change of the legal form of the company in some ways, 
however, the legal nature of the two operations is one. The difference between them is 
limited in that the merger requires the presence of two existing companies, whilst 
changing the legal form is achieved through one company. Markedly, holders of this 
opinion add that, despite this difference, it must consider the merger and change of the 
legal form from the angle of modification that occurs within the company.
292
 Despite the 
result of each of the two processes amending the company system in terms of the 
company form, its name and style of its work this amendment does not affect the 
company entity or its existence. The proponents of this opinion
293
 continue to deny the 
existence of differences between a merger and changing the legal form of the company, 
stating that we should not interpret the term as changing the legal form of the company in 
the narrow sense contained within company law;
294
 rather, this term must be interpreted 
in a broad sense so as to include all the changes and developments occurring in the entity 
of the merged company and merging company imposed by requirements and the 
necessities of economic development.
295
 
 
Despite the arguments given by the proponents of this opinion to support their 
position, it is contrary to the facts and subject to criticism in many ways. Firstly, this 
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theory contradicts the facts presented in various legal articles, such as 283/6 of the State 
of Qatar and 281/4 of the UAE Companies Laws, both of which consider that mergers 
cause the expiry of the transferor company. Thus, it is not valid to say that the merger 
does not result in the expiry of the transferor company; otherwise, these texts could be 
considered loquacious.
296
 Furthermore, such a statement violates the concept of mergers 
and their legal nature, which considers that a merger is a contract wherein all the rights 
and obligations of a merged company are transferred to a merging company through the 
force of law, following the completion of the merger operation and recording of the new 
company in the Commercial Register. Therefore, this argument contradicts legal texts 
and the nature of mergers.  
 
Secondly, to believe that the legal personality of the transferor company survives 
without expiry in merger cases
297
contradicts the provisions of UK, State of Qatar and 
UAE laws, which explicitly provide that "merger take place between two or more 
"existing" companies",
298
accordingly, mergers cause the transferor company to transfer 
all of its rights and obligations to the transferee company",
299
 "the transferor company is 
dissolved without going into liquidation, and on its dissolution transfers all its assets and 
liabilities to the transferee company".
300
 In addition, the pillars of the transferor company 
no longer have an independent existence for several reasons. Firstly, there is no longer 
the existence of a group of partners in the transferor company, simply because they 
become partners in the transferee company. Secondly, there is no longer the independent 
existence of the shares or quotas provided by the partners to the transferor company 
where, following the merger, such quotas or shares were found to be mixed with the 
financial disclosure of the transferee company (in the case of merger by absorption) or 
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with the financial disclosures of the new company resulting from merger (in the case of 
merger through the formation of a new company).
301
 Thirdly, the shareholders of the 
transferor company (with regards to their approval on merger decisions) intend to achieve 
profit or to subscribe to sharing the profits or potential losses through the merging or 
formation of a new company. Finally, the intentions for participation are no longer the 
same in terms of the partners of the transferor company, although the scope of 
cooperation has expanded. This includes the partners of the transferor company and the 
partners of the transferee company, especially if the form of the transferor company is 
different from the form of the transferee or new company.
302
 
 
Thirdly, the measurement of merger cases with liquidation companies’ cases – 
which the owners of this opinion believe – is a measure with a difference owing to 
differences in the results which merger and liquidation aim at. When the company expires 
for any reason other than merger, the intervention phase of liquidation is established in 
order to reach the apportionment of its assets after the payment of its debts, so the 
company subsequently loses its moral personality at the end of liquidation. Markedly, this 
means the expiry of the economic project of the company that has elapsed by liquidation. 
While in merger cases, the transferor company aims to continue its economic project and 
is not subject to liquidation; rather, its financial assets are transferred through a 
comprehensive transfer to the transferee or new company, and the legal personality of the 
transferor company only expires from the date that the merger is completed and the 
transferee or new company registered in the Commercial Register.
303
 
 
Finally, the measurement of merger with change in the legal forms of companies 
(on the basis that they have the same legal nature) is incompatible with many of the facts. 
Mergers essentially occur between at least two companies, whilst changing the legal form 
of a company involves a single company. In addition, a merger leads to the expiry of the 
legal personality of the merged firm (which is acknowledged by the proponents of this 
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view) and the transfer of its financial assets to the transferee or new company; changing 
the legal form of a company does not lead to the expiry of the moral personality of the 
company.
304
 Furthermore, the financial assets of a company that changes its legal form 
are not transferred to another company; rather, the change of the legal form is merely an 
amendment to the company system. Furthermore, mergers do not result in a change to the 
legal form of the merged company: this only happens in the case of the merger of a 
further company or with another company from the same legal form as the merged 
company.
305
 
 
On the other hand, applying the idea of changing the legal form of a company 
through a merger leads to the violation of laws in the case of a merger by the formation a 
new company. The consequence of a merger by the formation of a new company is the 
expiry of the legal personality of the transferor and transferee companies, the demise of 
their moral personalities and the establishment of a new company with a new legal moral 
personality. But a change of legal form of company does not lead to the expiry of the 
company or its moral personality does not expire, which therefore does not lead to the 
creation of a new moral personality like in a merger by the formation of a new 
company.
306
 
 
From the discussion above, we can conclude that proponents of this theory 
believe that a merger does not lead to the expiration of the transferor company or its legal 
personality; rather, it remains in existence and continues in the context of the legal 
personality of the transferee company after the merger. This is, however, contrary to 
reality because the supporters of this view (the concept of the survival of the moral 
personality of the transferor company after the merger) are mixing between the concept 
of a company and a company’s venture. The fact is that the loss of the transferor 
company’s moral personality via the merger directly leads to the expiry of the company. 
Accordingly, the transferor company does not have a legal existence afterwards; all its 
rights and obligations are transferred to the transferee company, which replaces it in all 
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its rights and liabilities, becomes the party who takes care of and looks after the interests 
of the company, and acts as the claimant and respondent in all the rights and obligations 
of both the transferor and transferee companies.  
 
The company’s venture is part of the economic entity of the company that it was 
established to achieve, which does not expire by M&As. Rather, it remains and is 
continuous within the framework of the legal personality of the transferee company. In 
accordance with the basis of this, all the transferor company’s rights and obligations 
(including the contracts and rights of employees, directors and shareholders) are 
transferred to the transferee company. Confusion between the concept of the company 
and its economic venture is contrary to this fact and the theory of the legal personality of 
a company regarding transferring rights and obligations between companies involved in 
M&As. 
 
The belief that the legal personality of the transferor company survives and the 
company continues in its work within the scope of the legal personality of the transferee 
company also means that there are two legal personalities: - the legal personality of the 
transferor company and the legal personality of the transferee company - for a single 
company (the transferee company or the new company resulting from the merger), which 
leads to an overlap with respect to the acquisition of the rights and obligations of the two 
companies before the merger by the transferee company after the merger. Therefore, this 
concept cannot be the legal basis for the transfer of rights and obligations of employees, 
directors and shareholders between companies involved in mergers or acquisitions. 
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2.3.2 Expiration of the Legal Personality of the Transferor Company 
The advocates
307
of this opinion believe that the legal basis for the transfer of all of the 
rights and liabilities between companies involved in the merger are due to the premature 
expiry of the transferor company and the demise of its moral personality, as well as a 
comprehensive transmission of its financial assets to the transferee company, which 
entails an increase in the capital of the transferee or new company; its capital comprises 
the financial status of the transferor companies. However, supporters of this theory have 
differing opinions concerning the legal basis for the comprehensive transmission of the 
financial disclosure of the transferor company to the transferee or new company, the 
Egyptian Court of Cassation in one of its Judgements
308
 stating that the merger is a sale 
and Mohamed Azmi (1998)
309
 believing that it is a transfer of rights and debts; Rupert G 
(1991)
310
and others
311
 suggest that it is a comprehensive transmission of the financial 
disclosure without liquidation. Markedly, Mustafa Kamal Taha (2000)
312
 and others
313
 
state that it is the continuation of the ‘company’s economic venture. Due to the 
importance of these opinions in determining the legal nature of M&As, access to the legal 
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basis for the transfer of employees’, the management’s and shareholders’ rights and the 
obligations between companies involved in M&As, the opinions will be explored in the 
following paragraphs. 
 
Firstly, merger includes the sale of the transferor company to the transferee 
company. Although the prevailing belief in jurisprudence and the judiciary is to consider 
merger to be a comprehensive transmission of the rights and obligations of the transferor 
company to the transferee company, the Egyptian Court of Cassation, in one of its 
judgements, nevertheless still considers merger as a sale contract. The Court – in its 
judgement dated February 15/1977
314
 – upheld the Court of Appeal in describing a 
merger contract in which, according to the judgement, the Eastern Company for Cinema 
merged with the General Company for Cinema as a contract of sale on the basis that the 
merger included the transfer of the transferor company’s assets and liabilities to the 
transferee company. However, the explanation of the court that the transfer of 
comprehensive financial disclosure of the transferor company to the transferee or new 
company – on the basis that the merger is a contract of sale – is contrary to the fact that 
selling is the transfer of ownership (or other financial rights) for a price in cash. The sales 
contract also requires the delivery of the thing sold to the buyer and obtain of the price; 
this does not take place in merger cases. The disadvantage of this interpretation seems 
clearer in the case of a merger by the formation of a new company, which leads to the 
demise of the moral personalities of both the transferor and transferee companies and the 
subsequent emergence of a new moral personality for the new company resulting from 
the merger. Here, a question arises: where is the buyer who bought the assets of the 
companies?
315
 The difference between a merger and a sale also seems apparent in the 
return received by the shareholders of the transferor companies in exchange for their 
shares. Whilst the seller gets the share price in cash and the legal relationship between the 
seller and his shares is cut off, the shareholders of the transferor company get new shares 
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instead of their old shares that were cancelled as a result of the merger.
316
 The result is 
that the shareholders of the transferor company become shareholders in full rights in the 
transferee or new company.  
 
Therefore, the interpretation of the expiration of the transferor company and the 
transfer of its rights to the transferee company on the basic measure of the merger as a 
contract of sale neither complies with the nature and theory of merger, nor with the legal 
provisions that consider merger as one of the reasons for the expiry of the commercial 
company merged and the transfer of its rights to the new company as a result of the 
merger.
317
 
 
Secondly, according to Mohamed Medhat Azmy (1998),
318
 the comprehensive 
transition of the financial disclosure of the transferor firm to the transferee company is 
the transference of rights and debts together. Markedly, the transferor company is always 
the assignor (sender), whilst the transferee or new company is the receiver with regard to 
that which represents the assets of the transferor company, or the transferee upon in 
relation to liabilities of the transferor company’s. The disadvantage of this interpretation 
– stating that the comprehensive transition of the financial disclosure of the transferor 
company to the transferee company is the transference of rights and debts together – 
seems clear in that the terms of the force of transference of rights and the conditions 
forcing debt transference are not consistent with procedures to be followed in the 
emergence or formation of merger, and conditions of into force. Notably, according to 
article 338 of Qatar and article 338/1 of UAE Civil Laws,
319
 which stipulate that a debt 
transfer is not made unless it is accepted by the creditor, the rights of the transferor 
company’s creditors are limited to the right to object to the merger. However, this 
objection does not mean that the consent of the creditors of the transferor company is a 
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prerequisite or a pillar from pillars to complete the merger agreement. Essentially, 
according to article 280 of UAE Companies Law, a merger (after taking place) only stops 
if it is opposed by the creditors of the transferor company during the specified period. 
Moreover, the impact of this objection to stop the merger is accepting the demise: either 
by waiver of the creditor concerning his opposition, or as otherwise ruled to reject the 
opposition by a final judgement or the fulfilment of the debt by the company if the debts 
are urgent, or through providing sufficient guarantees to fulfil it if the debt is deferred. 
 
Thirdly, a merger is a comprehensive transmission of the transferor company’s 
financial disclosure without liquidation. Abu Zeid Radwan (1978),
320
 Hassan Younis 
(1991),
321
 Hossam El-Din Alassar (1987)
322
 and others
323
 believe that transferring all the 
rights and obligations between companies involved in mergers refers to the expiration of 
the transferor company with the comprehensive transfer of its assets to the transferee or 
new company without being subject to traditional liquidation, as the liquidation of the 
transferor company is not followed by the division of its assets. Instead, the liquidation is 
limited to assessment of the assets and liabilities of the transferor company to find out its 
financial position. Furthermore, the transferor company’s financial disclosure – including 
its assets and liabilities – is transferred to the transferee or new company; thus, according 
to this view, the expiration of the transferor company is expiration or dissolution without 
liquidation. This opinion was supported by the Arab judiciary in a judgement of the 
Egyptian Court of Cassation,
324
 which decided that liquidation following a transferor 
company’s dissolution due to a merger is a theoretical liquidation and not a real 
liquidation, as its aim is limited to determining the financial position of the company.
325
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The fact is that to say that the expiration of the transferor company will be 
accompanied by a conventional liquidation of the transferor company leads to a result 
inconsistent with the nature of the merger and its legal effects: a merger leads to the 
transfer of the comprehensive financial disclosure of the transferor company with its 
commercial ventures to the transferee or new company without liquidation. 
 
2.3.3 Expiration of the Transferor Company’s Legal Personality 
without Liquidation 
 
According to regulation 2
326
 of the UK Cross-Border Merger Act, paragraph 8/5
327
 of the 
UK TUPE Act, Hosni Al-msry (1986),
328
 Husam al-Saghir (1987),
329
 Mustafa Kamal 
Taha (2000)
330
 and others,
331
the legal basis for the transfer of all rights and liabilities 
between companies involved in mergers refers to the expiration of the legal personalities 
of the transferor companies without liquidation, with the continuation of their economic 
ventures in the scope of the transferee company after the merger. Accordingly, a merger 
leads to the premature expiry of the transferor company and the demise of its moral 
personality with the continuation and transfer of its commercial ventures, as well as a 
comprehensive transmission of its financial assets to the transferee or new company, 
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which receives all the rights, assets and obligations of the transferor company and 
becomes the legal representative, claimant and defendant in all the rights and liabilities of 
both the companies. 
 
Mustafa Kamal Taha (2000),
332
 Hosni Al-msri (1986),
333
Hassan Younis (1991)
334
 
and Hossam El-Din Alassar (1987)
335
 support the theory of the expiration of the legal 
personality of a company with the continuation of its venture in a merger or acquisition, 
serving as the legal basis for transferring the rights and obligations of employees, 
directors and shareholders between the companies involved by comparing the concept of 
the company and its economic venture.
336
 Accordingly, the economic venture is an 
economic entity for production that is based on a set of physical elements and human 
elements interacting to achieve a particular purpose which the owners of the venture seek 
to achieve.
337
The material elements of the venture are represented in the physical and 
moral funds for venture. But the human elements are represented in the minds that create 
and administer the venture, as well as in the labour running it.
338
 In contrast to this, the 
commercial company is defined as a contract by which two or more natural or legal 
persons undertake sharing a venture which aims to make profit by submitting a share of 
cash or service and sharing in the profit or loss resulting from the venture.
339
 
 
From these definitions, the relationship between a company and its venture is 
clear: a company is necessarily based on a specific economic venture. In spite of this 
relationship, however, there should not be confusion between the company and the 
economic venture: the company is a legal building for partners themselves with the 
contract as its basis. Therefore, it organises the shareholders who form it. Markedly, 
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aventure is nothing more than an economic and technical means that is used by the 
company to achieve its purpose.
340
 In addition, a company enjoys a moral personality but 
venture does not: a company is the legal embodiment of venture because a venture is an 
economic idea whilst a company is a legal idea.
341
The venture is a socio-economic cell 
comprising three elements – labour, capital and management – and an economic object is 
larger than the company, although the company remains the legal object that embodies 
the venture.
342
 
 
Accordingly, it is obvious that the usefulness of the merger cannot be achieved 
unless the transferee or new company receives the financial rights of the transferor 
company – including assets and liabilities. As a result, there is a necessary continuation 
of the human elements who used the exploitation of the assets of the transferor company 
including all who manage the venture or the workers who were operating it. Also 
usefulness from the merger is not achieved if the transferor company shareholders do not 
get new shares from transferee or new company shares. 
 
This result explains and supports the legal personality theory of a company. 
Accordingly a merger leads to dissolve the transferor company without it going into 
liquidation or the demise of its moral personality. Its commercial venture survives and is 
transferred to the transferee company as a set of assets, which entails an increase in the 
capital of the transferee company: its capital comprises its financial assets and the 
financial status of the transferor company.
343
 Accordingly, a merger affects the statute of 
the transferee company in order to secure the entry of the partners or shareholders of the 
transferor company. Hence, the transferee company issues new shares to the shareholders 
of the transferor company in return for the shares they owned in the transferor company 
that expired due to the merger. The legal effects of a merger are not limited to an increase 
in the capital of the transferee company: the transferee company not only receives the 
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assets of the transferor company but also receives the venture that the company sought to 
achieve. Also, it receives all of the rights of the transferor company in the form of assets 
covered - including the positive and negative elements - and takes their place in terms of 
rights and obligations. Accordingly, all the rights and obligations of the transferor 
company - including the rights and liabilities of the employees, directors and 
shareholders - are transferred to the transferee company, which becomes the legal 
representative for the stakeholders of the two companies and the complainant and 
defendant in the rights and liabilities of the transferor and transferee companies. 
 
The legislations of the UK, the UAE and Qatar uphold this theory and the 
economic reality desire in maintaining the existence of economic ventures and 
encouraging their continuation when they expressly provide for the “comprehensive 
transfer of the financial disclosure of the transferor company to the transferee or new 
company”,344with continue of the transferor company ventures in its physical and human 
elements. Also, the legislators of the UK, Qatar and the UAE impose the continuation of 
labour contracts with the employees of a venture in the case of a change in its owner 
when they provide for “The service contract shall not terminate in case of merger of the 
enterprise with another enterprise or transfer of its ownership or the right in its 
management to a person other than the employer for any reason. The successor shall be 
jointly liable with the former employer for the payment of the workers entitlements 
accruing from the latter.”345 Accordingly, the legislators of UK, UAE and Qatar made a 
link between the employees and the venture being conducted as part of an investigation 
of the stability of the employment relationship – regardless of who is the venture owner – 
which means the continuation of employees and directors contracts despite a change of 
employer.  
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Accordingly, the personal nature theory that was applied under English common 
law is not realistic and is not commensurate with the legal relationship between the 
company and its employees, directors and shareholders, or with the legal nature of M&As 
or the effects that result from such operations. Also, this theory is not commensurate with 
the texts of new laws, which provide for all the rights and obligations of the transferor 
company to be transferred to the transferee or new company. This legal nature and the 
legal effects can be seen in the expiry of the transferor company and the demise of its 
moral personality, while its trade venture survives and is transferred to the transferee 
company, which receives all the assets of the transferor company and takes its place in 
terms of its rights and obligations. 
 
Consequently, the concept that the shareholders own everything in companies is 
disappeared by UK, UAE and Qatar legislation, which currently aim to appreciate and 
uphold the social and community interest aspects and depend on the legal personality of 
the company in the interpretation of the legal relationship between the company and its 
employees and directors. Accordingly, employees and directors have a relationship with 
the organisation itself, irrespective of who their employer is. This recognition is what has 
led the Companies, TUPE and Cross-Border Merger Acts of the UK, in addition to the 
UAE and Qatar Companies and Labour Laws, to provide for the automatic transfer of 
employees’ rights and obligations from the old employer to the new employer, and the 
automatic transfer of shareholders’ rights form the transferor company to the transferee 
company in a merger. Wherefore, the modern laws of the UK, the UAE and Qatar have 
abandoned the personal nature theory on the basis that companies are not purely market-
driven objects of enterprise to be abandoned to the exigencies of agents of capitalism and 
shareholders’ interests, but are economic ventures with a view to appreciate and uphold 
social and community interest aspects, shareholders and all other stakeholders of the 
company. Therefore, their existence should be maintained and encouraged. 
 
Abandoned of the UK, the UAE and Qatar in its legislations about the personal 
nature theory in their legislations; the idea that the shareholders are the owners of 
everything in the company and taking by the theory of legal personality of company is 
100 
 
not a coincidence: they follow the approach taken by the UK courts since the case of 
Salomon v A Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] AC 22 (House of Lords).
346
This case set out the 
principle of company personality and established that the firm as a person, distinct from 
individual shareholders, was the proprietor of itself and its assets. The House of Lords 
ruled to set aside a judgement of the Court of Appeal that felt Salomon was a fraud and 
his company was a "sham",
347
 ruling in favour of the claimants by stating that the 
company was properly set up, there was no fraud and thus Mr Salomon was a distinct 
entity from his company, his directorship, his shareholding and his rights as a secured 
creditor.
348
 
 
The new approach is thus to harmonise principles of company law and labour law 
with a view to appreciating and upholding the social and community interest aspects of 
both subjects. The firm is no longer viewed as a purely market-driven object of enterprise 
to be abandoned to the exigencies of agents of capitalism. There is also growing 
recognitionby the legislation
349
, jurisprudence
350
 and the judiciary
351
 that employees have 
a relationship with the organisation itself, irrespective of who the employer is.
352
 This 
recognition is what led the new legislation in the UK,
353
 the UAE and Qatar
354
 to provide 
for the automatic transfer of the employment relationship from the old employer to the 
new employer in M&A cases. And lead also to provide for the automatic transfer of the 
shareholders rights form merged to merging or new company. 
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The UK and Arabic judiciary support and uphold the theory of the legal 
personality of a company.
355
 A good illustration of the application of the theory of the 
legal personality of a company is Lee v Lee’s Air Farming [1961] AC 12.356 A claim was 
made to the Privy Council in London against Lee’s Air Farming Ltd (respondent), 
whereby the widow of Mr Lee claimed she was entitled to compensation under the TUPE 
Act as the widow of a ‘worker’. The issue went first to the New Zealand Court of Appeal, 
which refused compensation on the basis that Mr Lee was not a ‘worker’ within the 
meaning of the TUPE Act, which lead the claimant to appeal the case to the Privy 
Council in London. The Council ruled that the widow was entitled to compensation, on 
the basis that the firm and Mr Lee were distinct lawful entities and therefore capable of 
entering into lawful relations with one another. 
 
Finally, it must be noted that acquisitions may have a similar effect to a merger 
regarding the rights of employees, but the difference, most cases, some acquisition cases 
do not lead to expiry of acquired company. Also, shareholders of the acquired company 
(the transferor company) do not get new shares from the acquiring company’s shares as a 
result of acquisition. Also, the difference between a merger and an acquisition may occur 
with regard to an acquired company’s rights, which differ according to the type of 
acquisition, by what means it is carried out and the type of companies involved.
357
 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
 
There are some key points to take from this chapter. First, it is important at this stage to 
grasp the concept of the corporate personality of a company, which means that a trading 
company has a legal personality independent of its owners or shareholders. Accordingly, 
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a trading company is a legal entity that has rights and obligations in the face of others. 
Second, having grasped the concept of the corporate personality, we also need to 
understand its consequences, i.e. the fact that a company can hold its own property and be 
responsible for its rights and obligations concerning employees, directors and 
shareholders in M&A cases. 
 
With the aforementioned in mind, this chapter has provided an evaluation of the 
legal basis for transferring the rights and obligations of employees, directors and 
shareholders between companies involved in M&As. The chapter has analysed the 
personal nature theory that has prevailed under UK Common Law and discussed how the 
UK TUPE Regulations, CA and Cross-Border Merger Act have abandoned this theory in 
favour of the theory of the legal personality of a company. In addition, the chapter has 
also highlighted the concept of the legal theory of a company and how UK, UAE and 
Qatar Companies and Labour Laws have taken this theory as the legal basis for 
transferring rights and obligations between companies involved in M&As.  
 
The chapter has concluded that the legal basis for transferring all the rights and 
obligations - including those of employees, directors and shareholders - between the 
transferor and transferee company refers to the legal personality of a company and the 
extent of its expiry as a result of a merger or acquisition. Accordingly, mergers lead to 
dissolve the transferor company and the demise of its moral personality without it going 
into liquidation, as well as an increase in the capital of the transferee company in the 
share of all kinds of assets of the transferor company. Accordingly, the transferee 
company not only receives the assets of the transferor company but also receives the 
project that the transferor company sought to achieve before the merger. Also, it receives 
all of the rights of the transferor company (including the positive and negative elements) 
and takes the transferor company’s place in terms of rights and obligations. Therefore, 
the transferor company’s shareholders obtain new shares from the transferee company’s 
shares in return for their shares that expired by the merger. Also, it may be useful for the 
employees and directors who were running projects prior to the merger or acquisition to 
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continue managing and running the projects, in order to ensure that large projects of 
companies do not lose staff experience. 
With the aforementioned in mind, and due to UK, UAE and Qatar legislators 
acknowledging the importance of the legal personality of a company, the independence 
of this personality from the shareholders or owners of companies, the idea that the 
relationship between employer and employees is stronger than the relationship between 
employees and the company, furthermore, the concept that the shareholders own 
everything in companies is disappeared by UK, UAE and Qatar legislation, which 
currently aim to appreciate and uphold the social, community interest aspects and 
employees’ rights in the work and depend on the legal personality of the firm in the 
interpretation of the legal relationship between the company and its employees and 
directors, and the legal reasons for transferring their rights and liabilities in transfer and 
undertakings. Accordingly, employees and directors have a relationship with the 
company itself, irrespective of who their employer is. This recognition is what has led the 
Companies, TUPE and Cross-Border Merger Acts of the UK, in addition to the UAE and 
Qatar Companies and Labour Laws, to provide for the automatic transfer of employees’ 
rights and obligations from the old employer to the new employer, and the automatic 
transfer of shareholders’ rights form the transferor company to the transferee company in 
a merger. If the legislations of the UK, UAE and Qatar followed the theory of the legal 
personality of a company, this would facilitate interpretation and understanding of the 
legal basis for the transition of rights and obligations from the transferor to the transferee 
company and help to solve some of the problems that arise due to the negative effects of 
some M&As. 
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CHAPTER THREE: EMPLOYEE’S RIGHTS AND 
OBLIGATIONS IN M&AS 
3.1 Overview 
 
Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) are strategic tools utilised by organisations in an 
attempt to achieve a number of different objectives depending on their individual 
circumstances and their medium to long-term goals. Primarily, the central goal of a 
merger or acquisition is to increase efficiency and to accordingly seek to reduce costs in 
an attempt to improve overall profitability. Despite their overall attractiveness, however, 
mergers and acquisitions are not always successful and, if not handled with care, 
profound effects may be witnessed with regard to employees. 
 
Accordingly, there is the popular perception that M&A activity usually leads to 
(and indeed is frequently motivated by) the opportunity for substantial workforce 
reductions. This popular interpretation was reinforced by an influential contribution by 
Shleiffer & Summers (1988),
358
 who markedly suggest that control changes associated 
with merger activity offer the opportunity for firms to renege on implicit and explicit 
labour contracts, subsequently leading to a ‘breach of trust’ with employees. 
Furthermore, this notion has been similarly supported by Mylonakis (2006), who states 
that between 1997 and 2003, M&As between various banks decreased employees (a 
reduction of 10.23%)
359
. Additional consensus in this arena is also evident through the 
works of Conyon et al. (2005)
360
 and others
361
, with such research reporting that M&As 
subsequently lead to reductions in the levels of derived labour demand (both in the short 
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and long-term). This effect is not limited to the first years of merger or acquisition but 
rather extends up to ten or more years following the completion of operations. This 
ultimately affects performances at work and with regard to other rights, with decreases in 
employees’ contracts potentially amounting to 19% for related firms and 8% for 
unrelated mergers.
362
 
 
Due to such a cause, many M&As fail. Accordingly, breaking the mind-sets of 
people working in firms undergoing M&As and attempting to convince staff that the 
operation is for the good of the organisation (thus leading to improvements as well 
growth) is commonly perceived as an uphill task
363
. Due to the aftermath of M&As 
mostly affecting employees, it is a well-known fact that whenever there is a merger or an 
acquisition,
364
 it is likely that negative outcomes (i.e. layoffs due to the structure of the 
company resulting from the merger requiring a lower number of people to perform the 
same task) will be experienced. Accordingly, when companies are involved in M&As 
(especially where this involves changes in corporate identity or ownership) significant 
questions arise for the position of employees: for example, does this change mean that 
their employment contracts and other rights have ceased? In other words, to what extent 
do M&As affect employees and how can the negative aspects be overcome? 
 
Is the reason for the negative effects of M&As on employees owing to 
shortcomings in legislation, or is it due to the restructuring of the company resulting from 
the merger or acquisition? Furthermore, if the UK, UAE and Qatar laws ensure 
employees’ rights at work in M&As, what is the legal basis for this? Is it due to the link 
of workers to the enterprise or company more so than the link between them and the 
employer? Or is it owing to the fact that M&As do not lead to the liquidation of 
companies involved in M&A operations, but the transfer of their rights and obligations 
(including economic projects) to the new company resulting from the merger or 
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acquisition? Or is it for both reasons? This is discussed across seven sections in this 
chapter, according to the legislations under study and the theory of the legal personality 
of a company. 
 
In terms of the importance of workers’ contracts, there is the postulation that 
workers are one of the main pillars of the implementation of projects that companies seek 
to achieve. Moreover, owing to the negative effects on employees as a result of some 
M&A operations and due to the differences between the texts of the UK, UAE and Qatar 
laws in dealing with employees’ rights in the context of organisations undergoing M&A 
operations, this chapter explores the rights and obligation of employees in M&As, and 
identifying the legal basis for transferring their rights and obligations between transferor 
and transferee companies according to UK TUPE, CA and Cross-border Merger Acts, 
and UAE and Qatar companies and labour laws. The chapter is arranged as follows: 
 
Section 3.2 of this chapter explores the effects of M&As on employees’ rights. 
Section 3.3 identifies employees’ rights and obligations according to the UK TUPE Act, 
UK CA and UK Cross-Border Merger Act. This section is divided into two paragraphs: 
paragraph one defines the rights and liabilities of the owners of individual employees’ 
contract in M&As Cases, and paragraph two discusses the rights and obligations of the 
owners of collective contracts in M&As cases. 
 
Section 3.4 takes a closer look at the effects that M&As have on the employees of 
transferor and transferee companies according to the UAE and Qatar legislations. These 
sections further analyse and explain the rights and obligations of the owners of individual 
employee contracts, as well as collective labour contracts, in M&As according to the 
Qatar and UAE laws. 
 
Moreover, due to the differences between the texts of the laws under study in 
dealing with employees’ rights in the context of organisations dealing with M&A 
operations and to highlight the deficiencies and legal loopholes in each law, opinions are 
proposed and their advantages are considered. Section 3.5 classifies the similarities and 
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differences between employees’ rights according to the UK, UAE and Qatar laws. 
Section 3.6 looks at and classifies ways of overcoming the impacts of M&As on 
employees. Finally, Section 7 provides a summary and conclusion. 
 
3.2 Effects of M&As on Employees’ Rights 
 
There are contrasting views on the effects of M&As on employees. Accordingly, some 
economic theories predict that M&As can benefit employees. This allegedly occurs 
because the transaction constitutes a mechanism for stimulating additional investment in 
human capital and promoting ability upgrading of the workforce, particularly if these 
transactions result in the implementation of new technologies. For example, Jovanovic 
and Rousseau (2002, 2004)
365
 conjecture that high quality managers and high quality 
projects are complementary. Furthermore, they assert that takeovers result in the 
diffusion of new technologies and the reallocation of capital to more efficient uses and to 
better managers. Jovanovic and Rousseau add that technological change and ownership 
change are complementary, which implies that these transactions should lead to some job 
reduction but also skill upgrading and wage growth for workers that remain with the 
company. Mcguckin, Nguyen and Reznek (2001)
366
 state that M&As in general are 
processes that directly destroy jobs. Nevertheless, M&As facilitate synergies between 
merged organisations and consequently generate improvements in terms of efficiency and 
therefore increase competitiveness. The larger, combined and more efficient firms 
contribute to the overall good of the public as they can be expected to pass on various 
cost savings to consumers through the lowering of prices. Furthermore, increased 
efficiency in the utilisation of resources eventually translates into economic and 
employment growth. Short-term job losses should therefore be seen as an acceptable 
price for improved economic health and eventual higher employment growth. 
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In turn, some studies indicate that despite the positive effects of M&As in some 
cases, M&As are not always successful and, if not handled with care, there may be 
profound effects with regards to employees. These vary depending on the type of M&A, 
the place where it occurs and the type of services provided by the enterprise involved in 
the M&A.
367
In a highly influential article, Shleifer and Summers (1988)
368
 conjecture 
that M&As constitute a transfer of wealth from employees to shareholders. According to 
the authors, this occurs because acquirers do not honour implicit contracts with 
employees concerning salaries and benefits. Thus, in their view, the abrogation of these 
commitments enables the new owners of the firm to use the deal as a mechanism for 
enhancing the profitability of the firm and, ultimately, shareholder wealth at the expense 
of employees.
369
 
 
Using firm-level data, Conyon, Girma, Thompson and Wright (2002)
370
 reported 
that UK mergers resulted in a reduction in wages and compensation of non-production 
workers. In a follow-up to this study, Conyon, Girma, Thompson and Wright (2005),
371
 
studied and reported the negative effects of M&As on the demand for labour and 
subsequently indicate that there is a significant reduction in the use of labour post-
merger, amounting to 19% for related firms and 8% for unrelated mergers. Gugler and 
Yurtoglu (2004)
372
 analysed the effects on employment, concluding that there is a 10% 
drop in labour within industry demand in the aftermath of mergers involving European 
companies.
373
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Dutz (1989)
374
 believes that employment losses are likely to be more substantial 
in horizontal mergers than in vertical or unrelated cases, particularly where the industry 
exhibits substantial economies of scale and/or surplus capacity. Lehto and Ockerman 
(2006)
375
state that cross-border M&As
376
 lead to downsizing in manufacturing 
employment by up to 20%. On the other hand, domestic M&As with a domestic 
purchaser have negative effects on employment across all sectors. The effect of domestic 
M&As with foreign-owned purchasers on employment is remarkably negative in 
construction and other services.
377
Girma and Gorg (2004) determined that, when 
considering data from the UK electronics industry, it can be seen that the incidence of 
foreign takeovers reduces employment growth, particularly for unskilled labour 
workers.
378
 
 
From the above, it can be concluded that, in general, M&As lead to job losses and 
the number of jobs in the transferee or new company will almost invariably be less than 
the sum of the jobs in the transferor and transferee company before M&As. These losses 
come about as a consequence of consolidation and the related organisational restructuring 
and rationalisation of operations, which first reduce and then subsequently limit the 
creation of new jobs. This opinion is confirmed by an International Labour Organization 
(ILO) report
379
 that reviewed the effect of M&As on employment in the financial services 
sector: it states that they generally destroy jobs. The report underlines the fact that, 
because merger impacts are combined with other processes, such as globalisation, non-
merger related restructuring and the introduction of new technologies, it is frequently 
impossible to disentangle the losses related to M&As from those of other processes. The 
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ILO study concludes, however, that the impacts of M&As on employment and on 
working and employment conditions are nevertheless still negative. 
 
Furthermore, the ILO report on the effects of M&As on employment in banking 
and financial services notes that a merger or takeover invalidates employment agreements 
in numerous ways. The worker is now working for someone else but without ever having 
taken any steps to change employers. This brings home in the most emphatic manner the 
one-sidedness of the employment relationship, as well as the fact that workers have no 
control over the decisions of their employer.
380
 
 
The concept of mergers between companies and the dismissal of staff owing to 
administrative restructuring is a key problem in the GCC
381—much like the UK and other 
countries. This has become evident from various incidents resulting from the operations 
of M&A in the region. Notably, evidence for such a notion can be seen in the case of 
Alblad Bank,
382
 which resulted from the merger of eight institutions. This operation gave 
rise to confrontation with approximately 1,000 employees belonging to the Al Rajhi 
Exchange Company, which notably owns 13% of the shares of the bank. Importantly,
383
 
the bank considers that it is not obliged to have such employees within its workforce. 
However, the staff members requested adherence to the decision of the Saudi Council 
Ministers’ which decided to transfer all the staff of the exchange institutions to the bank, 
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with non-employment only following the completion of the accession of all staff—
including women and non-Saudis. Furthermore, the decision of the Council of Ministers 
included consideration to the bank carrying the amounts estimated by the Enterprise 
Monetary resulting from the dissolution of staff contracts owing to the merger, and taking 
into consideration the settlement rights of all workers within such institutions. Markedly, 
according to the Labour and Workers Law, Article 89,
384
 it is stated that, in the case of 
merger, the contracts of employees fall under the responsibility of the new employer. 
 
However, the new company did not adhere to this resolution. On the basis that the 
new company resulting from the merger needs a process of restructuring—which requires 
the dispense of some employees and their replacing with new working hands with new 
skills and high energies—the new company resulting from merger is unable to bear the 
burden of staff who were in the two companies before the merger. 
 
However, these justifications did not convince employees with cancelled contracts 
and affected rights, wherefore the case was brought to court. The primary rule of the trial 
committee was issued for the settlement of labour disputes in Jeddah city, which ruled 
that all workers return to their work at the Al-blad Bank, and that the bank was then 
required to pay their salaries from the date of layoffs from the Rajhi institutions—
spanning through to the date of their new work at the Al-blad Bank. Following this 
judgement, the bank offered workers the opportunity to forfeit their rights and 
accordingly return to work at the bank on a probationary stipulation. Through this 
request, the bank sought to circumvent the workers of the merged company and their 
rights to move complete with all of their rights intact to the merged company through the 
exploitation period cited in their new contracts, subsequently dismissing them during the 
probationary period, thereby refusing their rights. Notably, however, this was rejected by 
workers, who continued to claim the transfer of all rights.
385
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Here, the question in the instance mentioned, if the employees leaving their work 
in the in the Al-blad Bank, and giving up their claim during the trial: can then claim to 
consistently demand their old contracts or compensation in the case of failure of such in 
the work under experience, which are offered to them by the new company following the 
merger? 
 
Mobark (2005)
386
 justifies layoffs due M&As in the GCC by stating that the 
merger in the Arabic region generally lacks the concept of a deep economy, which 
enables strong economic institutions to be built. Importantly, mergers occur for several 
reasons, the most important of which is the composition of a strong economic entity; this 
ultimately requires a process of the restructuring of the companies, which consequently 
results in job losses. Mobark also adds that the work requires the efficiency of 
professionals: if there is professionalism and efficiency, mergers may then be more 
successful.
387
Furthermore, due to the size of companies in the GCC in comparison to the 
size of companies in the UK or other industrial countries, there are few M&As between 
national and foreign companies in the region and, for this reason, the Boards of Directors 
of companies in the GCC do not have a sophisticated management culture to help deal 
with the results of such mergers.
388
 However, the question remains here: are such reasons 
enough to implement layoffs? 
 
Taking into consideration this view regarding the effects of M&As on employees, 
the question is: in the UK, UAE and Qatar do M&As lead to the restriction of employees’ 
rights? Furthermore, according to UK, UAE and Qatar laws, what is the legal basis for 
transferring employees’ rights from the transferor to the transferee company in M&A 
cases? The following sections clarify employees’ rights in terms of individual and 
collective employment contracts in M&A cases according to UK, UAE and Qatar laws. 
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3.3 Employees’ Rights in the Transfer of Undertakings 
According to UK Legislation 
 
The UK TUPE and Cross-Border Merger Acts regulate the rights and obligations of the 
owners of individual and collective employees’ contracts by explicit provisions in cases 
of the transfer of undertakings. UK legislation has abandoned the personal nature theory 
of employment contracts that was applicable under British Common Law, which assessed 
the relationship between workers and employers on a personal basis regardless of the 
legal personality of the company. In accordance with this theory, the relationship between 
the employer and its employees is stronger than the relationship between the company 
and its employees; hence employees’ contracts and other rights expire once the employer 
changed. This subordination of employee rights in corporate theory is no longer 
applicable at the current time in UK law on the basis that there is a growing recognition 
that employees have a relationship with the organisation itself, irrespective of who the 
employer is. This recognition is what led several jurisdictions to introduce legislation that 
overrides the common law and allows for the automatic transfer of the employment 
relationship from the old employer to the new employer on the sale of a business. The 
new approach is thus to harmonise the principles of labour law and company law in the 
UK with a view to appreciating and upholding the social and public interest aspects of 
both subjects. The company is no longer viewed as a purely market-driven object of 
enterprise to be abandoned to the exigencies of agents of capitalism.
389
 
 
In response to the increasing number of business mergers, which were affecting 
workers' job security, in February 1977,
390
 the Council of the European Union adopted 
Directive 77/187, relating to the protection of workers in merger cases. The purpose of 
the directive is to safeguard the rights of employees of businesses that are sold or 
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transferred in EU member states.
391
Accordingly, the situation in the UK changed. UK 
law started to follow the legal theory of the personality of a company. The Transfer of 
Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Act 1981
392
 (otherwise called the TUPE Act) 
was issued, a law establishing the consultation rights of employees in M&As and 
providing for the automatic transfer of employment rights and liabilities from the old 
employer to the new.
393
The TUPE regulations were introduced in order to give effect to 
the Acquired Rights Directive of 1977 and to bring about a reversal of the common law 
rule, i.e. to ensure that employees are not prejudiced in any way by the transfer of the 
business in which they are employed. 
 
In 2006, the TUPE Act 1981 was updated by the TUPE Act 2006,
394
 which aims 
to ensure (as far as possible) that the rights of employees are safeguarded in the event of a 
change of employer by enabling them to remain in employment with the new employer 
on the terms and conditions agreed with the transferor.
395
 One of the main goals of the 
2006 TUPE regulations is to provide more clarity on the operation of the TUPE Act 
1981. Furthermore, one of the main goals of the 2006 TUPE regulations is that UK courts 
are obliged to follow the interpretations of the Acquired Rights Directive handed down 
by the CJEU.
396
 Accordingly, in the case of the seminal European Court guidance in 
Spijkers v Gebroeders Benedik Abbatoir CV,
397
 the law interpreted a transfer as where 
there is a transfer of an economic entity that retains its identity, meaning an organised 
grouping of resources that has the objective of pursuing an economic activity, whether or 
not that activity is central or ancillary.
398
 Also, in Ayse Suzen v Zehnacker 
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Gebaudereinigung GmbH Krankenhausservice,
399
 the judgement held that the law does 
not apply to a situation where a person has a trusted provision of services to a first 
undertaking and terminates that contract and enters into a new contract with a second 
undertaking. 
 
The TUPE Act 2006 governs employment
400
 contracts (whether individual or 
collective labour contracts) and accordingly remedies their effects through the elaboration 
of rules governing the relationship between the parties. Amongst these effects, the 
commitments of both the transferor company and the transferee company in terms of 
employment contracts and the conditions contained within them are considered. 
Accordingly, “all the transferor's rights, powers, duties and liabilities under or in 
connection with the transferring employees' contracts of employment are transferred to 
the transferee".
401
 This all-embracing concept encompasses rights under the contract of 
employment, statutory rights and continuity of employment and includes employees' 
rights to bring a claim against their employer for redundancy, discrimination, unpaid 
wages, bonuses, holidays, personal injury claims, unfair dismissal, etc.
402
In Enterprise 
Managed Services Ltd v Dance and Others,
403
 a case concerning a TUPE transfer, the 
Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT) held that a decision to ‘harmonise’ the incoming 
employees’ terms with existing employees could have been legitimately made to improve 
productivity, so that subsequent dismissals based upon the ‘harmonised’ terms may not 
have been for a reason connected with a transfer and would therefore not be 
automatically unfair under the TUPE Act.
404
 Accordingly, once it has been determined 
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that there has been a relevant transfer, the next question is: who is automatically 
transferred to the transferee? 
 
3.3.1 Individual Employees’ Rights in M&As According to the UK 
TUPE Act and the UK Cross-Border Merger Act 
 
Regulations 4 of the TUPE and 17/b of the Cross-Border Merger Acts regulate the rights 
of individual employees rights in M&As and provides for the right any person employed 
by the transferor and assigned to the organised grouping of resources or employees that is 
subject to the relevant transfer, which would otherwise be terminated by the transfer, but 
any such contract shall have effect after the transfer as if originally made between the 
person so employed and the transferee.
405
Although regulation 4 of the TUPE Regulations 
regulates individual employees’ rights, among the issues raised by this provision is the 
problem of determining which of those who work (in a non-technical sense) for the 
transferor count as employees. Regardless of the perennial difficulty in distinguishing 
between employees and independent contractors, this question has been made more 
difficult by the decisions of the Court of Appeal in Brook Street UK (Ltd) v.
406
 and Dacas 
and Cable and Wireless v. Muscat.
407
 These cases establish that an agency worker who 
has been on site for more than twelve months is probably an employee of the transferor 
and that someone who provides services via his/her own Service Firm may none the less 
be an employee of the transferor. 
 
In accordance with regulations 2 of the TUPE Act and 3 of the Cross-Border Act, 
an employee "means any individual who works for another person whether under a 
contract of service or apprenticeship or otherwise but does not include anyone who 
provides services under a contract for services and references to a person’s employer 
shall be construed accordingly".
408
The question remains here is who are the owners of 
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individual contracts who are entitled to move accordance with paragraphs 4 of the TUPE 
and 17 of the Cross-Border Acts? 
 
The TUPE Act “confers mandatory protection on the terms and conditions of 
employment of the employees who are the subject of a relevant transfer”.409 Accordingly, 
the rights of the transferor company’s employee’s transfer to the transferee company in 
the same conditions and privileges that they had in the transferor company, as M&As do 
not diminish the contractual rights of employees. Also, the law does not allow employers 
to force employees to agree validly and effectively to a diminution in their contractual 
rights. In an important decision concerning TUPE transfers, the Employment Appeal 
Tribunal (EAT) gave guidance in the case of Tapere v South London & Maudsley NHS 
Trust.
410
 First, it gave guidance on the interpretation of mobility clauses in the context of 
a TUPE transfer and, secondly, on Article 4/9 of the TUPE Act, which allows a 
transferred employee to treat themselves as dismissed if a relevant transfer involves a 
substantial change in working conditions that are to the employee’s material detriment. 
The EAT held that "detriment" should be considered using the subjective approach that 
applies in discrimination law.  
 
The TUPE Act also provides protection for employees in M&A cases regardless 
of the size of the business. It does not matter if it is a large business with thousands of 
employees or a very small one, like a shop, pub, and garage. This will not make a 
difference to the employee’s job. The TUPE Act aims for the protection of employees in 
M&As, represented namely by the employee's contract of employment being preserved 
and the liabilities of the employer,
411
 in connection with the contract, being passed from 
the transferor to the transferee. However, for an employee to be entitled to protection by 
the articles of the TUPE Act, including the right not to be unfairly dismissed, three 
criteria must be satisfied. Once these three requirements have been satisfied, the articles 
                                                 
409
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of the TUPE Act will apply.
412
 Firstly, the employee must have been assigned to the 
undertaking.
413
 Secondly, the employee must not have objected to the transfer. Thirdly, 
the employee must have been employed by the undertaking immediately before the date 
of the transfer.
414
 In other words, the employee is not transferred if he performs duties for 
or spends part of his working time involved in the part transferred but is not employed 
within this part at the time of the transfer, even though he may be employed elsewhere 
within the transferor's undertaking. The only exception is when Section 4/6 applies, 
which provides that: “shall not transfer or otherwise affect the liability of any person to 
be prosecuted for, convicted of and sentenced for any offence”.415 
 
The practical application for this can be seen in the decision of the CJEU in the 
Dutch case of Botzen and Others v Rotterdamsche Droogdok Maatschappij BV.
416
 The 
transferors went into liquidation. In order to safeguard as many of their employees’ jobs 
as possible, they entered into an agreement with another company, who agreed to take 
over several of the transferor's departments and the staff employed within them. The 
others, including the claimants, were dismissed by the liquidators of the transferor. The 
liquidators claimed that the Directive 77/197 did not apply to them as they did not work 
full time or substantially full time. The CJEU opined that the directive "must be 
interpreted as not covering the transferor's rights and responsibilities arising from a 
contract of employ or an employ relationship existing on the date of the transfer and 
entered into with employees who, although not employed in the transferred part of the 
undertaking, performed certain obligations which involved the use of assets assigned to 
the part transferred or who, whilst being employed in an administrative department of the 
undertaking which has not itself been transferred, carried out certain duties for the benefit 
of the part transferred."
417
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A question that arises here is whether the regulations only apply when the 
employee was dismissed after the transfer or whether there are circumstances in which 
they may apply when the employee was dismissed before the transfer. Regulation 4/3 of 
the TUPE Act preserves the rights of employees who are subjected to unfair dismissal 
due to a transfer of undertakings. One of the most startling and famous decisions relating 
to the TUPE Act was made by the House of Lords in Litster v Forth Dry Dock 
Engineering.
418
 This case arose because of attempts by the transferors to avoid the 
application of the TUPE Act by dismissing all employees a few hours before a transfer 
and then arguing that, in those circumstances, those dismissed could not be said to be 
employed immediately before the transfer. Their lordships held that the automatic 
transfer provisions applied not only to those employed immediately before the transfer 
but also those who could show that they would have been so employed had they not been 
unfairly dismissed for a reason connected with the transfer. Furthermore, according to the 
Court of Appeal in Fairhurst Ward Abbott v Bottes Building,
419
 paragraph 4 of the TUPE 
Act may apply where only a part of an undertaking is transferred. 
 
In P Bork International
420
the Court of Justice of the European Communities (ECJ) 
held: "the only workers who may invoke Directive 77/197 are those who have current 
employment relations or a contract of employment at the date of the transfer".
421
 
However, terminations of employees' relationships on a date before that of the transfer 
are in breach of article 4(1) of the directive. Accordingly, the employees must still be 
considered as employed by the undertaking on the date of the transfer with the 
consequence, in particular, that the obligations of the employer towards them are fully 
transferred to the transferee, in accordance with the texts of the relevant laws.
422
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The transferee company or the buyer cannot change employment conditions or 
agreements that were established between the employees and the transferor company 
before the transfer of the undertaking. There are two main checks and balances available 
here against an employer who wishes to re-organise terms and conditions of employment. 
The first is contractual and the second is by virtue of the law of unfair dismissal. Neither 
is entirely satisfactory. There is one limiting principle at least under contract law. It is 
clear that an employer may not lawfully unilaterally change employment terms. An 
imposed change gives rise to a breach of contract. Obviously, if the change of terms is 
fundamental, the employee may resign and claim constructive dismissal, triggering a 
claim for damages for wrongful dismissal and compensation for unfair dismissal. 
However, an employee does not have to take such a drastic step. They may of course 
simply resist the change and continue their employment. In order to this, in Rigby v 
Ferodo Limited [1988] ICR 29
423
 the court ruled that an employer who unilaterally 
proposed a 5% wage reduction was in breach of contract and could be resisted by the 
employee; thus allowing him to claim the arrears of pay wrongfully withheld from him 
under the contract.
424
 
 
Finally, it must be noticed that the provisions of the UK TUPE Act adopt a set of 
basic principles, the most important of which is calculating the period of service that the 
worker spent in the merged company in the case of transferring employment contracts 
from the transferor company to the transferee company.
425
 According to the TUPE Act, 
its provisions also apply to employees who are based outside of the UK as long as the 
employee is employed by a UK employer.
426
 The significant part of the business transfer 
is that it involves a UK business and their ‘undertakings’ in the UK. In the case of 
business transfers, if the firm that the employee works for has an ‘undertaking’ in the UK 
(e.g. premises, assets, fixtures and fittings, employees, etc.) but the employee is part of a 
team that spends the majority of their working week outside the UK (for example, as part 
                                                 
423
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of a sales team), then the employee should be covered under the TUPE Act.
427
Moreover, 
the TUPE Act covers employees that work in central or local government and are 
transferred from the public to the private sector. 
 
3.3.2 The Duty to Provide Employees with Information to Participate in 
M&A Decisions 
 
According to regulation 11 of the UK TUPE Act
428
 and regulation 23 of the UK Cross-
Border Merger Act,
429
legislative protection for employees includes the right to be 
informed about and, in some circumstances, consulted on an asset purchase and the right 
to a statutory redundancy payment (or severance). Such rights are in addition to any 
union arrangements or collective bargaining agreements, which will be transferred 
automatically and be binding upon the transferee firm. Accordingly, detailed advice 
should be sought concerning the prospective costs of proposals in order to restructure the 
target business after its acquisition. The case of Polkey v A.E. Dayton Services Ltd 
[1988] ICR 142, HL
430
 was an unfair dismissal case in which an employer had failed to 
consult an employee about impending redundancy. The House of Lords held that the 
failure to consult was itself enough to make the dismissal an unfair dismissal.
431
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The responsibility to consult arises if either of the companies involved in the 
merger or acquisition plans to make changes likely to have an effect upon employees 
after the transfer. In that situation, there is an obligation to consult with employee 
representatives and this consultation cannot merely be formal.
432
Consultation must be 
“with a view to seeking their agreement to the intended measures.”433 Furthermore, the 
employer must reply in writing to any representations received and if an employee rejects 
the response, he has to show in writing why he rejected it.
434
 The information and 
consultation responsibilities presuppose collective governance of the workplace. Hence, 
the responsibilities to notify and consult are owed primarily to collective institutions.
435
 
Only if the workers have failed to elect representatives after being given a reasonable 
opportunity can an employer’s responsibilities be fulfilled by dealing with individual 
employees.
436
 
 
Accordingly, the employer is not exempt from liability in the case of defaulting in 
carrying out consultation with employees; it is not a valid excuse for an employer to say 
that the reason for the lack of consultation with employees was the small number of 
employees concerned or the financial positions facing the companies involved. 
Regulation 13/9 of the UK TUPE Regulations 2006 does not contain a “special 
circumstances” exemption to relieve employers from liability in the case of a failure to 
consult with employees in M&As.
437
 In the case of Sweetin v. Coral Racing,
438
 the EAT 
held that the purpose of the remedy is to punish and deter non-compliance by employers. 
Therefore, in a case where there is no consultation at all, the starting point will be that the 
award is to be 13 weeks’ pay and it will be for the employer to show any mitigating 
factors sufficient to reduce the award. 
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In addition, UK legislation gives employees broad rights to participate in the 
operations of mergers and acquisitions.
439
 Notably, employee participation in this context 
is a system that provides employees with the right to play a role in M&A operations,
440
 
whereby employee participation means the influence of the employees, or their 
representatives, in the affairs of a company by way of: the right to elect or appoint 
members of the company’s supervisory or administrative organ and the right to 
recommend and/or oppose the appointment of some or all of the members of the 
company’s supervisory or administrative organ.441 
 
3.3.3The Rights of the Owners of Collective Labour Contracts in M&As 
According to the UK TUPE Regulations and Cross-Border Merger Act 
 
According to section 278/1 of the Trade Union and Labour Relation (Consolidation) Act 
1992 (TULRCA),
442
 a “collective agreement” means any agreement or arrangement made 
by or on behalf of one or more trade unions and one or more employers’ accordingly the 
agreement must include one or more of the following:
443
 terms and conditions of 
employment, or the physical conditions in which any workers are required to work;
444
 
engagement or non-engagement, or termination or suspension of employment or the 
duties of employment, of one or more workers;
445
 allocation of work or the duties of 
employment between workers or groups of workers; matters of discipline; a worker’s 
membership or non-membership of a trade union; facilities for officials of trade 
unions;
446
 and machinery for negotiation or consultation, and other procedures, including 
the recognition by employers or employers’ associations of the right of a trade union to 
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represent workers in such a negotiation or consultation or in the carrying out of such 
procedures.
447
 
 
According to Richard O’Dair (2006),448 one long-running controversy in the 
transfer of undertakings has been the effects upon transfers of collective agreements 
incorporated into contracts of employment, which are solved by court judgements
449
 and 
the provisions of laws. UK TUPE Act and Cross-Border Merger Act is organised and 
provides collective work contracts with special attention through the provision of 
employees being able to participate in cases of M&As through their representatives. 
According to regulation 7 of the UK Cross-Border Merger Act, once the merging 
companies have adopted the draft terms of the merger, the directors of the UK merging 
company are obliged to draw up a report that explains, amongst others things, the legal 
and economic grounds for the draft terms, as well as the effect of the cross-border merger 
on its employees. Copies of the directors’ report must be delivered to the employee 
representatives or, if there are no such representatives, to the employees directly.
450
 The 
employee representatives (or the employees if there are no representatives) can respond 
to the directors’ report with an opinion.451 
 
According to regulations 13, 14 and 15 of the TUPE Regulations 2006, an 
employer must inform and consult the representatives of the affected employees long 
enough before a relevant transfer.
452
 The employer must inform those representatives of: 
the fact that the transfer is to take place; the date or proposed date of the transfer and the 
reasons for it;
453
 the legal, economic and social implications of the transfer for any 
affected employees; and the measures that they envisage will mitigate the negative effects 
of the transfer process.
454
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In addition, legislation requires transferee companies to share certain information 
with their employees, including the number of employees employed by each merging 
company. This enables the employee representatives (or the employees where there are 
no employee representatives) to determine the allocation of seats in relation to the special 
negotiating body. Where the management of the merging companies fails to provide the 
required information, or where the information is considered to be false or incomplete, 
employee representatives or employees may then present a complaint to the Labour 
Court, which, if it finds that the complaint is well-founded, can make an order requiring 
the company to disclose the information. Furthermore, the law provides standard rules 
that set the minimum requirements for employee participation arrangements in so far as 
the employee representatives (or the employees where there are no such representatives) 
will have the right to elect, appoint, recommend or oppose the appointment of directors of 
the newly merged company.
455
 
 
With the aforementioned in consideration, we can conclude that the collective 
work contract is not between the worker and the employer, but rather between 
employees’ representatives and an employer or organisations, representing the interests 
of employees from one side and the employer from the other side defining the conditions 
that must be respected. Accordingly, the question that arises in this regard relates to 
employees employed by collective contracts: are their rights and obligations transferred 
between companies involved in M&As and what assurances are provided by UK law to 
achieve this? 
 
UK law governs this kind of contract in explicit texts and provides assurances, 
such as individual contracts. According to the TUPE Act, collective work contracts 
follow the same rule as individual contracts: they do not end with M&As but are 
transferred to the transferee company with all their conditions. The transferee company 
must be committed to implementing the conditions of the contracts, unless there is a 
collective agreement in the transferee company that includes better terms for 
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employees.
456
 Where the rights and obligations of the transferor organisation arising from 
a contract of employment or employment relationship are transferred to the transferee, 
the same terms and conditions in any applicable collective agreement apply until the 
agreement expires or is replaced.
457
 This includes the preservation of any contractual 
terms derived from collective agreements and any contractual provisions on how 
discretion under any relevant statute will be applied to the employee contract and other 
rights that are in force at the time of the transfer. This applies to “public and private 
undertakings engaged in economic activities whether or not they are operating for 
gain”.458 
 
Accordingly, the capability of an employer to vary employment terms before or 
after a TUPE transfer has been deeply circumscribed, even where the employee consents 
to such alteration. This is confirmed by the UK courts in one of their judgements 
concerning whether collective agreements that are negotiated from time to time can bind 
an employer following a transfer of employment; it was previously held that regulation 5 
of the TUPE Act renders such a ‘dynamic’ clause enforceable against the new 
employer.
459
 
 
In 2002, part of the undertakings of London Borough of Lewisham (the 
“council”) in which the claimants (former employees) worked was transferred to CCL, a 
private sector employer. In 2004, it was transferred again to Parkwood,
460
 another private 
sector employer. The TUPE Act 1981
461
 applied to each transfer. The claimants’ 
employment contracts contained a clause that provided that their salary would be “in 
accordance with collective agreements negotiated from time to time by the National Joint 
Council for Local Government (the “NJC”)”. After the 2004 transfer to Parkwood, new 
rates of pay for the period 1 April 2004 to 31 March 2007 were negotiated and agreed by 
the council and the relevant unions through the NJC. Other terms were also agreed 
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relating to training, development and other aspects concerning working relationships. 
Parkwood was not party to the negotiations. Although Parkwood increased pay in 2005 in 
accordance with the NJC rates agreed after the 2004 transfer, it did so expressly without 
acknowledging any liability to do so. Parkwood subsequently refused to increase pay in 
later years in accordance with further revised rates agreed through the NJC.
462
 The 
claimants brought claims to the Employment Tribunal for unlawful deduction from 
wages. They argued that their employment was transferred to Parkwood under regulation 
5 of the TUPE Act 1981 and that any collective agreements would also transfer under 
regulation 6 of the TUPE Act 1981. The tribunal rejected the claims and found that the 
renegotiated pay rise in 2004 amounted to a new collective agreement that did not bind 
Parkwood. On appeal, the Employment Appeal Tribunal (“EAT”) disagreed and found in 
favour of the claimants. The appellant (Parkwood) appealed to the court of Appeal (CA). 
The court of Appeal held that it was bound by the European Court of Justice decision of 
Werhof v Freeway Traffic Systems GmbH & Co,
463
which decided that terms referred to 
in a collective agreement negotiated by a third party (here the council, being the 
claimants’ former employer) will only continue to apply to the transferred employees’ 
contracts until the relevant collective agreement expires, terminates or is replaced.
464
 
 
The CJEU’s reasoning was based on article 3 of the Acquired Rights Directive 
77/187/EC (now Directive 2001/23/EC),
465
 which provides that "rights and obligations 
under a contract of employment existing at the date of the transfer are transferred to the 
transferee".
466
 The transferee had to comply with any collective agreement applying to 
the transferor “until the date of termination or expiry of the collective agreement or the 
entry into force or application of another collective agreement”.467 The CJEU in Werhof 
said clauses in employment contracts that refer to third party agreements are “static”, so 
                                                 
462
 This case posted by Ruth Bonino, ‘Effect of TUPE on Collective Agreements’ 
(2010)http://www.employmentlawwatch.com/tags/werhof-v-freeway/accessed 12 December 2011. 
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by Directive 98/50/EC of 29 June 1998; consolidated in Directive 2001/23 of 12 March 2001). 
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collective terms agreed after the transfer will not bind the transferor.
468
 The CJEU’s 
conclusion was based on two important considerations. First, that the directive did not 
intend a transferee to be bound by a collective agreement other than the one in force at 
the time of the transfer. Second, that the transferor has a fundamental right to join, or not 
to join, an association and this fundamental right would be breached if the “dynamic” 
approach were to apply.
469
 
 
From the above discussion, it can be noted that UK law governs collective 
employee contracts with individual contracts in explicit texts and provide for the transfer 
of employees’ right and obligations from the transferor to the transferee company in both 
collective and individual employees contracts. Thus, British legislation abandoned the 
theory of personal nature that was applicable in old British laws. Instead, it adopted the 
legal theory of the personality of a company, which considers that the relationship 
between employees and a company is stronger than that between employees and an 
employer. It also explains that a merger is a contract between two or more companies, 
which is assumed to lead to the expiration of the transferor company and the demise of its 
legal personality. However, this demise does not mean the decomposition of the company 
from the contracts concluded by it, simply because the transferee or new company 
succeeds the transferor company in all its rights and obligations. Importantly, all 
contracts concluded by the merged company remain in existence and continuous. The 
reason for the survival of contracts concluded by the transferor company in this case is 
because the merger does not lead to the liquidation of the transferor company
470
 and the 
sharing of its assets: its financial assets (including various positive and negative 
elements) and its economic ventures are transferred to the transferee company.
471
 This 
fact dictates the continuance of contracts concluded by the transferor company, which 
includes the rights of the owners of collective and individual employee contracts in the 
transferor and transferee companies in terms of work and other rights that they enjoyed 
before the merger or acquisition. 
                                                 
468
 Ruth D. Bonino, Effect of TUPE on Collective Agreements, Employment Law Watch [2010]. 
469
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 For more, see regulation 17 of the UK Cross-Border Act 2007. 
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To implement the provisions of the UK Companies Act and the TUPE Act 
regarding employees’ rights and obligations in M&A cases, the TUPE Act requires that 
there must first be real transmission of assets and shares between companies involved in 
M&A operations, whether in whole or in part. A relevant transfer may be affected by a 
series of two or more transactions and may take place whether or not any property is 
transferred to the transferee by the transferor: this applies to public and private 
undertakings engaged in economic activities. In other words, the TUPE Act’s provisions 
apply when there is a change in the person responsible for operating the undertaking. So, 
an administrative reorganisation of public administrative authorities or the transfer of 
administrative functions between public administrative authorities is not a relevant 
transfer. 
 
Secondly, for the purposes of applying the legislation, the transfer of undertakings 
must also occur between stable economic entities. The meaning of an economic entity 
being ‘stable’ is that in addition to being characterised as an economic entity, it also 
retains its identity.
472
 This was applied under the 1981 Act in the UK in Mackie v 
Aberdeen City Council,
473
 where a contract between a local authority and a contractor to 
produce an operational ‘smart card’ system that could be used by the council for the cash-
free payment of meals by school children and as a bus pass by senior citizens, which was 
for a fixed price, for a fixed task and for a defined product, was not a stable economic 
entity that could be the subject of a transfer on its termination.
474
 Although the word 
‘stable’ is not expressed in the new regulations or in the 1981regulations, there was no 
doubt about its application in the Mackie v Aberdeen City Council case (a case under the 
1981 regulations). It is proposed that the new regulations, in order to give effect to Union 
law, should also be read accordingly and the word ‘stable’ should be` implied.475 
                                                 
472
 See ECJ Case C-48/94 [1996] IRLR 51, for a detailed discussion see also McMullen,Business Transfers 
and Employee Rights First Ed, (Butterworths Lixisnxis 1998). 
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In the case of Smartex Limited [2006] CSIH36,
476
 the appellant (Ms Mackie) was 
employed by Smartex Limited (Smartex) from 28 October 2002 until 12 December 2003, 
when she entered the employment of the respondent. She resigned from that employment 
on 7 May 2004. She then lodged claims with the Employment Tribunal (ET), including a 
claim for unfair dismissal in accordance with the provisionsof the TUPE Act 1981. By a 
decision dated 24 September 2004, the ET held inter alia that there had been no such 
transfer and dismissed the claim. The appellant appealed to the Employment Appeal 
Tribunal (EAT).
477
 By a decision dated 21 September 2005, the EAT dismissed the 
appeal. It held that the type of business conducted by Smartex in the present case was a 
one-off contract for the production of a smart card. Once that contract was completed, the 
respondent's business with Smartex was at an end, leaving no stable or discrete economic 
entity. There was no transfer of tangible or intangible assets, even though the EAT had 
found that there was a stable economic entity before 12 December 2003, on the grounds 
that the business did not thereafter retain its identity. The court also held that the 
appellant's job with Smartex was to assist with the development of the card and to get it 
up and running. While part of her function in the initial phase was to pass on some of her 
expertise to her assistant, Miss Nicol, there was insufficient evidence to show that the job 
that Miss Nicol was assigned to do was the job that the appellant had been doing. Her 
contract with the respondent did nothing to support her contention that she continued to 
do the same job.
478
 
 
 
                                                 
476
 Smartex Limited [2006] CSIH36 XA125/05, SECOND DIVISION, INNER HOUSE, COURT OF 
SESSION. 
477
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3.4 Employees’ Rights in M&As According to UAE and Qatar 
Legislations 
3.4.1 Individual Contract Rights in M&As 
 
The State of Qatar and UAE Laws regulate individual labour contracts, through the 
elaboration of the rules governing the relationship between its parties, as well as its 
conditions, and the legal effects of M&As on such as these contracts. Article 1/9 of the 
State of Qatar and 1/4 of the UAE Labour Law define the concept of employment 
contract as “An agreement between an employer and worker, whether of a definite or 
indefinite duration, whereby the worker undertakes to perform a certain work for the 
employer, under his direction or supervision in return for a wage”.479 
 
Article 52 of Qatar and article 126 of UAE Labour Laws also state: “The service 
contract is not terminated when a change occurs in the form or legal status of the firm due 
to the merge of the enterprise with another enterprise or the transfer of its ownership or 
the right in its management to a person other than the employer for any reason. The 
original and the new employers shall remain jointly liable for a period of six months for 
the discharge of any obligations resulting from employment contracts during the period 
preceding the change; after the lapse of that period, the new employer shall solely bear 
such liability”. 
 
Through the texts mentioned, it can be concluded that the UAE and Qatar 
legislation -like the contemporary legislation- taking by the theory of the legal personality 
of company and determine and confirm that the worker is tied to the project regardless of 
a change of owner, which therefore means the continuation of the contract with a new 
employer, whether having acquired this status due to the transfer of ownership, such as 
                                                 
479
 Articles 1(9) of the State of Qatar Labour Law 14 of 2004 and 1(4) of the UAE Labour Law 12 of 1986, 
which define labour by saying ‘Labour: Any human effort, whether intellectual, technical or physical 
exerted in return for a wage’. 
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the sale of the business, or otherwise through the non-transference of ownership, such as 
rent. 
 
Accordingly, it is clear that if the enterprise ownership is moving to a new 
employer, this does not lead to breaking the link between the worker and the enterprise, 
and similarly does not affect the rights of workers or their contracts, where the new 
employer is accountable by solidarity with the old employer for six months to settle 
things between the new and old employer, and to thereby transfer the responsibility to the 
new employer. 
 
In order to preserve employees’ rights in transfers of undertakings on the basis 
that the employee is the weaker party in this equation, and also in order to maintain the 
legal status occupied by the worker before M&A, the legislature make the responsibility 
on employees’ rights a shared between the new and old employer for six months after the 
merger. However, the solidarity of the old employer with the new employer is not 
absolute, with the laws indicating that, after six months, the new employer is solely 
responsible for the implementation of the obligations arising from the employment 
contracts between the worker and the former owner of the venture.
 
 
The provisions of the judiciary in Arabic areas were supported and settled 
concerning this rule, when, most ‘courts sentenced that contract of employment does not 
end when the employer change’. An example, in appeal Nos 108 and 109 of 2009 
(Labour Court),
480
 the UAE appeal Court stated that “the text in Article 126 of the Labour 
Law indicates that when the individual ownership of the enterprise transfers from the 
original employer to the new employer each of them will be jointly liable with the other 
on the implementation of the obligations arising from employment contracts in the 
previous period to transfer of this property for a period of six months from the date of 
transitions. After the expiration of this period, the responsibility of the previous employer 
                                                 
480
 The judgement of the UAE appeal court, in appeal Nos 108 and 109 of 2009. 
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in the implementation of these commitments ends and the new employer remains solely 
responsible.
481
 
 
In another judgement, the Jordanian Excellence Court in its judgement
482
ruled 
that a contract of employment does not end when the employer changes through merger 
or acquisition.
483
 The summary of case is as follows: HPA worked under a contract of 
employment as an employee in the Mashreq Bank Lebanese Joint stock company Amman 
Branch since September, 1979, with the total amount paid to him at his last salary 
312.500 Dinars—unlike the thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth months’ salary in addition 
to allowances. On June 13, 1991, by decision of the Commission on Economic Security 
in Jordan the Mashreq Bank branches in Jordan split from the centre of president of the 
Bank in Beirut, and entrusted the administration of those sections to the Petra Bank
484
. 
On May 31, 1993, Mashreq Bank subsidiary Amman merged with Jordan Gulf Bank. The 
plaintiff (worker) introduced his claim in with case number 1033/92 in front of the Court 
of First Instance at the Amman- Jordan-against each of the Mashreq Amman Bank and 
Management Committee of the Bank of the Mashreq. Subsequently, the plaintiff did not 
end his work but continued to work in the Jordan and Gulf Bank Company. Notably, the 
transfer of ownership of the company from the employer to any other owner in any action 
does not affect the employment contract, where the contract between the worker and the 
new employer remains in existence through force of the law, as if the employee had 
signed with the new employer from the very beginning, thereby transferring its effects 
and being responsible for implementing all obligations resulting from such. Importantly, 
this is the lesson from the text of Article 52 of the State of Qatar Labour Law,
485
 and 
needs to be understood concerning the fact that the work of the plaintiff is on-going: 
splitting the Mashreq Bank branches in Jordan from the centre of administration in Beirut 
                                                 
481
 The judgement of the UAE appeal court, in appeal Nos 108 and 109 of 2009. 
482
 Judgement of Jordanian Excellence Court No. 284/95 of 25/03/1995. Source Pasbus (2006), Ibid, pp. 
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does not constitute the end of the service of all the users in Jordan. However, the 
respondent would not accept the decision made by the Court of Appeal, therefore he 
appealed against the judgement to the Court of Cassation. This appeal was based on his 
view that the Court of Appeal erred when it ruled that the plaintiff remained at the top of 
his work and he was not laid off from the work, even though the Committee of Economic 
Security completed the merger process between the Mashreq Bank and the Jordan and 
Gulf Bank.
486
 
 
However, the Court of Cassation rejected the appeal and supported the impugned 
decision on the basis that, although the merger would result in the expiration of the 
transferor company and the demise of its legal personality, this lapse does not mean the 
decomposition of the company from its contracts because the transferee or new company 
succeed the company in its rights and obligations. Ultimately, all contracts entered into 
by the transferor company continue and are on-going.
487
 The reason for the continuation 
of the contracts entered into by the transferor company is owing to the fact that the 
merger does not involve the liquidation of the transferor company and/or the sharing of 
its assets, but rather the transfer of its financial assets, including the positive and negative 
elements, which requires existence and continue the activities of the transferor company 
in the scope of the transferee company. This fact leads to the continuation of contracts 
entered into by the transferor company, where their impacts go to the transferee or new 
company.
488
 
 
Moreover, where the contract of employment continues once it is formed, a 
contractual relationship linking the two parties is established with the imposed 
continuous obligations imposed on each of them as long as the contract exists. 
Accordingly, the ownership of the facility is moved or changed, there should not be 
impact on the employment contracts between the employer and worker; therefore, the 
expiration of the transferor company and the demise its legal personality do not impact 
                                                 
486
 Judgement of Jordanian Excellence Court No. 284/95 of 25/03/1995. 
487
 For same meaning see articles 276 of Qatar and 284 of UAE Companies Laws. 
488
 The principal of the theory of the legal personality of company, for more meaning see Section 2.3 of 
Chapter Two of this thesis. 
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employment contracts; accordingly, the contract remains in force prior of merger and 
transferring to the transferee company by force of law, and that does not depend on the 
satisfaction of the worker or the transferor company, and where the transferee company 
cannot steer away from the contracts or obligations entered into by the transferor 
company.
489
 
 
This result was previously approved by the Egyptian Court of Cassation
490
 in its 
decision of 26December 1981, which also added two main rules to the judgement above. 
Firstly, the rules and provisions included in the contracts and regulations of the transferee 
company before a merger are non-mandatory and do not apply to the transferor 
company’s employees, as long as their contracts and systems that were in effect in their 
regard did not include similar rules and provisions. Secondly, the privileges that were 
enjoyed by the transferor company’s employees cannot be disregarded by the transferee 
or new company after a merger or acquisition.
491
 
 
This rule—which is stipulated by law and confirmed by court rulings—applies on 
the merger by absorption and merger by formation a new company where the employees 
in the transferor company maintain their legal status, and their contracts move from the 
transferor companies to the transferee company—even if there is no legal text in the 
contracts or in the merger contract requiring or deciding this. Ultimately, this is 
enforceable by law.
492
 Markedly, following the M&A operation, the employer should set 
internal appropriate rules and regulations for the company resulting from M&A to suit 
the new situation so as not to dissipate the rights of workers. 
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 For more, see Hammad M A M, ‘Merger Company According the Jordanian Companies Law’(Master 
Thesis, University of Jordan and Pasbos 2006). 
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 This was confirmed by the Jordanian Court Excellence
493
when it ruled that the 
transferee company is the successor of the transferor company in all its rights and 
obligations. This rule, from the public order, does not depend on the consent of the 
worker or the new employer; the intention of this rule is to protect the worker and to 
ensure stability in the employee’s work—especially following the relationship between 
the workers and enterprise or venture having become stronger than the relationship 
between the worker and the owner of business. With this in mind, it can then be stated 
that the employment contract will have lost its adjective personal,
494
 thereby implying 
that changing employer is not in itself a reason for the expiration of labour relations. 
Ultimately, this is not justified or fitting concerning the termination describing abuse, and 
lends it legitimacy in this case.
495
 
 
Notably, Saghir (1986)
496
 and Al-Borai (2003)
497
 state that there should be 
expansion concerning the application of the rule of continuity of contracts for work, with 
amendments including its scope. Importantly, everyone has a working relationship with 
their employer, and so the application of this rule requires, firstly, a change in the legal 
status of the employer, which subsequently means a change in the venture management. 
This, of course, includes a change either in the property or in utilisation. 
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From the aforementioned and according to the texts of laws, cases,
498
 theory of 
the legal personality of company and M&A nature, it can be stated that the transferee 
company is the legal successor of the transferor company, and replaces them in financial 
assets in their rights and their obligations, and also replaces them in contracts within 
which the transferor company was a party. Therefore, the expiration of the transferor 
company does not have any effect on the employment contracts of which the company is 
a party, with such contracts remaining continuous in the face of the transferee company, 
and whereby it is not permissible for the transferee company to terminate the 
employment contract established by the transferor company. However, the continuation 
of the work contract—which the transferor company is a party of—does not prevent the 
transferee company from its right to organise the ventures that transferred form the 
transferor company, to comply with the conditions required for, and to be a real 
organisation.
499
 
 
3.4.2 Employees’ Rights in M&As Regarding Employment Contracts of 
an Unspecified Duration 
 
Unlike employment contracts with an indefinite duration
500
 and casual work,
501
 
temporary work, according to the State of Qatar and UAE Labour Laws, is defined as 
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‘the work whose nature necessitates its performance in a limited period or which is 
limited to a certain work and ends upon its performance’.502 
 
From the text above, it may be stated that the provisions relating to the survival of 
labour contracts following M&A are the provisions relating to limited duration contracts; 
however, if the service contract is of an indefinite duration, any of the two parties may 
terminate the contract. In this case, the party intending to terminate the contract is 
required to notify the other party in writing, as defined by law.
503
 However, the right to 
terminate the service contract is not absolute, but rather must be based on legal 
justification, and there should therefore be no harm affecting the other party not 
commensurate with this interest of termination. If the termination is not intended to 
achieve a legitimate interest, or otherwise if the interest achieved by the termination does 
not fit with the harm to the other party, the termination in this case is arbitrary; the judge, 
in this case, has to predict the reasons for termination on the basis of substantive matters, 
as estimated by the judge in question without supervision from the Court of Cassation, 
when the estimate was based on palatable reasons.
504
 
 
In confirmation of this view, the Arab judiciary represented by the Egyptian Court 
of Cassation went on to state that the appointment of activity of the enterprise or pressing 
expenses or the shutting down one of its subsidiaries allows the employer to end the 
contracts of some workers based on his authority in the organisation or enterprise, which 
is at the discretion of him without supervision—as long as it is justified. In such 
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Labour Law, pp. 1-44. See also article 117 of the UAE Labour Law, which provides for that by 
saying:“The employer and employee may terminate the employment contract with unlimited period, for a valid 
reason at any time after conclusion of the contract by written notice duly given to other party, thirty days at 
least prior to termination. 2. In respect of daily pay employees period of notice shall be as: A. On week in the 
employee has worked for more than six months but less than one year. B. Two weeks if the employee has 
worked for at least one year. C. One month if the employee has worked for at least five years”. 
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operations the judiciary can only following the verification of the seriousness of the 
justifications, which lead to laying some workers or expenses.
505
 In appeal No 83 of 
1959,
506
 the court decided that the authority of the employer in regulating their enterprise 
is absolute power, on the basis that they are the company owner and responsible for its 
management, and not just an observer of its decisions. Notably, at his discretion, if he 
considers economic crisis casts its effects upon him, or a disaster is about to occur and 
may lead to a narrow circle of his activities or pressure him in terms of expenses, this 
allows him the freedom to take whatever decisions he sees as required in order to protect 
his business and to accordingly protect his legitimate interests.
507
 
 
We conclude from this that the ending of employment contracts of indefinite 
duration concluded by the combined company ultimately depends on the availability of 
justifications calling for termination; otherwise, the termination is considered arbitrary 
and therefore calls for worker compensation: such circumstances included, for example, 
employees being laid off owing to dual careers or work duplication, or owing to the 
reorganisation of the company’s overall structure following the merger, or the abolition 
of some operations which the company carried out before.
508
 On the other hand, a worker 
may terminate his employment contract if the merger transfers the workplace to an area 
far from the original place of work, or if the working conditions agreed upon between the 
worker and the company are changed, or if he has otherwise established more suitable 
working conditions.
509
 In short, the principle of contracts for work does not prejudice the 
right of two parties in unspecified period contracts to terminate the contract, provided that 
the termination is based on legitimate reasons. 
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3.4.3 Rights of the Owners of Collective Labour Contracts in M&As 
A collective agreement is a legally enforceable contract for a specified period (usually 
one year) between the management of an organisation and its employees represented by 
an independent trade union regulating the terms and conditions of work and the 
provisions of operation.
510
 This agreement is notably also between the organisation and 
trade union organisations, as well as the owner or a group of business owners. Markedly, 
it is written with the agreement detailing and defining conditions of employment (wages, 
working hours and conditions, overtime payments, holidays, vacations, benefits, etc.), as 
well as procedures for dispute resolution.
511
 This is also referred to as labour agreement, 
union agreement, or union contract. 
 
The collective agreements refer to the regulations of conditions of work and the 
conditions and provisions of operating in-line with international lab or standards 
contained in the Labour Conventions issued by the International Labour Organisation,
512
 
which subsequently lead to increasing the standard of living of workers—physical and 
cultural—and the provision of aspects of social care and healthcare for them.513 The 
collective agreement is not between the worker as an individual and the employer 
including a commitment in the work versus wage, but rather exists between the trade 
union organisation and represents the interests of the workers on the one hand and the 
employer on another. Moreover, it specifies the conditions that must be respected
514
 when 
the individual work is concluded so as to achieve the interests of the workers and to 
thereby ensure the employer has some degree of stability in his dealings with the workers 
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and accepting the union the terms of employment.
515
 This type of contract is renewed 
through collective bargaining, and is renewed if the last period was completed without 
agreement on the renewal extended to work the convention for three months, and 
continues to negotiate for its renewal, if passed two months, without reaching an 
agreement, any parties in the Convention was to submit the matter to the competent 
administrative authority in mind of taking the required action necessary.
516
 
 
From the aforementioned and according to Al-sair (1987),
517
 article 126 of the 
UAE and article 52 of Qatar Labour Laws focus on individual contracts of employment 
but not collective labour contracts. Despite the importance of collective labour contracts 
and the regulatory role of these collective agreements for labour relations, the texts of the 
UAE and Qatar Labour Laws do not apply the rule of the continuity of employment 
contracts in transfers of undertakings.
518
 
 
Mehrez (2002)
519
 believes that the regulatory role of collective agreements for 
labour relations cannot be denied, as it is considered as the Constitution to individual 
employment contracts, therefore, he gave three solutions; firstly, the collective agreement 
that held by the transferee company (including its rights and privileges) applies to 
employees of the transferor company, provided that the rights and  privileges in the 
collective agreement that hold by the transferee company must be at least equal with what 
was contained in the collective work contract provided by the transferor company.
520
 
However, if there is no collective contract concluded by the transferee company, this 
does not prevent the continuation of workers of the transferor company in using the 
individual advantages determined by their collective contract concluded by knowledge of 
the transferor company.
521
 Secondly, the transferee company can accept the collective 
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employment contract and abide by this in mind of the workers of the transferor company, 
and thus becomes a party to this contract, requiring the application of the principle of 
succession of the transferee company of the transferor firm public succession in all its 
rights and obligations.
522
  Thirdly, the transferee company can enter into negotiations 
with the Trade Union organisation workers regarding a new collective labour agreement, 
taking into account various new economic and social circumstances.
523
 
 
The fact is that the transmission of the collective labour contracts of the transferor 
company to a transferee or new company raises many practical problems due to different 
cultures and the nature of the work in the companies, which may need a large amount of 
money. Therefore, it is best to try to avoid problems and difficulties potentially facing 
companies involved in mergers due to the collective transition of the employees of the 
transferor company to the transferee company. This may require negotiations with 
representatives of the workers or trade unions concerning all conditions according to the 
workers’ rights and obligations following the merger. This may assist in establishing an 
appropriate solution during the preparatory phase, and will also better enable all parties to 
prepare for the merger.  
 
3.5 Kind of Employees Rights and Obligation in M&As 
According to articles 126 of the UAE and 52 of Qatar labour laws and regulations 4 and 5 
of UK TUPE Act 2006, as well as according to regulations 2/2, 3 and 4 of UK Cross-
Border Act, it is normal that the transference of employment contracts be concluded by 
the transferor company to the transferee or new company, not leading to the prejudice of 
the rights of workers or abridging the privileges enjoyed by them. The continuation does 
not only focus on labour contracts but also includes what workers enjoyed in the form of 
advantages and benefits prior to the merge, such as bon uses, promotions, vacations and 
discounts, facilities, qualification and training courses, nutrition, clothing and tickets that 
provided by some companies for their workers and all advantages that enjoyed by 
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employees prior to the merger. Where, the transferee or new company cannot repudiation 
of employment contracts which are concluded by the transferor company or to otherwise 
detract from the advantages that the employees were enjoyed prior to the merger. 
 
This applied in one of the issues of dispute submitted to arbitration COICA 
Cairo.
524
 The abstract of the case stated that the Contemporary of Oils and Soap 
Company accustomed to provide breakfast for workers who worked it during the 
Ramadan month, as well as to give workers the amount of meat on the occasion of Eid al-
Adha each year. After the nationalisation of the company in 1963, it was decided that a 
fee be given instead of this feature in-kind; this continued until the time at which the 
company merged into the Egyptian Oils and Soap Company, which subsequently 
abstained from adhering to this part of the contract. Despite the intervention of the 
General Union of Workers of Food Industries with the workers at the merged company, 
the merging company insisted on its position. Subsequently, when the dispute was 
referred to arbitration, the merging company stuck to its position by the grounds that the 
merger of the Contemporary Oils and Soap Company led to the end of all privileges 
enjoyed by its workers. However, the arbitral tribunal did not recognise the view of the 
merging company, and instead decided that the merger should not affect the wages of the 
workers or otherwise detract from the distinguishing features of their contract, nor should 
it detract or diminish or affect the workers of the merging company. COICA arbitration 
therefore decided to bind the merging company to pay all the features mentioned to 
workers of the merged company.
525
 
 
Furthermore, the transferee company would not impose its rules of procedure on 
the workers of the transferor company if the application of regulations would affect the 
rights they had enjoyed in the transferor company; however, the regulation of the 
transferee company applies to the workers of the transferor company, and the workers 
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should take benefit from it if the regulation has better advantages determined for them.
526
 
Regardless, in order to take advantage of such, a worker must be present at the company 
at an earlier date concerning the merger of transferor company workers, as long as the 
employment contracts associated with the transfer company do not decide upon similar 
systems. 
 
The Egyptian Court of Cassation confirmed this as the view when deciding that 
case of merger the transferee or new company take the liabilities and rights of employees 
of the transferor company and applies for them its system, however, if its system has 
different provisions from the provisions of the transferor company, which may lead to 
negative impact on the transferor company employees rights that they were enjoyed 
before the merger, the system does not apply. Essentially, there is no place for 
implementing the rule of equality in this area because equality can only be in the context 
of rights, which is an area guaranteed by law.
527
 
 
On the other hand, however, it is not permissible for the workers of the transferee 
company to demand to the advantages enjoyed by workers of the transferor company on 
the pretext of equality amongst workers in one establishment. The differentiation between 
workers per enterprise is not to prejudice the principle of equality if it were based on 
sound justifications. This principle was applied by the Arabic Judiciary by a judgement of 
the Egyptian Court of Cassation
528
when the court rejected the claim of a worker of a 
transferee company who requested that the transferee company make his rights equal to 
the rights of workers of the transferor company. In this instance, the court stated in its 
ruling that the transfer of ownership of the enterprise from one employer to another—in 
any act of any kind—does not affect the employment contract and the contract between 
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the worker and employer, which is required to continue to exist if the employee had 
signed with the employer at the beginning of his contract.
529
 
 
3.6 Conditions for Employee Transfer 
The principle of the survival of the rights and obligations of employees of companies 
involved in M&As, as provided by the laws under study and confirmed by jurisprudence 
opinions and judicial judgements, requires the availability of several conditions to be 
implemented. The most important of these conditions are discussed below.  
 
Firstly, the legal status of the employer must be changed. This condition requires 
that change occurs through a change in ownership or use, for example a transfer of 
ownership owing to death, inheritance, testament, sale or lease, or transformation or 
merger.
530
The UK TUPE 2006 regulations apply if an undertaking or business is 
transferred. They therefore do not apply simply if the ownership of shares in a limited 
company is transferred. In that situation, the basic position is that employees still remain 
employees of the company and thus do not need special rules to transfer their 
employment contracts to a new employer. In order to this, the UK Court of Appeal, in 
Millam v The Print Factory (London) 1991 Ltd CA 2007 ICR 1331,
531
 ruled that the texts 
of the TUPE regulations apply if an undertaking or business is transferred, or if a service 
provision change is made, but do NOT apply when shares in a limited company are 
transferred. 
 
In this situation, the continuity of the venture is not intended in the sense of 
continuation of the previous elements
532
, but rather that there be the continuation of the 
same or different activity/activities in order to achieve the same goal as that established in 
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the contract. In other words, the activities practiced by the workers prior to the change 
will continue on even after a change; this is what the Arabic jurisprudence agrees upon
533
 
where the continuation of employment contracts—despite a change of employer—
assumes continuation in the same or in a similar activity, despite this change.
534
 
 
Secondly, employees’ contracts must be continuous at the time the employer 
changed. Accordingly, the new employer does not have to adhere to contracts of 
employment that ended before the change of employer or the transmission of the 
enterprise.
535
 The rule of the continuation of employment contracts applies without regard 
to the type and nature of the employment contract, whether it is a fixed-term contract or a 
contract of an indefinite duration.  
 
Importantly, the cases of temporary cessation of the employment contract due to 
an emergency—such as illness or vacation, breastfeeding or the performance of military 
service, do not lead to cancel the contracts of employees even the employer have changed 
during this period—where the contracts still remain in force. The reason for this is that, 
as long as the stop was related to the rights and privileges enjoyed by workers in 
accordance with the law, the contract must therefore not be compromised. Thus, the 
advantages enjoyed by the workers of the transferor company must continue with the 
transferee or new company.
536
 
 
Thirdly, regulation 8 of the UK TUPE 2006 provides some new and important 
exceptions to the general principle that liabilities in connection with the contract transfer 
to the transferee. Once again, the underlying policy is the desire to free transferees from 
TUPE Act liability in order to encourage a “rescue culture”.537 Accordingly, to apply the 
provisions of the TUPE 2006 in M&As, the company or entity involved should retain its 
identity. In other words, the transferor company should not have entered into insolvency 
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or liquidation. The most helpful case and the case that is, even now, regularly cited by 
courts when forming judgements as to whether or not a business transfer has occurred is 
the European Court of Justice case of Spijkers v Gebroeders Benedik Abattoir CV [1986] 
2 CMLR 296.
538
 This case concerned a company that ran a slaughterhouse. The company 
became insolvent and closed down, dismissing all employees. It was purchased some 
time later, by which time it had entirely ceased activity and dissipated its goodwill. The 
ECJ identified that “the decisive criteria for establishing the existence of a transfer within 
the meaning of the Directive is whether the entity in question retains its identity.”539 To 
ascertain whether or not this has occurred, the ECJ stated that it is “necessary to take 
account of all the factual circumstances of the transaction in question” and went on to set 
out a number of factors that need to be considered, such as a change in the legal status of 
the employer and the continuation of the ventures of the companies involved. However, 
the court went on to say that, in deciding whether this condition is fulfilled, “each of 
these factors is only part of the overall assessment and cannot be examined independently 
of each other”.540 
 
Furthermore, employment contracts should be in existence at the time of the 
merger or acquisition: the employee should not have left their job in the transferor 
company for any reason, unless the reason refers to force majeure or the dismissal of 
employees by the employer because of the transfer.
541
 In accordance with regulations 4 
and 5 of the UK TUPE Act and articles 126 of UAE and 52 of Qatar Labour Laws, this 
does not apply for employees who left or resigned of their own free will before the 
merger or acquisition. In the case of Ayse Süzen v Zehnacker Gebäudereinigung GmbH 
Krankenhausservice ,
542
 the court ruled that the Directive 1977/187/EEC does not apply 
to situations where a person has a trusted provision of services to a first undertaking and 
terminates that contract and enters into a new contract with a second undertaking, unless 
there is a concomitant transfer from one undertaking to another of significant tangible or 
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intangible assets, or the taking over by the new employer of a major part of the workforce 
in terms of numbers and skills assigned by the predecessor to the contract. 
 
Finally, there must be the continuation of the commercial venture and the survival 
of the opportunity to work, which means a continuation of the activity that was carried 
out by former employers. When this activity continues—irrespective of whether or not 
the new employer uses the elements of previous exploitation—what matters is the unity 
of activity and not the elements of exploitation or production. Of course, when the facility 
is the same, it often exercises the same as its previous activities when changing employer; 
subsequently, the opportunities of work occupied by the workers with the previous 
employer continue. Notably, their contracts continue as those which were in effect at the 
time of change.  
 
Importantly, however, if the activity ceases temporarily—such as in the case 
when the new employer decides after the enterprise moved that some renovations and 
repairs are required on devices, equipment or the place at which the company carries out 
its activities—this does not preclude the application of the rule of the continuity of 
employment contracts as long as the facility will be operating again following the cease 
of the reasons for pause. 
 
It is noted that the continuation of a company in the performance of its activities 
in M&A cases does not mean uniformity and an exact match between the activity of the 
entity before and after the transfer or undertaking; rather, the intention is the survival of 
the jobs that were occupied by the workers before the change of employer.
543
 
 
According to a ruling of the Egyptian Court of Cassation ([1980] 459), the 
continuation of employment contracts in the transferee or new company after a merger or 
acquisition requires that the aims of the transferee company should be similar or 
complementary to the aims of the transferor company, where employees continue to 
perform work that does not differ much from the work agreed upon in the contract of 
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employment. This was confirmed by the Egyptian Court of Cassation in its judgement 
issued in a meeting on 1 March 1980,
544
 which ruled that it is not permissible to 
commission workers permanently in work substantially different from the work for which 
they have been contracted, unless required by necessity and provided that this change is 
only temporarily implemented to face this necessity and removed when the necessity 
expires. Alexandria Court, in its judgement issued on 30 December 1957,
545
 also ruled 
that “in the case of the sale of the enterprise, it is not allowed to force workers to continue 
the work if the buyer's work is completely different from the original work, especially if 
the work is exclusively artistic. The continuation in this case needs to be approved by the 
worker”.546 
 
3.7 Similarities and Differences Regarding Employees’ Rights 
in M&As in the Laws under Study 
3.7.1  Similarities between the Provisions of the Legislations of the UK, 
the UAE and Qatar Relating to Employees’ Rights in M&As 
According to sections 4, 5 and 7 of the UK TUPE Act, and articles 52 of Qatar and 126 
of UAE Labour Laws, it has been determined that the merger of a company does not 
entail the termination of labour contracts, but rather that all the rights, obligations and 
liabilities of the employees of the transferor company are transferred to the transferee or 
new company by virtue of law once the process of the merger has been completed.
547
This 
provision concerns public order, and does not depend upon the consent of the worker or 
the new employer. 
 
Importantly, according to the texts of the laws under consideration, it is normal 
that the transference of employment contracts from the transferor company to the 
transferee company is not limited to employees’ contracts, but should also include any 
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and all privileges enjoyed by workers in the form of advantages and benefits prior to the 
merge. Accordingly, “any such contract shall have effect after the transfer as if originally 
made between the person so employed and the transferee”.548 This is supported by the 
English
549
 and Arabic
550
 judiciaries, e.g. the Jordanian Court of Cassation rules that 
“…the merger led to the expiration of the transferor company and the demise of its legal 
personality”. However, such expiration does not mean the separation of the company 
from its obligations and contracts: owing to the merging or acquiring a company, the 
merged or acquired company must ensure legal succession in all its rights and obligations 
and that all the contracts concluded by the merged or acquired company remain and are 
continuous.
551
Notably, UK, Qatar and UAE laws follow the legal theory of the 
personality of a company, which is based on the moral personality of companies involved 
in M&As and the extent of their expiration with the survival of their commercial ventures 
as a result of a merger or acquisition. Accordingly, with mergers the moral personality of 
the transferor company expires without liquidation and devolves all its elements in terms 
of financial assets to the transferee company, which receives all the assets and liabilities 
of the transferor company, including its ventures as a set of property movable and 
immovable. Legislation, jurisprudence and the judiciary are based upon justifying the 
transfer of rights and obligations, including the rights of employees, between companies 
involved in M&A operations. Accordingly, the transfer of an activity from one company 
to another company is not considered to be a merger as long as the first company still 
retains its moral personality and financial assets.
552
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Also, M&As do not lead to the cutting or cessation of the legal relationship 
between the employees of the transferor and transferee companies.
553
 
 
The purpose of the laws and also the jurisprudence and the judiciary
554
 in 
upholding the legal theory of the moral personality of a company and deciding to transfer 
employees’ rights and obligation between companies involved in M&As operations is to 
support the principles applied by modern laws, which intend to protect the worker and 
ensure stability in their work - especially following the establishment of the relationship 
between the worker and the enterprise  and its venture becomes stronger than the relation 
between the employee and the employer that originally contracted him.
555
 It also aims to 
enable companies to benefit from their workers and the skills they acquired through their 
work in the company before the merger or acquisition. 
 
It is worth noting that the principle of continuation and the survival of labour 
contracts in the cases of mergers and the transmission of the commitments of the 
transferor company to the transferee company require adherence to certain conditions, 
which require a change in the legal status of the employer (either in terms of use or 
property) and the sustainability of the venture. The intention here is not the continuation 
of project elements as before, but rather to ensure the continuation of the same activity in 
order to achieve the same goals as prior to the merger. In addition, there must be the 
continuation of the business and the survival of employee opportunities and existing 
projects. Moreover, labour contracts must be applicable at the time when the employer 
changes, so the new employer does not have any obligation to an employment contract 
that ended before the merger or acquisition.
556
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The texts of the State of Qatar, UAE and UK laws relating to the effects of 
mergers on the rights of individual contracts are similar. The laws also follow the legal 
theory of the personality of a company and protect the owners of individual employees’ 
rights at work and all other privileges enjoyed by them in the transferor company and the 
transferee company, which becomes its legal successor in all rights and obligations by 
force of law.  
 
3.7.2 Differences between Employees’ Rights in M&As According to the 
UK TUPE and Cross-Border Merger Acts and UAE and Qatar Laws 
 
Although there are similarities between some of the texts of regulations of the UK TUPE 
Act, and Cross-border Act and the UAE and Qatar Labour Laws relating to preserving 
the rights of the owners of individual employment contracts, the texts of the laws relating 
to M&As and their effects upon employees have many differences. 
 
Unlike the UK TUPE Regulations and Cross-Border Merger Act,
557
in Qatar and 
UAE laws, there are no particular integrated and binding legal systems regulating M&A 
operations and their impacts on workers and their rights. They do not highlight solutions 
and treatments that can be used in order to reduce these effects: article 126 of the UAE 
and article 52 of Qatar Labour Laws only regulate the rights of individual employers in 
M&As, which leads to difficulties in terms of understanding employees’ rights in cases of 
the transfer of undertakings. This could in turn lead to corporate exploitation of these 
legislative shortcomings and mistakes, and the manipulation of the rights of staff, as 
happened in the case of Bank Al-blad and Al-Rajhi Companies Exchange with their 
employees.
558
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Unlike section 5 of the UK TUPE Act
559
 and regulation 36 of the Cross-Border 
Merger Act,
560
 UAE and Qatar legislations do not regulate the rights and obligations of 
the owners of the collective employees contracts
561
 in M&As, or give the owners of such 
contracts the right to participate in the selection of the new management of the transferee 
or new company.
562
 Furthermore, unlike the TUPE and Cross-Border Merger Acts of the 
UK, UAE and Qatar legislation does not regulate the rights of employees to participate in 
negotiation procedures in M&As, either by themselves or through their 
representatives.
563
This leads to deprive the owners of collective contracts of the right to 
take advantage of the provisions of the labour laws in the two countries, which state that 
the rights of individual employees are transferred from the transferor to the transferee or 
new company in merger cases. It also leads to the ignorance of employees of their legal 
situation after M&As and increases their concern for their future and their rights at work, 
which leads to negatively affect the morale of the employees and thus their performance 
in their work, which may affect the performance of the companies involved. The failure 
of the UAE and Qatar legislators to regulate the rights of the owners of collective 
contracts may also lead to the owners of companies that employ staff by collective labour 
contracts dismissing them without any rights once the firms enter into M&A negotiations, 
which at the same time deprives the company of a large segment of its workers and their 
skills.  
 
Importantly, unlike the UAE and Qatar laws, regulations 5 and 7 of the TUPE Act 
and regulation 36 of the Cross-Border Merger Act
564
 of the UK are regulate a collective 
work contract with special attention through the provision of employees being able to 
participate in cases of M&As through their representatives.
565
Moreover, the UK 
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legislation also includes the right to be informed about and, in some circumstances, 
consulted in the case of an asset purchase and the right to a statutory redundancy payment 
(or severance), as well as protection against unfair dismissal.
566
 
 
Furthermore, unlike UAE and Qatar legislation, the TUPE Act 2006 defines the 
conditions and scope of the application of its provisions.
567
 It applies to public and 
private undertakings engaged in economic activities, whether or not they are operating 
for gain. Moreover, the law applies to workers employed in the undertaking, business or 
the part transferred if they ordinarily work outside the United Kingdom.
568
 However, an 
administrative reorganisation of public administrative authorities or the transfer of 
administrative functions between public administrative authorities is not a relevant 
transfer and is not governed by any such law.
569
 Moreover, regulations 4 and 7 of the law 
do not apply to any relevant transfer where the transferor is the subject of bankruptcy 
proceedings or any analogous insolvency proceedings that have been instituted with a 
view to liquidate the assets of the transferor and are under the supervision of an 
insolvency practitioner.
570
 
 
3.8 Reducing the Negative Impacts of M&As on Employees 
Despite the existence of legal provisions to guide M&As and address their effects on the 
employees of companies involved in such operations, the negative effects of M&As on 
employees as a result of restructuring the new company after completion of the merger or 
acquisition is inevitable in some cases. There are many solutions that can be taken to 
solve this matter, as discussed in the following paragraphs. 
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Firstly, compensation can be given to employees who cannot be accommodated as 
part of the transferee ore new company or who do not want to be allocated positions 
lower than the positions they held prior to the merger. The compensation should be 
commensurate with the years of service that they had with the company and the services 
that they provided for the company prior to the merger and paid in cash from the profits 
made by the companies either before or after the merger. 
 
Secondly, companies involved in M&As should take overall responsibility for 
maintaining and protecting the rights of workers (such as their rights in work or other 
rights and privileges that they enjoyed before the merger or acquisition), as well as 
commitment and adherence to the texts of laws that confirm these rights for employees in 
the transfer of undertakings. A worker’s right to the protection of their employment 
contract is often viewed as highly significant. This is especially true as in a lot of cases 
workers are more interested in keeping their source of livelihood than being compensated 
for the loss of it, irrespective of how magnanimous the compensation they receive is or 
how well informed they may be about it. The contract of employment is the legal basis 
for every right and interest that the employee has in the employing firm. Therefore, it is 
where the worker first looks to establish what lawful protection they have in relation to a 
merger that would affect their privileges and interests.
571
Where the employee loses their 
employment or their contract is terminated without proper notice contrary to the 
provisions of their contract due to the merger or acquisition, problems could be created 
not only for the terminated employee but also the retained employees, who may be 
psychologically distressed by the process of the merger or acquisition due to the 
apprehension that they are next in line to lose their jobs.
572
 
 
The aforementioned opinion has been supported by the Egyptian Court of 
Cassation, which ruled that the transfer of ownership of a facility from one employer to 
another (via any means, including integration into another organisation) does not affect 
employment contracts: the contract between the employee and the new employer with all 
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the responsibilities remains in existence by force of law.
573
 In another judgement, the 
Egyptian Court of Excellence ruled that rewarding a worker becomes a duty for the 
successor to fulfil. The Kuwaiti Court of Excellence stated the same notion when 
suggesting that rewarding workers is a debt duty placed upon the successor, with workers 
continuing in the service of the successor with conservation payments as their rewards for 
the period preceding.
574
 
 
Thirdly, organisations must effectively develop and implement an assistance 
programme for displaced employees. Such a programme should include advanced 
notification, severance pay, extended benefits, a retaining programme, outplacement 
activities and employee consultation rights (their right to be informed within a reasonable 
time about the merger and how their rights and interests individually, as well as 
collectively, would be affected by it).
575
 Moreover, there should be strong emphasis 
placed on the needs of determining whether or not the acquired firm’s personnel are a 
good fit for the acquiring organisation. Consideration should also be given to whether or 
not mass layoffs can be avoided.
576
Moreover, communication between the executive 
team and employees during the pre-acquisition phase needs to be consistent so that 
anxiety levels amongst personnel can be kept to a minimum.
577
Consultation and 
communication are fundamental to the success of M&As and facilitate the process. They 
also serve as a way of involving workers in the process and soliciting their co-operation 
to avoid attitudes that could pose difficulties post-transfer.
578
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In addition, there should be focus on the dissemination of legal awareness 
between workers and organisations, with staff being made aware of company goals, as 
well as the positives, negatives and features associated with the merger or acquisition. 
Moreover, there should be the facilitation of a meeting of the workers of the 
organisations involved in the merger or acquisition, either directly or through their 
representatives. This would help them to participate in the process of the merger or 
acquisition, make them aware of the working conditions of the new company and give 
them knowledge of the members of the Board of Directors. It would also help to relieve 
them of anxiety regarding their future in the work that they will undertake during the 
merger or acquisition period. 
 
Furthermore, companies seeking to undergo a merger or acquisition must make 
bold decisions and ensure the training of personnel where their working circumstances 
have changed, with such methods and modern techniques adopted so that they can either 
work in the new institution resulting from the merger or acquisition or in another branch 
of the merging or acquiring company. 
 
Finally, from both of the cases referred to above and in accordance with the 
researcher’s view that whenever there are clear legal texts this eases M&A problems, 
there must be a reform of the texts relating to M&As in UAE and Qatar Companies and 
Labour Laws in terms of legal measures and solutions, which could include the 
following. 
 
Qatari and Emirati lawmakers should enact clear legal provisions to address the 
rights and obligations of employees in M&As, and provide for the right of employees to 
retain their functions and all the rights and obligations that consequent from it through 
amending the texts of article 126 of the UAE and article 52 of Qatar Companies Laws or 
adding new provisions to the Companies Laws of the two countries. This could be 
achieved by taking advantage of regulations 4 and 7 of the UK TUPE Act and regulations 
17 of the UK Cross-Border Merger Act, providing similar texts. 
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Qatari and Emirati lawmakers should enact legal provisions to require companies 
involved in M&As to notify their staff regarding the conducting of the merger or 
acquisition in enough time, giving them the right to participate by themselves or through 
their representatives. In addition, they should regulate the amount of compensation that 
can be obtained by workers who do not get a new job in the transferee or new company, 
as well as regulate the sanctions that may be imposed on companies that do not inform 
their employees regarding M&As. In order to achieve this, Emeriti and Qatari legislators 
can take advantage of regulations 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15 of the UK TUPE Act and 
regulations 22 and 23 of the UK Cross-Border Merger Act and provide similar texts. 
 
UAE and Qatar laws should regulate the rights and obligations of the owners of 
collective contracts in cases of M&As, and provide for the preservation of employees’ 
contractual rights against the transferee and all other rights “in connection with the 
contract”, such as discrimination claims and personal injury claims, with the right to 
participate in the negotiation processes and to choose their representatives. The laws 
should also give employee representatives the right to obtain expert assistance in 
information, consultation and negotiation procedures relating to M&As involving 
multinational companies and domestic companies. This should be implemented while 
also allowing employees and their representatives to give their views on M&As. In this 
regard, Emirati and Qatari legislators can take advantage of regulations 5, 11, 13 and 14 
of the UK TUPE Act and regulations 25-32 of the UK Cross-Border Merger Act. 
 
3.9 Conclusion 
 
Employees support the management and do the work of the business; thus subordinate 
employees and lower level managers are required for productive management and for the 
business to achieve success. However, the damaging effects of M&As on employment 
are unfortunate but inevitable in many cases. Parties involved in M&As are usually very 
hopeful in the initial stages. Plans often involve extensive strategising, restructuring and 
reconstructing. In most cases, the purchaser or new employer would want to alter the 
entire structure of the operation and its pattern of labour-management relations. This may 
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put employees under a lot of pressure to adapt to the changes brought about by the M&A, 
which may lead to the loss of many of the workers. It is generally thought that whenever 
there is a merger or acquisition between companies, workers are laid off. The reason for 
this is due to corporate restructuring, which occurs after the completion of the merger.  
 
With the aforementioned in mind, this chapter has provided an evaluation of the 
rights of employees in M&As according to Qatar and UAE laws, the UK TUPE 
Regulations and the UK Cross-Border Merger Act, as well as the theory of the legal 
personality of a company. The chapter has examined the effects of M&As on employees’ 
rights and obligations and showed that the effects vary by type of business deal bargain, 
the country and the type of merger or acquisition. In this regard, the chapter has pointed 
out that corporate restructuring, a lack of consultation with staff, underestimation of the 
results of the process and the ambiguity of the texts of the UAE and Qatar laws relating 
to employees’ rights in M&As are some of the important reasons increasing the negative 
effects of such operations on employees. 
 
The chapter has also explained the rights of employees who are employed by 
individual and collective contracts in M&As. Accordingly, the chapter has shown that 
UAE and Qatar Labour Laws, like the UK TUPE Regulations, uphold the theory of the 
legal personality of a company in the interpretation of the legal relationship between 
companies, workers and employers, providing for the automatic transfer of employees’ 
rights in the transfer of undertakings. With this in mind and according to the theory of the 
legal personality of a company, M&As lead to the transfer of the transferor company’s 
venture to the transferee or new company. Therefore, it may be useful for the employees 
who were running ventures prior to the merger or acquisition to continue doing so, in 
order to ensure that large ventures do not lose staff experience. In spite of this, unlike the 
UK TUPE Regulations and Cross-Border Merger Act, UAE and Qatar Labour Laws 
regulate the rights of the owners of individual employment contracts but not collective 
employment contracts, or the rights of employees to elect their representatives for or 
participate in M&A negotiation processes. The laws do not require an employer to inform 
their employees regarding M&As or give employees the right to make a claim to the 
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Labour Court in cases where the employer fails to inform them of such operations in 
enough time before the process begins. 
 
The chapter has also detailed the conditions required by the laws for the 
continuation of employment contracts and all subsequent rights in the transfer of 
undertakings. In this regard, the chapter has pointed out that the transfer of workers’ 
rights from the transferor to the transferee company includes the right to work and any 
other rights that they enjoyed before the merger or acquisition, providing the employees 
practiced such work without interruption prior to the operation. 
 
With the aforementioned in mind, this chapter provides many legal and 
procedural solutions, which, from the perspective of a researcher, could contribute to 
reduce the negative effects of M&As on employees. These solutions include the necessity 
of notifying workers or their representatives of the merger or acquisition process in 
sufficient time and giving them the opportunity to participate in negotiation processes, as 
well as providing them with the training they need to work in the new company. 
Financial remuneration during the time of a merger or acquisition can be important and is 
usually expected. Further solutions include rewriting the UAE and Qatar legal texts 
relating to workers’ rights in M&A cases commensurate with the new laws and the 
importance of their effects on workers; and adding legal texts to regulate the rights of the 
owners of collective contracts in M&As, as well as the rights of employees to obtain 
information on M&As and their potential effects on their rights. The adoption of such 
solutions would inevitably lead to mitigate the negative effects of M&As on employees 
and help the transferee or new company to mitigate the expenses that may be incurred by 
the company in training new employees. 
 
Retention incentives are an important part of any merger or acquisition. 
Employers need to retain their employees because they need to retain their intellectual 
capital, the client relationships that have been fostered and the business focus that allows 
the organisation to continue to operate effectively. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE EFFECTS OF M&As 
ONTHE RIGHTSOF BOARDS OF DIRECTORS 
4.1 Overview 
 
Directors’ duties are an implementation of the business, and exert the maximum effort of 
good corporate governance and to thereby achieve the goals for which the company was 
created. Moreover, directors have to attend meetings and the allocation of their activities 
should be ensured in order for them to serve the company and monitor its work, with 
preparation projects to ensure status confirmation and the subsequent increase profits.
579
 
Despite the importance of directors for companies, however, some studies
580
 still show 
conflict surrounding the legal status of the members of directors and conditioning the 
relationship between the company and its directors amongst the agency theory. This 
means that the company director is considered to be an agent of the partners in the 
company’s management.581 Moreover, the theory of the institution or organisation means 
the company director - or the Board of Directors - does not act as an agent for either the 
organisation or its partners, but rather as a member of organisation's entity, which speaks 
under its name, expresses its will and is obligated under such legal actions.
582
 
 
Legal problems are not limited to adapting the legal relationship between the 
company and its directors, but extend to the effects of M&As on authorities and the rights 
of directors of companies involved in such operations regarding retirement and 
                                                 
579
 Mahmoud Fahmy "The responsibility of members of the Board of Directors of shareholding Company" 
Business Conference, Cairo, [1980] 7 
580
Parkinson J.E, Corporate power and responsibility (Oxford University Press1993); Zahra, S A & Pearce 
J A, ‘Boards of directors and corporate financial performance: A review and integrative model’(1989) 15 
Journal of Management 291, 334; Donaldson L, Anti-managerial ‘Theory of the firm: Managerial 
behaviour, agency costs and ownership structure’(1976) 3 Journal of Financial Economics 305, 360 
581
 Berle A. & Means G.C, The modern corporation and private properly(Macmillan Press1932); 
Baysinger B D & Hoskisson R E, ‘The composition of boards of directors and strategic control’ (1990) 15 
Academy of Management Review 72, 87 
582
 Aktham ameen-Kholi,Classes in Commercial Law (2
nd
 edn, Cairo 1969) 39, 46; Mohsen Shafik, A 
mediator in Commercial Law (2
nd
 edn, Cairo 1957) 599, 536; Fama E.F, ‘Agency problems and the theory 
of the firm’(1980) 88 Journal of Political Economy 288, 307 
162 
 
departures for the purpose of taking advantage of an offer from another firm.
583
 Some 
people still hold the belief that the operations of M&As only have impacts on the 
employees and top management of the transferor company; in fact, M&As can also be 
tumultuous for the top management executives and other employees of the transferee 
company. Notably, the impacts of M&As on top level management may involve a ‘clash 
of egos’, as well as variations in the cultures of the two organisations.584 
 
The differences in the legal texts of the UAE and Qatar Companies Laws, which 
set a limit on the number of members of Boards of Directors and do not develop solutions 
for the fate or the legal status of members in M&A cases, subsequently assist in the 
emergence of legal and practical problems during or after the end of M&As between 
companies involved in M&As and their Boards of Directors, which may later lead to 
prevent the completion of the merger or acquisition or have a negative impact on the 
results. As confirmation of this, according to Jeffrey Krug (2009),
585
 mergers and 
acquisitions do not result in instability amongst management at target companies solely in 
the short term, as is often assumed, but ultimately result in abnormally high turnover 
lasting much longer. Target companies are believed to lose 21 per cent of their executives 
each year for at least ten years following an acquisition, with ‘more than double the 
turnover experienced in non-merged firms’.586 
 
Accordingly, when companies are involved in M&As, significant questions arise 
for Boards of Directors. For example, does this change mean that their employment 
contracts and other rights have ceased? How many top executives can continue on in their 
jobs after one, two or five years following M&As? What is the legal basis for transferring 
all directors’ rights and obligations between companies involved in M&A operations? In 
accordance with the theory of the legal personality of a company and UK, UAE and 
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Qatar laws, this chapter will respond to the questions above and discuss directors’ rights 
and liabilities in M&As.
587
 
 
Section 4.2 discusses the nature of the relationship between companies and 
directors according to agency and organisation theories. Section 4.3 classifies the Board 
of Directors’ duties, responsibilities and rights. The purpose of Section 4.4 is to provide a 
thorough understanding of the consequences of M&As for the Boards of Directors of the 
companies involved. Sections 4.5 and 4.6 identify the rights of directors in M&As 
according to UK, Qatar and UAE legislation. The purpose of Section 4.7 is to provide a 
thorough understanding of the consequences of M&As for the authority of directors in 
representing companies involved in M&As. Section 4.8 gives a summary of the 
similarities and differences between UK, Qatar and UAE legal texts relating to the 
impacts of M&As on Boards of Directors. Section 4.9 explains ways of overcoming the 
impacts of M&As upon Boards of Directors’ rights and contracts. Finally, the last section 
of this chapter provides a summary and conclusion. 
 
4.2Nature of the Relationship between Companies and 
Directors 
4.2.1 Agency Theory 
 
The application of economic theories to the study of organisations in general, and Boards 
of Directors in particular, has grown in popularity in the past years.
588
 However, due to 
the multiplicity of the jurisdiction on Boards of Directors and the economic roles that are 
undertaken by companies in their communities, the interpretation of the legal relationship 
between a public shareholding company and the members of its Board of Directors is still 
shrouded in mystery in relation to two theories: the first is agency theory and the second 
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is the theory of the institution. Kholi (1969),
589
 Ross (1973)
590
 and Jensen and Meckling 
(1976)
591
 believe that Boards of Directors are agents of the partners in terms of company 
management. In the classic case of Aberdeen Railway Co v Blaikie Brothers, 
592
 Lord 
Cranworth said that: “A corporate body can only act by agents, and it is of course the 
duty of those agents so to act as best to promote the interests of the corporation whose 
affairs they are conducting.”593 
 
The key idea of agency theory is that the company director acts as a proxy for the 
company.
594
The proponents
595
 of this theory argue that the separation of ownership and 
control underlines the concept that organisations are both work-sharing and risk-sharing 
entities.
596
 The shareholders contribute capital and bear the risk of the organisation, while 
the managers are usually wholly responsible for decision management.
597
 
 
According to the proponents of agency theory,
598
 a commercial company is a 
contract by which two or more natural or legal persons undertake to share in a venture, by 
submitting a share of cash or service and sharing in the profit or loss resulted from the 
venture.
599
 This concept is an important foundation that shows that upon the 
establishment of any joint stock in a company, there must be a contract defining the 
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general rules of the contract, such as satisfaction,
600
 the place of the contract
601
 and the 
reason.
602
 Moreover, the contract must be written.
603
 Thus, the theory of the agency is to 
ensure that the moral personality of the company is created as a result of the convergence 
of the will of the partners in the company. This means that the moral personality of the 
company is generated by the will of the partners, registration in the company register or 
the issuance of a certificate of incorporation, which is only an indication of the 
personality of a company that is already present prior to registration or before the 
issuance of a certificate. Notably, a company director, according to the theory of agency, 
represents only the interests of the partners and the will of the members.
604
 With this in 
mind, it follows that in joint-stock companies all members of the Board of Directors are 
associated with the company by an agency contract or an employment contract: if the 
idea that the shareholding company was founded on is contractual, this stems from the 
fact that the Board of Directors is an agent for the company. 
 
This theory has been criticised for several reasons. Firstly, it is not compatible 
with the legal system of managing companies, as the laws allow a partner who is 
appointed manager in a company contract to continue managing the company despite 
opposition from other partners.
605
Furthermore, a director may be selected by the majority 
of partners; however, they are considered to be a representative of the company and all its 
partners - even those who do not agree with their appointment, and this provision is 
incompatible with the rules of agency theory.
606
 
 
Secondly, the theory is inconsistent with the theory of the legal personality of a 
company and the special nature of the merger as a contract that leads to the expiry of the 
transferor company and the transfer of all its rights and obligations (including the venture 
                                                 
600
 About the concept and conditions of satisfaction see articles 65-147 of the State of Qatar Civil Law. See 
also articles 64-157of the UAE Civil Law  
601
 Articles 148-154 of the State of Qatar Civil Law 
602
 Where ‘the contract invalidate if he adheres to the contractor for no reason or to cause unlawful’. For 
more, see articles 155-157 of the State of Qatar Civil Law 
603
Most of the Arabic judiciary believe and uphold this theory, which is provided for explicitly or implicitly 
604
 Yamilky (2006), Ibid 
605
 Mohsen Shafik (n 312), Ibid, 536 
606
 Kholi Akthem Ameen (n 573) 39, 46 
166 
 
of the company) to the transferee company. This includes all the negative and positive 
elements and the rights of the transferor company, including the right for the Board of 
Directors of the company to become members of the Board of Directors of the transferee 
company. To say that the relationship between the company and its Board of Directors is 
governed by an agency contract is an infringement of this theory because in an agency 
contract, the principal or client can terminate or restrict the agency contract at any time: 
even there is an agreement to the contrary. This does not agree with the relationship 
between a company and its Board of Directors. Also, the laws authorise that anyone can 
be a shareholder, agent and a member of the Board of Directors of a company at the same 
time; notably, this may result in the duplication and multiplicity of tasks and functions, 
which may fundamentally affect the company’s work and success.607 
 
For the reasons above, Basbos (2006)
608
 and Almasry (1986)
609
 state that the 
director of a company is not considered an agent of the company or partners, but rather a 
member of the entity of the company who speaks on the organisation’s behalf, expresses 
their own will and are obligated in their legal actions. 
 
4.2.2 Theory of the Institution or Organisation 
 
The contractual theory in an interpretation of the contractual nature of a company 
remained prevalent until the end of the nineteenth century. However, at the beginning of 
the twentieth century,
610
 this theory began to recede in the face of institution or 
organisation theory, which is based on the care of the interests of the community, 
enterprise and directors. This theory emerged as a result of a contraction of the principle 
of will authority (pacta sunt servanda), which is one of the most important bases of the 
contract, and state intervention in the enactment of legislation that regulates economic 
institutions in order to maintain the general interests of society. Moreover, institution 
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theory is based on the modern idea that the interests of a company exceed the limits of 
the contract, as it involves the interests of all persons who are interested in the success of 
the company, such as creditors, employees and holders of bonds issued by the company. 
Furthermore, the company’s goals should not conflict with the economic development 
plan of the country. 
 
With the aforementioned in mind, a company is one of the elements that 
contribute to the achievement of national interest. Moreover, a company in this context is 
an institution aimed at achieving the interests of individuals and the interests of the state. 
Therefore, a company in this sense is a private institution that works side by side with 
public institutions to serve the community. In order to achieve its objectives in serving 
the national economy, it must provide the necessary flexibility when operating its 
activities.
611
 
 
According to this theory, the members of the Board of Directors are not linked 
with the company by any contractual link but are rather linked by legal relationship as a 
member - not an agent with a salary. 
 
To distinguish between the two theories, Stiles (1998)
612
 confirms that agency 
theory holds that there is an irreducible agency cost in the move away from ownership to 
managerial discretion and the realignment of incentives to reduce these costs are ex-ante 
costs.
613
 Despite this, Eisenhardt (1989)
614
 and Williamson (1984)
615
 say there are strong 
similarities between the two theories, particularly in regard to their view of the role of the 
Board of Directors as an instrument of control: “the board is principally an instrument by 
which managers control other managers”.616 
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Through a review of the two theories, the arguments and evidence put forward by 
their proponents and the legislative texts, the researcher believes that the legal nature of 
the relationship between a company and its Board of Directors is based on a mixture of 
the two theories. To reconcile agency theory and institution theory, Mohsen Shafik 
(1957)
617
 says that the rules of agency theory regulate the internal links among the 
partners on one hand and among the managers on the other hand, while the external 
relationship that arises between the directors on one hand, and with others on the other 
hand is governed by the idea of the lawful deputy. Accordingly, the legal status of the 
members of the Board of Directors or the directors of a company is determined on the 
basis that they are not agents but a special type of agent, given the complex nature of 
their jobs at high levels of the organisation with many responsibilities. Essentially, this is 
what most jurisprudence of law mechanisms seeks.
618
 It has also been stated in the 
harmonisation of the agency theory
619
 and the theory of institutions
620
 that the rules that 
control the agency of internal links are between the partners and managers. On the other 
hand, the external links between managers must take the idea of membership as the basis 
for these links. This means that the manager of a company is legally responsible for the 
company in everything required to meet its purpose and therefore is not simply an agent 
for the partners. Accordingly, and in line with the theory of the legal personality of a 
company, what are the duties, liabilities and rights of company directors? And what is the 
fate of the Board of Directors of the transferor company after M&As? 
 
4.3 Directors’ Duties and Responsibilities According to the UK 
Companies Act 2006 
4.3.1 Directors Rights and Obligations 
 
The Board of Directors, according to UK CA, is the body responsible for the 
management of the company, has the authority to make significant strategic and 
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management decisions and is responsible for seeing that the company is run lawfully.
621
 
According to UK legislation, a company is a separate entity, yet it cannot function 
without its Board of Directors, which is responsible for the management of the company 
on behalf of its owners.
622
 
 
In the UK, as in many countries, the role and responsibilities of a Board of 
Directors vary depending on the nature and type of business entity and the laws applying 
to the entity. The most important of the board’s functions are described in the most 
general terms by legal articles (e.g. in the Companies Act 2006), which have been 
developed by English courts over the last century or so, and by the proponents of the 
modern theory of directors. Firstly, the strategic role of the Board of Directors is a major 
factor in strengthening a company’s competitive position and in ensuring the alignment 
of the company’s purpose with shareholders’ interests. The strategic role of the board is 
one of its most important duties and usually includes: identifying what business the 
company is in; developing a vision and mission; assessing threats, opportunities, 
strengths and weaknesses; selecting and implementing strategies; the acquisition and 
allocation of resources; the setting of policies;
623
 and heavy involvement in the decision-
making process within the organisation in crisis situations.
624
 
 
Secondly, one of the most important elements and primary duties (this was 
debated for a long time in the UK Parliament
625
 before being approved legally) of a 
company director is that they “must act in a way that he considers, in good faith, would 
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be most likely to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members as a 
whole, and in doing so have regard (amongst other matters) to the likely consequences of 
any decision in the long term, the interests of the company’s employees, the need to 
foster the company’s business relationships with suppliers, customers and others, the 
impact of the company’s operations on the community and the environment, the 
desirability of the company maintaining a reputation for high standards of business 
conduct, and the need to act fairly between the members of the company.”626 
 
The expression ‘good faith’ has raised controversy in the literature due to its 
meaning, in this context, not easily being ascertained. Sealy (1989)
627
 identifies two 
meanings given to the phrase; first, it provides the idea of acting honestly and with the 
best intentions. The second definition connotes the idea of an activity being genuine. 
Sealy states that the first definition tends to require a more subjective application, while 
the latter requires a more objective application.
628
 
 
In the interpretation of ‘good faith’, Andrew R Keay (2010)629 says that Article 
172 the UK companies Act 2006 imposes a duty on directors to be more inclusive in their 
decision making, namely taking into account the relationships the company has with 
stakeholders while seeking to benefit the members. In Cobden Investments Ltd v RWM 
Longport Ltd,
630
 the court ruled that good faith can most likely promote the success of the 
company for the benefit of its members as a whole. In other contexts, it might mean that a 
person has to exercise the caution and diligence that is to be expected of an ordinary 
person of ordinary prudence.
631
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In terms of directors’ actions, good faith is not a new word to British courts and 
legislation;
632
 there are indications in previous case law that directors have had a 
comparable responsibility in the past. In the Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society Ltd 
v Meyer
633
, Lord Denning said that the duty of a director “was to do their best to promote 
its business and to act with complete good faith towards it.”634 The judgement remains a 
leading precedent for the clear statement that the duty of care of a director is to the 
company itself, not to the interests of particular shareholders.  
 
There are a number of reported cases where courts have not accepted that a 
director has acted in good faith.
635
For example, Judge Jonathan Crow, in Extrasure 
Travel Insurance Ltd v Scattergood (2003)
636
, did not convince when the directors said 
that they were acting in the best interests of the company. In this case, the court was of 
the opinion that there had been a breach of duty. The company, Extrasure, had paid a sum 
amounting to most of its funds to its holding company in a corporate group arrangement. 
Subsequently, Extrasure became insolvent and ultimately its business was sold off and 
the purchaser, together with Extrasure, brought proceedings against the two former 
directors who had orchestrated the payment to the holding company. It was argued, inter 
alia, that the directors had breached their duty to use their powers for the purpose for 
which they were conferred. The directors stated that they had acted in the best interests of 
Extrasure and that the sum represented money owed to the holding company.
637
 
However, the judge Jonathan Crow had no hesitation in rejecting this assertion based on 
the proven circumstances existing at the time of the payment.
638
 The deputy judge felt 
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that the reason offered by the directors had been created ex post.
639
 He was of the view 
that the sum was paid because another subsidiary of the holding company needed the 
money to pay a third party who was pressing for payment, and this action was not in the 
best interests of the company that actually made the payment. The deputy judge opined 
that the directors’ evidence was not plausible and he found against them. He said: “I am 
satisfied that the defendants did not think, on 17 August 1999, that the transfer of 
£200,000 was in the best interests of Extrasure.”640 
 
In Shepherd v Williamson [2010] EWHC 2375,
641
 the trial judge, Mrs Justice 
Proudman, considered that Mr Shepherd did not breach the duty imposed by section 172 
of the 2006 of the UK Companies Act
642
. According to section 994 of CA 2006,
643
 the 
shareholder presenting to petition - Mr Shepherd - was also a manager of the firm. In 
2007, the relationship between Mr Shepherd and Mr Williamson (the firm’s other 
manager and stockholder) deteriorated when they failed to agree upon the terms on which 
Mr Shepherd would retire from the business. Mr Shepherd subsequently petitioned under 
section 994 of the CA 2006 to seek the purchase of his shares and alleging, amongst other 
things, that he had been excluded from administration of the firm. It was in this context 
that Mr Williamson argued that Mr Shepherd had failed to act in good faith when, in 
November 2007, he left an anonymous voicemail message on the phone of a senior 
project manager of one of the company’s important clients (a hotel chain), to whom 
tenders were being submitted, saying that the company was under investigation by the 
Office of Fair Trading (OFT) and that an employee of the company and the hotel chain 
were colluding. Prior to January 2006, the point at which an Office for Fair Trading 
investigation began, the company had taken part in ‘covering’ in the construction 
industry, i.e. submitting a bid higher than other competing bids in a tender for a contract 
knowing that it would not succeed in order for a chosen tenderer to be preferred amongst 
                                                 
639
 Lord Greene MR in Re Smith and Fawcett Limited [1942] Ch 304 
640
 Ibid 
641
 Shepherd v Williamson & Anor [2010] EWHC 2375 (Ch) (24 September 2010) England and Wales 
High Court (Chancery Division) Decisions 
642
 Section 172 of the UK Companies Act 2006 which imposes a duty on each manager to act in a way in 
which he considers, in good faith, would be most possible to promote the success of the firm for the benefit 
of its members (shareholders), and the interests of the firm’s workers. 
643
 Section 994 of the UK Companies Act 2006 
173 
 
the colluding parties. Mr Shepherd was not directly involved with these activities. In 
September 2009, the firm was fined £91,053 by the OFT,
644
 a reduced figure reflecting a 
leniency agreement in which the company agreed to cooperate with the OFT’s 
investigation. The trial judge, Mrs Justice Proudman, considered Mr Shepherd’s good 
faith for the purposes of section 994 with reference to section 172. She noted that “an 
anonymous telephone call is not a praiseworthy course of action” but did not find that Mr 
Shepherd had breached the duty imposed by section 172.
645
 
 
The principle of good faith in the text of s.172
646
 does actually contain two other 
subsections, which provide exceptions to the duty laid down in paragraph 1 of the section 
172. First, paragraph 2 provides that where a firm includes purposes other than benefiting 
the members, it operates as if the reference to promoting the success of the firm for the 
advantage of its members were to achieve the purposes set by the firm.
647
 The second 
exception is contained in paragraph 3 of the article. It provides that the duty to promote 
the success of the company for the benefit of the members is subject to any enactment or 
rule of law requiring directors to consider the interests of the company’s creditors. What 
the subsection does is to recognise, inter alia, the common law development of a duty of 
directors to take into account the interests of the creditors of the company in certain 
circumstances. Thirdly, the Board of Directors has to act in accordance with the 
constitution of the company and must only exercise its powers for their proper purpose. 
 
The directors’ duties contained in section 172 of the 2006 Act replace the 
common law principle under which directors must act in accordance with the 
memorandum of the company and legal articles:
648
 the Board of Directors must act to 
promote the success of the company and act in a way that would most likely promote the 
success of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole. In doing so, the board 
must have regard (amongst other matters) for: the likely consequences of any decision in 
the long term; the interests of the company’s employees; the need to foster the company’s 
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business relationships with suppliers, customers and others; the impact of the company’s 
operations on the community and the environment; the desirability of the company 
maintaining a reputation for high standards of business conduct; and the need for 
members of the company to act fairly with one another.
649
 
 
In addition, directors must exercise their powers independently without 
subordinating to the will of others. A director must exercise the skill and care which a 
reasonably diligent person with both the general skill and experience of someone carrying 
out the functions of the director of the company would be reasonably expected to have 
and the skill and experience that the director actually has.
650
 Additionally, the director has 
to avoid conflicts of interest and conflict with other directors, whereby they must avoid 
conflict between their duties to the company and either their personal interests or duties 
to third parties.
651
 
 
Furthermore, a director must not exploit their position for personal benefit.
652
 
Accordingly, directors must not accept any benefits (including bribes) from a third party 
that are conferred because of his being a director or his actions as a director. However, 
the law provides that directors may accept benefits up to a certain level to ensure 
directors are not in breach of duty just for accepting corporate hospitality.
653
 
 
Additionally, a Board of Directors must: monitor the company’s management, 
and make sure that the company acts strictly in accordance with the powers and rules set 
out in its memorandum and articles of association, file copies of special and extraordinary 
resolutions of the shareholders and of certain ordinary resolutions at the Companies 
Registry and inform the Registrar of Companies of the appointment or retirement of any 
director or company secretary or of any change in the situation of the company’s 
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registered office.
654
To summarise this paragraph, in normal circumstances, directors will 
owe their duties and responsibilities to a company according to the provisions of the law 
and the company’s statute. However, the question remains: what director duties apply in 
a company that is in a state of insolvency? 
 
4.3.2Directors’ Liabilities Following the Insolvency of Company 
 
Some directors may choose to take advantage of the various protections afforded by 
company law by operating their companies with reckless or wilful disregard for the 
interests of their company’s creditors and even their shareholders. UK legislation has 
responded to this type of situation. According to section 463
655
 of the CA 2006, company 
directors are liable to compensate their company, in certain circumstances, where they 
allow published company reports to include untrue or misleading statements or omissions 
and where this causes loss to their company. A director may incur personal liability for a 
company in insolvency cases where the directors allowed the company to continue 
trading when there was no reasonable prospect that it would avoid going into insolvent 
liquidation (wrongful trading) and therefore they may be required to contribute to the 
company’s assets.656The directors may also be required to contribute to an insolvent 
company’s assets if they knowingly allowed the company to carry on business with the 
intent of defrauding creditors or for any fraudulent purpose (fraudulent trading).
657
 
 
Where a company is insolvent or threatened by insolvency, a director may need to 
consider and act in the interests of the creditors of the company in priority over the duty 
to promote the success of the company.
658
 In particular, a director must take every step to 
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minimise any loss to the creditors of the company at any time when they know or ought 
to conclude that there is no reasonable prospect of the company avoiding going into 
insolvent liquidation.
659
 The Board of Directors assumes the legal liability for offences 
that may be committed by directors who take their company into liquidation, which 
include:
660
 destruction or falsification of company records; transactions in fraud of 
creditors; misconduct in the course of winding up, which includes the failure to disclose 
and hand over the company’s books, papers and property; falsification of the company’s 
books; making material omissions from the company’s statement of affairs; and making 
false representations to creditors.
661
 
 
According to section 1270
662
 of the CA 2006, companies are also liable to 
compensate any person who acquires securities in a company on the strength of any 
preliminary statement or interim report or statement issued by it that contains an untrue or 
misleading statement or that omits mention of any matter that the law requires to be 
included in the report or statement in question issued by the directors during the 
discharge of their managerial responsibilities within the company. In the case of Lonrho 
Ltd v Shell Petroleum co Ltd [1980] 1 WLR 627,
663
 the House of Lords held that 
directors must always act in the best interests of their company, whose interests are “not 
exclusively those of its shareholders but may include those of its creditors”.664 The Court 
of Appeal, in West Mercia Safetywear Ltd v Dodd [1988] BCLC 250,
665
 expanded on 
this by ruling that the directors of a company that is in an insolvent state must have 
regard to the interests of its creditors. Thus, it is part of directors’ fiduciary duties to their 
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company that they act with due regard to the interests of their creditors during a period of 
insolvency.
666
 
 
The UK Companies Act 2006 also defines directors’ responsibilities in cases 
where they fail to perform their functions or breach their duties, as provided for by 
sections 171-177
667
 of the law. In accordance with section 178 of the CA 2006, they will 
be liable for any damages or compensation if the company suffers loss as a result of this. 
Moreover, they will be required to account for any profit made, as judged in the case of 
Regal (Hastings) Ltd V Gulliver [1942];
668
 return company property; and any contract 
entered into by them without disclosing their interest will be cancelled. The court ruled 
that a director is in breach of their duties if they take advantage of an opportunity that the 
corporation would otherwise be interested in but was unable to take advantage of. 
However, the breach could have been resolved by ratification by the shareholders, which 
those involved neglected to do.
669
 
 
A director may also be personally liable for the company’s debts if they have 
either undertaken personal liability (such as giving a written guarantee) or have allowed 
another person to believe that they were acting on their own behalf rather than on behalf 
of the company. A director who is in breach of their fiduciary duties to the company, or 
who exceeds their authority, may also be liable to the company and may have to pay 
damages or to account for any profits made.
670
 
 
4.3.3 Directors’ Rights in the Company 
Liability insurance may be available to protect directors against personal liability, except 
in circumstances where such protection is prohibited, for example in cases of wilful 
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neglect, wilful default, dishonesty or crime, breach of certain statutory prohibitions not 
involving a crime (such as unlawful distributions or wrongful trading), criminal fines and 
costs of litigation where indemnity is not permitted.
671
 It is legal for the company to take 
out such insurance and pay the premiums, although these are likely to be substantial, and 
the policies may be subject to specific exclusions.
672
 
 
Except for the amount of allowances and bonuses received, members of the Board 
of Directors have the same rights as company employees, such as the right to leave, the 
right to apply to work flexibly, the right to request time off to undertake study or training 
and the right not to be unfairly dismissed. Members of the Board of Directors also have 
the right to equal treatment for working hours, rest breaks and paid holidays; the right to 
access the statements of companies; the right of protection from unauthorised deductions 
of pay; and the right to work in a safe and appropriate environment.
673
 Furthermore, if 
one or more members of the Board of Directors are disabled, the employer (the company) 
must not treat them less favourably because of something connected with the person’s 
disability unless there is a fair and balanced reason. For this form of discrimination, the 
employer must know or should reasonably have been expected to know that the person is 
disabled. The protection provided by the EA
674
 does not just cover disability 
discrimination; an employee may be protected by the EA if they believe that they have 
been discriminated against because of their: age; disability; gender reassignment; 
marriage and civil partnership; race; religion and beliefs; sexual orientation; or pregnancy 
and maternity.
675
 
 
From the directors’ general duties according to the CA 2006, it can be concluded 
that being an answerable director means more than just acting with integrity and using 
one’s talents to the firm’s best benefit. The general duties mean that a director must act in 
the interests of the company and not in the interests of any other parties – including 
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shareholders.
676
 This principle applies even for ‘one-man’ companies, which means that a 
sole shareholder/director may not put his/her interests above that of the company. Also, 
directors have to act in accordance with the company’s constitution and observe any 
restrictions contained therein and act in order to bring ‘successes to the company. This 
involves creating sustainable profitability and exercising reasonable care, skill and 
diligence. Accordingly, a director must show the general knowledge and skill that may 
reasonably be expected of a person carrying out the functions expected to be carried out 
in relation to the company. Thus, a managing director will be expected to have 
knowledge of all areas of the business or to have engaged people who can help them; a 
director must also act in accordance with any specific general knowledge and skills they 
actually have. Therefore, a director who is a qualified accountant would be expected to 
show greater general knowledge, skills and interest in relation to financial aspects of the 
company than another director who was not so qualified. A director must not allow any 
personal or outside interest to affect their duty to the company. A director must, 
therefore, avoid any situation where they personally have, or may have, a direct or 
indirect interest that conflicts, or may conflict, with the interests of the company. Finally, 
a director must not accept benefits from third parties and must declare any interest in a 
proposed transaction or arrangement, whether it is direct or indirect. These legal 
obligations and responsibilities are placed on directors, breach of which can give rise to 
personal obligations under civil and criminal law and even disqualification from holding 
office as a director.
677
 Furthermore, company directors are liable to compensate their 
company if they allow published company reports to include untrue or misleading 
statements and where this causes loss to their company. A director may incur personal 
liability for a company in insolvency cases where the directors allowed the company to 
continue trading when there was no reasonable prospect that it would avoid going into 
insolvent liquidation. The question remains: do directors’ duties, rights and 
responsibilities remain in M&As? 
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4.3.4 The Roles of Boards of Directors in M&As 
Members of the Boards of Directors of companies involved in M&As face a unique set of 
challenges and considerations through every stage of the transaction, from inception to 
execution. Hence, many M&A transactions may not be successful. The common reasons 
for this failure include: overpaying for the target, which places additional pressure on the 
management; not fully understanding what is being purchased; a clash of cultures 
between the two companies; problems with layoffs; and exchanging shares between the 
shareholders of the companies involved.
678
 The most tragic situation occurs when the 
management and the board have properly identified an attractive target and executed the 
transaction well but failed to plan for the integration of the two companies.
679
 
 
Under UK legislation, the board is collectively responsible for the management of 
the companies and sharing in M&A operations. Accordingly, a draft of the proposed 
terms of the scheme of the merger must be drawn up and adopted by the directors of the 
merging companies in respect of each transferor company and the transferee 
company,
680
such as its name, the address of its registered office and whether it is a 
company limited by shares or a company limited by guarantee and having a share capital. 
It must also detail the number of shares in the transferee company allotted to members of 
the transferor company for a given number of their shares (the “share exchange ratio”) 
and the amount of any cash payment, as well as the amount of any benefit paid or given 
(or intended to be paid or given) to any experts.
681
 It should detail any benefits to any 
director of a transferee company and the consideration for the payment of the benefit.
682
 
A copy of the draft terms of the merger should be delivered to the Registrar of 
Companies,
683
 which must publish in the Official Gazette notice of receipt of a copy of 
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the draft terms from that company.
684
 The directors must prepare for the vote-on M&A 
decision-at the meeting which explains the effect of merger on the company and seeing 
out the legal and economic grounds for the proposal.
685
 There are must also be a report 
prepared on the proposal on behalf of the both companies, including commentary on 
acquisition of valuation.
686
 
 
Directors must also draw up and adopt a report, which must explain the effect of 
the merger for the members, creditors and employees of the company and state: the legal 
and economic grounds for the draft terms; any material interests of the directors (whether 
as directors, members, creditors or otherwise);
687
 and the effect on those interests of the 
cross-border merger, in so far as it is different from the effect on the like interests of other 
persons.
688
 The directors of a transferee company in the UK must deliver copies of the 
report to its employee representatives (or if there are no such representatives, the 
employees) no less than two months before the date of the first meeting of the members, 
or any class of members, of the company.
689
 Directors are also responsible for attending 
negotiation processes between the companies involved in the merger or acquisition and 
the employees or their negotiations about employee participation in merger or acquisition 
processes.
690
 
 
To ensure the success of M&As, Boards of Directors must follow certain legal 
procedures and practical measures. For example, directors should ask to review the post-
acquisition integration plan and determine who is accountable for its implementation. 
This would probably cover three areas: activities necessary immediately after the 
transaction closes, frequently a list of ‘housekeeping’ items; the communication plan, 
covering not only short-term communication with customers, stockholders and workers 
but also ongoing communication to address the primary concerns of key stakeholders 
based on solicited feedback; and, finally, the plan for delivering intended synergies, not 
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only in regard to cost savings through consolidation, buying synergies, etc., but also 
pertaining to activities intended to expand revenue.
691
 These plans should highlight on-
going processes to generate new performance improvement ideas as the organisations 
learn to work together.  
 
Not only does the board have a duty to oversee M&As, but it is essential to the 
success of any transaction. The board should coordinate with the acquirer and define a 
well-thought-out integration plan for the first three months and beyond. This strategy 
should be developed well ahead of the real integration. It should set forth milestones that 
must be reached within the first three months.
692
 The plan should designate leaders and 
define their roles and liabilities post-closing, and may even contemplate the formation of 
an integration committee to help smooth the transition period. Consideration may be 
given to bringing in a third party to assist with or lead the integration procedure.
693
 
 
Furthermore, it is incumbent for boards to be as sure as they can be that there is a 
workable and comprehensive integration plan in place before they approve a deal. An 
especially important part of the process is ensuring that the management talent will be in 
place to bring about the transition. Consideration needs to be given to recruiting and 
retaining talent, succession planning, organisation structure and communicating with 
employees at all levels.
694
 As a result of the important duty of directors to develop an 
investment strategy within the target firm in the development of M&As, the board should 
obtain information about the target and the transaction early and often. It is normally not 
the role of the board to establish guidelines or fence-posts for the economic terms of the 
deal; instead, the board should focus on understanding why the transaction is being 
proposed and reviewing the terms to ensure that they are consistent with the strategic 
goals of the firm.
695
 The board should communicate with the executive directors to get 
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information early and frequently and directors should read the information that is 
provided.
696
 They should not just focus on the price and the information presented but 
should examine the deal as business people and think about what is not being presented. 
They should test the assumptions behind the transaction, not just because it is the 
directors’ fiduciary duty to do so but because they care about the company and its long-
term success. 
697
 
 
Additionally, a board member should focus on the risks inherent in M&As 
through diligence in the work with very comprehensive reviews at various stages of the 
process to identify any problems, with an estimate of whether it is appropriate to bring in 
third-party advisors. This is particularly true in cases where a material adverse change is 
a very significant issue or there is a change in the business that would justify the 
purchaser seeking to terminate the transaction or adjust the purchase price.  
 
Moreover, every board member has a duty of care as part of his/her fiduciary 
duties in decision making. The management needs to ensure that the board is informed in 
a way that enables the directors to fulfil that duty. It is good practice for the board to be 
provided with a summary of the key terms of the merger agreement, as well as the pitfalls 
and risks. Directors also have to focus on determining a brief timeline of the merger 
integration, showing the key milestones and expected problems from M&A operations on 
people and how the new firm will deal with talent retention. In accordance with the 
competence of the Board of Directors, the board can properly approve a transaction only 
if it concludes that the proposal is in the best interests of the stockholders.
698
 Also, the 
board must evaluate a proposed business combination in light of the risks and benefits of 
the proposed transaction compared to other alternatives reasonably available to the 
corporation, including the alternative of continuing as an independent entity.
699
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It was held in Fulham Football Club Ltd v Cabra Estates Plc
700
 by the Court of 
Appeal that the test should be whether at the time of the agreement the directors were 
acting bona fide for the benefit of the company in M&As cases. If they were, then any 
agreement would be binding on them, even if they latterly considered that to implement it 
would be contrary to the company’s interests.701In Partco Group Led v Wragg,702 it was 
held that the mere supply of information by the directors of a target company, as required 
in the City Code (the forerunner to the Takeover Code), did not necessarily make them 
liable to an action for negligent misstatement.  
 
Finally, in the acquisition cases, directors must focus on one primary objective: 
securing the transaction offering the best value reasonably available for the stockholders, 
as a sale of control transaction represents the only opportunity to receive a control 
premium. However, not every merger constitutes a ‘sale of control’. A ‘stock-for-stock’ 
merger, where a majority of the shares in the continuing entity will continue to be held 
after the merger by a “fluid aggregation of unaffiliated shareholders representing a voting 
majority”, is not a sale of control.703 Of course, in this case, the Board of Directors must 
exercise its basic duty of care by reviewing all reasonably available information 
concerning the transaction and other alternatives.  
 
To consider all these matters, it may be necessary or desirable to create a 
taskforce of independent directors. This taskforce should include board members that 
have the expertise, time and ability to conduct a detailed evaluation of all aspects of the 
negotiations and deal. Their mission is to raise all issues (both short and long term) to 
ensure that management and outside advisors have thoroughly considered and evaluated 
all outcomes. 
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4.4 Effects of M&As on the Contracts and Rights of Directors 
in Practice 
 
There are two competing views on the effects of M&As on directors. Previous UK 
literature shows that acquiring firms frequently make one-off bonus payments to their 
senior executives (CEOs) for M&A completion.
704
 Haugen and Senbet (1981)
705
 claim 
that CEOs should be rewarded for their skill, effort and company performance, and the 
executive compensation package should be designed to align managers’ interests with 
those of shareholders. Core et al. (1999)
706
 and Zhao and Lehn (2006)
707
 further show 
that CEOs in companies with weaker corporate governance often receive greater 
compensation than those in companies with stronger corporate governance. 
 
On the other hand, many studies
708
 indicate that M&As may create instability in 
target executive teams that lasts for many years following acquisition. For example, 
Guest (2006)
709
 indicates that large acquisitions result in significant pay increases for top 
management during the year following acquisition; however, the increase is transitory 
and an offsetting decline occurs in the two years following the acquisition. Grinstein and 
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Hribar (2004)
710
 add that increases in pay associated with mergers tend to be one-off 
bonus payments. Krug (2003)
711
 states that most target companies’ top management 
teams are relatively stable before they are acquired. This stability is similar to that 
experienced by firms that are not acquired. For the average firm, this leadership 
continuity is permanently altered once the firm is acquired. Moreover, Krug argues that 
target companies can expect to lose 21% or more of their executives each year after the 
merger.
712
 
 
Richmond (2009)
713
 indicates that companies lose an average of 8–10% of their 
top executives each year through normal attrition. This attrition includes retirement and 
departures for the purpose of taking advantage of an offer from another firm. Importantly, 
during the first year following an acquisition, the target firm can expect to lose 
approximately 24% of its top executives: a turnover rate roughly three times higher than 
normal. In the second year, it can expect to lose an additional 15%, which is therefore an 
approximate loss of 40% of the firm’s original top management team in the first two 
years following an acquisition.
714
 
 
Black et al. (2007)
715
 confirm that there is growing evidence on employment 
losses (skilled and semi-skilled) post-merger, and they show that higher levels of merger 
and acquisition activities lead to shorter job tenure, implying that such transactions 
involve employee layoffs. Lehto and Böckerman (2008)
716
 conclude that almost all 
changes in ownership lead to job losses. In addition, Kuvandikov (2010)
717
 identified 
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several factors that help to explain post-merger employee layoffs, including: poor 
performance of merging firms pre-takeover, the disciplinary role of takeovers, the 
synergy created by mergers and the high premiums paid to targets. Coucke et al. 
(2007)
718
 and Hillier et al. (2007)
719
 believe that poor performance may also be 
associated with more traditional factors leading to employee layoffs, such as a decline 
in product demand as a result of general business cycle conditions and technological or 
other industry-wide changes. Furthermore, the reason for the loss of many members of 
Boards of Directors in the first and second years after completed acquisitions may be 
due to the restructuring of new companies resulting from M&As, which may be 
necessary in some cases due to the bankruptcy of one of the companies or the desire of 
the shareholders of the transferee company to reduce losses by reducing the number of 
members of the Board of Directors. 
 
The effects of M&As are not limited to the contracts of directors but extend to 
other impacts, such as level of output, wages and efficiency. These effects may extend 
to directors psychologically as a result of the process of negotiation and merger 
procedures. This could later lead to a negative impact on the level of work and 
production in the company.
720
 For these reasons, the top managers of the transferor 
company typically experience uncertainty concerning whether or not they will have a 
role to play in the transferee company and the role that they may be asked to play 
during and following the transition. These managers usually demonstrate resistance to 
M&A processes, as well as a range of other positive and negative reactions. Many mid-
level managers can also feel caught between the expectations of the executive 
management and loyalty to the people who report to them.
721
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In summary, the effects of M&As in terms of displacing target company 
executives appear to be growing stronger over time. Accordingly, the question that arises 
is how UK, UAE and Qatar laws ensure the rights of Boards of Directors in M&As?  
 
4.5 Director Transfer in M&As According to UK Legislation 
 
According to section 250 of the CA 2006,
722
 the term ‘director’ includes any person 
occupying the position of a director by whatever name they are called. This is a long-
standing feature of UK Company Law and has remained intact following the law reform 
process. It means that, in determining whether any person is or has been a director of a 
company, account must be taken not only of whether a person has been duly appointed 
and registered as a director in accordance with the prescribed procedures, but also of 
whether that person is or has been exercising the actual legal functions of a director and 
taking part as a full member in the process of making the sorts of decisions that directors 
routinely make. 
 
The legal status of public limited corporations is governed by the Companies Act 
2006.
723
According to section 154 of the CA 2006,
724
 all companies are required to have at 
least one director (a public company must have two). This is because companies, as 
‘artificial’ legal entities, cannot act themselves – they need to act through other persons. 
A company’s directors are the persons to whom the law looks to manage the affairs of a 
company on behalf of its owners and who invariably take most of the decisions relating 
to affairs of the company.
725
 This is so even in the case of small private companies that 
may have only one or two shareholders. Accordingly, in such a situation the law will still 
see a technical distinction between the interests of the shareholder as the owner of the 
company and the responsibilities of the director as the person who makes decisions on its 
behalf.  
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Accordingly, in UK legislation, a Board of Directors is a group of people elected 
by the owners of a commercial entity to take care of the interests of the company and its 
shareholders according to the principle of good faith. The role and responsibilities of 
Boards of Directors vary depending on the nature and type of business entity and the laws 
applying to the entity. According to advocates of the agency theory,
726
 directors of public 
companies have a duty to exercise skill and care and to act in good faith to promote the 
success of the company and benefit its members as a whole, as per the scope of its 
statute.  
 
Importantly, article 154of the act does not place limitations on the number of 
public company directors: it stipulates a minimum of two company directors but does not 
put an upper limit on the number, which means that the law does not prevent an increase 
in the members of directors of shareholding companies before, during or after M&A 
operations. Accordingly, in UK legislation, there is no indication that there should or 
could be the dispensing of directors of the transferor company or the abridging of their 
rights and privileges guaranteed by law (including their rights in work contracts with the 
transferee company) after the process of M&A and the restructuring of the new company, 
as long as there is no reason or legal justification otherwise. On the contrary, regarding 
M&A operations, UK law gives the directors of transferee companies wide participation, 
power and authorities through their participation in drawing up a report about the process, 
as well as delivering copies of the report to employee representatives, drawing up and 
adopting a draft of the proposed terms of the merger and delivering details to the 
Registrar of Companies of the company’s particulars (date, time and place of every 
meeting, together with a copy of the draft terms of the merger). From this, it is considered 
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imperative to state that in the case of M&As, all the rights, liabilities and contracts of the 
Board of Directors of the transferor company continue in the transferee company by force 
of law, even if there is no explicit legal provision as such. This is what is understood 
from the texts of UK laws,
727
 which protect employees’ terms and conditions of 
employment when a business is transferred from one owner to another and provide for 
the automatic transfer of their employment in both domestic and cross-border M&A. It is 
as if their employment contracts had originally been made with the new employer. Their 
continuity of service and any other rights are all preserved.
728
 Both old and new 
employers are required to inform and consult all the employees affected directly or 
indirectly by the transfer.
729
 
 
With this in mind, it can be stated that M&As do not withdraw or cancel the rights 
or contracts of the management of the transferor company, but rather that all the rights 
and contracts of the Board of Directors of the transferor company continue with the 
transferee company, which must maintain its obligations in regard to its directors and the 
transferor company’s directors in their work and all the rights and obligations consequent 
from it. According to the theory of the legal personality of a company, mergers result in 
the expiration of the transferor company and the demise of its moral personality, 
alongside an increase in the capital of the transferee company in terms of the shares in 
kind and all assets of the transferor company. Mergers also affect the Memorandum of 
Association and the company system through its amendment. The transferee company 
does not just receive the assets of the transferor company but also receives the venture 
that the company sought to achieve. Accordingly, it is considered that it may be useful 
for the ventures of the transferor company - in order to achieve its goals - survival of the 
Board of Directors of the transferor company and participation in the management of 
transferee company after M&A, to ensure the directors’ experience is not lost. 
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However, this does not mean exploiting the text of Article 154 of the UK 
Companies Act and doubling the number of members of the Board of Directors of the 
transferee company, which would ultimately lead to an overlap in the competences of 
members, affect the decision-making process or increase the financial burden of the 
company; rather, there should be a reasonable increase in the number of members of the 
Board of Directors of the transferee company consistent with the company’s needs and 
the stability of its work, taking advantage of the expertise and skills of its and the 
transferor company’s Board of Directors. In this case, it is noted that section 154 of the 
CA 2006 puts a minimum without setting an upper limit for the number of directors of 
public and private companies, which may lead to the exploitation of the text. Members of 
the Board of Directors who wish to stay in their positions in the top level of management 
may also demand that the transferee or new company increases its new management to a 
number higher than the company needs, which may lead to confusion and an overlapping 
of competencies among the members of the Board of Directors of the transferee or new 
company and the new company suffering heavy expenditures due to increasing the 
number of members of its Board of Directors without controls. In order to avoid an 
unlimited increase in the number of members of the Board of Directors of the transferee 
company in M&As, it is hoped that a paragraph will be added to the text of Article 154 
that allows, under exceptional circumstances, a 100% increase in the number of Board of 
Directors of the transferee company in the first M&A case and to 25% in subsequent 
mergers or acquisitions, or in any prospective M&A operations in the future. 
 
According to the researcher's belief, putting a specific limit on the number of 
directors of a transferee or new company resulting from a merger or acquisition not only 
prevents the exploitation of companies in increasing this number to a value that may 
outweigh the transferee company’s needs but also opens the door for board members of 
the two companies to compete for positions as members of the Board of Directors of the 
transferee or new company on the basis of competence and experience. This may pave 
the way for the election of the Board of Directors to be based on choosing the finest 
members of the two companies involved in the merger or acquisition. 
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An increase in the number of members of the board of the transferee company can 
be substituted for by calling for elections of a new Board of Directors from the old 
directors of the transferor and transferee companies. This should take place with the 
participation of the employees or their representatives and shareholders in the company 
one month after the end of the M&A process and the registration of the new company. In 
the case of a failure to select a new administration during this period, the period should 
be extended to three months. The new Board of Directors has to take care of the interests, 
rights and obligations and work in good faith for the benefit of both the transferor and 
transferee companies and their employees and shareholders. 
 
Furthermore, the transferee company can expand its management and the 
development of new positions through creating new sub-departments according to the 
parent company’s interests to accommodate former directors who were not fortunate 
enough to become part of the transferee company’s Board of Directors, provided that 
they have the same powers and rights that they had in their previous posts prior to the 
merger or acquisition. In accordance with the researcher’s opinion, accommodating the 
transferor company’s directors in the scope of the transferee company or in one of its 
branches enables the company to take benefit from the expertise and skills of the 
directors of the transferor company, especially in M&A cases between companies that 
differ in their products and services, or between companies from different places, such as 
a merger between a company from the UAE and a British company. This is because the 
transferee or new company may need to keep the transferor company’s customers or gain 
the trust of its employees, which may not be achievable by only maintaining the 
transferor company’s directors in the Board of Directors of the transferee company. 
Furthermore, the company saves cash payments that may otherwise be incurred in 
dispensing of the transferor company’s directors due to expenses in training the new 
administration or the movement and housing of new members. 
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4.6 Directors’ Rights in M&As According to UAE and Qatar 
Laws 
 
 
UAE Companies Law, like State of Qatar Companies Law, states that the management of 
the shareholding company will be undertaken by an elected Board of Directors.
730
 The 
statute of the company will define the method of its formation,
731
 the number of members 
and the period of membership on the board. The laws also stipulate the method of 
electing members to the Board of Directors and identify their terms of reference in 
representing the company before third parties and the judiciary. Directors should 
implement the decisions of the board and abide by its recommendations.
732
 Furthermore, 
the laws specify how to determine the emoluments of members of the Board of 
Directors
733
 and business that the members are not entitled to exercise during their work 
as members of the Board of Directors,
734
 alongside the method of dismiss them or 
resigning from the Board of Directors.
735
 
 
In the cases of M&As, it is noted that the stipulations of UAE legislature do not 
differ to those of Qatar legislature in terms of defining a maximum and minimum number 
of members of the Board of Directors of a shareholding company. Furthermore, there are 
no explicit texts in the laws of both the countries that regulate the possibility of the Board 
of Directors of the transferor company being involved in the management of the 
transferee company by increasing the number of members of the Board of Directors of 
the transferee company. Unlike in the UK, Article 94 of Qatar Companies Law provides 
for a specific number of members of a Board of Directors that cannot be bypassed: “the 
management of the shareholding company will be undertaken by an elected board of 
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directors, provided that the number of members should not be less than five and no more 
than eleven”.736Moreover, Emirati and Qatar Civil Laws provided for “the right of the 
company to dispense managers who are not partners”, saying “The managers of non-
partners are always susceptible to isolate”.737 
 
According to the texts above, the general rule is that it is not permitted to increase 
or reduce the number of members of a Board of Directors by modifying the contract of 
the company or its statute. Basbos (2006),
738
 Al-masry (1986)
739
 and others
740
 justify the 
defects of the legal texts of UAE and Qatar laws relating to this case by saying that 
allowing an increase in the number of members of the Board of Directors of public 
shareholding companies after a merger could obstruct transferee company directors from 
working to their best ability. Such action would cause the effectiveness of the resultant 
company to be weakened, as well as increasing difficulty when making decisions that 
serve the interests of the company. Accordingly, it is believed that the board would not be 
able to achieve perfect harmony between its members as each member would have their 
own specific ideas. 
 
However, faith in this opinion could lead to procedural obstacles and legal 
problems in M&As in terms of members of Boards of Directors who feel that the merger 
or acquisition threatens their jobs or their rights. It may also lead to companies not being 
able to benefit from the experience and skills of their old directors. Notably, this could 
adversely affect the entire M&A process, for instance by lengthening the speed of 
completion or stopping the process of the merger or acquisition entirely. Ultimately, 
however, there is no doubt that it would hinder the achievement of the objectives 
intended by the legislature regarding M&As between companies.  
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However, this does not mean that Qatar and UAE Companies Laws prohibit the 
members of the Board of Directors of the transferor company sharing management with 
the members of the Board of Directors of the transferee company. On the contrary, from 
the texts of the two countries’ laws, it can be discerned that the laws give directors of 
transferor companies the right to participate in the management of the transferee 
company, in addition to the opportunity to continue to manage the project that the 
company sought to achieve prior to the merger. This is provided for as the texts state that 
“the company in which it was merged or which resulted from the merger will be 
considered as legal successor to the merging companies and is replaced in all rights and 
liabilities”.741Furthermore, article 524 of the State of Qatar and article 525 of UAE Civil 
Laws provide that partners or shareholders who are members of the company’s Board of 
Directors and who are subscribers in the management of the company remain in their 
positions despite M&A operations: “the partner may not be removed from the 
administration of the company without justification, as long as the company remains in 
existence”.742 
 
In addition, articles 277 of Qatar and 280 of UAE Companies Laws provide that 
“All the rights and liabilities of the transferor company will be transferred to the 
transferee company, which is replaced in all its rights and liabilities”. Moreover, Articles 
52 of Qatar and 126 of UAE Labour Laws provide that “The service contract shall not 
terminate in the case of the merger of the enterprise with another enterprise or transfer of 
its ownership or the right in its management to a person other than the employer for any 
reason. The successor shall be jointly liable with the former employer for the payment of 
the workers’ entitlements accruing from the latter”. 
 
From the texts, there is reference made to Emirati and Qatari laws giving directors 
of the transferor company the right to transfer their rights in work and other aspects to the 
transferee company, with the opportunity to share in the management of the transferee 
company. Accordingly and in line with the theory of the legal personality of a company, 
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it is fair to state that the survival and continuity of the rights and contracts of the Boards 
of Directors of companies involved in M&As remains existing after mergers by force of 
law, provided there is no reason to withdraw such a privilege. 
 
 This has been confirmed by the Arab judiciary in its judgements, which have 
ruled that M&As do not lead to the end of the rights of employees in work.
743
 In the 
judgement of the Jordanian Court of Cassation,
744
 the court decided that the transferee 
company was responsible for the debts and the other obligations of the transferor 
company. As stated in resolution number 246/2004, “all the rights and obligations of the 
transferor company are move to transferee company after completion of merger and 
registration of the new company -transferee company-in the Commercial Register 
according to provisions of law, accordingly, transferee company become a legal 
successor of transferor company and replace it in all its rights and obligations”.745 
 
However, there are exceptions to the aforementioned ruling, such as in cases of 
liquidation, bankruptcy and final licensed closure, all of which may lead to the cessation 
of the work of the facility and its ventures. Excluding these cases, the contracts of the 
transferor company’s directors and their rights remain and continue, and the successor 
shall be jointly liable with the previous employers concerning the implementation of 
them. This was confirmed by the advisory opinion of the Egyptian People’s Council, 
which stated that as long as the facility is still active, the employment contract remains in 
place without regard to the change of owner; contracts do not end unless the facility has 
subsided in its existence and components due to a liquidation, bankruptcy or final 
closure. Accordingly, the Board of Directors or one of its members cannot leave work 
due to change employer or the owners of the company without legal reason or prior 
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notice, and the employer or owner of the new company also cannot disqualify directors or 
one of its members for this reason.
746
 
 
It is worth mentioning that if the merger changes the legal form of the company 
and leads to the demise of its legal personality, this requires a change in the legal form of 
the venture that the company was created to achieve. So, a member of the Board of 
Directors cannot terminate or leave work without any legal reason. On the other hand, the 
transferee company cannot refuse to maintain its contracts and obligations to the 
members of the Board of Directors as long as its established ventures remain in existence 
and the company is not liquidated.
747
 
 
However, the retention of members of the Board of Directors in their work and 
positions in M&As does not necessarily mean doubling the number of members of the 
Board of Directors of the transferee company, which would ultimately lead to an overlap 
between members (as previously discussed).
748
 Rather, advantages should be achieved 
through the expansion of the directors of the company and the development of new 
positions,
749
 with an election for a new Board of Directors for the transferee company 
from all members of the Boards of Directors of the old transferor and transferee 
companies. This should involve the participation of the employees (or their 
representatives) and the shareholders of the transferor and transferee companies. Even 
though companies involved in M&As do not lose the skills of their directors, or against 
the provision of laws that provide for the transfer of employees’ rights in transfer of 
undertakings cases, also in order to stop the opposition of the Board of Directors to 
M&As and to facilitate the success of M&As, the company must place directors who do 
not secure board membership in the new administration of the transferee company 
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elsewhere within the company in order to preserve the rights they enjoyed prior to the 
merger or acquisition. 
 
A practical example of this is the merger process that took place between the Arab 
Company for Pharmaceutical Industry and Advanced Pharmaceutical Industries Co.
750
 
Following the end of the merger procedures, the Boards of Directors of the two 
companies dissolved and an executive committee took over the management of the new 
company, which accordingly distributed shares to shareholders and invited the 
Extraordinary General Assembly to an extraordinary meeting for the election of a new 
Board of Directors consisting of eleven members: eight from the Arab Company for 
Pharmaceutical Industry and two from the Advanced Pharmaceutical Industries 
Company, as well as a new member.  
 
Here, we can point out that Emirati and Qatari laws are not sufficiently fair 
regarding the rights of the members of the Board of Directors of the merging company, 
due to the fact that the laws in the two countries do not provide for the Board of Directors 
of the merging company to participate in M&As and do not specify them roles during 
these processes. Also, they do not give them the right to object to the merger or to take it 
to court in cases of a failure to respond to their legitimate claims to stay in their jobs and 
positions with the same rights. Furthermore, the laws do not specify that measures must 
be taken in cases of members of the Board of Directors wishing to exit from membership 
of the company’s management regarding compensation. This requires the intervention of 
Emirati and Qatari legislators to repair and modify the texts by taking advantage of the 
provisions of UK legislation, providing similar texts to section 904 of the UK CA 2006 or 
section 2 of the UK Cross-Border Merger Act 2007.  
 
Also, the lawmakers in both countries should modify the texts of laws relating to 
the number of members of the Board of Directors of a public shareholding company, as 
per the situation in the UK Companies Act, by reducing the minimum number of 
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members and removing the maximum limit. This would give each company the right to 
determine the number of members of its Board of Directors according to its need, in the 
case of M&As or other cases, which in turn would overcome the problems that face 
companies involved in M&As due to objections by directors wishing to retain their posts. 
This also helps the transferee company to differentiate between members of its directors 
and the transferor company’s directors and to then choose an appropriate management 
team. A reduction in the number of members of Boards of Directors provided by article 
94 of Qatar and article 95 of UAE Companies Laws would leads to prevent overlap the 
terms of reference between members of the Board of Directors the transferor and 
transferee companies after the merger. 
4.7 Effects of M&As on the Director Authority in Representing 
the Transferor Company  
 
According to the theory of the legal personality of a company,
751
 the consequence of a 
merger is the expiration and dissolution of the transferor company. However, this 
dissolution is different from normal dissolution as the merger does not lead to the 
liquidation of the company’s funds752 and the apportionment of its assets; rather, the 
transferee company receives the full financial assets of the transferor company, including 
the positive
753
 and negative elements.
754
 Accordingly, the authority of the directors of the 
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transferor company to represent the company in front of others expires.
755
 The company 
is not represented by a liquidator and as soon as the merger process is completed, the 
Board of Directors of the transferee company becomes the legal representative for both 
the transferor and transferee companies, as well as the entity that claims to sponsor the 
interests of the two companies.  
 
Essentially, the Arab judiciary, by means of the Egyptian Court of Cassation,
756
 
supported this view when it ruled that an original creditor company had fully merged 
with another company prior to the adjournment of proceedings. The consequences of this 
merger were the expiry of the merged company, the demise of its moral personality and 
the end of its authority, as well as the authority of its director. Thus, a claim concerning a 
debt owed made by an appellant (a creditor) against a former director after the merger 
(the debtor) was not legally permissible, thus the judgement contested on it will be 
correct, when this claim is refused.
757
 
 
In another case, the plaintiff (A, M) filed a lawsuit against the Board of Directors 
of Jordan’s Al-Nisr Insurance after it was merged with Refco Insurance Company. The 
court ruled that while the plaintiff had filed a lawsuit against Jordan’s Al-Nisr Insurance, 
the company did not legally exist because it was proven to have merged with Refco 
Insurance Company. Therefore, the identity of it had expired and it did not legally exist at 
that time, which prevented the claimant from suing the company as such rights had been 
transferred to the new company.
758
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In a judgement of the Egyptian Court of Cassation, the court also ruled that a 
merger leads to the expiration of a company and the demise of its legal personality and 
thus the demise of the authority of its director in representing the company and the 
disposition of its rights.
759
The Al-nasr Company for Tobacco and Cigarettes asked the 
head of the Civil Chamber Court of Alexandria to force Hassan Khalil to pay the amount 
of 2000 LE; however, the president of the court refused to issue the command, so the 
company resorted to the establishment of proceedings before the Court of Alexandria 
College, requesting the defendant’s payment of this amount. As explained in its claim, 
the defendant owed the amount to the Kotharelli Brothers Company (which the claimant 
had merged with) under the warranty of a debt written on 15 December 1957. In a 
meeting on 5 February 1963, the court permitted the defendant to introduce a guarantor in 
the lawsuit. Angelo Kotharelli entered into the lawsuit in his personal capacity and in his 
capacity as a director for the company. The respondent said that he had paid the amount 
claimed by Angelo Kotharelli when he was a manager of the Kotharelli Brothers 
Company and a representative of the company, which subsequently merged with the Al-
nasr Company for Tobacco and Cigarettes. In June 1963, the First Degree Court decided 
to request the swear to Angelo Kotharelli. Kotharelli did not turn up, so it was considered 
that he had declined to swear. Hence, on 30 December 1963, the claim was dismissed. 
The Al-nasr Company for Tobacco and Cigarettes appealed this judgement in front of the 
Alexandria Appeal Court, which ruled that Angelo Kotharelli was not among the original 
defendants of the lawsuit and thus ruled to cancel the appellant’s judgement and 
obligated the defendant to pay to the appellant company the amount of 2000 LE and legal 
fees from the date of the judicial demand until the date of payment.
760
 
 
The judgement of the Alexandria Appeal Court was not accepted by the appellant: 
the appellant appealed against the judgement in front of the Court of Cassation on the 
basis that the judgement violated the law. The words of the appellant are significant: 
according to the law, it is not permitted for the Court of Appeal to say that it is not 
possible to direct an oath to a partner who has withdrawn from a company. This is 
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because the withdrawing partner had nothing to do with the incident. The Court of 
Cassation did not accept the arguments of the appellant and ruled that “from the 
impugned judgement it is clear that the Kotharelli Brothers Company - the original 
creditor - merged as a full merger in the company that appealed against it before 
adjourning the proceeding. The consequence of this merger was the expiry of its legal 
personality and therefore the end of the authority of its director, along with the demise of 
his entire obligation in the representation of the company or its rights in the face of 
others. Accordingly, directing an oath to the director concerning the payment of the debt 
owed on the company after the termination of his work in the representation of the 
company is not legally permissible; therefore the appellant’s judgement is correct if 
refused request an oath from the respondent. Therefore, the appeal should be rejected”.761 
 
To sum up, the expiration of the transferor company and the demise of its moral 
personality as a consequence of a merger or acquisition leads to the termination and 
demise of the authority and functions of the transferor company’s Board of Directors and 
the demise of their status as members of the Board of Directors of the transferor 
company, in terms of business and in terms of representing the company in front of 
others. However, these considerations do not mean the liquidation of the company. 
Notably, as long as the merger does not result in the liquidation of the company, the 
merged company does not require the appointment of a liquidator to represent it in the 
event of the demise of the power of its Board of Directors: the Board of Directors of the 
transferee company, according to every case, becomes the legal interface of the transferor 
company in regard to all its rights and obligations. On this basis, mergers result in the 
directors or the Board of Directors of the transferor company moving to the transferee 
company and forming part of its administration. One entity becomes representative of the 
two companies together, representing them in their rights and obligations.  
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4.8 Similarities and Differences between Directors Rights’ In 
M&As According to UK, Qatar and UAE Laws 
 
The laws under consideration disagree concerning the number of members appropriate 
for a Board of Directors of a public company. The UK Companies Act does not put a 
maximum on the number of Board of Directors members of a shareholding public 
company, which does not lead to the emergence of any problems or obstacles regarding 
this in M&A cases. The transferee company can combine the members of its Board of 
Directors with the directors of the transferor company or elect a new administration from 
the directors of the transferor and transferee companies after the completion of the 
merger and the registration of the transferee company in the Commercial Register. By 
contrast, UAE and Qatar Companies Laws put a maximum and minimum on the number 
of Board of Directors members that cannot be bypassed. Not only was an error 
committed by the Emirati and Qatari legislators when they put a limit on the number of 
directors of shareholding companies, but the legislators in both countries have not 
implemented suitable solutions for developing the texts of the laws relating to the number 
of directors or Board of Directors Company in the case of M&As. They have not 
provided effective alternative solutions for this matter, such as the rights of members of 
the Board of Directors of both the transferor and transferee companies to elect a new 
administration from the members of the old Boards of Directors of the transferor 
companies, which may lead to problems in companies wishing to undertake M&A 
operations as a result of the intransigence of some members of the Board of Directors 
who do not wish to leave their positions at the top of the administrative hierarchy of the 
company.  
 
Unlike UK laws, UAE and Qatar laws do not indicate the role that the members of 
the Board of Directors provide for the company or its employees, or for the success of the 
merger or acquisition process. Although the laws agree and address the transfer of all 
rights and obligations from the transferor company to the transferee company, they fail to 
show the kind of rights that must be moved, e.g. the rights of members of the Board of 
Directors of the merged or acquired company. This may lead some companies to exploit 
204 
 
the lack of clarity in the texts and evade their responsibilities towards the old members of 
management and their rights. 
 
UAE and Qatar laws still take agency theory as the basis for determining the 
relationship between companies and their directors, which leads to increase the split in 
opinions of some Arabic Jurists concerning the duties and rights of directors in service to 
a company (in terms of taking care of its interests and the interests of clients) and the 
nature of the relationship between the company and its Board of Directors.  
 
4.9 Reducing the Negative Impacts of M&As on Directors 
 
The negative effects of M&As are not limited to the impacts on the rights and contracts 
of the workers: they can also extend to the rights of the Boards of Directors. For this 
reason, chief executives often oppose a merger because they fear losing their jobs or 
transitioning to a new role. Likewise, board members are sometimes reluctant to 
contemplate a merger because they feel loyal to the chief executive and the staff that have 
spent years building the organisation. The researcher believes these fears can be eased by 
taking several procedural and legal steps, as described below. 
 
Firstly, there should be an honest and early appraisal of the extent of the ability 
and potential of the transferee or new company to combine its management and the 
transferor company management. In addition, there must be some coordination between 
the administrations of the two companies involved in the merger or acquisition, as well as 
communication concerning the introduction of the working conditions and the problems 
and disadvantages suffered by each company, if any, before entering into the processes 
and procedures of a merger or acquisition. Furthermore, there must also be coordination 
between the administrations and employees of the two companies in an attempt to work 
together, which would subsequently facilitate the merger or acquisition process and the 
transfer of financial contracts, debts and all rights and obligations between the 
companies. An example of a board correctly focusing on working conditions and 
employees occurred with Quickturn Design Systems, Inc. In 1998, Quickturn was 
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approached by Mentor Graphics in a hostile takeover attempt. In the first meeting of the 
Quickturn board after the offer was made, the directors paid considerable attention to 
employee welfare, since retaining talent was critical to Quickturn’s success, whether it 
remained an independent entity or not. As a result, the board immediately hired an 
independent human resources consultant to develop an employee retention strategy.
762
 
When Quickturn rejected the offer from Mentor. The board once again focused its 
attention on employees and by the time the merger occurred, the company had lost almost 
none of them.
763
 
 
Secondly, consideration should be given to the directors of the transferor 
company, giving them broad powers to contribute to the completion of the merger and 
preparing them psychologically to accept working side by side with the directors of the 
transferee company, either as members of the Board of Directors of the transferee 
company or in a new position in company or in one of its subsidiaries. This can be 
achieved through having meetings between the members of the Boards of Directors of 
companies involved in M&As and the shareholders and workers of the companies during 
or after the M&A process. Having a board connection between the two firms may 
improve information flow and communication between the firms, as well as increase each 
firm’s knowledge and understanding of the other firm’s operations and corporate culture. 
This enhanced knowledge and information advantage, in turn, may lead to a better 
merger or acquisition transaction between the two firms.
764
 The information advantage 
may also affect the takeover premium and hence the transaction price of the deal. This is 
because acquirers with a board connection to the target may enjoy a bargaining advantage 
in deal negotiations due to their private information about the target firm, relative to 
outside bidders with no connection to the target.
765
In addition, particularly in first-degree 
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connections, the presence of an acquirer’s director on the target firm’s board may limit 
competition from outside less-informed bidders, and reduce the acquirer’s incentive to 
offer a higher premium in order to deter a competing bidder. Finally, greater information 
flow and communication between connected firms may affect the transaction costs of the 
deal by mitigating the need for the advisory services of investment banks in initiating the 
transaction and identifying synergy sources. In a recent study of 1,664 acquisitions 
between 1996 and 2008, Ye Cai (2010)
766
 observed a board connection between the 
acquirer and the target companies in 9.4% of the transactions. In terms of dollar deal 
values, connected transactions represented 19.8% of the overall transaction volume.
767
 It 
was found that the average acquirer abnormal return from two days before to two days 
after the acquisition announcement was 0.12% in first-degree connected transactions and 
-2.33% in non-connected transactions. The difference was 2.45% and significantly 
different from 0 at the 5% level. In addition, they found lower takeover premiums in the 
presence of a first-degree connection. Interestingly, takeover premiums become even 
lower when the connected director is an executive at the acquirer.
768
 
 
Thirdly, the new directors should be informed of the modus operandi of the new 
company and its objectives. Moreover, they should be informed of the benefits, such as 
salaries, vacations and other incentives, to which they are entitled as a result of 
continuing to work for the company resulting from the merger or acquisition, whether 
remaining in their past positions or in lower positions, as long as it does not affect their 
financial rights and moral status. 
 
Furthermore, there should be an election of a new Board of Directors for the new 
administration of the transferee company, with the participation of the shareholders and 
owners of the transferor and transferee companies. The new administration becomes the 
sole legal representative of the new company and its shareholders and employees in 
claims made in relation to each of the rights and obligations of the transferor and 
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transferee companies, both before and after the merger or acquisition. A member cannot 
be elected more than once unless otherwise stipulated in the statute of the company; 
members of the Board of Directors may withdraw from the board provided that it is done 
in a suitable time and they are not liable to the company. The Boards of Directors of 
companies that decide to merge continue to exist until the completion of the registration 
of the transferee company and the approval of the separate accounts. At this time, the 
Executive Committee, formed from the chairmen and members of the Boards of 
Directors of the companies wishing to merge (or their managers, as the case may be) and 
the companies’ auditors take over the management of the company for a period not 
exceeding 30 days. During this time, it should invite the general assembly of the 
transferee company to elect a new Board of Directors. This should be realised after the 
shares resulting from the merger are distributed.  
 
After voting ends, the members of the Board of Directors of the transferee or new 
company are selected from the boards of both the transferee and transferor companies. 
The Board of Directors are elected for a period of three years; after that, new elections 
are conducted with the participation of members who were not chosen in the first election 
of the new Board of Directors. For members who are not elected in the first election or in 
following elections, or for those who lost their positions on the Board of Directors 
resulting from an election, the transferee company should appoint them to work in a 
position within the company or in one of its subsidiaries. They should receive the same 
salary and benefits that they were receiving prior to the election and with the same 
advantages offered by the acquirer for the newly elected management after a merger.  
 
A practical example of the election of members of a new Board of Directors for 
an acquirer from the members of the Boards of Directors of the transferee and transferor 
companies is the merger process that occurred between the Arab Company for the 
Pharmaceutical Industry and Advanced Pharmaceutical Industries Company. This 
resulted in a new company under the name of the Arab Company for the Pharmaceutical 
Industry. The Boards of Directors of the merged and merging companies dissolved and a 
new Board of Directors was elected, consisting of eleven members: eight from the Arab 
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Company for the Pharmaceutical Industry, two from Advanced Pharmaceutical Industries 
Company and one new member.
769
 
 
Another example is the merger transaction between Deutsche Telekom and 
France Telecom
770
 in the UK. After the merger, the two companies revealed that Tom 
Alexander, former CEO
771
 of Orange UK, was appointed Chief Executive of the new 
joint venture, while Richard Moat, the former CEO of T-Mobile UK, was named Chief 
Financial Officer and Deputy CEO
772
:  
 
“A Board of Directors has also been formed, on which Tom Alexander and 
Richard Moat will serve as executive directors. Tim Höttges, CFO of Deutsche Telekom, 
will lead the board as non-executive chairman for two years. After this time, the 
leadership will rotate to Gervais Pellissier, Deputy CEO and CFO of France Telecom, for 
two years.”  
 
Philipp Humm, Chief Regional Officer of Europe for Deutsche Telekom, and 
Olaf Swantee, Executive Vice President of Europe at France Telecom, also joined the 
six-person board, but as non-executive directors.
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In addition, in cases of the bankruptcy of a transferor company and the inability of 
the acquirer to absorb its management and the transferor company’s management, by 
cooperation and coordination between the two companies the acquirer can negotiate with 
members of the Board of Directors who cannot be accommodated as members of the 
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Board of Directors of the merging company or who do not want to stay in positions lower 
than their positions prior to the merger. They can be compensated commensurate with 
their length of service and the services that they provided for the company prior to the 
merger; the compensation should be paid in cash from the profits made by the companies 
before the merger or after the merger. Also, the payment should be made during a period 
of three months from the end of the merger or acquisition and recorded by the transferee 
company in the Commercial Register. 
 
In this regard, the lawmakers of the State of Qatar and UAE should review the 
legal texts of laws relating to the number of members of Boards of Directors of 
shareholding companies and modify the texts to accommodate the increased number that 
could be needed by companies in M&A cases. The current texts could be changed to say 
“the management of the shareholding company will be undertaken by an elected Board of 
Directors. The statute of the company will define the method of its formation, the number 
of members and the period of membership on the board, provided that the number of 
members should not be less than two. The period of membership thereof should not be 
more than three years.” 
 
Emirati and Qatari legislators could also add text to the laws to allow companies 
involved in M&As to elect a new Board of Directors from the directors of the transferor 
and transferee companies, in order to meet companies’ needs and to take care of the 
interests of shareholders, employees and others. Achieving this can be done through 
taking advantage of regulation 38 of the UK Cross-Border Merger Act and providing 
similar provisions.
774
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Finally, the legislators of UAE and Qatar should take note of UK laws and 
develop the terms of reference and duties of shareholding company directors in M&A 
cases, giving them the right to participation and consultation at all stages of M&A 
processes and the right of appeal against arbitrary decisions that may affect them as a 
result of these operations, which would strengthen the relationship between the 
companies and their directors and promote the success of M&A procedures. 
 
4.10 Conclusion 
Being a responsible director means more than just acting with honesty and integrity and 
using one’s talents to the company’s best advantage. Hence, the thrust of much modern 
legislation has been to seek the promotion of better standards of management in 
companies for the service of the company and its shareholders and to increase profits. No 
one can ignore the damage and the negative effects on the Board of Directors that may 
accompany some M&As, which may extend to their contracts, level of output, wages and 
efficiency, due to the corporate restructuring that occurs after the completion of a merger. 
It can also occur due to taking or adopting some of the laws to the principle of personal 
theory in the interpretation of the relationship between the employee and the employer, or 
due to adopting wrong a strategy regarding the number of the Board of Directors of the 
shareholding companies by some of laws. For instance, UAE and Qatar Companies 
Laws, unlike UK Companies Law, put a maximum on the number of members of the 
Board of Directors of shareholding companies that cannot be bypassed, even in M&As. It 
is known that a merger leads to the expiration of the transferor company and the demise 
of its moral personality, with the termination and demise of the authority and functions of 
the transferor company’s Board of Directors and the demise of their status as members of 
the Board of Directors of the transferor company, in terms of business and in terms of 
representing the company in front of others. This might lead to objections by some 
members of the Boards of Directors of the companies involved, especially those who feel 
they are going to lose their jobs, which might cause the failure of the merger or 
acquisition.  
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In accordance with the theory of the legal personality of a company, the transferee 
company not only receives the assets of the transferor company but also receives the 
venture that the company sought to achieve. Also, it receives all of the rights of the 
transferor company in the form of a sum of money covered. Therefore, it may be useful 
for the projects that were transferred from the transferor to the transferee company to be 
managed by the board of the transferor company who were initiated to manage such 
projects before the merger or acquisition, so that the companies involved and their 
projects do not lose the previous directors’ experience.  
 
With the aforementioned in mind, this chapter has provided an evaluation of the 
rights of Boards of Directors in M&As according to Qatar, UAE and UK laws. The 
chapter has analysed the relationship between a company and its directors according to 
agency theory and institution theory; the researcher concluded that the relationship 
between any company and its Board of Directors is an agency relationship from a special 
type of agency contract. Accordingly, a director of a Board of Directors is not an agent 
for the company or its partners, but is a member of its legal entity, speaks in its name and 
expresses its will, and their legal actions are binding on the company. Accordingly, the 
rules of agency theory govern the internal links between partners on one hand and 
between managers on the other hand, but the directors in the face of others are legal 
deputy about the company. An agency contract ends with the death of the client or the 
transfer of the enterprise from one person to another. Also, the client can dissolve the 
agency contract without the knowledge or consultation of the agent. The Board of 
Directors is a representative of the company and all its shareholders, even the 
shareholders who did not choose them to manage the company. By contrast, an agent 
represents only the person who chose them, and such rules do not apply to the 
relationship between a company and its directors.  
 
The chapter has also identified the duties, liabilities and rights of directors in 
general and in M&A cases. In addition, the chapter has also highlighted how M&As 
impact the top management of transferor and transferee companies and how this 
influence extends for many years following the completion of M&As process. 
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Additionally, the chapter has also highlighted the rights of directors to retain their 
contracts of work and for their rights to be transferred from the transferor to the 
transferee company. It was concluded that British laws clearly put a minimum limit and 
no maximum limit on the number of members of Boards of Directors of shareholding 
companies, which facilitates the integration of the boards of the transferor and transferee 
companies or the election of a new administration from the Boards of Directors of the 
two companies. Not only this, but UK laws give the directors of companies involved in 
M&As the right to participate in M&A procedures, which allows them the opportunity to 
know their position upon completion of the merger proceedings. This drives them to not 
oppose M&A processes and to contribute seriously and effectively to the success of such 
processes. 
 
The chapter has also included various proposals and solutions, which are seen by 
the researcher as having the potential to reduce the negative effects of M&As on 
company directors’ rights; this is particularly clear in the proposal to give the 
administrations of the transferor and transferee companies further powers to participate in 
M&As, incorporating the proposal to merge the companies’ management. Subsequently, 
there should be the election of a new administration with the participation of the 
shareholders and staff of the two companies. In addition, the legislators of the UAE and 
Qatar should develop the articles of the laws of both countries relating to the number of 
members of Boards of Directors of shareholding companies, taking advantage of the UK 
CA 2006 and providing similar text to section 154 of the UK CA. This would facilitate an 
increase in the number of members of the Board of Directors or the election of new 
management for the transferee or new company from the management of both the 
transferor and transferee companies in M&As. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: SHAREHOLDERS’ RIGHTS IN M&As 
5.1 Overview 
 
A shareholder is an individual or organisation owning shares in a firm: they have a legal 
claim on a percentage of the firm’s earnings and assets and share the same level of 
limited liability. In cases of bankruptcy, shareholders generally lose the entire value of 
their holdings.
775
 ‘Shareholders’ does not just mean the holders of shares, but could also 
include other parties holding a merely beneficial interest in such shares.
776
 
 
According to the theory of the legal personality of a company,
777
 a merger leads 
to the expiry of the transferor company. However, this expiration does not lead to the 
liquidation of the company and the division of its assets but instead involves transferring 
both the negative and positive elements
778
 of the transferor company to the transferee 
company. In such a case, the merger not only increases the capital of the transferee 
company but the company also receives all the projects that the transferor company was 
established to achieve. Accordingly, the transferor company’s shareholders receive a 
number of shares in the transferee company instead of their shares that expired by the 
merger, with the same rights as the shareholders of the transferee company, i.e. the right 
to attend meetings, to discuss and vote, to appeal decisions, to a share in the output of the 
liquidation of the company and to waive their shares to others. 
 
The problem here is not how shareholders get profits or new shares in the 
transferee company, or how they can attend meetings or vote on decisions, because such 
rights are stipulated by the texts of laws. Rather, the problems are: unlike UK legislation, 
UAE and Qatar laws only allow companies to issue one type of shares (ordinary shares), 
accordance with, if the shares of the transferor company consists of ordinary and 
preferences shares, while, the shares of the transferee company consists only from 
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ordinary, how can the transferee company distribute its shares to the shareholders of the 
transferor company? In addition, according to the UK, UAE and Qatar the shares of 
company are divided into shares in cash and shares in kind, accordance with, the 
legislators of UK, Qatar and the UAE have estimated that a company may not need to use 
or exploit all its capital to carry out its project during the first three years of its 
establishment. In order to that, the legislators in countries do not require a company to 
meet its full capital when it makes an IPO, but merely request that it meets 25 % of the 
stock of its cash value upon subscription.
779“On the contrary, the shares in kind shall 
meet their value in full upon underwriting”. Accordingly, if the shares of the transferor 
company are divided into shares paid their full nominal values and shares not paid their 
full nominal values, while, the shares of the transferee company are divided into shares 
paid their full nominal values, the question arises as to how the shares of the transferee 
company are distributed amongst the shareholders of the transferor company. 
 
In addition, unlike the UK Companies Act, the laws of UAE and Qatar do not 
allow for the transferee company to obtain shares of the transferor company shares in 
return for pay in cash, which leads to issues relating to how the transferee company 
shares are distributed amongst the transferor company’s shareholders if the shares of the 
transferor company including shares with decimal fraction, while, the transferee company 
shares free from decimal fraction. Furthermore, as some merger or acquisition operations 
might not receive acceptance from the partners or shareholders, the question accordingly 
arises concerning the extent of the rights of those partners or shareholders who do not 
support the suggestion of the merger or acquisition to exit from such operations and 
recover the value of their shares. The problems do not stop at this point but extend to the 
rights of shareholders in the sale or exchange of their shares in the transferee company 
after the merger process is completed.  
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Not only that, but M&A problems may affect the profits of the shareholders of the 
companies involved. Many studies
780
 relating to the implications of M&As provide 
mixed results regarding the merits of M&As in terms of outcomes for shareholders: some 
studies find that M&As lead to maximise shareholder value, which in some cases went up 
to between 16% and 45%.
781
 However, others believe that this is rarely the case, with the 
shareholders of the acquiring company commonly suffering losses following the 
acquisition owing to the acquisition premium and augmented debt load. This has the 
potential to reach approximately 10% of the overall market value for the five years post-
merger,
782
 which leads to a question about the fate of the profits of the transferor 
company’s shareholders after the merger. 
 
Accordingly, when companies are involved in M&As, significant question arise 
regarding shareholders. For example, how do M&As affect the rights of shareholders of 
companies? And what is the legal basis for transferring all the rights and obligations of 
shareholders in M&A cases? In accordance with the legal theory of the personality of a 
company, this question (alongside others) will be discussed in this chapter, which is 
arranged as described below. 
 
The chapter will begin by providing a general overview of the rights and 
problems for shareholders that may arise resulting from some M&A operations. Section 
5.2 explains the shareholders rights in M&As. Section 5.3 provides a thorough 
understanding of the consequences of M&As for the profits of shareholders and the legal 
basis for transferring their rights from the transferor company to the transferee company 
Section 5.4 considers the rights of the transferor company’s shareholders versus the 
merger according to UK laws, which is also divided into two parts: the first part discusses 
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the right of shareholders to approve M&As and the second part classifies the rights of the 
shareholders of the transferor company in the shares of the transferee company.  
 
Subsequently, Section 5.5 takes a closer look at the transferor company’s 
shareholders’ rights (versus merger) in the transferee company according to UAE and 
Qatar laws, which is separated into four subsections: the first subsection analyses the 
majority of shareholders required to approve M&A decisions; the second subsection 
takes a closer look at the transferor company’s shareholders’ rights in the shares of the 
transferee company, which deals with the way shares in the transferee company are 
distributed to the shareholders of the transferor company when there are differences 
between the nominal values of the shares of both companies; the third subsection 
addresses the rights of shareholders in terms of objecting to M&As and therefore 
choosing to exit from the company and recover the value of their shares; and the fourth 
subsection discusses the right of the shareholders of the transferor company to trade the 
shares that they obtained from the transferee company after the merger. Section 5.6 
classifies ways of overcoming the impact of the merger on shareholders. Finally, Section 
5.7 will present a summary of the chapter and conclusive remarks. 
 
5.2Consequences of M&As on Shareholders’ Profits 
The extensive literature relating to the implications of M&As provide different results 
regarding the effects of such operations on shareholders. For example, Malcolm and 
David (2007),
783
 Anand (2008),
784
 Delaney and Wamuziri, (2004),
785
 in addition to other 
studies,
786
 believe that one of the primary motives behind any strategic corporate M&A 
decision is to maximise shareholder value, owing to the fact that M&As induce a number 
of changes within the organisations. Essentially, the size of the organisation changes; its 
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stocks, shares and assets also change. Even the ownership may change. However, the 
impacts of mergers and acquisitions vary from entity to entity and also from country to 
country, depending on the structure of the deal.
787
 
 
Silvia Rigamonti (2001)
788
 examined the stock market valuation of mergers in the 
insurance industry between 1996 and 2000 in Europe. He formed a sample of 56 deals in 
which the acquiring company was listed and he found that insurance companies’ mergers 
enhance value for bidder shareholders. Over the event window (-20, +2), their abnormal 
return was 3.65%.
789
 The abnormal returns for acquiring firms were larger the greater the 
relative size of the deal value. He also found that mergers occurring between insurance 
firms located in the same European country were not valued positively by the market, 
while cross-border deals appeared to increase shareholder wealth.
790
Chari et al. (2004)
791
 
found significant and positive abnormal returns from cross-border M&As, due to 
international tax differences.
792
 
 
Martin et al. (1999)
793
 performed a systematic empirical analysis of the effects of 
merger and acquisition activity on profitability and firm level employee remuneration in 
the United Kingdom, using a specially constructed database for the period 1979-1991. 
They found that both profitability and wages rise following acquisition and that firms that 
merge within the same industry experience larger increases in profitability and pay their 
workers higher wages than those engaged in unrelated acquisitions. Aghion et al. 
(2005)
794
 reported that M&As lead to increased concentration in the industries where they 
occur and trends towards innovation, which leads to drive firm growth and increase 
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shareholder profits. De Bondt and Thompson (1992)
795
 believe that the increase in 
shareholder profits is due to the lower average cost of production due to either cost 
synergies, leading to economies of scale, or a transfer of superior technologies, leading to 
a downward shift of their average cost curves.
796
 
 
Mulherin and Boone (2000)
797
 studied the acquisition and divestiture activities of 
a sample of 1305 firms from 59 industries during the 1990–1999 period and reported that 
both acquisitions and divestitures in the 1990s increased shareholder wealth between 
16% and 45%.
798
 Vijgen (2007)
799
 highlights that M&As in the western parts of 
continental Europe during the period 1992–2002 created a significantly positive run-up 
and mark-up for target shareholders, with 11.4% and 10.1%, respectively. These findings 
appear in the UK, where studies by Kennedy and Limmack (1996),
800
 Gregory (1997)
801
 
and Cosh and Guest (2001)
802
 report that hostile acquisitions improve firm profitability 
over a three-year post-bid period by 4.9% each year, compared with −0.7% for friendly 
takeovers. 
 
Andrade et al. (2001)
803
 found that mergers concluded in the 1980s and 1990s 
yielded negative, not statistically significant, returns for acquirers in various event 
windows around the announcement dates. Conversely, they produced positive returns for 
targets of 14% to 20%.
804
 Furthermore, Ashton and Pham (2007)
805
 studied the effect of 
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61 UK financial institution mergers over the period 1988 to 2004. They found that these 
mergers increased efficiency and had little impact on retail interest rates.
806
 Fabio 
Braggion (2010) also finds that target banks experience positive abnormal returns of 
6.6% in the announcement month and the combined abnormal returns are a little over 
3%.
807
According to Danbolt (2004),
808
 increases in the gains of shareholders stem from 
many sources, such as reductions in agency costs, the enhancement of the competitive 
position and synergies. Mitchell et al. (2004)
809
 add that bidder shareholder returns seem 
to vary depending on the characteristics of the firms involved and the timing of the 
merger. Spyros I Spyrou (2010)
810
also reports that the magnitude of the gains to 
shareholders is dependent on the method of payment and that, for bidders and acquirers, 
trading activity, liquidity and bid-ask spreads are affected by the form of payment. The 
method of payment in takeovers is important for a number of reasons. From a theoretical 
point of view, Jensen (1986)
811
 discusses the agency costs of free cash flow and argues 
that acquisitions financed with cash and debt will generate larger benefits than those 
accomplished through the exchange of stocks because “stock acquisitions do nothing to 
take up the organisations’ financial slack and are therefore unlikely to motivate managers 
to use resources more efficiently”. Thus, firms that have large amount of cash or high 
cash flow are more likely to make cash offers.
812
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On the contrary, through reviewing a UK dataset for the period 1990-2009, Black 
et al. (2010)
813
 found a significant reversal in the long term, with failed deals 
outperforming those that succeeded. This outperformance is dependent on the target’s 
status and the method of payment and is not simply a reflection of the UK phenomenon 
of private deals being financed using cash. Moeller et al. (2004) take into account the size 
effect when comparing the announcement effect of equity and cash bids. Large acquirers 
of public targets lose −2.45% if paying with equity and lose only −0.75% if paying with 
cash. Small acquirers gain 2.84% if they pay with cash and lose −0.42% if they pay with 
shares. Conn et al. (2005) find that bids financed with any payment method other than 
cash lose −0.47% over 36 months following the announcement.  
 
Furthermore, Cook and Spitzer (1999)
814
 report that 83% of mergers are 
unsuccessful in producing any business benefit as regards to shareholder value. Conn et 
al. (2005)
815
 calculated abnormal returns for a sample of UK firms and found that 
acquirers lose around 20% over three years. Hence, the overwhelming consensus is that 
shareholders in acquiring companies suffer significant wealth losses when long-run 
returns are considered.
816
 Savor and Lu (2009)
817
 suggest that negative wealth effects 
could be the result of managerial empire building or hubris: managers may engage in 
M&As in order to maximise their own utility at the expense of shareholders. Another 
possibility is that M&As are initiated by firms with overvalued equity who wish to pay 
for the (real assets of the) target with overpriced shares.
818
 Becher (2000)
819
 and Bhagat 
et al. (2005)
820
 add that the reasons for the negative effects of some mergers on 
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shareholders are the difficulty in accurately measuring M&A returns and the difficulty in 
timing information release, with bidders systematically overpaying for acquisitions.
821
 
 
Many people invest in companies. They buy shares in the hope that the value of 
their investment will increase. People also buy shares in private companies in order to 
secure a say in how the company is run or to ensure that they are directors. There are 
other reasons for acquiring shares. A vital question for every shareholder is: when the 
company is involved in a merger or acquisition, what is the fate of the transferor 
company’s shareholders regarding the profits of the transferee company after the merger? 
 
5.3 Shareholders’ Rights in Profits of the Transferee Company 
According to the theory of the legal personality of a company, a merger leads to the end 
of the transferor company and the demise of its moral character. However, the expiration 
of the transferor company is not followed by the liquidation of the company and the 
division of its assets. As a result, the shareholders of the transferor company receive a 
number of shares in the transferee company in return for their shares in the transferor 
company (which elapsed as a result of the merger), retaining their capacity as 
shareholders in the transferee company. Accordingly, the shareholders of the transferor 
company enjoy all the rights of the shareholders of the transferee company, including the 
right to company profits that are achieved after the merger. 
 
Sections 630
822
 and 633
823
 of the UK CA 2006 afford protection to the 
shareholders of a company according to the class of shares; paying a dividend is the usual 
way for a company to distribute a share of its profits among its shareholders. In the UK 
CA 2006, section 829 to section 853, there are detailed statutory rules regarding the 
distribution of profits to the company’s shareholders. The main purpose behind these 
provisions is to prohibit companies from making distributions (including dividends) 
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except out of profits.
824
 Accordingly, in a public firm, the usual practice is to declare and 
pay an interim dividend based on the accounts for the first six months of the company’s 
financial year by the directors of company. The directors will then recommend a final 
dividend to the Annual General Meeting (AGM) based on the profits made in the full 
year, and the Annual General Meeting then passes a resolution declaring that dividend.
825
 
 
In private firms, the practice varies widely. If the firm is making profit, there are 
essentially two ways in which this profit can be paid over to the people who own and run 
the firm. First, after deducting tax at the source in accordance with the pay as you earn 
(PAYE) system, salaries or fees are paid to the directors (or others, e.g. family members) 
for the work they have done for the firm.
826
 Secondly, the other way of taking money out 
of the firm is for the firm to pay dividends. These are paid to shareholders and will be 
paid in accordance with the rights of the respective shareholders. 
 
The classic example of the rights of shareholders in companies’ profits is the 
House of Lords decision in Adelaide Electric Co v P Prudential Assurance (1934),
827
 
where the payment of dividends being moved to Australia along with the business 
resulted in a lower payment, given the relative strengths of the Australian and British 
currencies of the time. However, the underlying right to receive the dividend was 
unchanged. 
 
According to Stephen, Firsby and Hudson (2010),
828
 in the absence of any such 
agreement, the shareholder is entitled to dividends or other benefits declared after the 
date of completion of the contract of a merger, when the transferee or new company is 
recorded in the Commercial Register. According to Heron International Ltd v Lord Grade 
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[1983] BCLC,
829
 loss suffered by a shareholder as a result of a breach of duty in relation 
to a takeover bid is a personal loss and will not be reflective of loss to the company, and 
does not affect other shareholders’ rights in profits.830 
 
UAE and Qatar Companies Laws confirm this fact by stating that “The Company 
contract should not include any text that prevents any partner from the profit or exempt 
him from the loss; otherwise, it will become null and void. However, the text that 
exempts the partner who has not submitted any share in the partnership except his work is 
allowed”.831 “If the company contract has not fixed the share of the partner in relation to 
the profits or losses, his share shall then be in pro rata to his share in the capital. 
Moreover, if the contract limits the share of the partner in the profit only, his share in the 
loss shall then be equivalent to his share in the profit. The same can be applied if the 
contract limits the fixing of the share of the partner in the loss only.”832 Moreover, the 
imaginary profits cannot be distributed to the partners; otherwise the company creditors 
are then able to demand every partner to return what is received, even if they are a bona 
fide partner.
833
 
 
From the texts, it can be noted that the laws provide for shareholders’ rights in 
company profits and also include the prohibition of any agreement that prevents any 
partner from profits or waives him from losses. This right applies for the company’s 
shareholders before and after the merger, provided that the shareholders maintain their 
shares in the company resulting from the merger and do not leave the company or recover 
the value of their shares in cash before or after the merger. Accordingly, if the company 
contract has not fixed the share of the partner in the profits or losses, their share shall then 
be pro rata to their share in the capital. Moreover, if the contract limits the share of the 
partner in the profit only, their share in the loss shall be equivalent to their share in the 
profit: such rules apply for the shareholders of transferor and transferee companies after 
merger operations, with there being no difference between the transferor and transferee 
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companies’ shareholders in this regard. The laws under study confirm this by stating: 
“All the rights and liabilities of the merging company will be transferred to the company 
in which it was merged or to the company resulted from the merger to be effective after 
the completion of the merger procedures and registration of the company as per the 
provisions of this Law. The company in which it was merged or which resulted from the 
merger will be considered as legal successor”.834 
 
This opinion has been adopted by the Arab judiciary represented by the Egyptian 
Court of Cassation, which authorises the transmission of the financial disclosure of the 
transferor firm to the transferee company by the extent agreed upon in the merger 
contract. This was attested when the court ruled that “Mergers by absorption, or the 
formation a new company, lead to the expiration of the transferor company and the 
demise of its legal personality, with the transfer of its financial assets to the transferee 
company, which replaces it in all its rights and obligations and then becomes the 
responsible company regarding the rights, debts and profits for the transferor company’s 
shareholders.”835 
 
5.4 Shareholders’ Rights in M&As According to UK Laws 
5.4.1 Shareholders’ Right to Approve M&A Decisions 
The approval of shareholders and convincing them that the merger achieves their goals is 
not easy, but circumstances differ from case to case: shareholders in some cases may 
refuse to transition their rights in shares from one company to another when the merger 
takes place. Therefore, the question here is: is the approval of shareholders on M&A 
decisions important to complete such a process, and what percentage is required from the 
votes of shareholders for the success of such operations? Essentially, M&As need the 
consent of the corporation’s shareholders in order to effectuate the process, which can be 
                                                 
834
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obtained through illustrating that the merger or acquisition will result in increased 
profitability for the corporation. Accordingly, shareholders can stop a merger if they 
believe it is bad for the corporation or their profits by voting against it - or by suing the 
directors of the corporation.  
 
However, Jarrell Brickley and Netter (1998)
836
 and Maquieira Megginson and 
Nail (1998)
837
point out that although some merger operations lead to loss returns for 
shareholders, most shareholders support mergers, as apparent from votes by company 
shareholders and passage rates that frequently seem to indicate strong support for M&A 
processes. Jensen Ruback (1983)
838
adds that the reason shareholders give a majority 
consent for mergers to take place despite the risks that may threaten their interests is due 
to their desire to overcome difficulties from which the company is suffering or may suffer 
in the future as a result of opting to reject the merger offer. These difficulties may take a 
number of facets, such as financial, production and marketing hurdles, or a lack of skilled 
labour and an increase in unskilled employment. Similarly, the reason may emanate from 
the faith of shareholders in that the loss of their rights after a merger is an episodic or 
temporary loss that can be compensated quickly after a merger. This can come about as a 
consequence of an increase in the capital of the new company resulting from the merger, 
which will perhaps allow them to enter new markets.
839
 
 
A good example is Clear Channel Communication's acquisition of AMFM Inc., 
which occurred in 2000. Clear Channel's stock decreased by more than 7% over a three-
day period in October 1999, when the deal was rumoured and eventually announced. The 
stock then declined at an additional 6% over the following 141 days, subsequently 
leading to the merger vote. Importantly, both of these returns were even worse on an 
industry- or market-adjusted basis. Despite the markets’ negative assessment of the deal, 
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82% of Clear Channel’s possible votes were cast in favour of the acquisition, including 
79% of non-management votes (assuming management's vote was 100% in favour).
840
 
Consequently, a natural question arises here regarding the shareholders’ approval for the 
merger and its necessity, and whether this forms an important and integral condition for 
the success of merger operations. In this respect, what percentage of voting shareholders 
is required to support and approve mergers and acquisitions before such a process 
becomes legally binding?  
 
The UK legislation pays attention to the problems that can accompany the process 
of voting on M&A resolutions by shareholders. Accordance with, in the case of M&As, 
UK legislators are keen to ensure explicit regulations in terms of identifying the 
percentage of shareholder votes required for approval of M&As in the two kinds of 
merger (merger by absorption and merger by the formation of a new company). They 
stipulate that a majority of shareholders is required to approve merger operations. This is 
provided for by the law stating: “the scheme must be approved by a majority in number, 
representing 75% in value, of each class of members of each of the merging companies, 
present and voting either in person or by proxy at a meeting”.841 In addition, the UK 
legislation gives the competent court the legal right to control mergers and to ensure the 
safe conduct and approval of shareholders in merger operations.
842
 
 
Accordingly, a merger decision must be approved by three-quarters of the 
shareholders attending the voting either in person or by proxy at a meeting, regardless of 
the shares they own. This means that a merger decision is a special resolution that must 
be issued by the Extraordinary General Assembly; this is what is understood by the text 
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of article 283 of the UK Companies Act, which states: “the concept of a special 
resolution of the members (or of a class of members) of a company means a resolution 
passed by a majority of not less than 75% by members representing not less than 75% of 
the total voting rights of the members who (being entitled to do so) vote in person or by 
proxy on the resolution”.843In the case of an incomplete quorum in the first meeting, 
British legislators solve this problem by giving the competent court the authority to 
determine cases that do not require attendance of the meeting by the shareholders or their 
representatives.
844
In the Gramophone and Typewriter Ltd v Stanley [1908] 2 KB 89, 105, 
per Buckley LJ “the Court of Appeal ruled that "The directors are not servants to obey 
directions given by the shareholders as individuals; they are not agents appointed by and 
bound to serve the shareholders as their principals. They are persons who may by the 
regulations be entrusted with the control of the business, and if so entrusted they can be 
dispossessed from that control only by the statutory majority which can alter the 
articles.”845 
 
Although the UK law determining the validity of Ordinary General Meetings and 
the number of shareholders necessary for the approval of a merger is clear, Al-zmi 
(2004)
846
 believes that British law does not specify the number of shareholder votes 
necessary for the approval of a merger in cases involving the existence of special types of 
shares. In this regard, the draft merger would prejudice the rights and benefits of the 
shareholders in such categories (shareholders or creditors) where it is necessary to hold 
separate meetings for these special categories and to thereby obtain their approval of the 
merger project. Birds (2000)
847
 explains this situation by saying that although the General 
Assembly of a company grants approval of the merger project, the competent court 
controlling the merger approves merger decisions only after confirming the approval of 
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all categories of shareholders whose rights are affected by the merger, and also through 
separate meetings held for each category.
848
 
 
All individual shareholders (including those who did not attend the meeting) may 
object to the resolution on the basis that it has not been validly passed and was not 
approved by the majority of shareholders as required by law. According to Henderson v 
Bank of Australasia
849
 and Musselwhite v C H Musselwhite & Son Ltd,
850
 the effect of 
procedural irregularity is that the resolution is void and the individual shareholders would 
be entitled to bring a personal claim for a declaration of invalidity. They would also be 
justified in refusing to transfer their shares from the transferor to the transferee company. 
However, in Allen v Gold Reefs of West Africa Ltd
851
 challenged the resolution that the 
majority of shareholders must act bona fide in the interests of the company as a whole. 
 
Although the requirement for the majority of shareholders to exercise their power 
for the interests of the company is well established, it can be difficult to apply in 
situations where the proposed alteration affects the rights and obligations of shareholders 
inter se rather than the interests of the company itself. This was stated by Lord Hoffmann 
in Citco Banking NV v Pusser’s Ltd [2007] 2 BCLC 483 (at [18]): “it must…be 
acknowledged that the test of ‘bona fide for the benefit of the company as a whole’ will 
not enable one to decide all cases in which amendments of the articles operate to the 
disadvantage of some shareholder or group of shareholders”. 
  
From the above, we can conclude that companies involved in M&As must obtain 
the acceptance of the majority of shareholders on a merger or acquisition decision. As 
mentioned in Chapter One,
852
 a merger is a contract between two or more companies that 
occurs by the acceptance of the shareholders of the companies involved. Accordingly, a 
merger cannot take place without the consent of shareholders. In this regard, section 
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907
853
 of the UK CA 2006 and regulation 13 of the UK Cross-Border Act are clearer than 
article 140 of the UAE and article 140 of Qatar Companies Laws, due to the keenness of 
UK legislators to take into account the majority of shares of the shareholders present at 
the meeting to approve the merger decision. UK law does not require a dual majority of 
shareholders who are present at the meeting and who own the majority of shares. UK 
legislation also authorises the competent court to control the merger and to thereby make 
sure that the company takes into account the implementation of the conditions set by 
laws. The company must, accordingly, provide the shareholders with documents that 
request their approval for the merger. The law also defines cases that do not require the 
attendance of shareholders, which leads to facilitate M&A processes between companies 
and reduce their costs and the negative effects on stockholders.  
 
From the above, we can conclude that British legislation is clearer than UAE and 
State of Qatar legislation due to the keenness of British legislators to take into account 
the majority of shares of the shareholders present at the meeting to approve the merger 
decision. British legislation also authorises the competent court to control the merger and 
to thereby make sure that the company takes into account the implementation of the 
conditions set by laws and accordingly provide the shareholders with documents that 
request the shareholders’ approval for the merger. With the clarity of the texts of UK 
laws relating to this section, the researcher believes that the texts of UK laws relating to 
shareholders’ rights to approve mergers do not require any further additions or 
modifications. 
 
5.4.2 Classes of Shares 
 
A company is an independent legal entity, separate from its directors, shareholders, 
managers, employees and agents. Company assets belong to the company but, at the same 
time, shareholders own the company, which has a separate legal existence. Accordingly, 
a shareholder is an individual or organisation owning shares in a company. Shareholders 
have a legal claim on a percentage of the company’s earnings and assets, and share the 
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same level of limited liability as the company itself. In cases of bankruptcy, shareholders 
generally lose the entire value of their holdings.
854
 Shareholders have many rights and 
obligations in a company, such as making decisions about a number of special issues that 
affect the company by passing ordinary resolutions or special resolutions if required by 
the company system or the replaceable rules.
855
 Shareholders also have the rights to 
attend meetings and sell their shares. In addition, dividends are paid to shareholders out 
of the company’s post-tax profits. However, shareholders are not liable for the company’s 
debts, except for any amount unpaid on shares.
856
 
 
According to Farwell J (1901) in Borland’s Trustee v Steel Bros & Co Ltd857 a 
share is “the interest of a shareholder in the company measured by a sum of money, for 
the purpose of liability in the first place, and of interest in the second, but also consisting 
of a series of mutual covenants entered into by all the shareholders inter se accordance 
with the companies Act s. 3. The contract contained in the articles of association is one of 
the original incidents of the share”.858 More prosaically 54 (1) of the CA 2006 defines a 
share as being a “share in the company’s share capital”. A share in a company is in itself 
a form of personal property. All shares must have a fixed nominal value. The share is 
measured of a sum of money namely, the nominal amount of the share, and also by the 
rights and obligations belonging to it as defined by the companies Acts and by the 
memorandum and articles of the company.  
 
Types of shares vary from one company to another. The general situation in the 
UK Companies Act 2006 is that, in return for investing in a company, a shareholder gets 
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a bundle of rights in the company, which may vary according to the type of shares 
acquired. Most companies only have one class of shares (ordinary shares); however, UK 
law is extremely flexible and allows many classes of shares to be created. This is 
achieved by setting out the different rights assigned to the various classes, usually in the 
company’s articles. There may be a number of commercial or marketing advantages in 
providing different types of rights to different classes of shareholders or other investors in 
a company. Some investors may prefer to know with certainty that they will receive a 
fixed dividend; others may prefer to speculate on the company generating higher profits 
than a fixed dividend might require, and yet others may require voting profits than a fixed 
to the company because they prefer a higher fixed dividend or loan interest instead. 
Consequently, a company is not bound to issue all its shares with the same rights but may 
confer on different classes of shares, thus giving different right to different shareholders. 
Such classes of shares may be described as ordinary shares and preference shares. 
 
Ordinary shares are shares that grant the owner with a number of rights, such as 
the right to transfer the property to another person, to get the profits distributed by the 
company, to see the books of the company, the right of priority in the public offering 
(IPO)
859. Furthermore, when the company’s capital increases, to vote at and attend 
General Assembly meetings, to share in the company’s assets upon liquidation and the 
right to nomination for membership of the Board of Directors of the company is entitl.
860
 
In Greenhalgh v Arderne Cinmas,
861
 a class of shares was formed within the meaning of 
the article providing for variation in the rights attached to a class of shares. According to 
Lord St David in Upperton v Union-Castle Mail Steamship Co Ltd (1902),
862
 the 
preference shareholders proposed to alter the articles so as to give themselves a right to 
vote on all resolutions. This would not affect the rights of the small number of ordinary 
shareholders unless they approved it in accordance with an article providing for the 
variation of class rights, i.e. the class rights attached to the ordinary shares. 
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Preference shares, as evident from their name, are shares that give their owners or 
holders additional rights not enjoyed by the owners of ordinary shares. Some of these 
rights, in addition to those described for ordinary shares, include primacy over the owners 
of ordinary shareholders to a percentage of the profits of the company, as well as giving 
priority in obtaining the output of the liquidation of the company before the owners of 
ordinary shares and after bondholders. The owners of preference shares also receive a 
concession represented by an increase in the number of votes that they enjoy at meetings 
of the General Assembly, with a right of pre-emption over other shares.
863
In Wilsons and 
Clyde Coal CO Ltd v Scottish Insurance Crop Ltd,
864
 the colliery assets of a coal mining 
company had been transferred to the National Coal Board under the Coal Industry 
National Act 1946 and the company was to go into voluntary liquidation. Meanwhile, the 
company proposed to reduce its capital by retiring capital to the holder of the preference 
stock. The articles provided that in the event of winding up, the preference stock ranked 
above the ordinary stock in terms of payment the outstanding payments. It was held that 
the proposed reduction was neither unfair nor inequitable. Even without it, the preference 
shareholders would not be entitled in winding up to a share in the surplus assets, nor to 
receive more than a return of their paid-up capital. Accordingly, they  could not object to 
being paid, by means of the reduction, the amount that they would receive in the 
proposed liquidation.
865
 
 
In White v Bristol Aeroplane Co Ltd [1953],
866
 the company’s share capital 
comprised preference shares and ordinary shares and it proposed to increase its share 
capital by issuing new preference shares ranking pari passu with the existing preference 
shares and new ordinary shares ranking pari passu with existing ordinary shares. The 
question considered by the Court of Appeal was whether this clause applied on the basis 
that the rights of the existing preference shareholders would be ‘affected’ by the issuance 
of new pari passu shares. Lord Evershed held that the rights of the owners of the 
preference shares would not be affected; after the issuance of new preference or ordinary 
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shares, the rights attached to the existing preference shares would be, in formal terms, 
precisely the same as they had been before the issue. The only change would be in the 
enjoyment of, and the capacity to make effective, the voting rights attached to the 
shares.
867
 
 
Shares are also divided into enjoyment shares
868
 and capital shares. Enjoyment 
shares give their owners the right to the company’s profits without giving them the right 
to the assets of the company, after the consumption of the nominal value of the company 
shares. In other words, this is a type of share in which the consumption of nominal value 
is based on a decision by the Extraordinary General Assembly.
869
 In contrast to this type 
of share, capital shares essentially mean shares representing the capital of the company, 
giving their owners the right to profits, as well as the right to the assets of the company 
upon liquidation. 
 
It is worth mentioning that there is another distinction of share type: fully paid 
shares (shares in kind)
870
 and shares for which the nominal values have not been fully 
paid (shares in cash).
871
Shares fully paid up or shares in kind are shares for which 
shareholders have to pay all the actual value. This is stated in Article 158 of Qatar law 
Companies Laws: “The company may hold material shares given against non-cash assets 
or evaluated rights. The founders shall request the civil court to appoint one or more 
experts to verify whether these shares were properly evaluated and rectified. Estimation 
of these shares will not be final until it is approved by a group of underwriters with a 
numeral majority possessing two-thirds of the cash shares. Material shareholders have no 
right to voting even though they are cash shareholders. The material shares shall not 
represent the shares other than those paid up completely. The shares representing material 
dividends will not be delivered until their complete ownership is transferred to the 
                                                 
867
 White v Bristol Aeroplane Co [1953], Ibid, for more see Douglas Smith, Smith Company Law (First 
Edition, Planta Tree 1999) 
868
 For the meaning of shares and the rights of shareholders in this kind of shares see articles 170, 171 and 
172 of the UAE Companies Law 
869
 For more see Buallal F, Explanation of the new Moroccan Commercial Law [2007] 361 
870
 For this class of shares see sections 32/ 2, 557, 629 and 630 of the UK Companies Act 2006, and 125 
871
 For this cases of shares see section 586 of the UK Companies Act 2006 
234 
 
company”.872 By contrast, shares not fully paid their nominal values are shares in cash 
that are not required to be paid at once. Article 155 states that the “Share value shall be 
paid in cash by a single payment or in instalments. The instalment to be paid upon 
underwriting shall not be less than 25% of the share value. However, the share value 
must completely be paid within five years from the date of the publication of the decision 
of the company’s incorporation in the gazette”.873 
 
The purpose of section 630 of the UK CA 2006 is to protect shareholders who 
belong to a certain class, giving them, in the words of Gower & Davies,
874
 a “veto over 
the change proposed, even if the company’s constitution provides them with no right to 
vote on the issue”.875 Thus, when any proposal to alter the articles may vary their class 
rights, either the consent of that class of shareholders is required, usually with a 75% 
majority at a separate meeting of that class
876
 (unless the articles specify otherwise), or a 
written resolution is required with the support of the holders of 75% of the nominal value 
of that class.
877
 
 
Accordingly, if the shares of the transferor company are divided into different 
types or categories while the shares of the transferee company consist of one type of 
share, there are practical problems that may arise when distributing the shares of the 
transferee company to the shareholders of the transferor company. In relation to this 
aspect, how the transferee company can divide its shares for the transferor company’s 
shareholders if the transferor company’s shares are divided into many different types or 
categories, while the transferee company has only one type of shares? 
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5.4.3 Shareholders’ Rights in the Transferee Company’s Shares 
According to the theory of the legal personality of a company, sections 913 and 914
878
 of 
the CA and regulations 2 and 17 of the UK Cross-Border Act 2007, the general situation 
in the UK Companies Act 2006 is that, in return for investing in a company, a 
shareholder gets a bundle of rights in the company, which may vary according to the type 
of shares acquired. Most companies only have one class of shares (ordinary shares); 
however, UK law is extremely flexible and allows many classes of shares to be created. 
This is achieved by setting out the different rights assigned to the various classes, usually 
in the company’s articles. The main rights that are usually attached to shares are: to 
attend general meetings and to vote (typically, shares carry one vote each, although there 
may be non-voting shares or shares with multiple votes). Moreover, it should also be 
noted that the statutory rights state that a shareholder has the right to appoint a proxy to 
attend a general meeting,
879
 to request a general meeting, and to have a written resolution 
circulated to the members. Moreover, each shareholder has the right to get a share of the 
company's profits, where the distribution of profits is paid through means of a dividend of 
a certain amount paid in regard to each share.
880 
 
According to the theory of the legal personality of a company and UK legislation, 
the merger consequences are that the transferor company (without liquidation
881
) expires 
and transfers all its assets to the transferee company, and then the transferor company’s 
shareholders get a number of shares in the transferee company as opposed to their shares 
in the company that expired owing to the merger. This enables them to enjoy all the 
rights enjoyed by the old or former shareholders or partners in the transferee company, 
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such as the right to attend meetings
882
 of the General Assembly for discussion and voting, 
the right to participate in the management company,
883
 the right to receive a portion of 
profits and to receive a share in the output of liquidation, and the right to appeal decisions 
issued by the General Assembly contrary to the company system and the provisions of 
the law. These rights (the transferor company’s shareholders’ rights in the transferee 
company) are confirmed by the texts of laws, which state that “A proposed merger is 
where one of the companies proposes to acquire all the assets and liabilities of the other 
in exchange for the issue of shares or other securities of that one to shareholders of the 
other, with or without any cash payment to shareholders”.884 
 
However, the problem here is not the shareholders of the transferor company 
obtaining shares in the transferee company (because this is decided by the provisions of 
the law), but how these shares are distributed to the transferor company’s shareholders in 
‘mergers by absorption’ or in the case of a merger by the formation of new companies, 
such as when the actual value of the shares of the transferor company is different to the 
actual value of the transferee company’s shares, such as if the transferor company owns 
ordinary shares but the transferee company owns preference shares. Moreover, this 
problem also extends to several problems emerging in cases where there are decimal 
fractions in shares of the transferor company whilst the shares of the transferee company 
are free from fractions. Notably, therefore, questions arise concerning how the transferee 
company’s shares are distributed to the shareholders of the transferor company if the 
shares of the transferor company are from one type, how they are distributed in cases 
where there are differences between the nominal and actual values of shares of the 
transferor and transferee companies, and how they are distributed where there is the 
presence of decimal fractions in the shares of the transferor company and the absence of 
decimal fractions in the shares of the transferee company. What are the solutions 
provided by British legislation for such cases? The following section discusses these 
difficulties and suggests solutions for these problems. 
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5.4.4 Distribution of New Shares if the Companies in the Merger 
Involve Shares from One Type 
According to section 829 of the CA 2006, distribution means distribution of a company’s 
assets to its members, whether in cash or otherwise. This is subject to the following 
exceptions:
885
 the issue of shares as fully or partly paid bonus shares; extinguishing or 
reducing the liability of any of the members on any of the company’s shares in respect of 
share capital not paid up, or repaying paid-up share capital;
886
 the redemption or purchase 
of any of the company’s own shares out of capital (including the proceeds of any fresh 
issue of shares) or out of unrealised profits;
887
 and the distribution of assets to members 
of the company on its winding up.
888
 
 
Most companies have just one class of shares, which will be ordinary shares 
carrying one vote per share, full dividend rights and full rights on winding up. Companies 
often set up different classes of shares for a range of different reasons. These may include 
wishing to pay dividends in particular ways; providing shares for family members or 
employees; to separate voting rights, capital rights and rights to profits by allocating 
different classes; or for many other reasons. Ordinary shares and preference shares, 
shares in cash, material shares, shares fully or partly paid up and redeemable shares are 
included in these types of shares.
889
 
 
Accordingly, if the shares of the companies involved in the merger are from the 
same type with a single value, there are no practical problems with regard to the issue of 
replacement shares between the shareholders of the transferor and transferee companies, 
as each share of the transferor company will be offset by a new share in the transferee 
company. Accordingly, the transferor company’s shareholders must receive a number of 
shares from the transferee company shares, which must be the same type of shares as they 
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owned in the transferor company. Building on this fact, if the transferor company has one 
type of shares with one related value, the transferee company should issue one type of 
shares distributed amongst the transferor company’s shareholders, each one receiving a 
percentage of their shares in the transferor company.
890
 However, if the transferor 
company’s shares are divided in terms of rights and benefits into many types, or divided 
into several categories in terms of value, the shareholders of the transferor company must 
then get a number of shares conferring them with the same rights that were conferred 
upon their shares in the transferor company.
891
 Notably, however, if the transferee 
company’s system does allow the issuance of various types of shares, the transferee 
company is then required to issue one type of shares equivalent to the actual value type of 
the transferor company’s shares to all the shareholders of the transferor company, each 
one with the same percentage that they owned in the transferor company. Therefore, in 
order to determine the number of shares that the shareholders of the transferor company 
can obtain in the transferee company’s shares, it is necessary to know the real values of 
the shares of the two companies involved in the merger.
892
 
 
British legislation explicitly treats symmetric share trading, which it provides for 
by saying that a “proposed merger is where one of the companies proposes to acquire all 
the assets and liabilities of the other in exchange for the issue of shares or other”.893 
However, although this solves the exchange of shares between companies involved in 
mergers (as in the case mentioned), the question here remains: what is the solution if the 
amount owned by shareholders in the transferor company does not reach the limit to get 
them one or more shares in the transferee company? Whilst it is well known that the 
shares of companies are indivisibility shares, on the other hand transferor company shares 
often include some fractional shares, e.g. if the transferor company shares are equivalent 
to 1.08n of the shares of the transferee company.  
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Hossam al-Saghir (1987) says that, in this case, each shareholder with a number 
of shares that do not allow them to obtain new shares in the transferee company (as 
mentioned above) should sell the shares they own, lose their description as a shareholder 
or buy shares to complete the quorum. This opinion was met with strong opposition by 
Arini (2002),
894
 who states that, in this case, the decision to merge must be made by a 
consensus of all the shareholders of the transferor company unless the company system 
rules otherwise. This is because a merger decision in such circumstances may jeopardise 
the fundamental rights of the shareholders of the company by forcing them to sell all their 
shares or be forced to buy an additional number of shares to reach the quorum of shares 
required.
895
 
 
However, Arini’s (2002)896 argument goes against the fact because this opinion 
stands in contrast with section 907 of the CA 2006 and regulation 13 of the Cross-Border 
Merger Act, which confer the right to approve a merger decision to a majority of 
shareholders attending the meeting. In such matters, the researcher believes that no issues 
can arise when the transferor’s company shares include fractional shares. This is because 
sections 902 and 905 of the CA 2006 and regulation 17/1 of the Cross-Border Act 2007 
explicitly provide the right for shareholders who decide to sell their shares to obtain the 
cash equivalent of these shares. Accordingly, every shareholder who owns a number of 
shares less than the quorum has to buy shares to reach the quorum to get one or more 
shares in the acquiring company, as has been seen in the previous example, or has to sell 
their shares by auction. 
 
From what has been mentioned above, it can be concluded that British legislators 
are clearer in addressing the problems arising in relation to the exchange of shares 
between transferor and transferee companies in cases where the shares of the companies 
are from the same class or where one of the company’s shares include shares with 
decimal or integer numbers, as the CA 2006 and Cross-Border Merger Act 2007 allow 
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the transferee company to exchange shares with the shareholders of the transferor 
company by cash or by shares. This thereby facilitates mergers between companies and 
helps in the success of such processes because the shareholders who do not want to 
exchange their shares can obtain cash in return for their shares in the transferor from the 
transferee company without having to search for buyers from outside the company or 
selling the shares at auction. 
 
However, in the case of share trading, the problem is not limited to the exchange 
of decimal fractions between transferor and transferee companies, but in the fact that 
assuming the actual values of the shares of the companies involved in the merger are 
equal is an unrealistic assumption. This is because the actual values of shares of 
companies often differ, even if the shares are even in their nominal values. Accordingly, 
the question remains as to how shares can be exchanged when there are differences in the 
shares of the companies involved in mergers. 
 
With this in mind, it must be noted that the shares trading system (in addition to 
the payment in cash provided for by the UK Companies Act, unlike in Emirates and 
Qatar Companies Laws) facilitates the exchange of shares without prejudice to the unity 
of the share, and accordingly implements a solution for the problem of trading shares 
between companies when there are differences between the nominal values of the shares 
of companies involved in mergers, which may be faced with most mergers. According to 
articles 595/2 and 902 of the Companies Act 2006, companies should “allocate new 
shares or money from the transferee company assets for the benefit of shareholders of the 
transferor company with paying cash or without any cash payments”.897 It should be 
noted that the British Companies Act does not specify the percentage of the equivalent in 
cash received by the shareholders of the merged companies, in addition to the shares they 
will receive in the merging or new company. Accordingly, Bertrel (1991)
898
 says that the 
amount received by the shareholders of the transferor company (in addition to the shares 
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of the transferee company) is not limited to an amount of cash only, but could be in the 
form of bonds and others. This means that the shareholders of the transferor company 
will receive shares in the transferee company, in addition to amounts in cash, instruments 
or bonds that do not represent a share in the capital of the transferee company. This leads 
to facilitating the exchange of operations of shares between the transferor and transferee 
companies, whether the shares of both companies are from one type or from different 
types. The following sections will discuss such matters in depth with a review of the 
solutions provided for by British legislation. 
 
5.4.5 Distribution of Different Types of Shares 
5.4.5.1 Distribution of Fully or Partly Paid-Up Shares 
According to the UK Companies Act, company shares are divided in terms of the type of 
share offered by the shareholder into shares in cash
899
 and shares in kind. Shares in cash 
represent monetary shares in the capital of the company, but shares in kind represent 
material shares in the capital of the company.
900
 British legislators have predicted that a 
company may not need to use all its capital to carry out its project during the first years of 
its establishment and so are not required to fulfil all their capital when subscribing. The 
legislature only requires the fulfilment of one-quarter of the nominal value of the shares 
at subscription, which the UK Companies Act provides for by stating: “A public 
company must not allot a share except as paid up at least as to one quarter of its nominal 
value and the whole of any premium on it”.901On the contrary, shares in kind must have 
their value fulfilled in full upon subscription.
902
 Accordingly, if the shares of the 
company consist of both these types (cash shares not fully paid their value and shares in 
kind fully paid their value), the question arises: how are the transferee company’s shares 
distributed to the shareholders of the transferor company? 
                                                 
899
 Sections 91 and 583 of the UK Companies Act 2006  
900
 Payment in kind is compensation provided in the form of goods and services of value, rather than in 
cash format. One example of payment in kind is food and board. This is a form of payment often offered to 
people like ranch hands and live-in staff. For more reading see Joyful Giving "FAQ: In-Kind Donations of 
Stocks, Bonds & Mutual Funds, Mennonite foundation of Canada [2011] 1, 4 
901
 For more, see article 586 of the UK Companies Act 2006 
902
 For more, see article 283 of the UK Companies Act  
242 
 
 
Bertrel (1991)
903
 states that it is allowed to distribute the transferee company’s 
shares to the shareholders of the transferor company proportionate with the shares they 
owned in the transferor company without distinction between shares that are fully paid up 
in regard to their value and shares that have not been fulfilled to their value in full. On the 
other hand, Smith D (1999)
904
 states that there are two ways to solve this matter: the first 
solution is to distribute the transferee company’s shares proportionate to the number of 
shares owned by the shareholders of the transferor company without discrimination 
amongst them in terms of the amount paid from the value of the shares. The second way 
is to distribute the transferee company’s shares among the transferor company’s 
shareholders proportionate to the amount paid from the nominal value of the shares by 
them; thus, shareholders who own shares that are not fully paid their nominal value do 
not get the number of shares in the transferee company, similar to the shareholders who 
own shares that its nominal value have been paid in full.
905
 Accordingly, if the quorum 
for replacement is that every share in the transferor company is equivalent to eight shares 
in the transferee company, for example, then every shareholder who owns one share in 
the transferor company with its nominal value paid in full would receive eight shares in 
the transferee company.
906
 Moreover, a shareholder who owns one share in the transferor 
company with half its nominal value paid would receive four shares in the transferee 
company. In addition, shareholders who have paid a quarter of the nominal value of their 
shares in the transferor company will obtain two shares in the transferee company in 
return for their shares in the transferor company.
907
 
 
The researcher believes that the two opinions mentioned above do not agree with 
the facts, simply because Bertrel’s (1991)908 opinion is equal regarding the rights of 
shareholders who have paid the nominal value of their shares in full and those who have 
not paid the full nominal value, which means that the shareholders who did not pay the 
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full value of their shares obtain benefits in the transferee company at the expense of other 
shareholders that have paid the full value of their shares. The second opinion also does 
not provide a lasting and fast solution to the problem of exchanging fully or partly paid-
up shares between companies involved in mergers, due to the time that the process of 
accounting and distributing new shares into two categories takes.
909
 
 
Therefore, in order to solve the problem of distributing shares in the transferee 
company for the two sets of shareholders of the transferor company, the researcher 
believes that the transferor company may claim the shareholders (i.e. by shares that are 
not fully paid their nominal values) should pay the remainder from the nominal value 
before the merger. In this regard (and in the case that the shareholders delay or reject 
payment), the company may, after warning the shareholders in question, offer these 
shares for sale at auction or on the stock market if the shares had been recorded in the 
stock market. Thus, all shares have their nominal values paid in full, which facilitates the 
distribution of merging or new company shares, where the merging or new company 
distributes all merged company shares evenly - each shareholder with the same 
percentage of their shares in the merged company. Here, it should be mention that, 
according to UK legislation, exchanging fully or partly paid-up shares does not raise 
many practical problems because the Companies Act allows for companies involved in 
mergers to exchange shares by cash or by shares, which facilitates the purchasing of 
shares that cannot be exchanged by cash.
910
 
 
5.4.5.2 Distribution of Ordinary and Preference Shares 
According to the provisions of the UK Companies Act,
911
 a company is not bound to 
issue all its shares with the same rights but may confer different rights on different 
classes of shares, thus giving different rights to different shareholders. Therefore, some 
companies issue preference shares, which may entitle their owners to benefits not 
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enjoyed by owners of ordinary shares, in order to encourage the public to subscribe to 
new shares
912
 or to convert bondholders to shareholders,
913
 disposing the company from 
paying off its debts.
914
 
 
Accordance with, preference shares entitle their owners to priority or preference 
in some rights and profits, such as priority to obtain profits, several votes in the General 
Assembly of the company, or priority in the sharing of assets of the company upon its 
liquidation.
915
 By contrast, ordinary shares are defined as shares that do not entitle their 
respective owners to any rights with special qualities and the rights of owners of ordinary 
shares are ranked below the rights of preference shareholders.
916
 
 
Furthermore, returning to British legislative texts, it can be noted that this 
legislation authorises the issuance of preference shares. According to the UK Companies 
Act, a company can issue any shares, with specific rights or restrictions, under an 
ordinary resolution of the General Assembly of the company (provided it takes into 
account the provisions of law), without prejudice to any rights related to existing 
shares.
917 
 
According to the UK Companies Act, a company can issue ordinary shares with 
different rights, such as Class A, B and C ordinary shares, some of which have priority 
over others - in terms of access to profits, voting rights, or the company's assets upon 
liquidation.
918
 With this in mind, for the issuance of preference shares the UK Companies 
Act requires that the company's contract or its statute must authorise the issuance of such 
shares. In this regard, the company statute must include all the rights conferred by 
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preference shares to their owners, simply because the basic principle is equality between 
all shareholders in a company.
919
 
 
In this regard, if the shares of the transferor company were divided into ordinary 
shares and preference shares, while, the transferee company has only ordinary shares, the 
question would then arise concerning how the shares of the transferee company are 
distributed to the shareholders of the transferor company who own preference and 
ordinary shares after restructuring the company resulting from the merger. 
 
According to the UK Companies Act (and as long as the law allows the company 
to issue ordinary shares and preference shares), we must draw attention to the fact that 
there are no practical problems that raise concern in the cases of trading ordinary shares 
and preference shares between transferor and transferee companies, as long as the statute 
of the transferee company is authorised to issue preference shares. Subsequently, in this 
case, the transferee company issues two types of shares: ordinary shares are distributed to 
the shareholders who contributed by ordinary shares, whilst preference shares are 
distributed to the shareholders who contributed by preference shares. Thus, each 
shareholder of the transferor company gets the shares in the transferee company, each in 
proportion to the type of shares they owned in the transferor company. However, if the 
statute of the transferee company does not authorise the issuance of preference shares, the 
transferee company may amend its statute by adding articles to allow the issuance of 
preference shares by the Extraordinary General Assembly of the company.
920
 
 
However, in some cases, it should be noted that the approval of the Extraordinary 
General Assembly of the transferee company to amend the company system for the 
possibility of issuing preference shares is not easy: the Extraordinary General Assembly 
may reject this. In this regard, the question is raised as to the fate of preference shares in 
the transferor company in the event that the transferee company can only issue one type 
of shares, i.e. ordinary shares. 
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In this case the researcher believes that the responsibility of treating this problem 
must fall with the transferor company, where if the rule inadmissibility forces a 
shareholder to sell their shares in the company, it may allow the avoidance of this rule in 
cases where the statute of the transferor company allows the recovery of preference 
shares.
921
Notably, the declaration of the company willingness to recover preference 
shares usually leads to draw attention of the owners of preference shares to exchange 
their shares into ordinary shares and giving them the opportunity to do that. The statute of 
the company often provides for this right (the right for owners preference shareholders to 
convert their shares into ordinary shares), whereby, if they so desire, they can use or 
neglect it. This right corresponds to the company's right to recover preference shares; the 
existence of these two rights, side by side, in the statute of the company is common.
922
 
 
Accordingly, if the transferor company utilises its rights in the recovery of 
preference shares, campaign preference shareholders use their right to convert their 
shares into ordinary shares, and then all shareholders of the transferor company become 
shareholders by ordinary shares. However, if the statute of the transferor firm does not 
allow for the company to recover preference shares and does not give campaign 
preference shareholders the right to convert their shares into ordinary shares, it is then 
incumbent upon the transferor company to get approval from the owners of preference 
shares to accept ordinary shares in the transferee company.
923
 
 
In an attempt to solve this issue, the English judiciary in Griffith v. Paget (1877) 5 
Ch. D 894
924
 ruled that, in the case of a shareholding company (with capital divided into 
two or more shares) with shareholders possessing different rights, it is not within the 
authority of the General Assembly under the votes of the majority of the shareholders to 
determine the distribution of shares between the categories of shareholders, unlike their 
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rights. Accordingly, the shares of the transferee company must be distributed to the 
transferor company’s shareholders in proportion with the actual value of each type of 
share separately.
925
 
 
In summary of the above, we can conclude that the UK Companies Act 2006 
allows the issuance of preference shares side by side with ordinary shares. The law also 
allows for companies consisting of fully and not fully paid-up shares (shares in kind and 
in cash shares). Sections 902 and 907 of the UK Companies Act and regulations 2 and 17 
of the UK Cross-Border Merger Act allow the transferee company to exchange shares 
with the shareholders of the transferor company for the same shares or for cash in return 
for their shares that transferred to the transferee company. Accordingly, in merger cases 
between UK companies or between UK companies and foreign companies, there are no 
practical problems raising concern regarding the distribution of shares amongst the 
transferee company’s shareholders and the shareholders of the transferor company. In 
cases where the transferor company’s shares are divided into preference and ordinary 
shares, the transferee company issues two types of shares in merger cases: ordinary 
shares are distributed to shareholders of ordinary shares and preference shares are 
distributed to shareholders of preference shares. This also applies to cases of other share 
divisions (shares in kind, shares in cash, and capital or enjoyment shares), where the 
transferee or new company can issue different shares in accordance with the transferor 
company’s shares; thus each shareholder of the transferor company gets shares in the 
transferee company, each identical in proportion and type to those they owned in the 
transferor company.
926
 
 
                                                 
925
 For more see Griffith v. Paget (1877) 5 Ch. D 894; Sealy L. S Cases and Material in Company Law (5
th
 
Ed 1992), 514. 
926
 For the types of shares see John Armour 'Share Capital and Creditor Protection: Efficient Rules for a 
Modern Company Law' the Modern Law Review Limited, Blackwell Publishers (2000) 355, 378 and Paul 
P. Davies 'Introduction to Company Law' Second Ed (Oxford 2002), 263 
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5.5Shareholders’ Rights in M&As According to UAE and 
Qatar Laws 
5.5.1 The Majority of Shareholders Required to Approve M&A 
Decisions 
The intent of shareholders’ approval of a merger is to show the consent and desire of 
shareholders to move their money, rights and obligations from the transferor to the 
transferee company and to take steps to achieve this. This is realised through their 
attendance of an Extraordinary General Assembly meeting
927
 (in person or through their 
agents) and voting on the merger project or not objecting to it. According to the theory of 
the legal personality of a company, the consequence of a merger is the expiry of the 
transferor company and the transfer of its financial assets to the transferee company. In 
such a case, the shareholders’ approval of the merger or acquisition decision is highly 
important, owing to the impact on the structures and systems of the companies involved. 
For this reason, UAE and Qatar laws are keen to identify the specific majority required at 
the Extraordinary General Assembly to take such a decision. Accordingly, if the General 
Assembly of the company
928
 is the supreme authority in the shareholding company, the 
Extraordinary General Assembly
929
 is the entity that has the power and authority to make 
all decisions that could subsequently modify the system of the company – including 
merger decisions. This is determined by Article 137 of Qatar and Article 137 of the UAE 
                                                 
927
 A practical example of successful integration and shareholders majority required for that, United 
Airlines’ and Continental Airlines’ respective shareholders voted on September 17 to approve the merger 
of a wholly owned subsidiary of United’s parent UAL Corporation into Continental, allowing the merger of 
the two airlines to go ahead. Continental Airlines’ shareholders voted at a meeting held in Houston and 
UAL’s shareholders voted at a meeting held in Chicago. UAL Corporation’s primary subsidiary is United 
Airlines. More than 98 per cent of the votes cast by Continental’s shareholders and 75 per cent of its shares 
outstanding were voted in favour of the transaction. UAL saw similar results: More than 98 per cent of 
UAL shareholders’ votes cast and 84 per cent of the shares outstanding were voted in favour of the merger. 
928
The Extraordinary General meeting is a meeting specially called to discuss a particular item of a 
company's business, usually one of some importance? The meeting may be called by a group of 
shareholders or by the directors, for terms of reference and functions the Extraordinary General see articles 
122-136 of the State of Qatar Commercial Companies Laws. 
929
 The laws state for this by saying “The General Assembly of the company is the supreme authority in the 
shareholding company; the Extraordinary General Assembly is the entity which has the power and 
authority to make all decisions which could subsequently modify the system of the company—including 
the merger decision. However, this general assembly meeting is not entitled to make amendments in the 
statute of the company, by which the burdens of the shareholders may increase or amend the basic 
objective of the company.... Any decision in contrary to the above will be null and void”. For the terms of 
reference and functions of Extraordinary General Assemblies, see articles 137,138, 139 and 140 of Qatar 
Companies Law. 
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Companies Laws, which state that “The decision to dissolve or liquidate or transfer or 
merge the company in another company will not be taken except in the extraordinary 
general assembly meeting”.930 
 
UAE and Qatar laws both also determine a quorum for the validity of the General 
Assembly meeting by stating that “the extraordinary meeting of the general assembly will 
not be valid except if it is attended by shareholders representing a minimum of three-
quarters of the capital”.931 With this in mind, “if this level is not available in the case of 
the first meeting, the second meeting will be considered valid if there is the presence of 
shareholders representing more than half of the shares of the company”.932 “If this 
minimum threshold is not met in the second meeting, an invitation should then be sent for 
a third meeting to be held after thirty days from the second meeting. The third meeting is 
deemed valid irrespective of the number of shareholders attending the meeting”.933The 
legislations of both countries also determine that “the level or majority required in order 
achieving the approval of M&A decisions will not be valid until attended by shareholders 
who represent a minimum of three-quarters of the capital”.934 
 
Accordingly, it is clear that although the legislators give power to the majority of 
shareholders to amend the company system (including the approval of merger decisions), 
the legislators of both countries require a double majority: representing a numerical 
majority for shareholders attending the meeting and a majority in the value of the shares 
represented at the meeting. In other words, the majority required for the issuance of 
decisions by the Extraordinary General Assembly of a company relating to a merger is 
the majority that attended the meeting and also the majority in terms of share ownership. 
This means that a merger decision must be approved by more than half of the 
shareholders present at the meeting and the shareholders who approve the decision must 
own at least three-quarters of the value of the shares of the company. 
 
                                                 
930
 For more, see articles 137/4&5 and 137/1, 2, 3 & 4 of UAE Companies Law. 
931
 Articles140 of the State of Qatar and 140 of UAE Commercial Companies Law 
932
 Articles140 of the State of Qatar and 140 of UAE Commercial Companies Law 
933
 Articles140 of the State of Qatar and 140 of UAE Commercial Companies Law 
934
 Ibid 
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The texts still remain unclear concerning the majority required for the issuance of 
decisions by the Extraordinary General Assembly of the company in second meetings in 
the case of the absence of a quorum at the first meeting. The legislators stipulate that the 
presence of shareholders representing half the company's capital is required, but do not 
empower the court with the right to monitor and assess cases that do not require the 
presence of the shareholders or their representatives to approve M&As (such as in the UK 
Companies Act), which leads to difficulties in terms of the owners of the large shares in 
the determination of such operations, thereby failing if the minimum level required by the 
texts did not achieve. It is further acknowledged that the period stated by the text between 
the first, second and third meetings is a relatively long period, which may therefore affect 
the speed of completion of M&A procedures; this may in turn adversely affect the 
stability of the companies and the level of work and production due to preoccupation with 
negotiation process and shareholders’ approval. 
 
With the aforementioned taken into account, it would be preferable for Qatari and 
Emirati legislators to be clearer with respect to the majority required for the issuance of 
decisions by the Extraordinary General Assembly of a company, particularly in terms of 
the period of time between the first and second meetings. Essentially, in cases of an 
incomplete quorum in the first meeting, it can take benefit from the provisions of the UK 
Companies Act and leave the determination of the majority approval required of 
shareholders in M&As to the competent court and allowing them to monitor M&A 
operations. Also, there is nothing to prevent the legislators from reducing the percentage 
required to ensure the approval of the Extraordinary General Assembly on M&A 
decisions during the first meeting, by focusing on the majority of shares represented by 
those who attended the meeting - not considering the majority of shares of the partners or 
shareholders in full, as is the current situation. This could be achieved by modifying the 
current text and replacing it with new text providing that ‘The merger must be approved 
by a majority in number, representing 75% in value, of each class of members of each of 
the merging companies, present and voting either in person or by proxy at a meeting.’ 
Amending the texts of article 140 of the UAE and article 140 of Qatar Companies Laws 
by adding similar texts to section 907 of the CA and regulation 13 of the UK Cross-
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Border Act 2007 would remove control of the owners of large shares over M&A 
decisions; thus speeding up decision making and reducing the effort and money required 
from the companies involved. 
 
This is in regard to shareholding companies; however, if a company involved in a 
merger is a limited partnership company or joint company, the merger decision shall not 
be valid until it is issued by the consensus of the partners, unless the statute of the 
company states otherwise.
935
 Relating to merger decisions for a limited liability company, 
much like for limited partnership and joint companies, UAE and Qatar laws state that 
“merger decisions shall not be valid until they are issued by the consensus of 
shareholders and approval of the Concerned Authority”.936 
 
Accordingly, it can be stated that, unlike shareholding companies in Joint and 
Limited Liability Companies, decisions relating to mergers will not be valid until they are 
issued by the consensus of all solitary shareholders or partners, unless the statute of the 
company states otherwise. In such types of company, the laws seek support and consent 
from all partners regarding merger or acquisition decisions. This is owing to the fact that 
this kind of decision may lead to negative effects on the company entity involved and 
shareholder rights, as such companies consist of partners who manage the company and 
who will be jointly responsible for its liabilities in their private properties.
937
 The decision 
can also increase the obligations of the entity and the shareholders, e.g. if a shareholding 
company merges with a limited liability company or if a limited liability company 
merges with a joint company, as a joint company consists of shareholders who are jointly 
responsible in their properties for the liabilities of the company, while the shareholders or 
partners of a limited liability company will not be asked only for their share in the capital. 
In such a case, the merger decision must be issued unanimously. It should be noted that 
                                                 
935
 For more, see articles 37 and 55 of the UAE and 34 and 50 of the State of Qatar Commercial Companies 
Laws 
936
 Articles 254 of the State of Qatar and 249 of UAE Commercial Companies Laws  
937
 See articles 19 and 44 of Qatar Companies Law 
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that this rule of public order is not permissible for the General Assembly of the 
shareholders to overturn.
938
 
 
5.5.2 Shareholders’ Rights to Object to M&As 
There is no doubt that M&As lead to changes and amendments within the companies 
involved, with a change in the system and holding of the transferee company. Also, the 
transferee company bears the obligations and debts of the transferor company on the 
basis that it is the legal successor of the company. Accordingly, the question raised here 
is: what if shareholders wish to exit from the company on the grounds that the interests 
and rights they enjoyed in the transferor company (such as their rights in profit, obtaining 
new shares or participating in the administration of the new company) are threatened or 
deficient in the transferee company? Can shareholders exit from the company wishing to 
merge and recover the value of their shares? 
 
UAE and Qatar Companies Laws do not provide effective solutions that recognise 
the rights for shareholders to exit from companies involved in M&As and recover the 
value of their shares. Once two companies have entered into a merger agreement and the 
agreement is adopted by the Competent Authority specified by law, a resolution of the 
merger is applied without the need to achieve the approval of all the shareholders or the 
shareholders who oppose.
939
 Not only that, unlike the UK Companies Act, the laws of 
both countries do not give the transferee company the right to buy the shares of 
shareholders who do not want to retain their shares following M&A operations. This is 
inconsistent with the right of shareholders to exercise their rights and authorities 
guaranteed by law, which are acknowledged as the right of any person to utilise their 
rights in order to achieve their own interest,
940
 as long as the interest it purports to 
achieve is legal and legitimate and not intended to cause injury to others.  
 
                                                 
938‘The legal nature of companies and shareholders 
rights’<http://new.esgmarkets.com/showthread.php?t=44992> accessed 16 May 2011. 
939
 For more, see articles 273, 274, 275 and 277 of the State of Qatar Companies Law  
940
 See article 62 of the State of Qatar Civil Law  
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In order to avoid such problems, as long as no rules in the laws or the statute of 
the company prohibit or restrict the trading of shares, the researcher believes that 
shareholders should be able to withdraw from the company by selling their shares on the 
stock exchange. This accordingly ensures the principle of equity trading by allowing 
shareholders who do not seek to achieve a merger to exit from the company at a time that 
suits them and at the same time allow the entry of new shareholders without undermining 
the integrity of the company capital.
941
 In this regard, the question arises and remains 
concerning how the value of the shares of shareholders who want to withdraw from the 
commercial entity can be estimated before the merger. 
 
UAE and Qatar laws do not provide solutions for such a case; for this reason, 
Alsghir (1987)
942
 says that the value of shares should be estimated by agreement (or 
through the judiciary) whilst taking into account the current value of all assets of the 
company. Accordingly, the value that was reached or agreed upon must be delivered to 
the retreating shareholders before the completion of the merger process. In the case of a 
partner or shareholder disapproving this value, it will be up to them to refer the matter to 
the judiciary to estimate the price value of their shares.
943
 In this regard, the court rules in 
terms of the compensation for stakeholders –claimants- if there is a reason944 and the 
amounts are adjudged to have the same properties as the assets of the transferor 
company.
945
 
 
Moreover, to avoid such problems, the researcher believes that UAE and Qatar 
legislators could take benefit from Article 135 of Egyptian law No 159 of 1981
946
 and 
provide for “shareholders who object to M&A decision in the General Assembly or who 
                                                 
941
 For more see Al-azimy (n 503) 344, 345 
942
 Al-saghir (n 483) 309 
943
 For more, see article 296 of the Executive Regulations Egyptian Commercial Companies Law No 159 of 
1981 (In this case this reference used due to the similarity of the texts laws of the State of Qatar and UAE 
with the texts of Egyptian Law) 
944
 See article 135/5 of Egyptian Commercial Company Law No 159 of 1981. 
944
 In this text we are guided by article 135 of the Egyptian Commercial Companies Law Number 159 of 
1981 due to text clarity and the similarity of the texts of the State of Qatar and UAE laws with the texts of 
Egyptian Law 
945
 Article 135 of the Egyptian commercial Company Law 
946
 See articles 135/3, 4 and 5, Ibid. 
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did not attend the meeting by an acceptable excuse can request exit from the company 
and recover the value of their shares, and that in a written request to the company within 
twenty days from the date of publicity or published merger or acquisition decision, and 
the value of shares will be estimated by agreement or Judiciary, taking into account the 
current value of all assets of the company”.947 More importantly, the legislators of both 
countries could take advantage of sections 902 and 905 of the UK Companies Actand 
provide for similar texts”.948 This is because providing for the rights of a minority of 
shareholders who do not wish to exit from the companies involved in a merger and 
providing for the right of the transferee company to obtain shares in the transferor 
company by cash would remove exhibitions shareholders who do not prefer merge their 
capital with capital of shareholders of other company, thus, accelerate the completion of 
the merger.  
 
5.5.3 Shareholders’ Rights in the Transferee Company’s Shares 
According to the theory of the legal personality of a company, a merger leads to the 
expiration of the transferor company and the demise of its moral character. However, the 
expiration is not followed by the liquidation of the company and the division of its assets. 
As a result, the shareholders of the transferor company receive a number of shares in the 
transferee company as opposed to their shares in the transferor company (which elapsed 
as a result of the merger), retaining their capacity as shareholders in the transferee 
company. Accordingly, the shareholders of the transferor company enjoy all the rights 
experienced by the former shareholders or partners in the transferee company, like the 
right to participate in the company’s administration,949 the right to attend General 
Assembly meetings and discuss and vote on issues at such meetings,
950
 to appeal 
decisions issued by the General Assembly concerning violations of the company’s statute 
                                                 
947
 In this text, we are guided by article 135 of the Egyptian Commercial Companies Law Number 159 of 
1981 due to text clarity and the similarity of the texts of the laws of the State of Qatar and UAE with the 
texts of Egyptian Law 
947
 Chris Higson a and Jamie Elliott, ‘Post-takeover returns: The UK evidence’ (1998) 5 Journal of 
Empirical Finance 27, 46. 
948
 For more, see articles 595 & 902 of the UK Companies Act 2006  
949
 See articles 96, 97 and 98 of the State of Qatar and 97 and 98 of UAE Commercial Companies Laws  
950
 See articles 198 and 123 of Qatar and 199 of the UAE Companies Laws  
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or the provisions of law, and the right to a share in the outputs of the company’s 
liquidation. 
 
A merger in the legal sense is what leads to a change in the equity of the 
shareholders of the transferor company, whereby each one of the transferor company’s 
shareholders will get shares in the transferee company instead of their shares in the 
transferor company. Therefore, there is no merger when all the shareholders of the 
transferor company - even the shareholders who accepted the merger operation - receive 
cash as opposed to what they owned in shares in the transferor company. Such cases 
constitute sales and therefore mergers do not occur when the shareholders of the 
transferor company receive cash, bonds
951
 or other instruments from the transferee 
company instead of the shares in the transferor company that they owned before the 
merger.
952
 
 
This is confirmed by UAE and Qatar Companies Laws regarding mergers by 
absorption
953
 or mergers by the formation a new company, which stipulate that “Each 
merging company will be allotted a number of shares or equities equivalent to its shares 
in the capital of the new company. These shares will be distributed amongst the partners 
in every transferee company in accordance with their shares therein”.954 Accordingly, the 
result of the merger is that the shareholders of the transferor company must receive a 
number of shares in the transferee company that equate to the same quality of shares that 
they owned in the transferor company. Based on this fact, if the shares of the transferor 
company are of one type with a single value, then the transferee company is issued with 
one type of shares. These are distributed to the shareholders of the transferor company, 
with each in proportion to their rights in the transferor company.
955
 However, if the 
                                                 
951
 However, some of the legislation - as is the case in the British Companies Act - allows for the 
shareholders of the transferor companies to obtain shares with amount of money from the transferee 
company. For more see articles 595 and 902 of the UK Companies Act 2006. 
952
 Taha M K, Egyptian Commercial Law (First edn, Dar al Nahda al-Arabia 1968) Arabic Source; Al-
saghir, Ibid, 537, 538, Basbos, Ibid; Al-arif A, Explain the Companies in Egypt (1980), 160, Shafik M, 
Ibid, 672; Bak M S, Shareholders Company in the Egyptian and Comp ration Law(1949) 390. 
953
 For more, see article 274 of Qatar Companies Law  
954
 For more, see article 275 of Qatar Companies Law 
955
Al-shmary T,The Mediator in the study of Kuwaiti Companies Law and its amendments: Comparative 
Study (3
rd
 edn, without publisher) 12. 
256 
 
transferor company’s shares are divided in terms of rights and benefits into several 
different types or are otherwise divided in terms of value into several categories, then the 
shareholders of the transferor company must receive a number of shares in the transferee 
company conferring them with the same rights conferred to them by their shares in the 
transferor company. With this in mind, if the system of the transferee company does not 
allow the issuance of multiple types of shares, then the transferee company issues one 
type of share to all shareholders of the transferor company, in accordance with the quality 
of their shares in the transferor company.
956
 
 
Accordingly, to determine the number of shares that the shareholders of the 
transferor company should receive in the transferee company (which is known as the rate 
of the replacement of shares), it is important to understand the actual value of the 
transferee company’s shares, as well as the actual value of the transferor company’s 
shares. If the shares of the transferor company are from one type and the actual value of 
every share of the transferor company is equal to the actual value of every share of the 
transferee company, there are then no practical problems in regard to the process of share 
replacement; this is owing to the fact that every share in the transferor company is offset 
by a new share in the transferee company. However, in fact, an equal actual value of the 
shares of companies involved in mergers is purely theoretical. Often, the actual value of 
the shares of companies involved in mergers varies, despite being equal in nominal 
value.
957
 
 
Practically, the process of exchanging shares does not occur simply: there are 
practical problems that arise in the event of a disagreement concerning the actual values 
of the shares of the transferor and transferee companies, as well as in cases where there 
are differences in the types or classes of the transferor company’s shares. The texts of the 
laws of Qatar and the UAE do not give the transferee the right to buy shares from the 
transferor company by cash in merger cases and are not flexible enough to allow 
                                                 
956
 For more see article 274/4 of the State of Qatar Companies Law which provided for that by saying “The 
increase of capital will be distributed among the partners in the merging company in accordance with their 
shares therein”.  
957
 For more see Al-azimy (n 503) 266 and Al-saghir (n 493) 203 
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companies to issue multiple types of shares. This necessitates discussion concerning the 
problems arising as a result of differences in the actual values of shares of companies 
involved in merger operations. These issues are explored in the following sections. 
 
5.5.4 Distributing New Shares if the Transferor Company’s Shares are 
of One Type 
If the shares of the merged company are of one type and the actual value of the transferor 
company’s shares is equal with the actual value of the transferee company’s shares, then 
the issue of replacing shares does not pose any difficulty owing to the fact that, in this 
case, the replacement will happen on the basis of each share in the transferor company 
being offset by one share in the transferee company. However, equality concerning the 
actual values of the shares of the companies involved in the merger (as noted previously) 
is a theoretical assumption. Most likely, the actual value of the shares of the companies 
will vary. In this case, the actual values of the shares of the companies involved in the 
merger must be known in order to determine the rate of share replacement. This is 
determined based on the relationship between the actual value of the transferor 
company’s shares and the actual value of the transferee company’s shares.958This can be 
illustrated by the following example.
959 
 
If we assume that the capital of the transferee company is £900,000 and its 
number of shares is 900,000, then the actual value per share is £1. If its net assets are 
estimated to be £120,000, on the other hand, then the capital of the transferor company 
will be £600,000, with the number of its shares totalling 600,000 and its net assets worth 
an estimated £160,000. 
 
The actual value of the transferee company’s shares: 
         
              
 
 
                                                 
958
Al-azimy H, ‘The effects of Merger on Shareholders and Creditors Companies’ (PhD thesis in Law, 
University of Cairo 2004) 267. 
959
 See similar example Alsghir, Ibid, and Alazimy, Ibid, 268 
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The actual value of the transferor company’s shares:
         
               
 
 
 
Accordingly, it is clear that the relationship between the actual value of the transferee 
company’s shares to the actual value of the transferor company’s shares is:  
         
              
 :
         
              
= 1,333 to 2,666 
 
This means that the actual value of the transferee company’s shares equates to 
half the value of the actual shares of the transferor company. Thus, the replacement rate 
for one share in the transferor company is two shares in the transferee company. In this 
regard, the transferee company must issue two new shares for each share in the transferor 
company; thus each shareholder in the transferor company will receive double the 
number the number of shares in the transferee company. 
 
In fact, the issue of determining the rate of replacement of shares between 
companies involved in mergers is not simple. There are practical difficulties arising in 
this regard concerning the principle of indivisible shares, whereby, according to UAE and 
Qatar Companies Laws, the share is part of the equal parts of the company’s capital and 
is indivisible.
960
Therefore, the shareholders of the transferor company must receive a 
correct number of shares in the transferee company without fractions, as opposed to their 
shares that they owned in the transferor company. Accordingly, the matter of replacing 
shares does not raise any difficulty as long as the transferor company’s shares are integers 
free of fractions, as is the case if shares in the transferor company are equal to one, two or 
three shares in the transferor company. However, the rate of replacement of the 
transferor’s company shares using an integer free of fractions is supposed to be a rare 
occurrence in practical life. In reality, the rate of replacement of the transferor’s shares is 
often by a number including some fractional shares, e.g. if the transferor company’s 
shares are equivalent to 5.08 shares in the transferee company. 
 
                                                 
960
 For more, see articles 154 of Qatar and 149 of UAE Companies Laws, which explicitly provide for this 
property by saying that “shares of a shareholding company are undividable”  
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In order to overcome this problem, Al-azmi (2004)
961
 finds that the most 
appropriate number of shares in the transferee company must be selected to be equivalent 
in terms of the integer value of the shares in the transferor company, or that the most 
appropriate number must otherwise be selected from the shares of the transferor 
company, which can be rounded to an integer. This is provided that it is an approximation 
of fractional shares in the smallest way possible, which can therefore provide a 
replacement rate without fractions. To illustrate this, we can use the following 
example.
962
 
 
If we assume that the actual value of the transferee company’s shares = £1,560 
and the actual value of the transferor company’s shares = £900, then the value of the 
transferee company’s shares is then estimated by the number of shares of the transferor 
company, which totals
     
   
     . 
This means that each share in the transferee company is equivalent to 1.63 shares 
in the transferor company; therefore, it is necessary to select the most appropriate number 
of shares of the transferee company to be equivalent in terms of integer value to a number 
of shares in the transferor company, which may be approximated to an integer, for 
example.
963
 
 
Number of shares in the 
company  
Equivalent number of shares in 
the transferor company 
 
Output after the shares are 
approximated 
1 1.63 2 
2 3.26 3 
3 4.89 5 
4 6.52 7 
Figure one: Distribution of New Distributing Shares Comprising of Integers and Decimal Numbers: Similar 
examples in Al-azmi Halid (2004, p 271) and Al-sqir (1987, p 203) 
 
                                                 
961
Al-azmi H (n 940) 270 
962
 See same example Al-azmi (n 940) 173 
963
 For more see Al-azmi (n 893 )270, and Al-saghir (n 493) 203  
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Through the table, it is clear that the approximation of 4.89 to 5 shares represents 
less override relating to the approximation of fractional shares of the merged company to 
the nearest integer. Consequently, the rate of replacement is formed on the basis that 
every five shares in the merged company are equivalent to three shares in the merging 
company. This example (which is representative of rounding fractional shares to integers) 
leads to finding a replacement rate devoid of fractional shares and takes into account and 
develops a solution to Article 154 of Qatar Companies Law.
964
 
 
The approximation of fractional shares to the nearest integer (as in the example 
above) provides a solution to the problem of exchanging shares that include decimal 
fractions between transferor and transferee companies, which leads to a replacement rate 
of shares free from decimal fractions being calculated. However, it can be seen that 
following such a process without implementing other procedural solutions or 
modifications to article
965
 278 of UAE and articles 154 and 275 of Qatar Companies 
Laws may lead to benefit the shareholders of one of the two companies (the transferor or 
the transferee company) at the expense of the shareholders of the other company. For this 
reason, the researcher believes that until we get a correct replacement process, all the 
shares of each partner must be approximated separately, with compensation for the 
shareholders for the value of fractional shares that are waived. The process of 
compensation is discussed in the following paragraphs.
966
 
 
Firstly, shareholders who have been affected as a result of rounded fractional 
shares must be compensated through the allocation of a share of the profits realised 
before the merger
967
 or which will be achieved by the transferee company after the 
                                                 
964
 Rounding fractional shares to the nearest integer in cases where there are decimal fractions in the shares 
of one of the companies involved in the merger, such as in the example above, provides a solution to the 
problem of share exchange when the transferor company’s shares include decimal fractions while the 
transferee company’s shares are free from such fractions. It also provides a solution to article 137 of Qatar 
Companies Law, which prevents the indivisibility of shares in the face of the company in merger cases. 
This leads to facilitate the exchange of shares between the transferee company and the shareholders of the 
transferor company and thus increases the likelihood of the success of the merger process 
965
Articles relating to exchange for the rights of the transferor company shareholders in the shares of 
transferee company after the merger in the UAE and Qatar Commercial Companies Laws 
966
 Al-azmi (n 985) 271 
967
 See section 172 of UAE Companies Law 
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merger. This must be distributed to the affected shareholders and, during the specified 
period, should be commensurate with the damage suffered owing to the rounding of 
fractional shares. In this case, if the rounding of fractional shares results in richer 
shareholders of the transferee company and damage to the shareholders of the transferor 
company, a proportion of the profits should be allocated and distributed to the 
shareholders of the transferor company to help achieve a balance between the 
shareholders of the transferee and transferor companies.
968
 
 
Secondly, shareholders who have been affected by the rounding of fractional 
shares should be compensated by specifying the date use of the new shares, i.e. the date 
that the accounting profits of the new shares can begin. For example,
969
 if two companies 
merged on 01 January 2011, it may then be agreed that all the new shares issued by the 
transferee company to the shareholders of the transferor company do not only deserve 
profits from October 2011 - they are worthy of profits for the period from 01 January 
2011 until 31 September 2011.
970
 Accordingly, if the approximation of fractional shares 
leads to richer shareholders of the transferor company and damage to the shareholders of 
the transferee company, the postponement of the date of the shareholders of the transferor 
company utilising new shares obtained in the transferee company leads to achieving a 
balance between the shareholders of the transferor and transferee companies.
971
 
 
Thirdly, shareholders who have been affected by the rounding of fractional shares 
should be compensated in cash by distributing amounts of money to the affected 
shareholders, equivalent to the value of the fractional shares that are waived.
972
 This 
means that the shareholders of the transferor company will receive shares in the 
transferee company in addition to cash instead of the decimal shares that cannot be 
approximated. This system of exchanging shares (in addition to making payments in 
cash) between companies involved in mergers could ease the process of replacing shares 
without prejudice to the unity of the share and could thereby assist in developing an 
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appropriate solution for the problem of fractional shares that appears in some merger 
processes.
973
 
 
Importantly, UAE and Qatar legislators do not implement such solutions. They 
should therefore take advantage of the UK Companies Act and add to the merger texts to 
allow companies involved in mergers to allocate a certain percentage of their capital 
payments to shareholders who do not wish to merge, or instead of shares that cannot be 
approximated.
974
 
 
In this regard, the question remains: what is the solution if the number of shares of 
one of the shareholders of the transferor company is less than the quorum that would 
enable them to obtain one share in the transferee company? For example, if it was 
decided that the replacement rate would be that every share in the transferee company is 
equivalent to two shares in the transferor company. In this regard, it may then be 
questioned: what is the solution for shareholders who have individual number of shares in 
the transferor company? 
 
Emirati and Qatari legislators have not addressed or considered special provision 
for this matter. To resolve this issue, Al-saghir (1987)
975
 and Al-azimy (2004)
976
 believe 
that every contributor who owns a number of shares less than the quorum can either sell 
the shares that they owned and lose their description as a contributor (if they had only one 
share) or buy new shares in the transferee company to meet the quorum. Supporters of 
this opinion believe - in this case – that the merger decision can be made by the majority 
specified by law or the statute of the company 
 
Arini (2002) does not recommend this opinion on the basis that mergers in these cases 
(involving buying or selling shares by cash) require the unanimous approval of the 
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shareholders of the transferor company on the merger decision, unless the statute of the 
transferor company provides otherwise. Arini (2002) bases his opinion on the basis that 
the merger decision in this case leads to compromise the fundamental rights of the 
shareholder, as it forces the contributors to sell the shares they owned or to purchase an 
additional number of shares to meet the quorum. 
 
The researcher agrees with the supporters of the first opinion, who believe that 
every shareholder who owns a number of shares less than the quorum can either sell the 
shares that they owned and lose their description as a contributor or buy new shares in the 
transferee company to meet the quorum. Merger decisions in this case can be made by the 
majority specified by law or by the statute of the company, even if the decision involves 
forcing some shareholders to buy or sell shares if they do not meet the quorum. In this 
regard, respecting the opinions of the majority shareholders (especially shareholders who 
have a lower number of shares than the quorum required for replacement) is 
fundamental,
977
especially as the shareholders who own shares less than the quorum 
required for replacement have a small percentage of the total of the transferor company’s 
shares. Moreover, mergers often occur between public shareholding companies and it 
should be noted that total approval from shareholders in public shareholding companies is 
more or less semi-impossible due to the large number of shareholders in them.
978
 
Shareholders who own a small percentage of shares also do not attend the meetings of the 
General Assemblies of these companies.
979
 
 
Accordingly, shareholders who decide to sell their shares if they have less than 
the quorum for replacement can do it and get the amount of cash versus these shares. 
Confirming this, Sidky (1993)
980
 believes that if the principle of the freedom of the share 
requires the partner not to be forced to give up his shares, it may sometimes be necessary 
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to exclude the condition for shareholder consent when the interests of the company 
require it.
981
 Therefore, in order to eradicate such a problem, the researcher believes that 
UAE and Qatar legislators need to take advantage of section 902 of the UK CA and 
section 2 of the Cross-Border Merger Act and provide for the rights of companies 
involved in mergers to exchange shares with shares or with a cash payment receivable by 
members of the transferor company.  
 
5.5.5Distributing New Shares if the Shares of the Companies involved in 
the Merger are of Different Types 
5.5.5.1Distribution of New Shares Comprising Fully and Not Fully Paid-Up 
Shares 
According to Articles 155 and 158
982
of Qatar Companies Law, shares are divided in 
terms of cash shares (not fully paid-up shares) and shares in kind (fully paid shares): cash 
shares constitute cash shares in the company’s capital while shares in kind are material 
shares in the capital of the company. 
 
The legislators of Qatar and the UAE have estimated that a company may not 
need to use or exploit all its capital to carry out its project during the first years of its 
establishment. Accordingly, the legislators in both countries do not require a company to 
meet its full capital when it makes an IPO
983
, but merely request that it meets a quarter of 
the stock of its cash value upon subscription. The laws state that the “share value shall be 
paid in cash by a single payment or instalments. The instalment to be paid upon 
underwriting shall not be less than 25% of the share value. However, the share value 
must be completely paid within five years from the date of the publication of the decision 
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of company incorporation in the gazette”.984 “On the contrary, the material shares shall 
meet their value in full upon underwriting”.985 Accordingly, if the shares of the transferor 
company are divided into shares paid their full nominal values and shares not paid their 
full nominal values, the question arises as to how the shares of the transferee company 
are distributed amongst the shareholders of the transferor company. 
 
UAE and Qatar laws do not address this matter. In this regard, Al-azmi (2004)
986
 
believes that it is permitted for the shares of the transferee company to be distributed 
amongst the shareholders of the transferor company proportionate to the number of 
shares owned, without discriminating between shares paid their full values and shares not 
paid their full values. Alqilubi (1977),
987
 Kaid (1997),
988
 Taha (2000)
989
 and Obeid 
(1997)
990
 progress on this to suggest that there are two ways of distributing such shares: 
firstly, in proportion with the number of shares owned by the shareholders of the 
transferor company, without discrimination between them in terms of the amount paid 
towards the value of the shares; and secondly, the distribution of shares in proportion to 
the amount paid towards the nominal value of the shares. Shareholders who have not paid 
the full nominal value of their shares do not get the same number of shares in the 
transferee company as shareholders who own shares with their nominal value paid in 
full.
991
 Accordingly, if the quorum for replacement is each share in the transferor 
company is equivalent to four shares in the transferee company, then each shareholder 
with one share in the transferor company with its nominal value paid in full will receive 
four shares in the transferee company. A shareholder who has one share in the transferor 
company with half its nominal value paid will receive two shares in the transferee 
company, while a shareholder who has paid a quarter of the nominal value of their shares 
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will receive one share in the transferee company for each share they had in the transferor 
company.
992
 
 
In order to avoid the problems associated with the distribution of the transferee 
company’s shares to two sets of shareholders of the transferor company, the researcher 
(consistent with some of the jurists
993
) believes that it could be permissible for the 
transferor company to demand that its shareholders who have contributed by shares not 
paid their nominal values to pay the remainder of the nominal value in full before the 
merger. In the case of their delayed or refused payment, after warning them the company 
could offer the shares for sale by auction or in the stock market if the shares are 
registered as such.
994
 Thus, all the shares become paid their nominal value in full, which 
facilitates the distribution of the transferee company’s shares equally amongst all the 
transferor company’s shareholders.995 
 
5.5.5.2 Distributing Capital and Enjoyment Shares 
Enjoyment shares (consuming shares)996 means returning the share value to the 
shareholders during the company’s life and before its expiry.997Such shares are called 
enjoyment shares, which are capital shares that have consumed their nominal value, and 
their owners recover this value during the company’s life. Importantly, it corresponds 
with capital shares, which are shares whose owners only recover their nominal value 
following the expiration and liquidation of the company.
998
 
 
Pursuant to the principle of the stability of the company’s capital, the rule is that, 
during the course of its life, it is not permissible for the company to consume all or some 
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of its shares by returning its nominal value to shareholders. However, resorting to 
consuming its own shares may seem necessary to companies in some cases, such as if the 
company is a franchise company given by the government or by a juristic body for a 
certain period, following which the property and assets of the company devolve to the 
donor (free of charge), such as electricity and gas companies. Alternatively, there may be 
other organisations that require the consumption of their assets, such as ships and 
aircrafts, which may then result in the company not having the same value of shares at 
the end of its life. In this instance, it is impossible for the shareholders to recover the 
value of their shares.
999
 
 
UAE Companies Law allows a company during the course of its life to consume 
all or some of its shares by returning their nominal value to shareholders. It provides for 
this by saying: “the articles of association may provide for share depreciation during the 
life of the company if its venture depreciates gradually or is based on temporary 
rights”.1000 The consequence of this is that a company can only consume all or some of its 
shares if the statute of the company stipulates that this is permissible. However, if the 
statute of the company does not comprise permission to consume shares, it is permissible 
for the Extraordinary General Assembly to amend the company system by providing 
authorisation to enjoyment shares.
1001
 If the statute of the company allows the 
consumption of its shares, it has to pay the nominal value of its consumer shares from its 
profits and reserves, with the exception of legal reserve.
1002
 
 
Accordingly, the relationship between the company and shareholders who own 
shares consumed as a result of use by the company is not interrupted: they retain their 
capacity as a shareholder and get enjoyment shares instead of consumed share capital. 
However, a shareholder who consumes their shares retains their capacity as a shareholder 
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in the company but ultimately does not retain the same rights as they had before 
consuming their shares. At the same time, the owners of capital shares who do not 
consume their shares retain the same rights. Accordingly, it is logical to state that the 
rights of the owners of enjoyment shares are inferior to the rights of owners of capital 
shares that are not consumed.
1003
 
 
Therefore, owners of enjoyment shares retain their capacity as shareholders in the 
company and have all the same rights as the owners of capital shares that is not 
consumed, including the right to attend General Assembly meetings, vote and be 
involved in profit sharing, as well as the right to the output of the liquidation of the 
company. However, the proportion of profits for owners of enjoyment shares may be less 
than the profits obtained by the owners of capital shares that are not consumed. In 
addition, the owners of enjoyment shares cannot share in the apportionment of the assets 
of the company upon liquidation only after the owners of the capital shares that did not 
their shares consumed recovering the value of their shares. This is logical as the owners 
of enjoyment shares have already recovered the nominal value of their shares during the 
company’s life.1004 It is in this regard that the question arises concerning how the 
transferee company’s shares are distributed among the transferor company’s shareholders 
if the transferor company’s shares are divided into capital shares and enjoyment shares 
while the transferee company’s shares are only capital shares. 
 
Unlike the UAE, Qatar law does not provide a solution to this case because it does 
not provide for the right of the company to consume shares during the company’s life. 
Furthermore, the laws of both countries do not address the operations of exchanging 
shares between companies involved in mergers. For this reason, the problem stands out 
more especially as the shareholders of the transferor company must receive new shares in 
the transferee company equivalent to their shares in the former, while the owners of 
enjoyment shares have fewer rights than the rights associated with capital shares. Logic 
then requires that the value of the enjoyment shares is less than the value of capital 
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shares. Accordingly, there is no equality between the owners of enjoyment shares and the 
owners of capital shares.
1005
 
 
With this taken into account, Bastian (1996)
1006
 progresses to say that the 
transferee company’s shares are distributed to the shareholders of the transferor company 
on the assumption that these shares represent money resulting from the company’s 
liquidation and each shareholder then obtains shares equivalent to their share in the result 
of the liquidation of the company. Samih Kaliouby (1993)
1007
 explains this by saying “the 
owners of enjoyment shares receive all the same rights as the owners of capital shares 
except recovering the nominal value of shares when the company goes into liquidation”. 
This means that when the liquidation of the company occurs, the owners of capital stock 
recover the nominal value of their shares. After this, the remaining assets of the company 
are distributed amongst all the shareholders, whether they are subscribers by shares of 
capital or enjoyment of shares.
1008
 
 
It follows that it is necessary for the owners of capital shares to receive a number 
of shares in the transferee company equivalent to the nominal value of their shares in the 
transferor company, so the position of the owners of capital shares becomes equal to the 
owners of enjoyment shares in terms of both of them having regained the nominal value 
they contributed to the capital of the transferor company, even if they differed in the 
nature or the time they obtain this versus. After uniting the owners of enjoyment shares 
with the owners of capital stock, the remaining shares of the transferee company are 
distributed to all shareholders (owners of enjoyment shares and owners of capital shares) 
on the basis of one replacement rate, without distinguishing between them. In order to 
illustrate this, the following example is cited.
1009
 
 
If we assume that the transferee company receives the net assets of the transferor 
company and the shares of the transferor company are divided into two types of shares, 
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the first type would be capital stock, totalling 20,000 shares; and the second type would 
be enjoyment shares, totalling 20,000 shares. The nominal value of the transferor 
company’s shares is £100 and the actual value of the transferor company’s shares is 
£500. The transferee company issued 40,000 shares instead of the transferor company’s 
shares and the actual value of the transferee’s shares totals £50. The distribution of the 
shares of the acquirer to the shareholders of the merged company would be as follows.
1010
 
 
Firstly, the owners of capital stock in the transferor company must get a number 
of shares in the transferee company equivalent to the nominal value of the shares they 
owned in the transferor company in order to become owners of capital stock in the same 
status as the owners of enjoyment shares. This can then be distributed like the rest of the 
shares in the transferee company to all shareholders in the transferor company on the 
basis of one exchange rate without distinction between them.
1011
 This can help to 
determine the number of shares that the owners of capital stock can obtain versus the 
nominal value of their shares by the following equation:
1012
 
 
The number of shares of capital in the transferor company = 2,000 share capital 
The nominal value of the transferor company’s shares = £10 pounds per share 
The actual value of the merged company’s shares = £50 per share 
The number of enjoyment shares of the transferor company = 2,000 enjoyment shares  
 
The actual value of the transferee company’s shares = £5 per share 
The number of new shares issued by the transferee company = 40,000 new shares 
 
The net assets of the transferor company shall be = the actual value of the shares × the 
number of shares = £50 × 40,000 shares = £2,000,000 
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Furthermore, the nominal value of the shares of the owners of capital in the 
transferor company = the number of shares of capital × the nominal value of the shares = 
2,000 shares × £10 = £20,000 pounds. Then, the owners of the capital stock in the 
transferor company get a number of shares in the transferee company equivalent to the 
nominal value of the shares they owned in the transferor company = the nominal value of 
their shares ÷ the actual value of the transferee company’s shares = 20,000 ÷ £5 = 4,000 
shares in the transferee company. 
 
If the number of shares of capital in the transferor company is 2,000, this means 
that the owner of each share capital in the transferor company would receive two shares 
in the transferee company; in other words, each share capital in the transferor company 
corresponds with two shares in the transferee company. The remaining shareholders in 
the transferee company following the owners of capital stock instead get the nominal 
value of the shares they owned in the transferor company = 40,000 - 4,000 = 36,000 
shares in the transferee company.
1013
 
 
After the owners of capital stock receive a number of shares in the transferee 
company equivalent to the nominal value of the shares they owned in the transferor 
company, the owners of capital shares become in the same position as the owners of 
enjoyment shares. The remaining shares of the merging company are then distributed 
amongst all the shareholders in the merged company, i.e. the owners of capital stock and 
the owners of enjoyment shares, on the basis of one exchange rate, without distinction 
between them. This is highlighted as follows. 
 
The remaining shares of the transferee company ÷ all the transferor company’s 
shares = 36,000 shares in the transferee company ÷ 4,000 shares in the transferor 
company shares = 9 shares. 
 
Therefore, each shareholder with one share (capital shares or enjoyment shares) in 
the transferor company receives nine shares in the transferee company. 
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To sum up, the share of the owners of capital stock is equal to 4,000 + 18,000 = 
22,000 shares in the transferee company. The share of the shareholders or owners of 
enjoyment shares equals 18,000 shares in the transferee company. This means that each 
share of capital stock is offset by 11 transferee company shares, with all shares of 
enjoyment shares offset by approximately 9 shares in the transferee company.
1014
 
 
It is noted that these problems do not arise in the cases of acquisition as the 
acquiring company acquires all or most of the shares of the acquired company by cash; 
thus the problem of exchanging shares between companies does not appear in acquisition 
cases. More importantly, the researcher believes that the reason for the emergence of 
such matters is mainly due to the lack of clarity of the texts of UAE and Qatar Companies 
Laws relating to shares trading. It is also due to the lack of rights of companies to issue 
different types of shares, as well as the transferee company not being allowed to buy 
shares from the transferor company by cash. All of these issues lead to the accumulation 
of problems during the process of exchanging shares between companies involved in 
mergers. Such problems can be treated through reconsidering the texts of the laws and 
modifying them through taking advantage of the provisions of UK laws. 
 
5.5.5.3 Distribution of Ordinary and Preference Shares 
The fact that the capital of a joint stock company is divided into equal shares in terms of 
its nominal value,
1015
 whereby the basic principle is that shares equal in nominal values 
entitle their owners to equal rights, namely rights in profits, attending General Assembly 
meetings, voting and the right to a share of the assets of the company after liquidation. 
However, the equality rule between shareholders does not relate to public order.
1016
 
Accordingly, the company system may provide for the contrary - both during the 
establishment of the company or in the course of its life. During a company’s life, some 
companies systems may include text that allows exclusions to the rule of equality 
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between shareholders through the issue of preference shares.
1017
 It is usual for some 
company systems to provide for the establishment of preference shares that entitle their 
owners to various advantages not enjoyed by the holders of ordinary shares. Notably, this 
occurs when the company needs new funds and decides to increase its capital by issuing 
preference shares in order to encourage the public to subscribe in new shares.
1018
 The 
company may also resort to the issuance of preference shares when it seeks to convert 
bondholders to shareholders and to replace their bonds with shares, or to otherwise offer 
them special advantages until they accept the transition to shareholders and thus get rid of 
the payment of the company debts.
1019
 
 
From the aforementioned, it can be said that ordinary shares are shares that do not 
entitle their holders to any rights of any special nature and the rights of the owners of 
such shares are ranked after the rights of the owners of preference shares.
1020
 In contrast, 
preference shares give their owners priority or preference: the owners of such shares 
enjoy (whilst shareholders by ordinary shares do not) various advantages, which might be 
priority in getting profits, priority in sharing of the company assets upon liquidation or 
more votes in the General Assembly of the company.
1021
 
 
Concerning the permissible issuance of preference shares, UAE legislators believe 
that preference shares that have multiple votes may allow the minority shareholders who 
own the majority of votes to control the fate of the company and impose their hegemony 
on the majority of the shareholders. For this reason, UAE Companies Law prohibits 
companies from issuing preference shares.
1022
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Qatari legislators have remained silent regarding the issuance of such shares, 
neither permitting nor preventing it, which leads to confusion amongst the Arabic 
jurisprudence about the permissible extent of increasing a company’s capital in 
preference shares according to the current texts of the relevant law. Younis (1991)
1023
 and 
Salym (2001)
1024
 say that a company can only amend its statute by adding provisions to 
increase the capital of the company by preference shares if all old shareholders approve. 
Nevertheless, Abd Al-Rahim (1975),
1025
 Radwan (1978)
1026
 and Sarkhou (1982)
1027
 
believe that, according to the Qatar Companies law, it is permissible for a company to 
amend its statute by the decision of the Extraordinary General Assembly and then to issue 
preference shares. The proponents of this argument base this opinion on Articles 188 and 
189 of Qatar Companies law, which gives the Extraordinary General Assembly the right 
to increase some shareholder rights and obligations or decrease them. Accordingly, the 
researcher believes that the opinion that a company can issue preference shares by a 
decision from its Extraordinary General Assembly is the right view. This is owing to the 
fact that, the issuance of preference shares does not result in an increase in the old 
shareholders’ obligations, as they will retain the same rights they enjoyed prior to the 
issuance of preference shares. The only occurrence that will happen in this case is that the 
preference shares will give their owners some privileges. Furthermore, in the case of 
issue preference shares there is the opportunity for the old shareholders of the company to 
accept or refuse the issuance of preference shares during an Extraordinary General 
Assembly meeting. 
 
Given the ambiguity of UAE and Qatar legal texts in identifying the extent of 
allowing the issuance of preference shares, the question raised is how the transferee 
company’s shares are divided amongst the transferor company’s shareholders if the 
transferee company’s shares consist of ordinary shares while the transferor company has 
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ordinary and preference shares. In other words, what is the fate of the preference shares 
of the transferor company if the transferee company only has ordinary shares? 
 
According to the theory of the legal personality of a company and UAE and Qatar 
laws, the transferor company’s shareholders obtain shares in the transferee company 
instead of their shares in the transferor company that expired due to the merger. However, 
the picture concerning ordinary and preference shares of companies involved in a merger 
remains incomplete and unclear in the current texts of UAE and Qatar Companies Laws. 
Ahmed M Mehrez (1985),
1028
 Hussein Al-Masri (1986)
1029
 and others
1030
 argue that, 
according to UAE and Qatar laws, if the statute of the transferee company does not 
authorise the issuance of preference shares, the company can amend its statute by adding 
rules to allow the issuance of preference shares by a decision of the Extraordinary 
General Assembly of the company. However, the Extraordinary General Assembly of the 
company may refuse to amend the statute of the company to issue preference shares, 
which again leads to the question about the fate of preference shares in the transferor 
company. 
 
Amir Siddiqi (1998)
1031
 believes that the treatment of this problem is the 
responsibility of the transferor company: if the rule does not authorise forcing the 
shareholder to give up their shares, the shareholder is then not compelled to sell their 
shares to the company. However, the bypassing of this rule is permitted if the statute of 
the transferor company allows it to recapture preference shares.
1032
 If the company 
decides to use its right to preference share recovery, this gives the owners of the 
recovered shares the market value of such shares, plus any dividends payable, and then 
the owners of the refunded shares exit from the company.
1033
In such a situation, the 
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company is required to declare its desire to recover the preference shares and the 
company’s announcement usually draws the attention of the owners of preference shares 
to their right to convert their shares into ordinary shares, thereby giving them the 
opportunity to convert such shares.
1034
 
 
Al-Melhem Ahmed (2000)
1035
adds that the statute of the company often provides 
the owners of preference shares with the right to convert their shares into ordinary shares. 
This conversion provides an option for the owners of preference shares that they can use 
or ignore. This right corresponds with the company’s right to recover preferred shares, 
where custom indicates the existence of these two rights side by side in the statute of the 
company.
1036
Accordingly, if the transferor company utilises its right to recover 
preference shares, the campaign of preference shares similarly adopts their right to 
convert their shares into ordinary shares, whereupon all shareholders of the transferor 
company become shareholders by ordinary shares.
1037
 
 
However, if the transferor company’s statute does not authorise the company to 
recover preference shares and does not give the owners of preference shares the right to 
convert their shares into ordinary shares, the transferor company must then obtain 
approval from the owners of preference shares to accept ordinary shares in the transferee 
company. If the transferor company does not get the approval of preference shareholders, 
the merger process fails. Nevertheless, if the transferee company obtained the approval of 
the owners of preference shares, they must then receive ordinary shares in the transferee 
company equivalent to the actual value of their preference shares in the transferor 
company. 
 
However, if the transferor company’s statute does not authorise the company to 
recover preference shares and does not give the owners of preference shares the right to 
convert their shares into ordinary shares, the merger process fails. Nevertheless, if the 
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transferee company obtained the approval of the owners of preference shares, they must 
then receive ordinary shares in the transferee company equivalent to the actual value of 
their preference shares in the transferor company.
1038
 
 
In order to provide more clarity surrounding how a transferee company can 
distribute its shares amongst the shareholders of the transferor company in the case of 
multiple share classes, the following example is provided.
1039
 
 
Let us assume that transferee company A has issued a total of 100,000 shares 
versus the net assets of transferor company B, which was valued at an estimated £2 
million. The capital of company B is divided into two types of shares: ordinary shares 
totalling 200,000 shares (the actual value per share is £7) and preference shares 
numbering 60,000 shares (the actual value per share is £10). 
 
The distribution of the shares of the transferee company would be as follows: 
The actual value of ordinary shares = 200,000 shares × £7 = £1,400,000 pounds  
The actual value of the preferred shares = 60,000 × 10 = £600,000  
 
The new shares will be distributed by 1,400,000 to owners of ordinary shares to 600, 00 
for owners of preference shares, at the rate: 7:3 
 
Thus, the allocation for owners of ordinary shares is 0.7 from the shares of the transferee 
company, which would be their share 100,000 × 0.7 = 70,000 shares in the transferee 
company. 
 
The owners of preferred shares are allocated 0.3 from transferee company shares, with 
their share then being = 100,000 × 0.3 = 30,000 shares in the transferee company. 
 
                                                 
1038
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Thus, every 20 ordinary shares in transferor company B is equivalent to 7 shares in 
transferee company A. Moreover, every two preference shares in transferor company B 
are equivalent to one share in transferee company A.
1040
 
 
From the above, we can conclude that when the capital of the transferor company 
is divided into ordinary and preference shares, the rule requires the retention of 
shareholders’ rights as conferred to them by their old shares before the merger.1041 The 
consequence is that it is necessary for the owners of preference shares in the transferor 
company to get preference shares in the transferee company.
1042
 However, if the statute 
of the transferee company does not authorise the issuance of preference shares or its 
Extraordinary General Assembly does not agree concerning the issuance of such shares, 
as is the case in the legal system of UAE and Qatar Companies Laws, then the owners of 
preference shares in the transferor company will receive ordinary shares in the transferee 
company, provided that the value of the new shares is equivalent to the actual value of 
the preference shares. 
 
Although such arguments provide solutions to the problem of exchanging shares 
when the transferor company’s shares consist of preference and ordinary shares while the 
transferee company only has ordinary shares, the researcher believes that such a solution 
does not match the objectives that companies seek to achieve from the issuance of 
preference shares, which involve encouraging the public to subscribe to new shares 
(preference shares) and taking advantage of the special features offered by preference 
shares in order to convert bondholders to shareholders, and thus pay off its debts. This 
method in the distribution of shares may also lead to a slower merger process and placing 
additional expenses on the companies involved due to delaying the proceedings. This 
distribution method may also force the owners of preference shares in the transferor 
company to accept ordinary shares in the transferee or new company, which may push 
some of them to object to the merger and exit from the company. Therefore, the 
researcher believes that the legislators of the UAE and Qatar should remedy and address 
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the lack of provision in the texts of their laws for the right for companies to issue 
preference shares side by side with ordinary shares. They should take advantage of the 
text in the UK Companies Act relating to classes of shares and provide similar texts, 
taking into account the peculiarity of the work of companies and shareholders in the 
region. 
 
5.6 Overcomethe Problems of Distribution of the shares of 
Companies Involved in M&As 
Through searching and comparing the texts of the laws of Qatar, the UAE and the UK, it 
can be concluded that there are some similarities between some of the texts, e.g. in 
consideration of the rights of shareholders regarding mergers, rights in profits, the right to 
attend meetings of General Assemblies, the right to vote on resolutions and the right to 
get new shares with profits in the transferee company. Notably, however, many of the 
texts of the aforementioned laws differ in the way they deal with other related topics, as 
well as in regard to certain rights and benefits that must be guaranteed by companies 
involved in mergers for their shareholders. Undoubtedly, shareholders are an integral part 
of the company entity. In this regard, a series of legislative and procedural measures must 
be undertaken in order to preserve shareholders’ rights in M&A cases, as described 
below. 
 
Firstly, in order to achieve the approval of shareholders on M&A decisions, 
articles 140 of the UAE and 140 of Qatar Companies Laws
1043
 (much like section 907 of 
the UK Companies Act and regulation 13 of the UK Cross-Border Act 2007) require 
approval by a majority in number, representing 75% of the shareholders. However, unlike 
UK legislation, UAE and Qatar laws require a double majority, representing a numerical 
majority of the shareholders attending the meeting and a majority in the value of the 
shares represented at the meeting. Not only that, but the texts of the laws of both 
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countries still remain unclear concerning the majority required for the issuance of 
decisions by the Extraordinary General Assembly of the company in second meetings in 
the case of the absence of a quorum at the first meeting. They also do not empower the 
court with the right to monitor and assess cases that do not require the presence of 
shareholders or their representatives to approve M&As, which leads to difficulties as 
decisions regarding M&As given to the control of the owners of the large shares on the 
decision-making, thereby leading to the failure of the merger operation in cases of non-
adherence to the minimum level required by the text. 
 
With the aforementioned taken into account, it would be preferable for Qatari and 
Emirati legislators to be more discerning with respect to the majority required for the 
issuance of decisions in the Extraordinary General Assembly of the company relating to 
approvals on merger decisions. Such a ratio must be taken by focusing on or considering 
the shares of shareholders represented at the meeting - not deliberation of the shares of 
the partners as a whole, as is the current situation - by modifying the current text of 
article 140 of UAE Companies Law, as well as article 140 of Qatar Companies Law. In 
addition, controls should be developed to regulate and ensure the approval of 
shareholders on merger decisions. There would be no problem in taking advantage of 
section 907 of the UK Companies Act and regulation 13 of the UK Cross-Border Merger 
Act
1044
 and providing similar text. 
 
Secondly, UAE and Qatar Companies Laws do not recognise the rights of 
shareholders opposed to the idea of the merger to exit from the company and recover the 
value of their shares. Accordingly, when two companies agree on a merger and this 
agreement is adopted by the competent authority specified by law, the merger decision is 
applied without the need to achieve the approval of shareholders who may oppose the 
merger project, which is inconsistent with the rights of shareholders to exercise their 
rights and authorities guaranteed by law. To solve such matters, shareholders who do not 
wish the merger or to remain in the transferee company should be able to withdraw from 
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the company by selling their shares on the stock exchange securities, as long as there is 
no provision in the law or the statute of the company restricting the trading of such 
stocks. This accordingly ensures the principle of equity trading for shareholders who do 
not seek to achieve a merger and wish to exit from the company at a time that suits them, 
which simultaneously leads to the entry of new shareholders without prejudice 
concerning the capital of the company. In order to avoid such problems, Qatari and 
Emirati legislators should also add text to the texts relating to the concept of mergers in a 
form that allows shareholders who are unwilling to enter into a merger to exit from the 
company. Notably, there would be no problem in taking guidance and benefit from 
Article 135 of Egyptian Companies Law,
1045
 which provides for this right that by saying 
“shareholders who object to the merger or acquisition decision in the General Assembly 
or who did not attend the meeting by an acceptable excuse can request exit from the 
company and recover the value of their shares, and that in a written request up to the 
company within twenty days from the date of publicity or published merger or 
acquisition decision, and the value of shares will be estimated by agreement or Judiciary, 
taking into account the current value of all assets of the company”.1046 
 
Third, the UK Companies Act allows for companies to issue different types of 
shares that come with different conditions and rights. It is known that shares differ from 
company to company. Amongst these shares, there are ordinary shares, preference shares, 
shares in cash and shares in kind. Furthermore the UK Companies Act provides that a 
“merger is where one of the companies proposes to acquire all the assets and liabilities of 
the other in exchange for the issue of shares or other securities of that one to shareholders 
of the other, with or without any cash payment to shareholders”.1047 Accordingly, it must 
be recognised that, in accordance with the provisions of the UK CA, it is not likely that 
practical problems will arise with regard to the issue of replacement shares between the 
shareholders of the transferor and transferee companies because each shareholder of the 
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transferor company will get shares in the transferee company, each in proportion to the 
type the shareholder owned in the transferor company, or an amount of money. 
 
Unlike UK legislation, UAE and Qatar laws do not allow for companies to issue 
different types of shares. Assuming equal actual values of the shares of companies 
involved in the merger is an unrealistic assumption, as the actual values of shares of 
companies often differ, even in regard to their nominal value. This difference appears 
clearly in the case of the shares of the transferor company that includes decimal fractions 
whilst the transferee company’s shares do not include these. In such cases (according to 
UAE and Qatar Companies Laws), the share is part of the parts of equal value of the 
company’s capital and is indivisible.1048 Also, unlike UK Companies Act, the laws in 
both countries do not give the shareholders of the transferee company the right to buy 
shares from the transferor company shares by cash. Notably, this leads to issues when a 
transferee company divides its shares in regard to the shareholders of the transferor 
company. This problem can be overcome through selecting the most appropriate number 
from the shares of the transferee company, which should be equivalent in terms of the 
true value number (i.e. a number without decimal fraction) to the shares of the transferor 
company. Otherwise, the most appropriate number should be selected from the shares of 
the transferor company, which can be rounded to an integer (provided that the rate of 
fractional shares is rounded in the smallest way possible), with compensation for 
shareholders who have been affected by the rounding of fractional shares. They should be 
paid by a sum of money corresponding to the value of the fractional shares that has been 
waived or could not be approximated. In addition, the legislators of UAE and Qatar 
should add text to the Companies Laws of the two countries to allow the transferee 
company to pay in cash to the transferor company shareholders in return for their shares 
that cannot be rounded to an integer. This can be achieved by taking advantage of 
sections 902 and 905 of the UK CA and regulation 2 of the UK Cross-Border Merger Act 
by providing similar text.
1049
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In addition, it is well known that company shares are divided in terms of the type 
of quota offered by the shareholder into shares in cash, whose shareholders only have to 
fulfil one-quarter of the nominal value of the shares (i.e. 25% of these shares), and 
material shares, whose value must be fulfilled in full. In this regard, if the shares of the 
transferor company consist of shares in cash not fully paid their values and material 
shares fully paid their values, whilst the shares of the transferee company consist of 
shares in cash and material shares fully paid their values, the problem arising here is how 
the transferee company can distribute its shares to the shareholders of the transferor 
company.
1050
 Qatar and UAE laws do not govern this case; therefore, in order to solve 
these matters, the researcher believes that the transferor company must request that 
shareholders whose shares are not fully paid their nominal value should accordingly pay 
the remainder from the nominal value before the merger. In the case that the shareholders 
delay or reject payment, the company may warn them to offer these shares for sale at 
auction or on the stock market if the shares are restricted in the market. Thus, all shares 
fulfil their nominal values, paid in full, which facilitates the distribution of the transferee 
company’s shares.1051 The transferee company continues to distribute its shares to all the 
transferor company’s shareholders evenly -each with the same percentage of shares as 
they held in the transferor company before the merger. Furthermore (and in order to 
resolve this matter on a permanent basis), there is nothing to prevent Qatari and Emirati 
legislators from adding text to the laws to organise the payment process for the value of 
cash shares that have not had their full value met by the shareholders, or to organise the 
sale of their shares by auction as soon as possible after the start of merger procedures. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
the capital of the shares of the transferor company”. Here it should be noted that, through the shares trading 
system—in addition to payment in cash—the exchange of shares without prejudice to the unity of the share 
will be facilitated, which provides a solution for the problem of fractional shares that may be faced with 
most mergers. Moreover, through the requirement of the payment in cash, provided that does not exceed 
the amount of 20% of the capital of the merged company - as researcher deems-is intended to avoid 
mistakes and bugs, commonly incurred by the lawmakers in Britain when failing to specify the percentage 
of the versus in cash which the shareholders of the merged companies can receive in addition to the shares 
they will receive in the merging or new company, where if payment in cash exceed 90%, the process 
becomes an acquisition and not a merger. 
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Furthermore, UAE and Qatar laws do not allow for the company to issue 
preference shares. Accordingly, if a foreign company’s shares consist of preference and 
ordinary shares (the transferor company) and the company wishes to merge with a 
national company that only has ordinary shares (the transferee company), the matter is 
raised as to how the transferee company’s shares are distributed to the shareholders of the 
transferor company after restructuring the company resulting from the merger. To solve 
such problems, the researcher believes that responsibility for the procedural treatment of 
this problem must be with, or in the hands of, the transferor company. In this regard, if 
the general rule requires that it is not permissible to force the shareholder to abandon or 
sell his shares in the company, it may allow concession to this rule if the statute of the 
transferor company allows the company to recover preference shares. If the company 
decides to use its right to recover the shares, this means it would give the owners of the 
recovered shares the market value of these shares in addition to the profits, thus resulting 
in the exiting of the owners of the recovered shares from the company.
1052
 Accordingly, if 
the transferor company uses its right to recover preference shares, the owners of the 
preference shares may use their right to convert their shares into ordinary shares, and then 
all shareholders of the merged company become shareholders by ordinary shares.
1053
 
However, if the statute of the transferor firm does not allow for the company to recover 
preference shares and does not allow for the owners of preference shares to convert their 
shares into ordinary shares, it is incumbent upon the transferor company to get approval 
from the owners of preference shares to accept ordinary shares in the transferee company. 
Notably, whoever gives their consent must receive ordinary shares in the transferee 
company equivalent to the actual value of the preference shares. The researcher also finds 
that this procedural solution must be accompanied by another legal solution and add legal 
text to the heart of the Companies Laws of the two countries allowing companies to issue 
all types of shares like the UK Companies Act. This would avoid the problems that arise 
due to differences in the actual values of shares in the case of exchanging shares between 
companies involved in mergers. 
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Additionally, it is known that the shares of some companies are divided into 
capital shares and enjoyment shares, where enjoyment shares are shares consuming their 
nominal values: the owner recovers this value during the life of the company.
1054
 On the 
other hand, the owners of capital shares only recover their nominal values after the 
expiration and liquidation of the company. Here, it should be noted that shareholders who 
have consumed their shares do not experience any interruption in their relation with the 
company, but rather remain able to retain their capacities as shareholders and achieve the 
enjoyment of shares as opposed to the shares of capital consumed. However, this 
description does not give the shareholder the same rights as they enjoyed prior to the 
consumption of such shares. Therefore, a problem arises here concerning how the shares 
of the transferee company are distributed amongst the transferor company’s shareholders 
if its shares are divided into capital and enjoyment shares whilst the transferee company’s 
shares are only capital shares.  
 
UAE and Qatar laws do not provide answers to such problems, so the researcher 
believes (going with the opinion of jurists
1055
) that as long as the enjoyment shares have 
fewer rights than the rights of capital shares, logic requires that the value of enjoyment 
shares is less than the value of capital share. Therefore, it is not fair or logical that there 
should be equality between the owners of enjoyment shares and the owners of capital 
shares, although each of them gets the same shares in the transferee company. For this 
reason, the transferee company’s shares are distributed to the shareholders of the 
transferor company on the assumption that these shares represent funds from the 
liquidation of the company, and then every shareholder gets a share equivalent to their 
share in the output of the liquidation of the company.
1056
 The owners of enjoyment shares 
enjoy the same rights as owners of capital shares, except they recover the nominal value 
of their shares when the company goes into liquidation. This means that, upon company 
liquidation, the owners of capital shares recover the nominal value of their shares; after 
that, the remaining shares of the company are divided for all shareholders into capital or 
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enjoyment shares. The consequence of this is that the owners’ of capital shares must 
receive the number of shares in the transferee company equivalent to the nominal value 
of their shares that they owned in the transferor company. Accordingly, the owners of 
capital shares become in the same position as the owners of enjoyment shares, as every 
one of them recovers the nominal value that contributed to the capital of the transferor 
company. After the positions of the owners of enjoyment and capital shares become 
equal, the shares of the transferee company are then distributed for all shareholders, i.e. 
the owners of enjoyment shares and the owners of capital stock, on the basis of the 
exchange of one rate without distinction between them. 
 
5.7 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has discussed and classified the rights of shareholders in M&As. It has 
found that, according to the theory of the legal personality of a company, a merger in the 
legal sense is an operation that leads to a change in the equity of the shareholders of the 
transferor company, whereby each one will get shares in the transferee company (in line 
with the “share exchange ratio”) or a cash payment in return for their shares in the 
transferor company. Consequently, the transferor company’s shareholders enjoy the same 
rights as the transferee company’s shareholders, such as the rights to attend the General 
Assembly and to discuss, vote and appeal decisions issued by the General Assembly 
concerning the violation of the statute of the company or the provisions of law; rights in 
the profits; and the right to a share from the output of liquidation. 
 
The chapter has also highlighted how British legislature more clearly addresses 
share exchange problems, as it authorises companies to issue preference shares side by 
side with ordinary shares, gives three-quarters of the shareholders the right to vote on 
merger decisions and entrusts the competent court to make sure this is achieved, with an 
with an evaluation of cases that do not require the presence of shareholders during the 
voting on the merger decision. There is no doubt that the existence of such texts in British 
legislation facilitates the exchange of shares between the transferee and transferor 
company when the transferor company’s shares consist of preference shares and ordinary 
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shares while the transferee company only has ordinary shares. Furthermore, the 
identification of the percentage of the votes of the shareholders present that is necessary 
to approve the merger decision removes the fear of failing to reach a merger decision due 
to the control of the owners of large capital.  
 
Furthermore, according to the CA and the UK Cross-Border Act the consequences 
of merger is that; the transferor company is dissolved without going into liquidation, and 
on its dissolution transfers all its assets and liabilities to the transferee company. The 
consequences of that the transferor company shareholders obtain new shares or payment 
in cash in return for their shares that transferred to the transferee or new company. These 
texts solve the issue that arises due to differences between the nominal and actual values 
of the shares of the companies involved in the merger and facilitate the distribution of the 
transferee company’s shares to the shareholders of the transferor company in cases where 
the transferor company’s shares consist of fully paid-up shares and not fully paid shares. 
They also provide a solution to the problem of exchanging shares that include decimal 
fractions, which leads to the quick completion of the merger process, a reduction in costs 
and an improvement in its likelihood of success. However, UK CA and Cross-Border 
Merger Act do not specify the amount that the transferee company is allowed to pay 
instead of some shares in the transferor company, which may lead to the merger lose one 
of its properties and lead to confusion between a merger and an acquisition. This can be 
overcome by specifying the sum necessary to purchase the shares of the transferor 
company that cannot be cannot be replaced for any reason. 
 
The chapter also highlighted the differences between the texts of the UK CA and 
UAE and Qatar Companies Laws and developed solutions relating to the rights of 
shareholders in M&A cases. Accordingly, it was found that, unlike the UK CA, UAE and 
Qatar Companies Laws do not allow companies to issue preference shares. Importantly, 
unlike sections 902 and 905 of the UK CA and section 2 of the UK Cross-Border Merger 
Act, articles 274/4 and 275 of Qatar and articles 277/4 and 279 of UAE Companies Laws 
do not allow the transferee company to make payments in cash in return for some of the 
transferor company’s shares that cannot be replaced by new shares due to a difference in 
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the actual values of the shares between the two companies. This occurs when the 
transferor company’s shares are divided into preference and ordinary shares while the 
transferee company only has ordinary shares, when the transferor company’s shares 
consist of fully and not fully paid-up shares while the transferee company only has shares 
not fully paid, or otherwise when the transferor company’s shares include decimal 
fractions while the transferee company’s shares are devoid from fractional shares. 
 
Furthermore, for merger decisions, unlike section 907 of the UK CA and section 
13 of the UK Cross-Border Merger Act, articles 137 and 140 of UAE and article 140 of 
Qatar Companies Laws require approval from the majority of shareholders attending the 
meeting who own a majority of shares, which may lead to the failure of the merger 
process in cases where there is a lack of the quorum required by law. Furthermore, unlike 
sections 902 and 905 of CA and regulations 2 and 17 of the UK Cross-Border Act,
1057
 
Emirati and Qatari legislators have failed to govern the rights of partners who reject the 
idea of the merger project and have also not provided them with the right to exit from the 
company and recover the value of their shares. 
 
In order to resolve such problems, the researcher concluded that companies 
involved in a merger should develop plans and programmes to solve the problem of 
exchanging shares by compiling an accurate inventory and performing an assessment of 
the shares of the companies before making the merger decision. Then, the owners of 
shares that have not been fully paid their actual values should be given the opportunity to 
pay the full values or sell their shares at auction. Emirati and Qatari legislators should add 
legal text to the Companies Laws of the two countries to allow companies to issue 
preference shares, as well as allow the transferee company to pay in cash instead of some 
of the shares of the transferor company to avoid the issue that arises due to differences in 
the actual values of the shares of the two companies involved in the merger, just as in the 
UK Companies Act. Also, in order to resolve these problems, UAE and Qatar legislators 
should add legal text that allows or gives any shareholder unwilling to participate in the 
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merger 
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merger the right to exit from the transferor company and recover the value of their shares 
or to sell them by auction. In addition, Emirati and Qatari legislators should replace the 
current texts of the laws of the two countries with new texts focusing on the majority of 
shareholders present at the meeting, taking advantage of section 907 of the CA and 
regulation 17 of the UK Cross-Border Merger Act. 
 
It must be noted that this chapter focused on the rights of shareholders in mergers 
without acquisition, as trading shares between companies involved in acquisitions does 
not raise any legal problems, due to the acquired company’s shareholders receiving an 
amount in cash in return for their shares in the acquired company, which is transferred to 
the ownership of the shareholders of the acquiring company. Accordingly, the acquired 
company’s shareholders do not receive any shares entitling them to any rights in the 
acquiring company after giving up their rights for the benefit of cash. Therefore, in 
acquisition cases, there are no issues relating to share exchange between the acquired 
company’s shareholders and the acquiring company. Adding such texts to UAE and 
Qatar Companies Laws through taking advantage of the UK CA and Cross-Border 
Merger Act would solve the matter of the exchange of shares between transferor and 
transferee companies when there are differences between the nominal and actual values 
of the shares of the companies involved. It would also allow the minority shareholders 
who object to the merger decision to get out of the company and recover the values of 
their shares in cash, which leads to the quick completion of the merger process, a 
reduction in costs and an improvement in its likelihood of success. 
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CHPTER SIX: CONCLUSION AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
6.1 Conclusion 
 
This thesis examines how M&As affect employees, directors and shareholders, and the 
legal basis for transferring their rights and obligations between companies involved in 
such operations, according to the UK Companies Act, the TUPE Regulations and the 
Cross-Border Merger Act and UAE and Qatar Companies and Labour Laws. Given that 
the negative effects of M&As on employees, directors and shareholders commonly occur 
in both UK and UAE and Qatar corporations and the fact that UK legislation regulates 
such processes more clearly than the UAE and Qatar legislations, one of the important 
reasons for making this study a legal comparative study dealing with the rights and 
obligations of employees, directors and shareholders in M&As was to take some lessons 
from the results of the research and the UK legislation’s legal texts to improve the texts 
of the UAE and Qatar laws on this matter. 
 
Mergers and acquisitions are currently two of the most important ways for 
companies to expand their operations, increase profitability in the long run, benefit from 
economies of scale, reduce costs, reduce taxes, build ‘economic empires’ and protect 
themselves from bankruptcy. However, M&As between companies may aim to reduce 
costs by laying off employees or members of the Board of Directors, which may be 
inevitable in some M&As. The effects of M&As in terms of the rights and obligations of 
employees, directors and shareholders vary from entity to entity and also from country to 
country, depending on the structure of the deal, the type of M&A and the type of services 
provided by the enterprises involved in the merger or acquisition. Accordingly, some 
M&As have positive effects in terms of increased efficiency and reduced costs in an 
attempt to improve overall profitability, which intensify incentives to exert effort and 
thus achieve economic and employment growth.  
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On the other hand, there is growing evidence of employment losses (skilled and 
semi-skilled) post-merger that extend to the Boards of Directors and may include the 
wages, efficiency and psychological wellbeing of employees, which may create 
instability in target executive teams that ultimately lasts for many years following the 
acquisition. This may lead to feelings of confusion among the employees and the Board 
of Directors, which may encourage them to leave the organisation, causing the 
corporation to lose their expertise. Such effects may also lead to objections by directors 
who feel that they are going to lose their jobs so work to disrupt or delay M&A 
proceedings. This can be done by deliberate delaying signing a draft of the proposed 
terms of the merger scheme, by providing misleading information about the company’s 
financial situation and its profits, by disclosing the secrets of the company to another 
company, or by neglecting their duties or incite the employees to leave work or to object 
to the merger, which thus leads to negative impacts and contributes to the failure of the 
merger process. 
 
These problems are not limited to company employees or Boards of Directors; 
they also extend to shareholders, who are hampered by many procedural and legal 
obstacles and problems when exchanging shares between the transferor and transferee 
companies when there are differences between the class of shares and the actual value of 
shares of the transferor company and the actual value of the transferee company’s shares: 
if the shares of the transferor company consist of ordinary and preference shares while 
the shares of the transferee company consist only of ordinary shares, or if the shares of 
the transferor company are divided into fully and partly paid-up shares, while the shares 
of the transferee company are divided into shares paid their nominal values in full. 
 
In addition, according to the UAE and Qatar laws, the company capital is divided 
into equal shares is indivisible in the face of the company, which leads to issues relating 
to how the transferee company shares are distributed amongst the transferor company’s 
shareholders if the shares of the transferor company including shares with decimal 
fraction, while, the transferee company shares free from decimal fraction? Furthermore, 
as some merger or acquisition operations might not receive acceptance from the partners 
292 
 
or shareholders, the question accordingly arises concerning the extent of the rights of 
those partners or shareholders who do not support the suggestion of the merger or 
acquisition to exit from such operations and recover the value of their shares. The 
problems do not stop at this point but M&A problems may affect the profits of the 
shareholders of the companies involved 
 
Several factors help to explain post-merger employee layoffs, including: the 
restructuring of new companies resulting from M&As, pre-takeover poor performance of 
merging firms or a decline in product demand arising as a result of general business cycle 
conditions and technological or other industry-wide changes. Negative shareholder 
wealth effects could also be the result of managerial empire building or hubris: managers 
may engage in M&As in order to maximise their own utility at the expense of 
shareholders. Another possibility is that M&As are initiated by firms with overvalued 
equity. There is also difficulty in accurately measuring M&A returns and in timing 
information release, with bidders systematically overpaying for acquisitions. One cause 
of the direct and indirect factors that increase the negative effects of M&As on 
employees, directors and shareholders in UAE and Qatar companies is the lack of clear 
provisions in the laws of both countries in addressing and regulating M&As and their 
legal effects. 
 
Employees, directors and company capital are the three basic elements for the 
conduct of commercial ventures that companies are established to achieve. Therefore, if 
their rights and obligations in M&As are not resolved fairly, this can lead to a rise in 
layoffs, increased unemployment and depriving companies from staff experience and 
skills. Companies can thus incur extravagant expenses due to training new employees or 
due to a lack of sufficient knowledge of working conditions by the board of the new 
administration of the transferee or new company, who are appointed or elected after the 
merger. Furthermore, the negative effects of merger on the shareholders’ profits or their 
rights to sell shares and exit from the companies involved, or not putting in place 
appropriate solutions for the exchange of shares when the actual value of the transferor 
company’s shares differ from the actual value of the transferee company shares, may lead 
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to the opposition of shareholders, who see the lack of clarity regarding the results of the 
merger as enough reason to fear their rights after the operation. They may then withdraw 
their capital from the companies involved, which may lead to the failure of the merger or 
acquisition operation and dispel the capital of the companies, thereby undermining their 
service to society. 
 
The study intended to discover why and how such impacts could occur in the 
corporation systems of the UK, the UAE and Qatar. It determined the legal basis for 
transferring the rights and obligations of employees, directors and shareholders between 
companies involved in M&As. The results of the study, UK legislative texts and judicial 
judgements were then used to improve and develop the UAE and Qatar legislations. 
 
To achieve these objectives, the study had to examine the topic from varying 
aspects through an analytical comparative study between the texts of the UK Companies 
Act, the Cross-Border Merger Act and the TUPE Regulations with the UAE and Qatar 
Companies and Labour Laws according to two theories: the personal nature theory and 
the theory of the legal personality of a company.
1058
 The study reached the conclusion 
that the legal basis for transferring these rights and obligations is due to the legal 
personalities of the companies involved in M&As. Accordingly, a merger leads to 
dissolve the transferor company and the demise of its moral personality, as well as an 
increase in the capital of the transferee company in the share of all kinds of assets of the 
transferor company, without going into liquidation.
1059
 Furthermore, M&As affect the 
Memorandum of Association of the transferor company in order to secure the entry of the 
transferor company’s partners or shareholders. Accordingly, the transferee company not 
only receives the assets of the transferor company but also receives the venture that the 
company sought to achieve.
1060
 Also, it receives all of the rights of the company in the 
                                                 
1058
 For an explanation of this theory, see Section 2.3 of Chapter Two of this thesis. 
1059
 For more information, see regulation 2 of the Cross-Border Merger Act 2007. 
1060
 For more information, see regulation 2 of the Cross-Border Merger Act 2007, which provides that "The 
consequences of a cross-border merger are that— the assets and liabilities of the transferor companies are 
transferred to the transferee company". 
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form of a sum of money covered, including the positive
1061
 and negative elements.
1062
 
The result of this is that the transferee company replaces the transferor company in terms 
of its rights and obligations. 
 
Consequently, in the case of mergers, the transferor company’s shareholders 
obtain new shares in the transferee company in return for their shares that expired due to 
the merger. Furthermore, during M&As, it may be useful for the employees and directors 
who were running and managing the ventures of the transferor company before the 
merger or acquisition to continue managing and running the ventures that the transferor 
company was established to achieve, which transferred to the transferee or new company 
by the merger or acquisition, so as to ensure that the large ventures of companies 
involved in M&As do not lose the experience of the staff and Board of Directors. 
Moreover, to ensure the success of M&As, it is essential to keep employee and director 
turnover low after M&As, as there can be large financial implications from the cost of 
hiring new employees, the loss of knowledge and the loss of client relationships. 
Therefore, organisations must proactively work to maintain or regain employees and 
directors through taking tangible steps to effectively reduce turnover during a merger or 
acquisition. 
 
The theory of the legal personality of a company is the theory that the researcher 
believes and supports as the legal basis for transferring rights and obligations from the 
transferor to the transferee company. On this basis, M&A processes only occur between 
existing companies enjoying legal personalities. Also, the personal nature theory gives 
rise to the idea that the relationship between a company’s owners and its employees and 
directors is stronger than the relationship between employees and directors with the 
company. Furthermore, the concept that the shareholders own everything in companies is 
                                                 
1061
 For the meaning of ‘positive elements’, see the footnote in Section 2.3: Theory of the Legal Personality 
of the Company in Chapter Two of this thesis. 
1062
 For the meaning of ‘negative elements’, see the footnote in Section 2.3: Theory of the Legal Personality 
of the Company in Chapter Two of this thesis. 
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old idea and not present in the legislations of the UK, the UAE and Qatar,
1063
 which 
currently aim to appreciate and uphold the social and community interest aspects and 
depend on the legal personality of the company in the interpretation of the legal 
relationship between a company and its employees and directors. Accordingly, 
employees and directors have a relationship with the organisation itself, irrespective of 
who their employer is. This recognition is what has led the Companies,
1064
 TUPE
1065
 and 
Cross-Border Merger
1066
 Acts of the UK, in addition to the UAE and Qatar 
Companies
1067
 and Labour Laws,
1068
 to provide for the automatic transfer of employees’ 
rights and obligations from the old employer to the new employer, and the automatic 
transfer of shareholders’ rights from the transferor company to the transferee company in 
a merger. Wherefore, the modern companies and labour laws of the UK, the UAE and 
Qatar have abandoned the personal nature theory on the basis that companies fare 
economic venture with a view to appreciate and uphold social and community interest 
aspects, shareholders and all other stakeholders of the company. Therefore, their 
existence should be maintained and encouraged.
1069 
 
The study also found that merger is a partnership contract that occurs by the 
acceptance of the shareholders of both the companies. Accordingly, the transferor 
company’s shareholders obtain new shares in the transferee or new company in return for 
their shares in the transferor company that expired as a result of the merger. By contrast, 
an acquisition is a sale contract, so the acquired company’s shareholders obtain cash in 
return for their shares; thus cutting off the legal relationship between the acquired 
company and its shareholders. It was also concluded that M&As should not impact the 
rights and liabilities of the owners of individual and collective employment contracts; it 
                                                 
1063
 See section 904 of the UK Companies Act 2006, regulations 2 and 17/ 2 of the Cross-Border Merger 
Act 2007, regulations 4 and 5 of TUPE Act and articles 280 of UAE and 277 of Qatar Companies Laws 
with articles 126 of the UAE and 52 of Qatar Labour Laws. 
1064
 Sections 904, 902 and 905 of the UK Companies Act. 
1065
 Paragraphs 4, 5 and 7 of the UK TUPE 2006. 
1066
 For more information, see regulation 17/ 2 of the UK Cross-Border Merger Act 2007. 
1067
 Articles 280 of UAE and 277 of Qatar Companies Laws. 
1068
 Articles 126 of UAE and 52 of Qatar Labour Laws. 
1069
 This concept for companies confirmed by regulation 17/ 1/ b of the UK TUPE Act and articles 126 and 
52 of Qatar labour laws which provide for “The consequences of merger are that— the rights and 
obligations arising from the contracts of employment of the transferor companies are transferred to the 
transferee company”. 
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was pointed out that the workers’ rights that are transferred are not limited to 
employment contracts but also include all the rights and obligations that they enjoyed in 
the transferor company before the merger or acquisition. 
 
The study analysed the relationship between a company and its directors 
according to agency theory and institution theory; the researcher concluded that the 
relationship between any company and its Board of Directors is an agency relationship 
from a special type of agency contract. Accordingly, a director is not an agent for the 
company or its partners but is a member of its legal entity, speaks in its name and 
expresses its will, and their legal actions are binding on the company. Accordingly, the 
rules of agency theory govern the internal links between partners on one hand and 
between managers on the other hand. However, in the face of others, the directors are 
legal deputies of the company. Furthermore, the study concluded that, according to the 
theory of the legal personality of a company, a merger in the legal sense is an operation 
that leads to a change in the equity of the shareholders of the transferor company, 
whereby each one will get shares in the transferee company (in line with the “share 
exchange ratio”) or a cash payment in return for their shares in the transferor company. 
Consequently, the transferor company’s shareholders enjoy the same rights as the 
transferee company’s shareholders, such as rights in profits; the right to a share from the 
output of company liquidation; and the rights to attend the General Assembly meeting, 
vote and appeal decisions issued by the General Assembly concerning violations of the 
statute of the company or the provisions of law. 
 
The study also concluded that although UAE and Qatar laws (like UK legislation) 
regulate mergers, uphold the theory of the legal personality of a company as the legal 
basis for transferring rights and obligations between companies involved in mergers and 
provide for the transfer of the rights and obligations of employees and shareholders from 
the transferor company to the transferee or new company, through comparing UK, UAE 
and Qatar legal texts of laws related to M&As, it was found that there are many 
fundamental differences between the texts of the laws of these countries in terms of 
regulating M&As and the treatment of their effects on the rights and obligations of 
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employees, directors and shareholders of companies involved in such operations. This 
may contribute to increase the negative effects of M&As on the rights of employees, 
directors and shareholders of the companies involved; therefore, the study proposes a set 
of procedural and legal recommendations and solutions. More detailed findings with 
recommendations are summarised in the following sections: 
 
6.1.1 Address the Legal Concepts of M&As in the UAE and Qatar Laws 
 
Unlike UK legislation, UAE and Qatar laws do not regulate the concepts of acquisitions 
and cross-border mergers. The laws also do not specify the competent court for the 
approval of pre-merger requirements, which leads to confusion regarding the concepts of 
the two terms and their effects from a legal aspect, and the legal basis for transferring 
rights and obligations between companies involved in M&As. In order to remove this 
ambiguity, there is a need to rewrite the UAE and Qatar laws relating to regulate the 
provisions of domestic and cross-border M&As, as well as the rights of employees, 
directors and shareholders in M&As, commensurate with the importance of these 
operations. 
 
The existence of clear legal provisions regulating M&As and the rights and 
obligations of employees, directors and shareholders in such operations would make it 
easier to understand and implement the provisions of the laws as the need arises, reduce 
the negative effects of M&As, create confidence in the hearts of investors and owners of 
capital in companies and encourage companies to enter into such operations. Wherever 
there are clear legal texts preserving the rights of companies and clients, this improves 
the likelihood of success of M&As, creating a favourable environment for M&As 
between companies in the region. This leads to increased investment and national 
companies taking advantage of the skills and reputations of foreign companies, as well as 
diversifying and increasing their production. Political stability in the present day depends 
on economic stability, and economic stability is dependent on the existence of a 
favourable environment and proper legal basis that regulates the transactions and 
preserves the rights and obligations of the parties involved in such transactions. It is 
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therefore important to rewrite the texts of the UAE and Qatar laws relating to M&As, 
reformulating them in line with the importance of M&As. 
 
Unlike, article 904 of the UK CA and article 2/3 of the Cross-Border Merger Act, 
articles 276 of UAE and 272 of Qatar Companies Laws allow all companies to enter into 
merger operations, without distinction between companies that enjoy moral personalities 
and companies that do not have moral personalities. This therefore means that particular 
partnership companies can merge with public companies, which contravenes the texts of 
the laws and the theory of the legal personality of a company, which requires M&As to 
be between existing companies enjoying legal personalities. The texts of the articles in 
UAE and Qatar Companies Laws also deprive companies involved in M&As from taking 
benefit from the advantages of a merger, e.g. the exemption of the companies involved 
from all taxes and fees deserved due to the merger, which can be obtained by M&As 
between public shareholding companies. Accordingly, the legislators in the UAE and 
Qatar should determine the types of companies that can enter into M&A operations and 
amend article 272 of Qatar Companies Law and article 276 of UAE Companies Law. 
This should be done by focusing on existing companies that have a legal personality and 
taking advantage of the UK Companies Act and provide for the similar text of section 
904 of the UK CA 2006, stipulating that “except particular partnership companies, even 
companies in the process of liquidation, a merger takes place between two or more 
shareholding companies, or between a shareholding company and a joint company, or a 
limited partnership company, equities partnership company or limited liability company, 
to form a shareholding company”. 
 
Adding such text to the provisions of Companies Laws enables companies to take 
advantage from the tax exemptions provided by the legislations for shareholding 
companies involved in M&As and avoids the entry of companies that do not enjoy legal 
personalities into such operations. Furthermore, it would even enable companies under 
liquidation to enter into M&As, on the basis that companies are economic entities created 
in the public and shareholders’ interest; they should therefore be maintained so they can 
continue to do their work.  
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6.1.2 Solutions to reduce the Negative Effects of M&As on Employee’s 
Rights 
Although employees’ contracts and other rights in M&As are important, unlike 
regulations 23, 29 and 38 of the UK Cross-Border  Merger Act and regulations 11and 13 
of the UK TUPE Act, UAE and Qatar Companies and Labour Laws do not give 
employees or their representatives the right to participate in M&A decisions, to be aware 
of M&As, to obtain information before the merger or acquisition proceedings start, or to 
participate in the selection of members of the Board of Directors of the transferee or new 
company resulting from the merger or acquisition. Furthermore, unlike regulation 11 of 
the UK Cross-Border Act, the UAE and Qatar legislations also do not provide the 
transferee company with the right to receive detailed data and information from the 
transferor company about the identity and age of an employee; disciplinary procedures 
taken against an employee; grievance procedures taken by an employee; certificates and 
courses that they received; or information about any collective agreement that will have 
effect after the transfer. Unlike regulation 13 of the UK TUPE Act, UAE and Qatar 
legislators do not regulate or require the transferor and transferee companies to negotiate 
with the affected employees due to a relevant transfer. The laws of both countries also do 
not enable the employer to consult with affected employees or their representatives long 
enough before a relevant transfer, nor do they require employees to be informed of the 
fact that a transfer is to take place, the date or proposed date of the transfer, the reasons 
for it and the legal, economic and social implications of the transfer for any affected 
employees. 
 
 Unlike regulations 4 and 5 of the UK TUPE Act, the laws of both countries also 
do not indicate the types of employment contract that can be transferred in transfers and 
undertakings, i.e. whether they refer to individual or collective employee contracts. 
Unlike regulation 33 of the UK Cross-Border Act, the UAE and Qatar Companies Laws 
do not give the employees of companies involved in M&As the right to elect the 
members of the special negotiating body in M&As; moreover, unlike regulation 36 of the 
UK Cross-Border Act, UAE and Qatar laws do not specify standard rules for employee 
participation. 
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Unlike regulation 7 of the UK TUPE Act, the UAE and Qatar legislations do not 
provide a solution for the dismissal of employees because of a relevant transfer, either 
before or after M&As. They also do not specify the legal status of workers in cases of 
bankruptcy of one of the companies involved in the merger or acquisition. Furthermore, 
unlike regulations 24 of the UK Cross-Border Merger Act and 12 and 15 of the TUPE 
Act, UAE and Qatar laws do not provide for the right of employees to file a grievance, 
present a complaint or seek appropriate compensation when a merging company has 
failed to provide information about a merger, or in the case that the information provided 
was false or incomplete in a manner particular to the employees or their representatives. 
Due to such legislative deficiencies and imbalances in the UAE and Qatar legislations, 
there is no doubt that they lead to increase the negative effects of M&As on employees 
and decrease confidence in their success. With this in mind, the researcher believes that 
such matters can be overcome by many solutions, as discussed in the following 
paragraphs. 
 
Articles 126 of UAE Labour Laws and article 52 of Qatar Labour Laws must be 
developed by Qatari and Emirati legislators, providing for the rights of individual 
employees to be automatically transferred with the business, in all terms and conditions 
of their work contract, in the cases of transferring an undertaking (M&As). In order to do 
this, UAE and Qatar legislators can take advantage of regulation 4 of the UK TUPE Act 
and provide similar texts. The development of such texts in UAE and Qatar Labour Laws 
would lead to remove ambiguity in the current texts and confirm the transfer of the rights 
and obligations of owners of individual contracts in M&As, where any such contract shall 
have the same effect after the transfer as when it was originally made between the person 
so employed and the transferee. 
 
UAE and Qatar legislators should regulate the right of the owners of collective 
contracts to maintain their employment contracts, transferring it from the transferor 
company to the transferee or new company in cases of M&As. They should also provide 
for the right of employees to select their representatives in M&A negotiation processes, 
the right to be consulted and informed about M&A procedures and the right to transfer 
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their contracts and all the rights resulting from them from the transferor company to the 
transferee company. In this regard, Qatari and Emirati legislators can take advantage of 
section 5 of the UK TUPE Act and provide similar texts, taking into account the working 
conditions in the region. The researcher believes that adding such text would remove the 
ambiguity concerning the interpretation of the texts of articles 126 of UAE and 52 of 
Qatar Labour Laws, as well as confirm the right of the owners of collective contracts to 
transfer their rights and obligations in M&As, just as the owners of individual contracts 
can. Adding text to the provisions of UAE and Qatar legislations would allow the rights 
of the owners of collective contracts to be transferred in transfers and undertakings, 
which is particularly important as most companies in GCC countries import their 
employees en masse through the guaranty system: the Services Office or company bring 
in a group of workers and then send them to work individually or by collective contracts. 
Providing such a provision would protect such workers, as they are the weaker party in 
the company.  
 
Qatari and Emirati legislators should enact legal provisions to require companies 
to inform their staff regarding the conducting of M&As, giving them the right to 
participate by themselves or through their representatives in the selection of a Board of 
Directors of the transferee or new company, as well as give employee representatives the 
right to obtain expert assistance in information, consultation and negotiation procedures 
relating to M&As involving multinational companies and domestic companies. This 
should be implemented while also allowing employees and their representatives to give 
their views on M&As. In this regard, Qatari and Emirati legislators can take advantage of 
section 29 of the UK Cross-Border Merger Act and section 15 of the UK TUPE Act, and 
provide similar texts. 
 
Qatari and Emirati legislators should also regulate the legal status of employees in 
the case of bankruptcy of one of the companies involved in the merger or acquisition, 
providing employees with the right to present a complaint to the Labour Court and the 
right to seek appropriate compensation when a merging company has failed to provide 
information about a merger, or in the case that the information provided was false or 
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incomplete in a manner particular to the employees or their representatives. In this 
regard, Qatari and Emirati legislators can take advantage of regulations 8, 12 and 15 of 
the UK TUPE Act and 24 of the UK Cross-Border Act and provide similar texts. The 
addition of such texts to the provisions of the laws of both countries would ensure that 
employees have the right to get correct information about the conditions of M&As and 
their results in an appropriate timeframe, with compensation when companies fail to 
correctly inform their employees. 
 
Both the old and the new employers must inform and consult the representatives 
of the ‘affected employees’. They must explain: why the transfer is taking place; when it 
will take place; what the legal, economic or social implications are; and what actions the 
employer might take in relation to the transfer. The employer must allow trade unions to 
access affected employees and provide accommodation for consultations. The laws 
should provide the right for employees and their representatives to present a complaint to 
an employment tribunal in cases where the employer has failed to consult with them. In 
this regard, the legislators of the UAE and Qatar can take advantage of regulations 13 and 
15 of the UK TUPE Act 2006. 
 
Organisations must effectively develop and implement an assistance programme 
for displaced employees. Such a programme should include advanced notification and 
employee consultation rights (their right to be informed within a reasonable time about 
the merger and how their rights and interests individually, as well as collectively, would 
be affected by it). 
 
There should be focus on the dissemination of legal awareness among employees 
of organisations, through holding training sessions for staff, and do lectures for them in 
the field of law, management and public relations. Moreover, there should be the 
facilitation of a meeting of the workers of the organisations involved in the merger or 
acquisition, either directly or through their representatives. This would help the 
employees to participate in the process of the merger or acquisition, make them aware of 
the working conditions of the new company and give them knowledge of the members of 
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the Board of Directors. It would also help to remove any fear or anxiety of the employees 
that accompanied them during the merger or acquisition period. 
 
Companies involved in M&As could resort to negotiation with their employees 
who cannot be accommodated as part of the merging company or who do not want to be 
allocated positions lower than their positions prior to the merger. Such compensation 
should be commensurate with the years of service that the employees had with the 
company and the services that they provided prior to the merger. Alternatively, the matter 
should be shown to the Arbitration Committee, with a commitment to its decision. This 
case requires that the transferor company was not exposed to bankruptcy. 
 
Companies seeking to undergo a merger or acquisition must make bold decisions 
and ensure the training of personnel where their working circumstances have changed, 
with such methods and modern techniques adopted so that they can either work in the 
new institution resulting from the merger or acquisition, or in another branch of the 
merging or acquiring company. 
 
The adoption of such legal and procedure solutions as mentioned above would 
eliminate the anxiety and create confidence and peace of mind for employees of 
companies involved in M&As, motivating them to work at the same level and pace as 
before the merger. In addition, it would help companies to avoid lawsuits that can be 
raise by employees who feel that the companies involved did not inform them or allow 
them to participate in the merger, or from employees who cannot be accommodated in 
the transferee or new company. Such solutions also enable the transferee or new company 
to take advantage of the experience and skills of its employees and the transferor 
company’s employees, as well as avoid the expense of training new workers. 
6.1.3 Overcome the Negative Effects of M&As on Directors’ Rights 
 
The negative effects of M&As are not limited to impacts on the rights and contracts of 
employees: they can also extend to the rights of directors. For this reason, chief 
executives often oppose a merger because they fear losing their jobs or transitioning to a 
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new role. Likewise, board members are sometimes reluctant to contemplate a merger 
because they feel loyal to the chief executive and the staff that have spent years building 
the organisation. In addition to corporate restructuring, the type of merger or acquisition 
and the differences between the corporate cultures involved, the differences in the legal 
texts of the UAE and Qatar companies laws (which set a limit on the number of members 
of Boards of Directors and do not develop solutions for the fate or legal status of surplus 
members in M&A cases) subsequently assist in the emergence of legal and practical 
problems during or after the end of M&As for the companies involved and their Boards 
of Directors, which may later lead to prevent the completion of the merger or acquisition, 
or have a negative impact on the results, due to objection to or wilfully impeding M&A 
procedures by some members of the Boards of Directors of the companies involved. If 
they feel that the process threatens their interests or their rights in action, they may do 
this through miscalculating the profits of the companies involved, hiding some important 
documents that may be in their possession or disclosing some secret important 
information related to the companies involved and its products to another company that 
may seek to attract them and benefit from their expertise and the information in their 
possession. To mitigate the negative effects of M&As on the Boards of Directors of the 
companies involved, the study has constructed many proposals, as discussed in the 
following paragraphs. 
 
There must be some coordination between the administrations of the two 
companies involved in the merger or acquisition, as well as communication concerning 
the introduction of the working conditions and the problems and disadvantages suffered 
by each company (if any), making an honest and early appraisal of the extent of the 
ability and potential of the transferee company to combine its management with the 
transferor company’s management. This would subsequently facilitate the merger or 
acquisition process and the transfer of financial contracts, debts and all rights and 
obligations between the companies. 
 
There should be an election of a new Board of Directors for the new 
administration of the transferee company from the Boards of Directors of the transferor 
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and transferee companies, with the participation of the shareholders and employees or the 
employees’ representatives1070 of the transferor and transferee companies. The new 
administration becomes the sole legal representative for the transferor and transferee 
companies with its shareholders and employees in all rights and obligations that have 
arisen or may arise before and after the merger or acquisition, and the claimant and 
respondent in all the rights and liabilities of the companies involved. “Every director of 
the transferee company, who has been elected, appointed or recommended by the 
employee representatives or the employees, shall be a full director with the same rights 
and obligations as the directors representing shareholders, including the right to vote”.1071 
 
There should be consideration given to members of the management of the 
transferor company, with broad powers to contribute to the completion of the merger and 
prepare them psychologically to accept work in the Board of Directors of the new 
company, or in a new position in sub-departments of the parent company or its 
subsidiaries if not elected as a member of the Board of Directors of the transferee or new 
company. This can be achieved through activating the sub-departments in the parent 
company of the transferee company and the development of new positions commensurate 
with the size and scope of the work of the transferee or new company after the merger or 
acquisition. This also can be achieved by: intensifying meetings and communication 
between the members of the Boards of Directors, the shareholders and the workers or 
their representatives of the companies involved in the merger or acquisition; the 
exchanging of opinions; and the reviewing of the proposals that lead to the election of a 
new administration, taking advantage of other members and their experience in line with 
the transferee or new company’s needs. Moreover, directors should be informed of the 
benefits, such as salaries, vacations and other incentives, to which they are entitled as a 
result of continuing to work for the company resulting from the merger or acquisition, 
whether remaining in their past positions or in lower positions, as long as it does not 
affect their financial rights and moral status.  
 
                                                 
1070
 In this regard, see paragraphs 22, 29, 30, 33, 38 and 39 of the UK Cross-Border Merger Act 2007. 
1071
 Paragraph 83/ 4 of the UK Cross-Border Merger Act 2007. 
306 
 
In this regard, Emirati and Qatari legislators should remedy and change article 95 
of UAE Companies Law and article 94 of Qatar Companies Law, putting a minimum but 
no maximum on the number of members of Boards of Directors of shareholding 
companies. In this regard, Emirati and Qatari legislators can take advantage of section 
154 of the UK Companies Act 2006, which provides that “a public company must have at 
least two directors”, and provide similar texts. Amending the provisions of the UAE and 
Qatar Companies Laws relating to the number of members of the Board of Directors of 
shareholding companies through putting a minimum without a maximum to the number 
would make it easy for the transferee company to increase the number of its Border of 
Directors and accommodate its directors and the transferor company’s directors; this 
would also help the transferee company to form a new administration from its directors 
and the directors of the transferor company by election-based appointment, enabling the 
transferee company to keep the administrative crew of the two companies and take 
advantage of their skills and experience. 
 
The Emirati and Qatari legislators should address the rights of members of Boards 
of Directors of companies involved in M&As, providing them with the right to participate 
in M&A negotiation processes and the right to provide their opinions and proposals with 
effective contribution to the success of such operations. This could include: drawing up 
and adopting a draft of the proposed terms of the merger; explaining the effect of the 
merger for the members, employees of the companies involved; negotiating with the 
employees who wish to leave the company to find alternatives; preparing plans and 
programmes for corporate work during and after the operation; and providing 
visualisations of the problems that could be faced in the work of the companies during or 
after the merger or acquisition and providing relevant solutions. Furthermore, the 
directors of the merging companies should adopt a draft of the proposed terms of the 
merger scheme and deliver a copy to the registrar, informing the workers about the 
merger and its stages and listening to their concerns and suggestions can help contribute 
to the success of the process and the speed of its completion. In this regard, the Emeriti 
and Qatari legislators can take advantage of sections 905 and 906
1072
 of the UK 
                                                 
1072
 For more information, see sections 8, 905 and 906 of the UK Companies Act 2006. 
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Companies Act 2006 and regulations 7 and 8
1073
 of the UK Cross-Border Merger Act 
2007 and provide similar legal texts.  
 
Legislators in the UAE and Qatar could also add text to the laws under study to 
allow the transferee company to increase the number of members of its Board of 
Directors or to elect a new Board of Directors from its directors and the transferor 
company’s directors, in order to meet the transferee company’s needs, expand its 
activities and increase its number of shareholders and employees after the merger or 
acquisition. This should include the caveat that the increase is made within a reasonable 
limit according to the transferee or new company’s needs. Providing for an increase in 
the number of directors of the transferee company by a limited number in M&As would 
help the transferee company to accommodate the administration and management of the 
transferor company without any legal problems or obstacles and allow them to take 
advantage of the skills and experience of the members of the Boards of Directors of the 
two companies. 
 
In cases where the transferee company is unable to accommodate its directors and 
the transferor company’s directors due to losses in the profits of one of the two 
companies or lower production and sales of the transferee or new company after the 
merger, the researcher believes that the companies involved can negotiate on the 
appropriate compensation acceptable to both the transferee company and the members of 
the Boards of Directors who cannot be accommodated as members of the Board of 
Directors of the transferee company or who do not want to stay in positions lower than 
their former positions. Such a solution prevents companies involved in M&As from 
accommodating a greater number of board members than they need to, while at the same 
time protecting the rights of the members of Boards of Directors through providing them 
with fair compensation in return for their service in the company before the merger or 
acquisition. 
                                                 
1073
 Paragraphs 7, 8 and 12 of the UK Cross-Border Merger Act 2007. 
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6.1.4 Solve the Matters of the Distribution of Shares between 
Companies involved in the Merger 
 
The UK Companies Act, the UK Cross-Border Merger Act and UAE and Qatar 
Companies Laws provide for the rights of shareholders in M&As. This includes the right 
for shareholders in the transferor company to obtain new shares in the transferee 
company instead of their shares that expired as a result of the merger, the right to approve 
M&A decisions, the right to attend meetings of the General Assemblies and vote on 
resolutions, and rights regarding the profits.
1074
 Despite these similarities between the 
texts of UK, UAE and Qatar Companies Laws, the texts of the laws differ in the way they 
deal with other topics relating to shareholder rights in M&As. This therefore requires 
intervention and the development of practical and legal solutions, as discussed in the 
following paragraphs. 
 
In order to achieve the approval of shareholders on M&A decisions, UAE and 
Qatar Companies Laws (much like the UK Companies Act and the UK Cross-Border 
Merger Acts) require approval by a majority in number, representing 75% of the 
shareholders. However, unlike section 907 of the UK Companies Act and section 13 of 
the UK Cross-Border Merger Act, article 140 of UAE Companies Law and article 140 of 
Qatar Companies Law require a double majority, representing a numerical majority of the 
shareholders attending the meeting and a majority in the value of the shares represented 
at the meeting. In addition, the texts of the laws of both countries still remain unclear 
concerning the majority required for the issuance of decisions by the Extraordinary 
General Assembly of the company in second meetings in the case of the absence of a 
quorum at the first meeting. They also do not empower the court with the right to monitor 
and assess cases that do not require the presence of shareholders or their representatives 
to approve the merger or acquisition, which leads to difficulties because decisions 
regarding M&As are given to the control of the owners of the large shares. This therefore 
leads to the failure of the merger operation in cases of non-adherence to the minimum 
level required by the texts.
1075
 
                                                 
1074
 For more information, see article 169 of UAE Companies Law. 
1075
 For more detail and example see paragraphs 5.4.1 and 5.6 of the Chapter Five of this thesis. 
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With the aforementioned taken into account, it would be preferable for Qatari and 
Emirati legislators to be more discerning with respect to the majority required to approve 
the draft terms of M&As and focus on a majority in number, representing 75% in value, 
present and voting either in person or by proxy at a meeting. They should give the 
competent court the right to observe the voting process and to estimate cases that do not 
require the presence of shareholders or their proxy at a meeting. This can be achieved by 
taking advantage of and providing similar texts to section 907 of the UK Companies Act 
and regulation 13 of the UK Cross-Border Merger Act. These texts provide a solution to 
the problem that arises due to the control of the owners of the large shares over the 
decision-making process for approving the draft merger or acquisition terms at the first 
meeting. They also solve the problem of the lack of the quorum of required shareholders 
to approve the merger decision in the second and third meetings as required by the 
provisions of UAE and Qatar Companies Laws; thus improving the chance of the success 
of the merger or acquisition process. 
 
Unlike sections 902 and 905 of the UK Companies Act and paragraphs 2 and 17 
of the UK Cross-Border Merger Act, UAE and Qatar Companies Laws do not give the 
transferee company the right to payment in cash in return for some shares in the 
transferor company. The laws also do not recognise the rights of shareholders opposed to 
the idea of the merger to exit from the company
1076
 and recover the value of their shares. 
Accordingly, when two companies agree on a merger and this agreement is adopted by 
the competent authority specified by law, the merger decision is applied without the need 
to achieve the approval of shareholders who may oppose the merger project, which is 
inconsistent with the right of shareholders to exercise their rights and authorities 
guaranteed by law.  
 
To solve such matters, as long as there is no provision in law or in the statutes of 
the companies restricting the trading of such stocks, shareholders who do not agree with 
                                                 
1076
 This is dissimilar to section 994 of the UK Companies Act 2006, which gives a minority shareholder 
the right to petition the court for an order to stop any act by the majority in a manner unfairly prejudicial to 
the interests of the members generally, or to some part of its members. This could include a breach of a 
legal bargain between the shareholders (e.g. a Shareholders Agreement or Articles of Association) or a 
breach of quasi-partnership principles. 
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the merger decision or who do not wish to remain in the transferee company should be 
able to withdraw from the company by selling their shares on the stock exchange. This 
accordingly ensures the principle of equity trading for shareholders who do not wish to 
achieve a merger and wish to exit from the company at a time that suits them, which 
simultaneously leads to the entry of new shareholders without prejudice concerning the 
capital of the company. Qatari and Emirati legislators should also add to the provisions of 
the laws relating to mergers to allow shareholders who object to the merger or acquisition 
decision in the General Assembly or who did not attend the meeting by an acceptable 
excuse can request exit from the company and recover the value of their shares, in a 
written request to the company within a certain period from the date of the publicity or 
publication of the merger or acquisition decision, and the value of their shares will be 
estimated by agreement or the Judiciary, taking into account the current value of all 
assets of the company. 
 
The UK Companies Act allows companies to issue different types of shares.
1077
 
Furthermore, according to sections 902 and 905 of the Companies Act and paragraphs 2 
and 7 of the Cross-Border Merger Act, the transferee company can pay cash to the 
transferor company’s shareholders in return for their shares that transferred to the 
transferee or new company.
1078
 It must therefore be recognised that, in the UK, it is not 
likely that practical problems will arise with regard to the issuance of replacement shares 
for the shareholders of the transferor and transferee companies because each shareholder 
of the transferor company will get shares in the transferee company, each in proportion to 
the type that the shareholder owned in the transferor company, or an amount of money. 
 
Unlike the UK Companies Act, UAE and Qatar Companies Laws do not give the 
transferee company the right to pay in cash instead of the transferor company shares. 
Notably, this leads to issues when a transferee company divides its shares in regard to the 
shareholders of the transferor company. This matter appears clearly in cases where the 
shares of the transferor company include decimal fractions while the transferee 
                                                 
1077
 For more information, see sections 556, 560, 617, 586 and 580 of the UK Companies Act 2006. 
1078
 For more information, see Chapter 9: Class of Shares in the Companies Act 2006. 
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company’s shares do not. This matter can be overcome through selecting the most 
appropriate number from the shares of the transferee company, which should be 
equivalent in terms of the true value number (i.e. a number without a decimal fraction) to 
the shares of the transferor company. Otherwise, the most appropriate number should be 
selected from the shares of the transferor company, which can be rounded to an integer 
(provided that the rate of the fractional shares is rounded in the smallest way possible), 
with compensation for shareholders who have been affected by the rounding of fractional 
shares. They should be paid a sum of money corresponding to the value of the fractional 
shares that has been waived or could not be approximated. In addition, the legislators of 
the UAE and Qatar should add text to the Companies Laws of the two countries to allow 
for the transferee company to determine an amount of money to be paid to the 
shareholders of the transferor company in replacement of their shares that cannot be 
rounded to an integer, taking advantage of sections 902 and 905 of the UK Companies 
Act and paragraphs 2 and 17 of the UK Cross-Border Merger Act and provide similar 
texts. 
 
According to sections 586 and 593 of the UK Companies Act, articles 161 and 
153 of UAE Companies Law and articles 155 and 158 of Qatar Companies Law, 
company shares are divided in terms of the type of quota offered to the shareholders into 
shares in cash, whose shareholders only have to fulfil one-quarter of the nominal value of 
the shares (i.e. 25% of these shares) in the first year of the founding of the company, and 
shares in kind, whose value must be fulfilled in full. The matter arising here is how the 
transferee company can distribute its shares to the shareholders of the transferor company 
if the shares of the transferor company consist of fully and not fully paid-up shares, while 
the transferee company’s shares consist only of fully paid shares. 
 
Qatar and UAE laws do not govern this case; therefore, in order to solve these 
matters, the researcher believes that the transferor company must request that 
shareholders whose shares are not fully paid their nominal value should accordingly pay 
the remainder before the merger. In the case that the shareholders delay or reject 
payment, the company may warn them to offer these shares for sale at auction or on the 
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stock market if the shares are restricted in the market. Thus, all shares fulfil their nominal 
values, paid in full, which facilitates the distribution of the transferee company’s shares 
to its shareholders and the transferor company shareholders in line with the shares they 
had prior to the merger.
1079
 
 
Unlike sections 556 and 560 of the UK Companies Act, article 153 of UAE 
Companies Law and article 152 of Qatar Companies Law only allow a company to issue 
ordinary shares and do not allow the issuance of preference shares. The laws also do not 
put solutions in place for share trading between shareholders in the transferee and 
transferor companies if the shares of the transferor company are divided into ordinary 
shares and preference shares while the transferee company’s shares only consist of 
normal shares. Furthermore, UAE and Qatar laws do not pay attention to the problem of 
exchanging shares between companies involved in a merger when there are differences 
between the nominal values and the actual values of the companies’ shares. 
 
To solve such problems, the researcher believes that responsibility for the 
procedural treatment of this problem must be with, or in the hands of, the transferor 
company. In this regard, if the general rule requires that it is not permissible to force the 
shareholder to abandon or sell their shares in the company,
1080
 concessions to this rule 
may be allowed if the statute of the transferor company allows the company to recover 
preference shares.
1081
 If the company decides to use its right to recover the shares, this 
means it would give the owners of the recovered shares the market value of these shares 
in addition to the profits of shares; thus resulting in the exiting of the owners of the 
                                                 
1079
 Article 167 of UAE Companies Law and article 157 of Qatar Companies Law provide for the right of a 
company to sell the shares of shareholders who default to pay the value of their shares in cash, by saying: 
“If the shareholder delays in the payment of the share instalment on the due date, the Board of Directors 
may act on the share by notifying the shareholder for payment of the instalment due through registered 
mail. If he does not make settlement within thirty days, the company can sell the share in a public auction 
or securities market. The company shall settle its delayed instalments and expenses from the value derived 
from that sale and the remaining amount shall be returned to the shareholder. In spite of this, the delayed 
shareholder can, even on the day of sale, pay the value due on him plus the expenses of the company. If the 
outcome of the sale is not enough to settle these amounts, the company can collect them from his private 
assets. The company shall cancel the share on which such action was made and the buyer shall be given a 
new shareholding of the cancelled number. The sale activity must be indicated in the share register, 
mentioning the name of new owner”. 
1080
 Article 174 of UAE Companies Law and article 166 of Qatar Companies Law. 
1081
 For more information, see article 176 of UAE Companies Law. 
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recovered shares from the company.
1082
 Accordingly, if the transferor company uses its 
right to recover preference shares, the owners of the preference shares may use their right 
to convert their shares into ordinary shares and then all shareholders of the merged 
company become shareholders by ordinary shares. However, if the statute of the 
transferor firm does not allow the company to recover preference shares and does not 
allow for the owners of preference shares to convert their shares into ordinary shares, it is 
incumbent upon the transferor company to get approval from the owners of the 
preference shares to accept ordinary shares in the transferee company. Notably, whoever 
gives their consent must receive ordinary shares in the transferee company equivalent to 
the actual value of the preference shares. More importantly, this procedural solution must 
be accompanied by another legal solution and legal text should be added to the heart of 
the Companies Laws of the two countries to allow companies to issue preference shares 
alongside ordinary shares, like the UK Companies Act does. This would avoid the 
problems that arise due to differences in the actual values of shares in the case of 
exchanging shares between companies involved in mergers. 
 
The shares of some companies are divided into capital shares and enjoyment 
shares, whereby enjoyment shares are shares consuming their nominal values: the owner 
recovers this value during the life of the company. Accordingly, if the shares of the 
transferor company are divided into capital and enjoyment shares while the transferee 
company has only capital shares, the question raised is how the transferee company can 
divide its shares among the shareholders of the transferor company. 
 
To solve this matter, the researcher believes that as long as the owners of 
enjoyment shares have fewer rights than the owners of capital shares, logic requires that 
the value of enjoyment shares is less than the value of capital shares. Therefore, it is not 
fair or logical that there should be equality between the owners of enjoyment shares and 
the owners of capital shares, although each of them gets the same type of shares in the 
transferee company. For this reason, the transferee company’s shares are distributed to 
                                                 
1082
 For more information, see Ahmed Abdul Rahman Al-Melhem, Preference Shares in the Kuwait 
Companies Law and Comparative Law (First edition, Council of Scientific Publications 2000) 56. 
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the shareholders of the transferor company on the assumption that these shares represent 
funds from the liquidation of the company, and then every shareholder gets shares 
equivalent to their shares in the output of the liquidation of the company. The owners of 
enjoyment shares enjoy the same rights as the owners of capital shares; nevertheless, they 
cannot recover the nominal value of their shares when the company is liquidated. This 
means that, upon company liquidation, the owners of capital shares recover the nominal 
value of their shares; after that, the remaining shares of the company are divided among 
all shareholders who contributed by capital or enjoyment shares. The consequence of this 
is that the owners of capital shares must receive a number of shares in the transferee 
company equivalent to the nominal value of the shares that they owned in the transferor 
company. Accordingly, the owners of capital shares become in the same position as the 
owners of enjoyment shares, as each one of them recovers the nominal value that they 
contributed to the capital of the transferor company. After the positions of the owners of 
enjoyment and capital shares become equal, the shares of the transferee company are then 
distributed among all shareholders, i.e. the owners of enjoyment shares and the owners of 
capital stock, on the basis of the exchange of one rate without distinction between them. 
 
It must be noted that the issue of trading shares between transferee and transferor 
companies only arises in mergers without acquisition, as trading shares between 
acquiring and acquired companies in acquisition cases does not raise any legal problems 
for the acquired company’s shareholders. This is because the shareholders of the acquired 
company get cash instead of their shares that expired as a result of the acquisition, which 
means the ownership of shares in the acquired company is transferred to the ownership of 
the acquiring company’s shareholders; thus breaking the legal relationship between the 
acquired company and its shareholders. Accordingly, the acquired company’s 
shareholders do not receive any shares entitling them to any rights in the acquiring 
company after giving up their rights for the benefit of cash. Therefore, this does not raise 
any problems relating to exchanging shares between the acquiring company and the 
shareholders of the acquired company. 
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Finally, we can conclude that, whatever the outcome of a merger or acquisition or 
its effects on employees, directors and shareholders, M&As remain two of the most 
important processes that keep economic entities from bankruptcy, increase products, 
maximise profits, exchange experiences and skills, and open new markets for the 
companies involved. Accordingly, the economies of the UAE and Qatar could potentially 
exploit and take benefit from an upsurge in M&As through encouraging such operations 
between national companies with one other and between national and foreign companies. 
 
Despite some legislative reforms that have taken place in the UAE and Qatar, the 
protection of employees and directors and also the problem of exchanging shares between 
transferee and transferor companies in the context of M&As and corporate restructuring 
has largely been regulated by a patchwork of legal texts that have substantial gaps. 
Accordingly, the Emirati and Qatari legal systems do not yet fully reflect the progressive 
position on the issue as seen in the UK CA 2006, the Cross-Border Merger Act 2007 and 
the TUPE Act 2006, in terms of prior employee consultation, automaticity of the transfer 
of employment, not putting an upper limit on the number of members of the Board of 
Directors of public shareholding companies, and the right for companies to issue different 
classes of shares with share exchanges between the transferee and transferor companies 
by shares or by cash. Therefore, it is hoped that the UAE and Qatar legislators will effect 
these changes regarding the provisions of laws relating to M&As so that any tension that 
exists between the protection of workers’ rights and corporate interests in M&As will be 
resolved. 
 
6.2 Study Contributions 
The main limitation of this research is that it represents a cross-sectional look at the 
effects of M&As on employees, directors and shareholders and looks at the legal basis for 
the transition of their rights and obligations. The study is the first legal comparative study 
that deals with the legal rights and obligations of employees, directors and shareholders 
in M&As, and tries to contribute and provide a range of legal and procedural solutions to 
the effects of M&As on the contracts and other rights of employees, directors and 
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shareholders according to the UK Companies, Cross-Border Merger and TUPE Acts and 
UAE and Qatar Companies and Labour Laws. The most important contributions provided 
by the thesis are: 
 
The thesis tries to remedy the legislative shortcomings and mistakes and fill the 
legal gap in the texts of UAE and Qatar legislation relating to M&As by taking advantage 
of UK legislation. The study tries also to provide a clear picture of the legal concept of 
M&As and the differences between them, from both a legal and a practical perspective, in 
order to open the door for researchers and commentators of laws to contemplate and 
devise the nature of mergers and acquisitions. They can then identify their effects on the 
legal personalities and stakeholders of the companies involved. 
 
Importantly, the thesis provides the legal basis for transferring the rights and 
obligations of employees, directors and shareholders between companies involved in 
M&As. Studying such theory helps in establishing the rules applicable to M&A 
operations and also helps to determine the legal implications of them, particularly 
concerning the effects on the moral personalities of the transferor and transferee 
companies and their financial assets. It also helps in understanding a company’s 
relationship with its employees before or after a merger, as well as providing knowledge 
of the proper interpretation of the legal texts regarding M&As. 
 
The thesis provides solutions to the legal and procedural problems that appear 
during the distribution of the transferee company’s shares to the shareholders of the 
transferor company in return for their shares that expired due to the merger, due to 
differences in the types of shares or the nominal and actual values of the shares of the 
companies involved in the merger. 
 
The study provides a solution to employees, directors and shareholders, 
enlightening them of their rights and obligations in M&As. This applies to the GCC in 
general and to the UAE and Qatar in particular, which are in dire need of such a study 
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due to the large number of M&As between local businesses and between local and 
foreign firms, with an absence of clear legislation governing such operations. 
 
According to the theory of the legal personality of a company, the thesis also 
provides a legal basis to continue the research into M&As and their effects from different 
aspects. It provides advice for the development of legislation and the judiciary in the 
region, which would lead to modern legislation consistent with the legislation of 
developed countries and would strengthen the role of the judiciary in resolving the 
disputes that can arise from M&As. This would in turn lead to investor confidence in the 
national legislation and the success of M&As. 
 
6.3 Future Research 
Despite the importance of the results and the practical and legal solutions provided by the 
thesis for the problems of exchanging shares between transferor and transferee companies 
and for the effects of M&As on the rights of employees and directors, with the legal basis 
for transferring rights and obligations between companies involved in M&As found by 
the study, due to the secrecy pursued by companies in their work, in addition to the 
secrecy judgements made by the courts in the GCC in general and in the UAE and Qatar 
in particular, the study does not cover the effects of M&As on firms in the UAE and 
Qatar from the practical side. Further research is needed to examine the effects of M&As 
on boards, employees and shareholders in companies in the UAE and Qatar region. For 
example: 
 
o The thesis does not address the effects of M&As on employees' contracts and all 
the rights consequent from these through a realistic assessment of the impact of 
such operations on national or foreign (expat) employees' contracts in the first 
year after a merger or acquisition and the years that follow. It also does not 
investigate the time required for the stability of the employees in their work in the 
merged companies or the scope of the impact of M&As on the level of workers' 
rights and responsibilities, or the level of their performance and skills in 
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companies operating in the UAE and Qatar. Further research is needed into 
employees' rights and obligations in M&As and the effects that such operations 
have on their rights from both practical and legal aspects. Practical, procedural 
and legal solutions can then be developed for such effects by taking advantage of 
UK legislation, taking into account the circumstances, nature of the work and the 
size of the companies in the UAE and Qatar region. 
 
o The thesis does not remedy the legal effects of M&As on the rights and 
obligations of managers at the top or lower levels in a firm or in one or more of its 
subsidiaries that function inside or outside of the UAE and Qatar from the 
practical side. Further research on the legal effects of M&As on directors could 
address the effects of domestic and cross-border M&As in reality through 
considering M&A cases in the region, then analysing and studying the cases and 
developing solutions in the light of the texts of the relevant laws. 
 
o The study of the effects of M&As on shareholders of the UAE and Qatar 
companies involved is still in its infancy; therefore, there is enormous potential to 
research this area using analytical frameworks, specifying particular processes to 
remedy the negative effects of M&As on shareholders and auditing the reasons 
for why the UAE and Qatar legislators do not allow companies to issue preference 
shares, as well as investigating the matters that result from this in cases of M&As 
and solving such matters, with work on the development of the texts of 
legislation, according to the accidents and cases that display. 
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